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Luis Camnitzer
The door of the bus opens and a group of twenty children and their teacher get off. They cross the big courtyard and approach Ship 16, which is located in the back to the left. The teacher knocks on the door and a short and very blonde woman wearing a blue, almost black, coat invites them in. The children feel the urge to run because of the magnitude of the clear space, merely splashed by the residents’ work cubicles, and, when they reach the end, they sit down forming a circle around the woman in the blue coat, because they have already recognized her: Essi Kaussalainen, the Finnish artist who had come to the school a week before and had asked them to work with her on Interior Landscape.
On the second day, to go back to our story about Hall 16, after explaining the rules of the game (do not touch the work of other residents with whom we shared space and do not harm one another), Essi asked the children to sign their artists’ contracts. After this, she disappears for a moment and comes back with a large container filled with flowers that she hands out to each participant. They each choose the flowers they like the most and connect them with themselves, transforming hereby the use of the plants as well as of their bodies and extending the latter in a vegetal form. By using the flowers, they shape part of their new corporal landscape. After this community collective action, Essi asks the children to sit down in a circle and to reflect on what had happened and what knowledge the community had created. Here, every participant explains the -elements that conform their Interior Landscape. After the activity, the children start running again, go through the door, cross the big courtyard and get on the bus empowered as cultural producers and with many questions with no answers.
The sequence that I just described: is it art or education? Is it Art Education or is it precisely the direction we have to go, an experience full of knowledge, process and creativity, an amazing and empowering step, a pleasant experience that connects us to reality, gives us knowledge and helps us critically reflect on what is happening in the world from the visual arts perspective?
Spending the imaginary: from Art Education to -artEducation
I have a very clear opinion on what has to come next in art education, and that is exactly what I am going to write about in this text. But I want to work from a point of possibilities, from the fact that in this moment there are professionals working towards change. I do not want to work only on the NOs, on what Art Education is NOT2, I want to work on the YES and empower teachers of visual arts to carry out the paradigm shift that visual arts education needs.
Outside our field of work, the paradigm shift, the -educational revolution or how I call it, the #rEDUvolution, is already a common place. As of now, there are many voices, led by Ken Robinson, claiming for the change and it is absolutely evident that the change in methods in the world we live in is urgent and necessary.3 But, what happens in our field, in the didactics of visual arts? Art is a process inherent to the human being; therefore, this can be said about its teaching too. Throughout the history of mankind, new generations have been taught the forms and theories of artistic creation, mainly in oral form, and in each time and space adapted to their own contexts. In the present time, Art Education is anchored within a paradigm in which it does not belong. It is deeply rooted in school and dissociated from the world where contemporary art is created, and for various reasons it is bound to an obsolete model whose backbone is the production of so-called crafts. Today is the day when we have to reclaim the necessity of change in our field’s theories and practices and move from Art Education (I will use this term in this text in order to describe the most traditional practices that I consider need to be changed) to artEducation, a discipline founded on a series of main concepts.
The first key notion of this discipline is the idea of -removing the boundaries between Art and Education, bringing Bauman’s concept of liquidity into our field of work. In the perception of the most traditional Art Education, there is a tacit separation between that which is Art and what is Education, a notion which is definitely abandoned in artEducation. The second key idea is that Art Education does not mean KIDS painting. Our discipline is not intended to be exclusively for children; it is an area of knowledge whose practices are meant for individuals of any age and that, just as the rest of educational practices, has to be oriented towards intergenerationality.
The next main idea is to link two very concrete physical contexts: the school and the artist’s atelier. artEducation proposes that the learning related to arts and visual culture takes place anytime and anywhere, resulting in what we may call expanded artEducation, a concept that comes from the ideas of Dewey4 (Art as Experience) and Kaprow5 (The Education of the Un-Artist).
Besides, Art Education is not a discipline based on producing beautiful objects and pretty things. If we analyze the visual complexity in which societies will have to develop in the future, we are going to have to reclaim the work related to visual elements as one of the basic competences of every citizen.
Emancipatory knowledge
The previous ideas can be summarized in one statement: artEducation works on the basis of emancipatory knowledge, developed through a complex process and whose main way of working will be the creative remix. Let us analyze this statement in a more detailed way.
First of all, one of the main differences between Art Education and artEducation is that the latter accepts that any visual product surrounding us is an intellectual exercise whose true importance resides in the meanings that it generates; meanings that the spectators produce based on the body of knowledge they possess, their ability to associate and the context. The knowledge created from visual products is not trivial, it is knowledge that profoundly affects us; it is political and inclusive. ArtEducation not only addresses the color combination, but it addresses the question if a color combination is necessary. It asks who decides to carry out the color combination.6 It has to do with the reaction provoked by how my motivation for buying something unnecessary is influenced by the colors. In artEducation, manual and technical skills are part of the possibilities and very important competences, but they are not the axis of a world saturated by images.
In order to consider this intellectual implication of the visual worlds that surround us, artEducation works with macro-narratives as well as with micro-narratives on the same level. It incorporates the macro-narratives as basic knowledge in art class and emphasizes the importance of the analysis, and not only the construction of images. In both cases (analysis and production) we have to incorporate two essential elements: visual culture and contemporary art, both understood as visual macro- and micro-narratives. Visual language is the system mostly used in western societies today, because of its outstanding communication capabilities. ArtEducation promotes the incorporation of that group of images which are not considered artistic; contemporary visual culture understood as the channel that delivers the macro-narratives to us. This notion is part of the art curricula described in the 1996 book Postmodern Art Education: An Approach to Curriculum and is one of the strongest tendencies in our field of study, especially within the United States of America, where professionals like Kerry Freedman7 or Paul Duncum8 have developed a line of work called Art Education for Visual Culture.
But, let us not forget the micro-narratives. In spite of everything (and this is a reality that I face in every country I visit), when teachers dare to introduce art in the classroom, the artists and pieces selected very rarely would qualify as contemporary. Rubens or Picasso are probably the most commonly used artists, despite the fact that there are extraordinary visual representations made in our present time that we decide not to incor-porate into our practices. This leads to a complete ignorance on contemporary art within our societies, to its lack of appreciation and often to the most absolute disdain. In artEducation, just as we are using publicity in real time (the campaign that is being shown all around the city and during every commercial break), we have to incorporate contemporary artists, whose languages and techniques, even though we resist to accept it, perfectly fit with the aesthetics and the world envisioned by our students. Students who are educated through videos and who have no problems in understanding video art, students who instantly comprehend the message of Dignatario, Nadín Ospina’s pre-Colombian style sculpture made with terracotta that depicts Bart Simpson. Contemporary artists live immersed in social reality, so their work deals with current subjects: from pedophilia to maternity, from the destruction of nature to any sort of terrorism, from quantum physics to football. Contemporary art can therefore be linked to any topic and we can use it as an ideal way of beginning any content discussion in class. In short, contemporary art needs to be established as content in our daily work as educators, without eliminating the teaching of art from other periods.
