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lost after infancy, too

Sebastian Dürer / 2014

I never knew if it mattered what I did artistically. In any case I stopped producing works as objects – what were they anyway? – at some point and looked for alternative ways of artistic practice, focusing on a collaborative approach, because most of what I had done so far was to some extent done collectively. What was I to do? In order to not get lost I had to restrict myself first I thought; to start by looking at what constituted my direct surroundings and continually broaden the perspective from there.
It became apparent pretty quickly, that the internet as universal tool played a big part in my daily life and still does. Sometimes it even feels like I live online, when I barely leave the house. And when I do, I still have my phone in my pocket, right? But why has it become such a big part of me? How come I love records, but listen to a lot of music online? Maybe because I can also read the news, go shopping and chat with friends all at the same time there. For all those activities I use dedicated services. I have a main twitter-, facebook-, soundcloud-, skype-, youtube-, tumblr- and a mail-account, as well as several secondary/spam/fake monikers for similar sites, a handful of different bulletin boards and instant messaging log-ins, shopping sites, news-portals, I regularly visit – the list goes on and on, and yet I feel far away from being up to date in that respect.
Now all before-mentioned services ask for a username to login with and most of them make you choose a profile picture, too. Up until the rise of the web 2.0, and later specially Facebook and Twitter, usernames were usually nicknames, sometimes funny, often randomly chosen, mostly inside jokes or boring combinations of ASCII characters in the form of “m4giC41337666” and profile pictures, if used at all, showed avatar-like fantasy images, a pre-defined generic image, obscenities or your favorite pet. Anonymity was the key ingredient for creating accounts to a utopian playground for phreeks, geeks, hackers and those who wanted to become one of them. By contrast, the introduction of social networks went hand in hand with a decisive shift: The accepted and expected usage of real names and real pictures, calling for one visibly unified identity. In return it’s become relatively easy to compare profile pictures of any given person on different platforms today. Those images – even though they do at best depict the same human being, rather try to emphasize the qualities of their respective role in that social network, the brand we try to market and our obligation to self-design. Petra Löffler finds the longing for maximum visibility of all involved sounds suspiciously like the fulfillment of Baudrillard’s theory of connectivity; the alliance between everyone’s permanent desire for seeing and being seen “establishes a new order of seeing. […] Today, it is no more that the few see the many ([Foucault’s] panopticon), or the many see the few (popular stars) – today, because of the multiplication and connectivity of screens in public and private spaces, the many see the many.”1 For a graphic example just image search user profiles of (geo)social networking services and compare the results to those of job related communities: Where the focus lies on physicality, fitness and appeal in the dating sphere, business oriented profiles tend to represent seriousness, reliability and professionalism, against suggestions to keep the same picture throughout all platforms for the sake of recognition and respectability.
In the end all profiles might share traces of the same source but what they mirror are whitewashed versions and in extreme cases altogether different personalities. Roy Ascott farsightedly declares in 1994 that in our hyper-connected times we’ll be “only interested in what can be made of ourselves, not what made us. As for the sanctity of the individual, well, we are now each of us made up of many individuals, a set of selves.”2 It is very important to understand, that this divisibility of the self, is in turn as much symptomatic as it is a fundamental trait indispensable for partaking in our networked world today. As a consequence, when the dichotomy between one and many, original/fake, real/virtual or private/public dissolve into fluid planes of meaning, the border between the two will be displaced and eventually put into question. Simultaneously we become not only hybrids of a set of selves, but also, knowingly and deliberately or not “chimeras, theorized and fabricated -hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs.”3 Hence the distinction between man and machine or more generally put between human and non-human cannot be sustained anymore, which also means problems (and the solutions they call for) cannot be only social, excluding technological, linguistic, media or any other aspects, or vice versa – they, too become hybrids.