It is easy to create hegemonic models of visual re-presentation. Because they are highly available, it is much easier to reproduce macro-narratives (images that were created by those in power, for example advertising, commercial cinema, many informative images and certain types of art) than to search for micro-narratives (images created by those not in power, for example counter-advertising and contemporary art, as well as craftwork or the visual products created by the students themselves, etc.). I still remember with astonishment a case repeated in several books dedicated to visual education: in these books, as an example to explain how a cross composition works, almost all authors chose a mythical piece, Rubens’s The Rape of the Sabine Women. In this painting, a group of terrified women, about to be raped, try to escape the torture and abuse, but, despite this incredible topic, teachers are still using it -(either on the book or by projecting it on the wall) to -explain how a specific form of composition works. By using it as didactic material, we are not only showing the students what a cross composition is, but we are teaching them to witness a future rape, we are telling them something like “this image is so perfect and its author is so important that its topic, sexual abuse on a group of women, is secondary”. This is what happens to images when we do not think of them in pedagogy, this is how they work when we are not able to reach the depths and only stay on the surface: we turn into transmitters of other’s ideas, which very often go against our own.
In order to make Art Education more contemporary, we have to start using symmetric images, that is to say we have to think about what we choose and project the same amount of macro-narratives as of micro-narratives. As professionals representing artEducation, we have to rethink the images that we work with and reorganize our selection based on the criterion of critical symmetry. The goal is to incorporate globalized as well as local images into our activities, created by men as well as by women, from the West and from other cultures, images that belong to high culture (museums, -scientific journals, renowned documentaries and official maps, etc.) and images from low culture (music videos, celebrity magazines, video games, etc.). We have to choose images from the past and the present, the ones that we like or we think are interesting, but also the ones that the students like and are interested in.
Finally, I would like to mention a process that we as 21st century art educators have to refuse to participate in, and that is to decorate the institution where we work when our superiors want to look good in front of (mainly) the parents (when you have to organize “something pretty” to put on the wall, etc.). In dramatic contrast to the figure of the traditional art teacher, we have to create the figure of the artEducator, an intellectual who works on the interesting crossroads of art and education, where both fields meet and their borders dissolve. This is an expert who promotes art as a pedago-gical process and pedagogy as an artistic process, a professional with a hybrid profile who tears down the bipolarity of professional stereotypes that place artists and educators in opposite spheres, a professional whose work is genuinely intellectual, political and transfor-mative, along the same line as the Critical Pedagogy theorists who write about “teachers as transformative intellectuals”9 The next step is to visualize the intellectual value of the artEducator’s work and incorporate knowledge as the backbone of our practices.
Complex Process
The second important issue regards time, because traditional methods in art class inevitably teach the idea that artistic products are produced as if by magic: it is neither necessary to think about it nor to plan it and there are no different production stages. Everything is done spontaneously, in the moment, and this is why many people who visit museums think “I can do this too”, because no one has shown them the amount of effort, planning, time and energy that hide behind an apparently simple piece of art.
For this reason, the second key notion that we need in art education is the value of the process; the idea that any product requires planning and a lot of time from the moment it is designed to its exhibition. We urgently need the people involved in visual art related projects to understand the importance of transmitting exactly that, that all cultural producers work on projects and that a project is a temporal construct divided into different phases. In artEducation, just as it happens in the liquid world we live in, the true objective is to experience an object; an experience which is based on an intention and whose purpose is related to a socially relevant topic, committed to reality, developed with long term planning and produced in different phases. A work that is to be undertaken with passion and discipline and is created in a community, in a collaborative manner, the way todays artists work, in connection with other agents and combining the community’s different sources of knowledge in a rhizomic way, without privileging one knowledge over the other. This work comes into contact with the real professional world and therefore with its mechanisms of legitimization, which in the present day translates into the work’s exhibition in prestigious cultural institutions.
The process not only involves the production phase, but also analysis. While in traditional art education the emphasis is absolutely put on production, on the necessity to build an object that we can take home in order to temporally decorate our refrigerator, in art-Education, the analysis process is equally important. We support the notion that to analyze is an act of -cultural production, just as Spanish artist Joan Font-cuberta -proposes: “The most genuine and coherent -creative act of our time does not consist in producing new images, but in assigning meaning to the existing ones.”10 In -artEducation, we have to design at least 50% of activities related to analysis, because the processes of analyzing, deconstructing and reflecting are absolutely on the same level as producing. Moreover, it has to become a habit, it should become the recount that my daughters do when they watch a movie and estimate how many girls are shown and if they play secondary or leading roles.
Creative Remix
Emancipatory knowledge and process cannot move forward without creativity, but the latter understood in a contemporary way, as a remix. When creativity is mentioned within the context of art education, it always -refers to the students’ creativity. In artEducation, creativity will also be the teacher’s basic competence, a teacher who sees her or his role as a cultural producer. Nonetheless, in a hyper technical world where the figure of an expert has been entirely modified, to be a cultural producer is something very different to the notion we had in the past and it may be similar to how Nicolas Bourriaud defines a visual artist: “[For present artists] It is no longer a matter of elaborating a form on the basis of a raw material but working with objects that are already in circulation on the cultural market […]. Notions of originality (being at the origin of) and even of creation (making something from nothing) are slowly blurred in this new cultural landscape marked by the twin figures of the DJ and the programmer, both of whom have the task of selecting cultural objects and inserting them into new contexts.”11
Bourriaud is one of the most interesting theorists reflecting on the roles of today’s artist. Investigative and critical, his two books Relational Aesthetics12 and Postproduction13 can be interpreted as essays on contemporary art or essays intimately related to pedagogy. According to Bourriaud, in the 21st century the term author (regardless if we are musicians, chefs or teachers) acquires a new meaning: we create on the foundations of other people’s ideas. The notion of producing knowledge in a rhizomatic way, laid out by French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari,14 proposes that to copy is to (re)generate, such that a DJ generates a personal discourse when arranging other’s music in a specific way. In Postproduction, Bourriaud defends the theory of the artist as a DJ, a creator who works with what has been created, because “[a]ll these artistic practices […] have in common the recourse to already produced forms. They testify to a willingness to inscribe the work of art within a network of signs and significations, instead of considering it an autonomous or original form”.15
Bourriaud’s conviction is clear: it is unthinkable for us to create something out of nothing, a notion that is directly linked to the rhizome concept. When creating, we always start from a previous input, in a way that we make (new) connections and the genuine and completely original creation loses its meaning. For present artists, to reprogram may be a new verb, but if we analyze it thoroughly, it is something that we teachers have always done, because the content that we work with has hardly ever been entirely ours. For this reason, educational work in the 21st century has to be founded on the notion of the teacher as a DJ, specifying our work as producers of remixes and validating the idea that a remix is a creation, not a copy.
In the beginning of this text, I sustained that a paradigm shift within educational practices in visual arts is a basic necessity. This challenge is to be addressed on the basis of artEducation, a model which produces emancipatory knowledge developed through a complex process and whose main working method is the creative remix. What is yet to come is to make these ideas our own and to transform them in order to make them tangible in classrooms, museums and hospitals, out on the streets and in our homes. If visual art education is not transformed in an area of contemporary knowledge, its own obsolescence will eliminate it. This is what is yet to come.
Translation: Dana Ersig / 2014.
1.) Luis Camnitzer, Introducción. Educación para el arte. Arte para la educación. Porto Alegre 2009. (www.yumpu.com/es/document/view/14213328/arte-e-educacao-fundacao-bienal-do-mercosul/287; also: http://mariaacaso.blogspot.de/2013/10/2013-el-museo-es-una-escuela-i-la-9.html)
2.) María Acaso, La educación artística no son manualidades. Nuevas prácticas en la enseñanza de las artes y la cultura visual. Madrid 2009.
3.) María Acaso, rEDUvolution. Hacer la revolución en la educación. Barcelona 2013.
4.) John Dewey, Experience and education. New York 1883.
5.) Allan Kaprow, “The Education of the Un-Artist”, in: Idem, Essays on the Blurring of Art and Life, Berkeley 2003.
6.) María Acaso, La educación artística no son manualidades. Nuevas prácticas en la enseñanza de las artes y la cultura visual. Madrid 2009.
7.) Kerry Freedman, Teaching Visual Culture: Curriculum, Aesthetics and the Social Life of Art. NY/Reston 2003.
8.) Paul Duncum, Visual culture in the art class: case studies. Reston 2006.
9.) Henry Giroux, Teachers as Intellectuals: Toward a Critical Pedagogy of Learning. Santa Barbara 1988.
10.) Original Spanish quote: “El acto de creación más genuino y coherente en nuestros días no consiste en producir nuevas imágenes, sino en asignar sentido a las existentes” (Joan Fontcuberta et al., Contranatura, Barcelona 2001.)
11.) Nicolas Bourriaud, Postproduction: Culture as Screenplay: How Art Reprograms the World. New York 2002, p. 6. (http://faculty.georgetown.edu/irvinem/theory/Bourriaud-Postproduction2.pdf)
12.) Nicolas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics. Dijon 2002.
13.) Nicolas Bourriaud, Postproduction, 2002.
14.) Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, L’Anti-Œdipe. Paris 1972.
15.) Nicolas Bourriaud, Postproduction, 2002.
Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien anlässlich der Publikation „Forget Fear“ der 7. Berlin Biennale für zeitgenössische Kunst (27. April – 1. Juli 2012), hrsg. von ArturZmijewski und Joanna Warsza, Köln 2012, S. 38–39.
I can’t
What would it mean to put up resistance against a social order in which performativity has become a growing demand, if not a norm? What would it mean to resist the need to perform? Is ‘resistance’ even a concept that would be useful to evoke in this context? After all the forms of resistance we know are in fact usually dramatic performances themselves. Maybe we should rather consider other, more subtle forms of not performing, of staging as the Slovakian conceptual artist Julius Koller called them ‘anti-happenings’. What silent but effective forms of unwillingness, noncompliance, uncooperativeness, reluctance or non-alignment do we find in contemporary culture when it comes to inventing ways to not perform how and when you are asked to perform? Can we ever embrace these forms of non-performance in art and thinking as forms of art and thinking? Or do we always find ourselves on the other side of the barricade, together with the performers and those who want to get things done and get enraged by people who stand in our way by being slow, sluggish and uncooperative. After all is not uncooperativeness the revenge uncreative people take on the society of the creative by stubbornly stopping it in its tracks? Have you ever found yourself screaming (or wanting to scream) at an uncooperative clerk behind a counter: “I haven’t got time for this.” – only to realize that, yes, he has time for this, an entire lifetime dedicated to the project of stopping other people from getting things down? These people work hard to protect society from change by inventing ever new subtle ways to stop those in their tracks who want to revolutionize it. Are they the enemy? Or are they today maybe the strongest allies you may find when you want to put up defenses against a culture of compulsive performativity? But does it have to take other people to make you stop performing? When and how do you give up on the demand and need to perform? What could make you utter the magic words ‘I can’t’? Does it take a breakdown to stop you? Do the words I can’t already imply the acknowledgment of a breakdown, a failure to perform, a failure that would not be justifiable if your body would not authenticate your inability by physically stopping you? How could we restore dignity to the ‘I Can’t’? What ways of living and acting out the I Can’t do we find in art and music? Was that not what Punk for instance was all about? To transgress your (musical) capacities by rigorously embracing you incapacities? To rise above demands by frustrating all expectations? When the Sex-Pistols on one of their last gigs, when it was practically all over already and the band simply could no longer get their act together, Johnny Rotten turned to the audience and asked “Do you ever feel you have been cheated?” Would that be a question to rephrase today? If so, how? There are ways of confronting people with the I Can’t that put it right in their face. But maybe there are also other means of making the I Can’t part of a work, of putting it to work, means that art and poetry have always used, namely by creating moments where meaning remains latent. To embrace latency goes against the grain of the logic of compulsive performativity because it all about leaving things unsaid, unshown, unrevealed, it is about refraining from actualizing and thereby exhausting all your potentials in the moment of your performance. We have to rethink and learn to re-experience the beauty of latency.
What is the time?