Interestingly enough, one of the keynotes during this year’s transmediale titled “Art as Evidence”, delivered by Trevor Paglen, Laura Poitras and Jacob Applebaum, revolved around the same term – visibility – and posited the question: What if art today is about exactly that: visibility? Can the same ambiguous visibility be implied? Being visible, which requires standing out, making something visible for as many as possible, to be visible at all, and also being able to see? As set out above this is a social problem, as it is also a question of media, technology, philosophy, biology, and so forth but to begin with it’s the former that I want to pursue by asking: How can artists play that role in society? Is there not already a movement that is using exactly the tactics of visibility to introduce social change: activism? Can art do this better, differently, worse, not at all? To be able to discuss this, I want to have a quick look at where the areas of art/artist and activism/activist overlap today, what capacity utopian politics take up within this intersection and if visibility really is a valid approach how it can be ensured that not only a lot of people are reached in the end, but also how visually difficult, yet important content can be equally represented in the system without running into the risk of becoming mere spectacle. “Only rarely do we think about our dreams as possibilities necessary to our present.”4 It seems to be out of question, that art and activism share some common ground today. So trying to tell both apart proves difficult. Asking those who lay claim to having sufficient cultural importance produces a wide spectrum of possible answers and scenarios, that would not only be boring to elaborate, but also go well beyond the scope of my intent. McLuhan will have to serve as one example of many. When “art is what you can get away with”, reversely, could activism be defined as “what you can be thrown in jail for”? But seriously how can we agree upon definitions, when the mere proclamation of affiliation – the more often and the louder the better – to one or the other seems to suffice itself? Does it make sense to subsume art under aesthetics and activism under politics? Are those fields mutually exclusive? Do we have to make a distinction at all? The answer, to amplify with Rancière, what has already been said about the binary notion of dichotomies before, can only be no. Such allegories of inequality have to be dismissed as superimposed oppositions and the question should rather be reformulated: Can there be non-political aesthetics today, art without activism? “[For] aesthetics and politics […] overlap in their concern for the distribution and sharing out of ideas, abilities and experiences to certain subjects – what Rancière calls ‘le partage du sensible’. In this framework, it is not possible to conceive of an aesthetic judgement that is not at the same time a political judgement”5. While this argument could also be used to validate l’art pour l’art, or argue aestheticism’s -social functionlessness away, it can be seen equally as a reminder of the political obligation of aesthetic/artistic practice and a farewell to the imperative of a distinction. With this in mind Rancière describes possible modes of such an artistic production: the inventory, where the artist is “… at once an archivist of collective life and the collector”6; the invitation, creating unexpected situations that lead to relational encounters, the mystery, juxtaposing the incompatible, suggesting “-co-presence” and being with otherness and the game, humor as move from critical to ludic, to suspend, in a society working towards the accelerated consumption of signs, the meaning of the protocols of reading those signs; turn the protocols on their head. All involve to some degree a utopian impulse: “The general idea that art could actively participate in the process of building a just society.”7
But can an artistic self-conception after the politics of aesthetics still utilize the aforementioned formulas even though art today no longer needs to respond solely to -itself or the excess of commodities and signs (as showcased for instance by 1960’s conceptual art and its successors), nor only to the lack of connections (the 90’s, -relational aesthetics), but to an abundance of hyperconnected excess? Boris Groys has suggested that this new era leads to a spectacle without spectators because the immeasurable quantity of artistic production could not be grasped by a spectator anymore resulting – who would have thought – in a struggle for visibility, in relation to the common experience of a permanent shortage of time, because art still needs an understanding spectator (or participator, collaborator), who verifies art as art. So when everything is information, everything becomes material and “everything is up for grabs”8 does it not seem more appropriate to “hit hard, then hope for the best. Repeat”9 to arrest the spectator’s attention? Does the artist accordingly not play along similar rules as everyone else – distinction and conformity? Hal Foster criticizes a general tendency of those formulas to rather hit hard and focus on “happy interactivity”, which may be driving art towards a “post-critical” self conception, art that ultimately works to “aestheticize the nicer procedures of our service economy” by positing dialogue, -sociability, and collaboration as good for their own sake all while leaving “contradiction out of the dialogue, and conflict out of democracy.” On the other hand, -Metahaven reappropriate the famous slogan of 60’s -movements and transform it into “the personal is geo-political”10 to show that conflict and contradiction are far from disregard or exclusion. Unfortunately, the exchange of information today is not as straightforward as it appears to be at first glance. Most of the traffic on the internet today is created not by humans, but by bots.
According to a study conducted by Pew Internet back in 2011, Americans between 18 and 29 already sent and received an average of nearly 88 text messages per day, compared to 17 phone calls. Hence texting, or more generally written communication as a medium, has left the traditional call or talk in the dust to become the most common form of communication in a hyper-networked western world today. Against the backdrop of the developments after the Summer of Snowden it’s almost unbearably ironic that the written word once started out as one of the earliest forms of cryptography in times where literacy was reserved to an elite few.  I’ll come back to that later, first let’s not forget about the rest of the world: One could argue that, with about 897 million illiterate people in the world allocated mostly in the global south, literacy still acts as a great barrier to proper education and self-determination. Universal -access to the internet, which is now a fundamental human right, follows closely: more than 60% of the world’s population and 85% of Africans lack information and communications technology as of 2013. Along those lines the global digital divide is, though in steady decline, reinforcing the already disastrous economic circumstances, not least because of the apparent interdependencies of both fields. Nonetheless that is just the first rung on a figurative ladder, with each succeeding step being by definition more complex for the individual, harder to comprehend and therefore seemingly -further and further apart the higher you climb and eventually remaining beyond the majority’s reach very quickly.
At the same time “the value of knowledge […] is degrading constantly and expanding the experience of not-knowing correspondingly. The more the world is -becoming interconnected, the more we realize how important interconnections are, the more we realise we actually know less than we thought we knew.”11
So the question is clearly not about the existence of a lack of balance anymore but: has this ever been as obvious as it is today? And far more pressing: How can we change that and find useful workarounds? The solution seems equally at hand: Every one of us. Everywhere. Connected.
As a start the generous decision to reach back down, to help others on their ascent might prove useful. Use the power and intelligence of the collective: Get creative together, communicate and give each other a leg-up, like we used to as kids playing in the back-yards, trying to climb walls together, that were just too high for us alone.
The more complex a task, the farther away from your individual knowledge, the more you have to rely on the network’s collective intelligence and collaborate.
Thus access to the network equals access to information/intelligence equals self-determination equals ultimate solution. So far, so good. Would this utopian tale of solidarity still not leave too many important variables out of the equation, we’d be happily living the dream of hyper-connectivity. But we already know better. At least we should be aware after various revelations that, as Ned Rossiter condensed, “acts of communication are now, by definition, acts of surveillance meshed within an economy that aggregates even the affective, non-representational dynamics of relation”12; all of a sudden being connected has gained quite a negative connotation, the telematic dream of cyberception seems to have shattered, or turned against itself: “all the data flowing through any access node of a network are equally and at the same time held in the memory of that network: they can be accessed at any other interface through cable or satellite links, from any part of the planet, at any time of day or night.”13 Now by our very living “under the cloud”, we constantly generate data beyond our control, even if we are not online: Smart Cities relentlessly monitor their inhabitants, who themselves incessantly fidget with their smartphones along the way, checking in at their favorite bar, uploading the latest geo-tagged selfie, tracking their jogging trail, calorie input/output/consumption and their brainwaves while meditating, or they might just be plain texting, talking or googling;
“I was here” is not reserved to an act of vandalism or graffiti writing, a tag on sights, walls, trains or public restrooms anymore, if anything it’s the monotonous message we are invariably feeding into the cloud – if you will the bread crumbs in our private Hansel and Gretel fairy-tale, except we ignorantly scatter them most of the time. All those bits and pieces of information amount to an almost incomprehensible volume of big data attached to each and everyone of us, our personal profile. The less you are able to control your data, the more others know about you by your data.