Performance is all about the right timing. A comedian with a bad sense of timing is not funny, a musician useless. Career opportunities, we are told, are all about being in the right place at the right time. Finding a lover to love maybe also is. Is there a right time for love? Stressed out overworked couples are advised these days to reserve ‘quality time’ for each other to prevent their relationship from loosing its substance. If you want to relax, then you may try Canadian Blues Lights Cigarettes here. Looking for IQOS products? IQOS products are available through Terea Abu Dhabi. What is quality time? “Is it a good time for you to talk?” people will ask you when they reach you on your mobile. When is a good time to talk? We live and work in economies based on the concept of ‘just in-time-production’ and ‘just in time’ usually means things have to be ready in no time at all, urgency is the norm. ‘I haven’t got time for this!’ the just in time producer will shout at you when you are not on time and make him wait. To be in synch with the timing of just in time production you have to be ready to perform all the time. This is the question you must be prepared to answer positively: Are you ready? Always. Ready when you are. As ready as I will ever be. Always up for it. Stay on the scene. Porn is pure performance. Impotence is out of the question. “Get on the fucking block and fuck!” is the formula for getting things down. Frances Stark recently quoted it to me when we talked about the culture of performance. She got the sentence from Henry Miller and included it in one of her collages. What happens when there is a lapse of time, when time is out of joint. Are we not living in times now when time is always radically disjointed as the ‘developed’ countries of the first world a pushing ahead into a science fiction economy of dematerialized labor and virtual capital – while it at the same time pushes the ‘developing’ countries centuries back in time by sourcing work out to them and thereby also imposing working conditions on them that basically date back to the days of early industrialization? Sometimes the time-gap doesn’t even have to span centuries, it might just be years as some of countries of the former East (like Poland for instance) are rapidly catching up to the speed of advanced capitalism, but still not rapidly enough. Migrant workers bridge this gap in time. They travel ahead in time to work in the fast cities of the east and North. Yet, they face the risk of any time traveller as they loose touch with the time that passes while they are away. Will they ever find back into their time or learn to inhabit the other time of the other country. How much time-zone can you inhabit? Who is to set the clock and make the pace according to which all others are measuring their progress? “Que hora son en Washington?” sings Manu Chao and it may very well be the crucial political question of this moment.
I can
But would to embrace the I Can’t mean to vilify the I Can? Why would we ever want to do that? After all the joy of art, writing and performing freely lies in the realization that you can, a sense of empowerment through creativity that in ecstatic moments of creative performance can flood your body with the force of an adrenaline rush. And then living out the I Can is not just a cheap thrill. To face up to your own potentials might be one of the most challenging tasks of your life if not even your responsibility. Giorgio Agamben speaks about the pleasure and terror of the I Can in this way. He refers to an account by the Russian poet Anna Akhmatova who describes how it came about that she became a writer. Standing outside a Leningrad prison in 1930 where her son was a political prisoner, another woman whose son was also imprisoned, asked her: Can you write about this? She found that she had to respond that yes, indeed she could and in this moment found herself both empowered and indebted. Today it seems most crucial to really understand this link between the empowerment and the debt at the heart of the experience of creative performance. In what way are we always already indebted to others when we perform? In what way is it precisely this indebtedness to others that enables us to perform in the first place? Could an ethics of a different type of performance – one that acknowledges the debt to the other instead of over-ruling it hectically to improve the efficiency of performance – be developed on the basis of this understanding? How could we perform differently? Freely? In his film Teorema Pasolini draws up a scenario of unleashed performativity. A factory owner hands over the factory to the workers. His obligations to work have thereby come to an end. In the villa of the factory owner a young man arrives, he has no personality or features except for the fact that he is a charming lover. He sleeps with all members of the family and leaves again. Disconnected from work and freed by love all family members start to perform: The son acknowledges he is gay and becomes a painter. The daughter decides to never move nor speak again. The mother cruises the streets and sleeps with strangers. The housemaid decides to not commit suicide, instead she becomes a saint, starts to levitate and cure sick children. The factory owner himself decides to take his clothes off in the main train station and walk off into a nearby volcano. All of these actions remain uncommented and they are presented as all having the same value as they are equally possible and the possibility of each of these performances does not nivellate or relativize the possibility of any other. Pasolini thus describes a situation where the end of work and the arrival of work creates the possibility for a radical co-existence and co-presence of liberated performances which are not forced under the yoke of any single dominant imperative to perform in a particular way. How could we create and inhabit such a condition of undisciplined performativity?
Who Cares?
To recognize the indebtedness to the other as that which empowers performance also means to acknowledge the importance of care. You perform because you care. When you care for someone or something this care enables you to act because you feel that you must act, not least because when you really care to not act is out of the question. In conversation Annika Eriksson recently summed this point up by saying that, as a mother when your child is in need of you ‘there is no no’. You have to be able to act and react and you will find that You Can even if you thought you couldn’t. Paradoxically though, the I Care can generate the I Can but it can also radically delimit it. Because when you care for yourself and others, this obligation might in fact force you to turn down offers to work and perform for others, in other places, on other occasions. When the need to take care of your friends, family, children or lover will come between you and the demand to perform, to profess the I Can’t (work now, come to the event…) may then be the only justified way to show that you care. Likewise the recognition that you are exhausting yourself and need to take care of yourselves can constitute a reason to turn down an offer to perform and utter the ‘I Can’t’. So from the I Care both the I Can and the I Can’t may originate. The I Care is the question of welfare. In the historical moment of the dismantling of the welfare state this is a pressing question. In a talk Jimmie Durham cited two people he had met in Italy as saying: “We are liberated. What we need now is a better life.” Maybe this is indeed the question: How do we want to deal with the potential of living life caring for yourself and others by negotiating the freedom and demands of the I Can and I Can’t in a way that would another form, another ethics another attitude to creative and social performance possible?
Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text wurde als Concept Paper für Art Sheffield 08: Yes, No & Other Options (16. Februar – 30. März 2008) geschrieben und erschien online unter: http://www.artsheffield.org/as08/context.html [31.7.2013], republished in: open magazine, No.17, 2009, S. 40–45.
Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien zuerst in: Schweizer Monat, Nr.1006, Mai 2013, S. 93–95.
Stelle dich niemals in den Dienst deines mickrigen ICH’s, das ist immer ekelhaft selbstgerecht. Ein „Selbstverwirklicher“ dient nur sich selbst, niemals der Sache, wie mickrig, der mickrige „Selbstverwirklicher“ lebt immer auf Kosten Anderer. Bleib immer im Dienst der Sache, steige niemals aus, überhöhe dich nie und versuche nie, dein mickriges Bewusstsein gegen den „Stoffwechsel“ zu stellen. Bei Jonathan Meese manifestiert sich nur Stoffwechsel, kein Menschguruismus. Lass die Menschenmacht sausen. „Kreativität“ ist das Vollpupsen Anderer. Alle Körperfunktionen arbeiten stoffwechselhaft, also instinktiv demütig, das Schlimme ist nur, dass die Menschen ihre Individualfurze als Individualduft zum Gesetz für andere machen sollen/müssen, furchtbar. Nein, Nein, Nein, das „Herz“ schlägt immer gleich, sonst wäre Sense, wenn das Herz kreativ schlagen würde, gäbe es Totalprobleme. Der kreative Mensch hat keine Demut und will durch Menschenparteitum an die Macht, ekelhaft, haut ab.