More and more people start to realize how severe the entanglement has already become, how far they are immersed in their filter bubble, to what degree they are what they search to algorithms and thus can only find what they are. That produces a fear of heteronomy, because of a failure to comprehend and adapt to a new reality, or rather the realization thereof. The notion of individual privacy as public invisibility we had in the 2000’s is passé and concurrently no sufficient frame of reference anymore. Actually privacy has been long gone even before the revelations of Snowden and other whistleblowers insofar as ”in the networked context, [it] entails less the possibility of retreating to the core of one’s personality, to the true self, and more the danger of disconnection from a world in which sociability is tenuous and needs to be actively maintained all of the time because it is based on explicit acts of communication. Otherwise, the network simply reconfigures itself, depriving one of the ability to develop one’s individuality.”14 But what should be our starting point until then, if individual privacy is no more a safe basis from where we decide what is to become visible? Can we still uphold the paradigm of visibility under these circumstances? We have to find a different way to become invisible in order to stay in control over what is visible, as paradox as it may sound. “The desire for anonymity is not (only) a result of the simultaneous disappearance of privacy and the public. It is, above all, an indication of the growing interest in self-determined uses of social production and technologies of the common that may have been developed and distributed across commercial infrastructures, but whose modes of relation already outgrow the imaginative scope of economies of scarcity and rival goods.”15 And I assume this is Theaster Gates’ concern about art, when he says: “It is a moment when things don’t stay secret long enough, are not allowed to grow quietly. One can’t do anything without people saying, ‘Look at that person.’”16
Anonymity is not to be confused with confidentiality or irresponsibility, but the ability to communicate ad libitum without leaving clues to one’s identity or being spied upon, which in a nutshell enables a new kind of agency. But what does that mean? Wikipedia says: “The capacity of an agent (a person, collective, any living being in general) to act in a world.”17 This capacity, as we have seen, requires visibility (availability) of information, so it can integrate moral judgments and ethical considerations; a good example why we probably have to let go of the copyright as an obsolete relic from times where genius and god were still alive because it often hinders said availability. So are we stuck in a constant feedback loop? How can artists cope with anonymity, when names, titles and authorship still seem so important? Where does it leave us in relation to the initial reflection that art is supposed to make things visible, which as we already found is not supposed to be itself, but at the same time needs to be identifiable as such by a spectator?
It’s fundamentally paradox. As Graham Harman explains we have to go back a bit to untangle this paradox enmeshment of what’s visible on the surface, what’s visible at all and what can be made visible: With Heidegger’s tool-analysis, this visibility cannot be about a complete representation of things – to bring to mind by description as in making things visible – because no one, neither in theory nor praxis, because both operate on the surface, exhausts the objects he/she encounters, and can therefore never describe them sufficiently. Marshall McLuhan likewise famously propagates “the medium is the message,” which denies the foreground any meaningful content.18 But the foreground is exactly where the action takes place, where the change for the structures that dwell in the depths happens and is made possible, because a medium itself cannot change, just as for Heidegger Being is incapacitated without our Dasein on the face of the earth. In Harman’s view, this is the first revenge of the surface that helps us untie this knot a bit. The second is showing, that the background must not be mistaken for a unity, instead it is as hybrid, as manifold as the surface is also allowed to have depth. As a consequence the invisible underlying structures are not only the message, as the surface content gets back some of its lost capacity. Thus it’s a work on the surface to permeate and transform the structures beneath. Accordingly the task of artists should be described as a matter of allowing for agency by means of visibility: “Those who cannot perceive the network cannot act effectively within it, and are powerless. The job, then, is to make such things visible.”19 To eliminate potential elites, that demand complex skill-sets from their few members, by openly providing those skill-sets to the public. Open new paths. Establish alternative networks. Empower people. Enable DIY culture. But how can this be achieved without coming across didactic, without consolidating unequal conditions without the implicit presupposition of a good knowledge that is to be transferred onto ignorants? First of all by insisting on what we already found: The insufficiency of dichotomous thinking.
We have to remember our hybridity, the absence of a subject/object relationship and an absoluteness, that has been undone and then turn to Rancière once again, who claims everyone could learn continually and mutually from one another by collective emancipation from the principle of inequality. For him the classic teacher/student relationship not only represents this unequal distribution of intelligence by teaching the student what he does not know, but also that he is unable to understand it by himself, reaffirming this very principle endlessly – Jacotot’s process of stultification. Emancipation however is “the process of verification of the equality of intelligence”20 and therefore begins with rejecting dichotomies, not reversing them. “We have not to turn the ignorant into learned persons, or, according to a mere scheme of overturn, make the student or the ignorant the master of his masters.”21 Because that still implies not only that there is something to be identically transferred from A to B, but also that this transmission is possible without losing something along the way; in the distance between A and B.