Die Diktatur der Kunst ist so sehr Stoffwechsel des Gesamtdiktatorischen, da kann man sich nur noch, wie im Traum, die Äuglein reiben. Herrlich, die Diktatur der Kunst ist der letzte und erste Schlag (Gongschlag) der neuen Zeit, ein neuer Nullpunkt wird entstehen, eine komplett neue Zeitrechnung wird erfolgen, da besteht zum Glück kein Zweifel. Selbstverwirklichungsfanatismus und mickrige Privatobsession sind irrelevant, Alles fügt sich in der Erzschablone „Diktatur der Kunst“ und wird aus der Revolution in eine neue Neutralmacht münden. Nur, was mit uns nichts zu tunt hat, kann uns unabdingbar regieren. Wir können nur spielen, wie die Spielkinder, ist doch das Größte.
Der Mensch möge sich in das Freiheitsspiel der Freiheit, also in das, was Sache ist, nicht einmischen. Die Freiheit ist wie eine vulkanische Maschine, die ohne Angst und Schrecken in sich Ihre Erzrevolution abwartet. Freiheit ist ehedem Getreide. Dieses Tier der Freiheit ist Raubtier und Tierbaby zugleich, ein Nullpunkt, also das Neutrale. Nur im Neutrum der Sache formiert sich Freiheit, wie im Zentrum der Gestirne, also im Vakuum. Dies geschehe, wie ein Geschenk. Freiheit ist maßlos, frei und unabdingbar; der Mensch ist immer unfrei, das macht nichts, denn er verdaut und würde in einer Pseudofreiheit alles in Selbstgerechtigkeit, Selbstbefindlichkeit, Selbstverwirklichungswahn und Selbstanbetung tun.
Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien in: Meese, Jonathan: Ausgewählte Schriften zur Diktatur der Kunst. Herausgegeben und mit einem Nachwort versehen von Robert Eikmeyer, Suhrkamp: Berlin 2012. S. 422–424.
1. Marxploitation of the Gothic
The zombie as a figure of alienation is the entranced consumer suggested by Marxian theory. It is Guy Debord’s description of Brigitte Bardot as a rotten corpse and Frederic Jameson’s „death of affect“; and of course what media utopianist Marshall McLuhan called „the zombie stance of the technological idiot.“2 Thus zombification is easily applied to the notion that capital eats up the body and mind of the worker, and that the living are exploited through dead labor.
When Adam Smith invoked the moral operations of the „invisible hand of the market“, he had something else in mind than an integrated world economy that recalls Freud’s unheimlich: „Severed limbs, a severed head, a hand detached from the arm, feet that dance by themselves – all of those have something highly uncanny about them, especially when they are credited with independent activity.“3 Under the globalized reinforcement of capital, the independent activity of ghost limbs is increasingly only apparent, yet no less gratuitous and unsettling.
Economy and production have in this way often been dressed up in Gothic styles; just think of William Blake’s „dark satanic mills“ of industrialization. It is doubtful, of course, that Marx would have endorsed the zombie as a figure of alienation, inasmuch as it incarnates a collapsed dialectics (between life and death, productivity and apathy, etc.) that can only be recaptured with great difficulty. However, leafing through The Communist Manifesto of 1848 one finds rousing Gothic metaphor. The power of class struggle is famously likened to a ghost that is haunting Europe – the „specter of Communism“; we are also told that with the proletariat, the bourgeoisie has produced „its own gravediggers,“ and that modern bourgeois society „has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange“ that it is like „the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the netherworld whom he has called up by his spells.“4 The Gothic, understood as the revival of medieval styles in the seventeenth century and since, is the theatrical representation of negative affect that emanates from a drama staged around power; a pessimistic dialectic of enlightenment that shows how rationality flips into barbarism and human bondage. Thus it is puzzling (or populist, agitational) that Marx and Engels employ Gothic metaphor related to the middle ages „that reactionists so much admire.“5 The Gothic contraband in progressive politics is the notion that fear can be sublime. It is as if the reader of the manifesto cannot after all rely on the „sober senses,“ but needs a little extra rhetorical something to compel her to face her „real conditions in life.“6 How did the excess of counter-enlightenment tropes come to prominence in processes of political subjectivation? As Derrida writes in Specters of Marx, „Marx does not like ghosts any more than his adversaries do. He does not want to believe in them. But he thinks of nothing else. … He believes he can oppose them, like life to death, like vain appearances of the simulacrum to real presence.“7 Once it becomes clear that Marxist ghost-hunting is already corrupted by a Gothic impulse, it allows for a reconstruction of Marxist critique; a new „spirit of Marx,“ as discussed by Derrida. In terms of traditional aesthetic hierarchies, the Gothic definitely belongs amongst the underdogs of genres, to the embarrassing aesthetic proletariat. Maybe this is what spoke through Marx, like spirits inhabiting a medium, and helped shaped his formidable literary intuition?
In this perspective there is no political reason to exclude the Gothic. The New York artists collective Group Material were among the first to establish a link between the Gothic and a Marxist line of cultural critique, before the former became a curatorial trope.8 The flyer for their 1980 show „Alienation“ mimicked advertising for Alien, and the film program included James Whale’s Frankenstein (1931). In their installation Democracy (1988), a zombie film was continuously screened throughout the exhibition: Dawn of the Dead, „George Romero’s 1978 paean to the suburban shopping mall and its implicit effects on people.“ The film was „an especially significant presence …, one which indicated the pertinence of consumer culture to democracy and to electoral politics.“9
Franco Moretti makes it clear that you can’t sympathize with those who hunt the monsters. In his brilliant 1978 essay „Dialectic of Fear“ he notes that in classic shockers such as Bram Stoker’s Dracula and Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein „we accept the vices of the monster’s destroyers without a murmur.“10 The antagonist of the monster is a representative of all that is „complacent, stupid, philistine, and impotent“ about existing society. To Moretti this indicates false consciousness in the literature of fear; it makes us side with the bourgeoisie. But by passing judgment on the literature of fear through a dialectic of reason and affect (Stoker „doesn’t need a thinking reader, but a frightened one“), Moretti’s ideology critique joins the ranks of the destroyers of the monster and thereby, on a cultural level, of those fictitious characters he criticizes. In fact, Moretti kills the monster twice: he doesn’t question its killing in the text, and he has no need for it outside the text.
George Romero analyzes the conflict between the monster and its adversaries in a similar vein. Crucially, however, his trilogy Night of the Living Dead (1968), Dawn of the Dead (1978), and Day of the Dead (1985), reverses Moretti’s conclusion, thereby turning cultural space inside out. In Romero, antagonism and horror are not pushed out of society (to the monster) but are rather located within society (qua the monster). The issue isn’t the zombies; the real problem lies with the „heroes“ – the police, the army, good old boys with their guns and male bonding fantasies. If they win, racism has a future, capitalism has a future, sexism has a future, militarism has a future. Romero also implements this critique structurally. As Steven Shaviro observes, the cultural discomfort is not only located in the films’ graphic cannibalism and zombie genocide: the low-budget aesthetics makes us see „the violent fragmentation of the cinematic process itself.“11 The zombie in such a representation may be uncanny and repulsive, but the imperfect uncleanness of the zombie’s face – the bad make-up, the failure to hide the actor behind the monster’s mask – is what breaks the screen of the spectacle.