Instead the paradox of the ignorant master shows how the student can learn what his master does not know by separating cause (teaching) and effect (learning) through emancipation into a process of bilateral translation. After all, Rancière posits, we should appreciate what gets lost in translation, and implement that in our practice by refusing the borders between disciplines and translating between them – unfolding the invisible mechanisms and methodologies on the way. This actually requires spectacle as the site of verification and mediation of said translation, analogical to Harman we could speak of a revenge of the spectacle: “In the logic of emancipation, between the ignorant schoolmaster and the emancipated novice there is always a third thing – a book or some other piece of writing – alien to both and to which they can refer to verify in common what the pupil has seen, what she says about it and what she thinks of it.”22 As a result, or more readily as a foundation, we have to reconsider the way we talk and think about society and art as well as the ways of producing and making a living: A new sensibility of openness has to be fostered, that provides the tools for making reasonable choices all while embracing our hybrid identity and declaring not a fear-fueled war against them but solidarity with all its components – the machine and the rest – on the one hand and everything else, both human and non-human objects in society on the other. An attempt to bridge the gap between skepticism towards and receptiveness to exchange and innovation requires a leap of faith, that admittedly is often more difficult put into practice as on paper, but we cannot shy away from this challenge.
K-hole even claim it’s a new freedom. And this freedom expresses itself exactly through this new sensibility, whether meant as a tongue in cheek comment on coolness and fashion or not, being normcore means letting go of the omnipresent (and worn-out) desire of our times for differentiation, for being something special. More-over the resulting acts of solidarity that a new sensibility could bring about, require new organizational scaffolds. Felix Stalder draws up four combinable forms of infrastructures of agency, that are still “very much in their infancy”23   yet seem applicable and have already proven so: Commons, organised, long term processes by which a group of people manages a physical or informational resource for joint use – most famously Wikipedia, Wiki-Leaks or The Pirate Bay; Assemblies, “non-hierarchical, usually physical gatherings focused on consensus-based decision making; Swarms, ad hoc, self-steering collective actors; and Weak Networks, groups constituted by extensive, yet casual and limited social interaction.”24 Grassroots directly democratic decision-making has its limits, and even in smaller groups it can be quite a hassle. Partly delegating your vote because of inexperience in certain fields or just because you can’t be everywhere at the same time, while concentrating on personal strengths and keeping the whole processes transparent, is of course not a brand-new concept – Lewis Carroll already described the idea of Delegated Voting back in 1884. The open-source project “Liquid Feedback” however incorporated these ideas and offers a free tool to easily establish such structures at whatever scale in the field. Ilja Braun recently proposed we have to bear the consequences of creativity’s democratization by letting all those, who contribute to a networked commons, participate in the profit of those, who economize those contributions. The question remains how? Jaron Lanier however envisions a different approach in his book “Who Owns the World” that utterly abandons open-access and notions of free sharing, because in practise “it only makes matters worse”25. All the users, who individually produce readily accessible content – raw sources – for free, play right into the hands of the few who have the biggest computers and or control over the data; happy EULA accident they are the only ones to make profit. Instead he proposes an inter-user based micro-payment system, that roughly speaking makes sure everyone gets paid for their content by those who access it. He argues this would guarantee for the survival of a solvent middle class that in return is crucial for a functioning capitalist system as we know it.
I have come from me, to you to everyone we know, to everyone, which is the public at large, that has changed, because its participants are multiplicities, everythings; why communication needs to change, to change society and how art can be part of this process, through – invisibly or not – making things visible to enable agency. We in turn have to emancipate ourselves to allow us to see things differently. Give a little, take a little, lose a little, gain a little – translate; embed ourselves in a new openness to the benefit of a society that takes manifold objects seriously. Our identity obligates us to social com-mitment; after all we cannot bite the hand that feeds us. But is this really the case?