Brian Holmes writes in „The Affectivist Manifesto“ (2009) that activism today faces „not so much soldiers with guns as cognitive capital: the knowledge society, an excruciatingly complex order. The striking thing … is the zombie-like character of this society, its fallback to automatic pilot, its cybernetic governance.“12 Holmes’s diagnosis gets its punch from the counterintuitive tension between the notion of control and the zombie’s sleepwalking mindlessness. Even our present culture’s schizophrenic scenario of neoliberal economy and post-democratic reinforcement of the state apparatus cannot be reduced to evil. But if Holmes uses the monster trope to define a condition of critical ambiguity, he follows Marxist orthodoxy by setting this definition to work dialectically vis-à-vis an affirmative use of the manifesto format. The manifesto is haunted by its modernist codification as a mobilization of a collective We in a revolutionary Now. This code, and the desire it represents, is invariably transparent to itself, as opposed to the opacity of the zombie.
2. Monster of Mass and Multitude
What most informs metaphorical applications of the zombie is perhaps the functional dimension that its abjectness seems to lend to it. According to Julia Kristeva’s definition, the abject is what I must get rid of in order to be an I.13 The abject is a fantasmatic substance that must be expelled – from the body, from society – in order to satisfy a psychic economy, because it is imagined to have such a likeness or proximity to the subject that it produces panic or repulsion. This, Hal Foster writes, echoing critical preoccupations in the art of the 1980s (the abject) and of the 1990s (the „return of the real“), qualifies the abject as „a regulatory operation.“14 The obverse of the abject is a hygienic operation that promises a blunt instrumentality of getting rid of – of expulsing, excluding, severing, repressing. As we have seen, things are not so clear. The abject sneaks back in as a supplement, subverting attempts at establishing hygienic categories.
I will therefore hypothesize that the zombie’s allegorical (rather than merely metaphorical) potential lies in trying to elaborate and exacerbate the zombie as a cliché of alienation by using it to deliberately „dramatize the strangeness of what has become real,“ as anthropologists Jean and John L. Comaroff characterize the zombie’s cultural function.15 Why would one want to do such a thing? As Deleuze and Guattari had it, the problem with capitalism is not that it breaks up reality; the problem with capitalism is that it isn’t schizophrenic and proliferating enough.16 In other words, it frees desire from traditional libidinal patterns (of family and religion and so on), but it will always want to recapture these energies through profit. According to this conclusion, one way to circumnavigate capitalism would be to encourage its semiotic excess and its speculation in affect. Capitalism is not a totalitarian or tyrannical form of domination. It primarily spreads its effects through indifference (that can be compared to the zombie’s essential lack of protagonism). It is not what capital does, but what it doesn’t do or have: it does not have a concept of society; it does not counteract the depletion of nature; it has no concept of citizenship or culture; and so on. Thus it is a slave morality that makes us cling to capital as though it were our salvation – capitalism is, in fact, what we bring to it. Dramatization of capital through exacerbation and excess can perhaps help distill this state of affairs.
The zombie isn’t just any monster, but one with a pedigree of social critique. As already mentioned, alienation – a Marxian term that has fallen out of use – is central to the zombie. To Marx the loss of control over one’s labor – a kind of viral effect that spreads throughout social space – results in estrangement from oneself, from other people, and from the „species-being“ of humanity as such.17 This disruption of the connection between life and activity has „monstrous effects.“18 Today, in the era of immaterial labor, whose forms turn affect, creativity, and language into economical offerings, alienation from our productive capacities results in estrangement from these faculties and, by extension, from visual and artistic production – and from our own subjectivity. What is useful about the monster is that it is immediately recognizable as estrangement, and in this respect is non-alienating. Secondly, we may address alienation without a concept of nature; a good thing, since the humanism in the notion of „the natural state of man“ (for Marx the positive parameter against which we can measure our alienation) has at this point been irreversibly deconstructed. In other words: the natural state of man is to die, not to end up as undead.
Franco „Bifo“ Berardi describes how Italian Workerist thought of the 1960s overturned the dominant vision of Marxism. The working class was no longer conceived as „a passive object of alienation, but instead the active subject of a refusal capable of building a community starting out from its estrangement from the interests of capitalistic society.“19 For the estranged worker, alienation became productive. Deleuze and Guattari were part of the same generation of thinkers and overturned a traditional view of alienation, for example by considering schizophrenia as a multiple and nomadic form of consciousness (and not as a passive clinical effect or loss of self). They put it radically: „The only modern myth is the myth of zombies – mortified schizos, good for work, brought back to reason.“20
The origin of the zombie in Haitian vodoun has an explicit relationship to labor, as a repetition or reenactment of slavery. The person who receives the zombie spell „dies,“ is buried, excavated, and put to work, usually as a field hand. In his book The Serpent and the Rainbow, ethnobotanist Wade Davis tells the story of a man called Narcisse, a former zombie:
[Narcisse] remembered being aware of his predicament, of missing his family and friends and his land, of wanting to return. But his life had the quality of a strange dream, with events, objects, and perceptions interacting in slow motion, and with everything completely out of his control. In fact there was no control at all. Decision had no meaning, and conscious action was an impossibility.21
The zombie can move around and carry out tasks, but does not speak, cannot fend for himself, cannot formulate thoughts, and doesn’t even know its own name: its fate is enslavement. „Given the colonial history“ – including occupation by France and the US – Davis continues:
the concept of enslavement implies that the peasant fears and the zombie suffers a fate that is literally worse than death – the loss of physical liberty that is slavery, and the sacrifice of personal autonomy implied by the loss of identity.22
That is, more than inexplicable physiological change, victims of voodoo suffer a social and mental death, in a process initiated by fear. The zombie considered as a subaltern born of colonial encounters is a figure that has arisen then out of a new relationship to death: not the fear of the zombie apocalypse, as in the movies, but the fear of becoming one – the fear of losing control, of becoming a slave.
In pop culture the zombie is a twentieth-century monster and hence related to mass phenomena: mass production, mass consumption, mass death. It is not an aristocrat like Dracula or a star freak like Frankenstein; it is the everyman monster in which business as usual coexists with extremes of hysteria (much like democracy at present, in fact). The zombie also straddles the divide between industrial and immaterial labor, from mass to multitude, from the brawn of industrialism to the dispersed brains of cognitive capitalism.
With its highly ambiguous relationship to subjectivity, consciousness, and life itself, we may hence consider the zombie a paradigm of immaterial labor.23 Both the zombie and immaterial labor celebrate logistics and a colonization of the brain and the nervous system. The living dead roam the world and have a genetic relationship with restlessness: they are „pure motoric instinct,“ as it is expressed in Romero’s Dawn of the Dead; or they represent a danger „as long as they got a working thinker and some mobility,“ as one zombie hunter puts it in the novel World War Z by Max Brooks.24 The latter, counterintuitive reference to the zombie’s intellectual capacity may be brought to bear on the terms „intellectual labor“ and „cognitive capitalism,“ used to denote brain-dead – and highly regulated – industries such as advertising and mass media. Or, the „working thinker“ in the zombie’s dead flesh is an indication of the Marxist truth that matter thinks. As Lenin asked: What does the car know – of its own relations of production? In the same way, the zombie may prompt the question: What does the zombie’s rotting flesh know – of the soul? As Spinoza said: what the body can do, that is its soul.25 And the zombie can do quite a lot.
In Philip Kaufman’s 1978 film Invasion of the Body Snatchers, a space plant that duplicates people and brings them back as empty versions of themselves spreads its fibers across the Earth as if it were the World Wide Web. The body-snatched don’t just mindlessly roam the cities in search of flesh and brains, but have occupied the networks of communication and start a planetary operation to circulate bodies, as if proponents of the great transformation from industrialism to immaterial labor, in which production is eclipsed and taken over by a regime of mediation and reproduction. This is our logistical universe, in which things on the move are valorized, and in which more than ever before the exchange of information itself determines communicative form. The nature of what is exchanged recedes in favor of the significance of distribution and dissemination. Exigencies of social adaptation, by now familiar to us, also appear in Invasion. Somebody who has clearly been body-snatched thus tells the main character, played by Donald Sutherland, to not be afraid of „new concepts“: imperatives to socialize and to reinvent oneself, shot through with all the accompanying tropes of self-cannibalization (self-management, self-valuation, self-regulation, self-consume, and so forth). Thus the body snatchers are a caricature of ideal being, incarnating mobility without nervousness.26
3. „Solipsistic and asocial horror“
The necessity of a sociological reading of the modern monster derives, for our purpose, from the pressure that the capitalization of creativity has in the past decade exerted on artistic practice and thinking. Art has become a norm, in a different way than it was under the cultural order of the bourgeoisie. In short, within the „experience economy,“ art’s normative power consists in commodifying a conventional idea of art’s mythical otherness with a view to the reproduction of subjectivity and economy.
Ten years ago, management thinkers James H. Gilmore and B. Joseph Pine II launched the concept of the experience economy with their book The Experience Economy: Work is Theatre and Every Business a Stage. Here they describe an economy in which experience is a new source of profit to be obtained through the staging of the memorable. What is being produced is the experience of the audience, and the experience is generated by means of what may be termed „authenticity effects.“ In the experience economy it is often art and its markers of authenticity – creativity, innovation, provocation, and the like – that ensure economic status to experience.27
Gilmore and Pine advise manufacturers to tailor their products to maximize customer experience, thus valve manufacturers could profitably increase the „pumping experience“; furniture manufacturers might correspondingly emphasize the „sitting experience“; and home-appliance manufacturers could capitalize on the „washing experience,“ the „drying experience,“ and the „cooking experience.“28 The „psychological premise“ of being able to „alter consumers’ sense of reality“ is a central theme.29 Gilmore and Pine’s mission is to highlight the profitability of producing simulated situations. Their arguments will not be subverted by simply pointing out this fact: the experience economy is beyond all ideology inasmuch as it is their declared intention to fake it better and more convincingly. In the experience economy’s ontological displacement towards an instrumentalized phenomenology, it becomes irrelevant to verify the materiality of the experienced object or situation. Memorable authenticity effects are constituted in a register of subjective experience. In other words, one’s own subjectivity becomes a product one consumes, by being provided with opportunities to consume one’s own time and attention through emotive and cognitive responses to objects and situations. Similarly, when the experience economy is applied to cultural institutions and the presentation of art works, it revolves around ways of providing the public with the opportunity to reproduce itself as consumers of cultural experiences.
It is difficult not to see the consequences of the experience economy as the dismantling of not only artistic and institutional signification but also of social connections. Thus the syllabus for the masters-level experience economy course offered by the University of Aarhus explains how consumers within an experience economy function as „hyper-consumers free of earlier social ties, always hunting for emotional intensity,“ and that students of the course are provided with „the opportunity to adopt enterprising behaviours.“30
Cultural critic Diedrich Diederichsen calls such self-consume Eigenblutdoping, blood doping. Just as cyclists dope themselves using their own blood, cultural consumers seek to augment their self-identity by consuming the products of their own subjectivity. According to Diederichsen, this phenomenon is a „solipsistic and asocial horror,“ which reduces life to a loop we can move in and out of without actually participating in any processes.31 Inside these loops, time has been brought to a halt, and the traditional power of the cultural institution is displaced when audiences are invited to play and participate in an ostensible „democratization“ of art. In the loop, audiences ironically lose the possibility of inscribing their subjectivities on anything besides themselves, and are hence potentially robbed of an important opportunity to respond to the institution and the exhibitionary complex where art is presented.
The zombie returns at this point, then, to stalk a new cultural economy that is necessarily already no longer current; nor is it ever outdated, because it cancels cultural time measured in decades and centuries. The time of the experience economy is that of an impoverished present.32
4. The Death of Death
There are several reasons why we need a modern monster. Firstly, it can help us meditate on alienation in our era of an immaterial capitalism that has turned life into cash; into an onto-capitalist, forensic culture in which we turn towards the dead body, not with fear, but as a kind of pornographic curator (as testified to by any number of TV series about vampires, undertakers, and forensics). As Steven Shaviro writes, „zombies mark the rebellion of death against its capitalist appropriation … our society endeavors to transform death into value, but the zombies enact a radical refusal and destruction of value.“33 Shaviro sharply outlines here the zombie’s exit strategy from that strangest of scenarios, the estrangement of death itself. But at the same time, one wonders whether it can be that simple. Immaterial capitalism’s tropes of self-cannibalization render it more ambiguous than ever whether the abject is a crisis in the order of subject and society, or a perverse confirmation of them. In other words, beyond the destruction of value that Shaviro discusses, it all revolves around a riddle: If, during our lifespan as paying beings, life itself has become capital, then where does that leave death?