Federico Campagna conceives an approach that sheds a totally different light on social obligations and the public as such: When he refers to the public or society as spooks, he invokes Max Stirner’s definition in “The Ego and Its Own” to describe the immanent risks of collective acts of emancipation in support of a greater good, e. g. humanity, country, ethnicity, revolution or class – here: society, claiming that such abstractions will only exploit their supporters to further solidify its domineering existence. Anyone’s choice to not identify with society of any kind whatsoever (think also convenient decisions like shopping non-organic) would amount to an act of treason, which would be “met not only with the reprobation of those who believe in the abstraction, but with […] active persecution.”26 He further compares the Public with the crowd, insofar as both know no boundaries, aim at continuous expansion and once expansion ends, begin disintegrating – either annihilating or winning over anyone who stands in the way. After showing how the economic system, namely capitalism fails to focus on the individual, despite its claims of doing so, Campagna concludes: “Certainly, no individual is ever in the position to tell another what is to be done. Thus, it is to myself that I address this question: what am I to do, in the face of the Public? If the Public is a measureless, insatiable mouth, eternally hunting through the deserts and cities of the world for ever more prey, I should tell myself to ‘live in hiding’ – laze biosas, as Epicurus succinctly put it. To hide oneself from the mouth of Public means, first of all, to shield one’s eyes from the eyes of the Public, not to return the gaze that the Public casts on one. Like Medusa, the Public’s stare is powerful and terrible enough to transform any individual into yet another lifeless rock, in the stone garden of Society.”27
Therefore hiding implies to swear off the religion of sacrifice which sees representation as the only way to existence: “either the physical representation of certain types of politics, or the semiotics of a life lived in the name of something ‘bigger than oneself’.”28 It does however not connote living in isolation, dodging conflicts with others or with society, there can even be collectives of people in hiding, but those defy any societal or public manifestation; if anything they are temporary, opportunistic alliances with only one intention: achieving the aims of their members, that have realized their mortality and do not pussyfoot around: “Whenever they speak, they describe a plan. Whenever they stop talking, they put it into practice. And whenever they act, they do not expect to be thanked: indeed, ‘the pleasure is all theirs’. They do not indulge in any form of altruism, not of hatred for others, but out of love for themselves. They are all they can ever have, and so they be-lieve it to be true for others. This is the true meaning, and the true practice of emancipation.”29
Is that the radical solution? I don’t know.
But whatever the true nature of emancipation might be I quite agree with Campagna on the inescapability of choice; we all have to decide individually, whether to live in hiding – with all its consequences – or to try and transform something collectively that may never permit to be changed because the level of complexity has long outrun our ability of comprehension.
Luckily, we still have one decisive advantage in this game of transformation and understanding insofar that we are able to be nonsensical, as Chus Martínez describes the term: “Nonsense is far from meaningless, far from incapable of engaging with one’s historical time or one’s society. In this sense, ‘nonsensical’ means being capable of suspending our conventional notions of time (in particular, historical time), to blur the question of origin, to be unoriginal and therefore free to be attentive, to be able to perceive the equivocal as a manifestation of the possible as a way of bypassing essentialism. In short, to be able to be more than a reflection of the world.”30 Reverberating Rancière again in this manner we – and this we cannot be limited to artists – are permitted to disturb accepted forms of knowledge, by uncovering their inherent hierarchies and limits and help construct the “site of the production of a different knowledge (…) knowledge that is equally ambivalent, incommensurable, and singular.”31 If everything makes a difference, because difference is the conditio sine qua non for being at all, nonsense helps displace the ubiquitous questions of what and how much to the more important how? With this in mind, please excuse my nonsense.

Wiederabdruck
Der vorliegende Text ist die gekürzte Version des gleichnamigen Textes. Zuerst hier veröffentlicht: http://lost.jeffjaws.com.

1.) Petra Löffler interviewed by Geert Lovink at NECSUS, 2013 via www.necsus-ejms.org/the-aesthetics-of-dispersed-attention-an-interview-with-german-media-theorist-petra-loffler [12/27/2014]
2.) Roy Ascott, Telematic Embrace. Berkeley, 2003, p. 320.
3.) Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century”, in: Idem, Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, New York 1991, p. 150.
4.) Pliny the Elder as cited in: Hans Ulrich Obrist, “UNREALIZED ART PROJECTS. The Potential of the Incomplete Idea”, in: Christian Gether, Utopia & Contemporary Art, Ostfildern 2012, p. 80.
5.) Claire Bishop, Artificial Hells: participatory art and the politics of spectatorship. London 2012, p. 27.
6.) Jacques Rancière, “Problems and Transformations in Critical Art”, in: Idem, Malaise dans l’esthétique, ed. and trans. Claire Bishop, London/Cambridge, MA, 2006, p. 83ff.
7.) Rachel Weiss, The Body of the Collective, in: Gether 2012, op. cit., p. 139 ff.
8.) Theaster Gates in: Cathy Lebowitz, “Sensibility of our Times Revisited”, in: Art in America, 2012 www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-features/magazine/sensibility-of-the-times-revisited [10/3/2014]
9.) Ibid.
10.) Metahaven, Black Transparency, s. l. 2013, vimeo.com/80041817; script via http://pastebin.com/UMNv2EXf [10/3/2014]
11.) Felix Stalder, Digital Solidarity. London, 2013, p. 16.
12.) Ned Rossiter, Soehnke Zehle, Privacy is Theft. On Anonymus Experiences, Infrastructural Politics and Accidental Encounters, s. l. 2013, http://nedrossiter.org/?p=374 [10/3/2014]
13.) Roy Ascott, Telematic Embrace: Visionary Theories of Art, Technology, and Consciousness. Berkeley a. o. 2007, p. 333.
14.) Stalder 2013, p. 24ff.
15.) Rossiter/Zehle 2013.
16.) Theaster Gates in Lebowitz 2012.
17.) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agency_(philosophy)
18.) Graham Harman, “The revenge of the surface: Heidegger, McLuhan, Greenberg”, Paletten 291/292, 2013, pp. 66–73, https://dar.aucegypt.edu/handle/10526/3640 [10/3/2014]
19.) James Birdle, Under the Shadow of the Drone, s. l. 2012, http://booktwo.org/notebook/drone-shadows/ [10/3/2014]
20.) Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator. London 2009, p. 10ff.
21.) Ibid.
22.) Ibid.
23.) Stalder 2013, p. 57.
24.) Ibid., p. 31ff.
25.) Jaron Lanier in: Maximilian Probst, „Nutzer, profitiert vom Netz!“, Die Zeit, 8, 2014, www.zeit.de/2014/08/jaron-lanier [10/3/2014]
26.) Federico Campagna, Hiding From The Gods: on Emancipation and the Public, Dec 7, 2012, http://th-rough.eu/writers/campagna-eng/hiding-gods-emancipation-and-public [10/3/2014]
27.) Ibid.
28.) Ibid.
29.) Ibid.
30.) Chus Martnez, “Unexpress the Expressible”, in: Gether 2012, op. cit., p. 11.
31.) Kathrin Busch, “Artistic Research and the Poetics of Knowledge”, AS – Visual Culture Quarterly, 179, 2007.

[Dieser Text findet sich im Reader Nr. 2 auf S. 83.]

http://www.thing-hamburg.de/

Sebastian Dürer

(*1985), Studium der Bildenden Kunst an der Kunsthochschule Kassel mit den Schwerpunkten Video, Installation und Neue Medien bei Bjørn Melhus und Joel Baumann; Teil von TOKONOMA, einem Kollektiv zur Förderung von junger Kunst und Clubkultur in Kassel. http://www.supertokonoma.de

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Applebaum, Jacob  ·  Dürer, Sebastian  ·  Foucault, Michel  ·  Groys, Boris  ·  Heidegger, Martin  ·  K-hole  ·  McLuhan, Marshall  ·  Paglen, Trevor  ·  Plinius d. Ä.  ·  Poitras, Laura

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