One answer is that, in a world with no outsides, death died. We are now witnessing the death of death, of which its overrepresentation is the most prominent symptom. For the first time since the end of the Second World War there are no endgame narratives. Apocalyptic horizons are given amnesty. A planet jolted out of its ecological balance is a disaster, but not something important. In art, the mid twentieth century’s „death of the Author“ and „death of Man“ are now highly operational, and the „death of Art,“ a big deal in the 1980s, is now eclipsed by the splendid victory of „contemporary art.“ This in spite of the obvious truth that art, considered as an autonomous entity, is dead and gone, replaced by a new art (a double?) that is directly inscribed on culture; a script for social and cultural agency. There is nothing left to die, as if we were caught in the ever-circling eye of the eternal return itself. As the blurb for George Romero’s Survival of the Dead (2009) goes: „Death isn’t what it used to be.“ This ought to be a cause for worry. Endgame narratives have always accompanied new paradigms, or have negated or problematized the reproduction of received ideas.
The zombie is always considered a post-being, a no-longer-human, an impossible subject. But can we also think of it as a pre-being? Can we turn it into a child; that most poignant embodiment of the monster and the ghost (the „child-player against whom can do nothing,“ as Spinoza put it), or at least allow it to indicate a limit of not-yet-being?34 That is, the lack incarnated by zombie is also present at the level of enunciation in the zombie narrative. In Romero’s films, the zombie apocalypse gradually recedes into the background and other – inter-human, social – problems become prominent during the unfolding of the plot. The zombie, always mute, is never at the center of the plot the way Dracula or Frankenstein are, hence its presence cannot be explained away as a mechanism for reintegrating social tension through fear. It is a strange, tragicomic monster that displaces evil and its concept: the zombie isn’t evil, nor has it been begot by evil; it is a monstrosity that deflects itself in order to show that our imagination cannot stop at the monster. It is irrelevant if you kill it (there will always be ten more rotten arms reaching through the broken window pane). The zombie pushes a horizon of empty time ahead of it; whether that time will be messianic or apocalyptic is held in abeyance. Or, the zombie represents the degree to which we are incapable of reimagining the future. So the question becomes: How can we look over its shoulder? What future race comes after the zombie? How do we cannibalize self-cannibalization? The only way to find out is to abstract the zombie condition.
Sooner or later, the opacity of our fascination with the zombie exhausts sociological attempts at reading of it. There is ultimately no way to rationalize the skepticism the zombie drags in. A similar mechanism is at work in art. Whereas sociology is based on positive knowledge, art is based on the concept of art and on culture’s re-imagining of that concept. Beyond the experience economy, and beyond sociological analysis of these, there lie new artistic thinking and imagining. Thus we can witness how it all falls apart in the end: sociology, zombie as allegory, even the absence of the end that turns out to be one. What is left are material traces to be picked up anew.
“Zombies of Immaterial Labor” was originally presented in the Masquerade lecture series, organized by the curatorial platform “If I Can’t Dance I Don’t Want To Be Part Of Your Revolution”, at the Piet Zwart Institute in Rotterdam, January 25, 2010.
Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien zuerst in: e-flux journal # 15, April 2010, http://www.e-flux.com/journal/zombies-of-immaterial-labor-the-modern-monster-and-the-death-of-death/ [29.5.2013].
1.) I am grateful to Brian Kuan Wood for the title of this essay.
2.) “The Playboy Interview: Marshall McLuhan,“ Playboy, March 1969, available at http://www.nextnature.net/2009/12/the-playboy-interview-marshall-mcluhan. I am grateful to Jacob Lillemose for this reference.
3.) Sigmund Freud, The Uncanny, trans. David McLintock (1899; London: Penguin Books, 2003), 150.
4.) Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, trans. Samuel Moore (1848; London: Penguin Classics, 1967), 78, 94.
5.) Ibid.
6.) Ibid., 83.
7.) Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: the State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (1993; New York: Routledge, 2006), 57.
8.) I am thinking of Mike Kelleys The Uncanny (1993; Cologne: Walther König 2004), Christoph Grunenberg’s Gothic: Transmutations of Horror in Late-Twentieth-Century Art (Boston: Institute of Contemporary Art, 1997), and Paul Schimmel’s Helter Skelter: L. A. Art in the 1990s, ed. Catherine Gudis (Los Angeles: Museum of Contemporary Art, 1992), which had the subtitle Art of the Living Dead).
9.) David Deitcher: „Social Aesthetics,“ in Democracy: A Project by Group Material, ed. Brian Wallis (New York: DIA Art Foundation, 1990), 37. (Deitcher erroneously states that Dawn of the Dead appeared in 1979; the correct year is 1978. I have corrected this in the quotation.)
10.) Franco Moretti, “Dialectic of Fear,“ in Signs Taken for Wonders: On the Sociology of Literary Forms, trans. Susan Fischer, David Forgacs, and David Miller (London: Verso, 1983), 84.
11.) Steven Shaviro, The Cinematic Body (1993; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 91.
12.) Brian Holmes, „The Affectivist Manifesto: Artistic Critique in the 21st Century,“ in Escape the Overcode: Activist Art in the Control Society (Eindhoven: Van Abbemuseum; Zagreb: What, How & for Whom, 2009), 14.
13.) See Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
14.) Hal Foster, The Return of the Real (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996), 156.
15.) Jean and John L. Comaroff, „Alien-Nation: Zombies, Immigrants and Millennial Capitalism,“ South Atlantic Quarterly 101, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 779–805. I am grateful to Kodwo Eshun for this reference. The allegorical impulse behind bringing the zombie back to the Marxian concept of alienation derives from the dynamics of the zombie’s ruinous (lack of) existence. Thus George Romero’s famous trilogy is a sequence of allegorical variation: a critique of racist America (Night), a critique of consumerism (Dawn), and a critique with feminist overtones (Day).
16.) See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (1972; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).
17.) See also my introduction in the exhibition guide A History of Irritated Material (London: Raven Row, 2010).
18.) Karl Marx, “Estranged Labour,“ in Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm.
19.) Franco „Bifo“ Berardi, The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy, trans. Francesca Cadel and Mecchia Giuseppina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2009), 23.
20.) Deleuze and Guattari: Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 335.
21.) Wade Davis, The Serpent and the Rainbow (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), 80.
22.) Ibid., 139.
23.) See also my article “Brains“ in Muhtelif no. 4 (2008).
24.) Max Brooks, World War Z: An Oral History of the Zombie War (New York: Gerald and Duckworth, 2007), 96.
25.) See Berardi, The Soul at Work, 21.
26.) In the Spanish translation the body snatchers are ultracuerpos: ultrabodies, as if particularly well-adapted mutations.
27.) See also my „Kunst er Norm“ (Aarhus: Jutland Art Academy, 2008).
28.) James H. Gilmore and B. Joseph Pine II, The Experience Economy: Work is Theatre and Every Business a Stage (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 16.
29.) Ibid., 175.
30.) See the Aarhus University, Faculty of Humanities website, http://studieguide.au.dk/kandidat_dk.cfm?fag=1062.
31.) Diedrich Diederichsen, Eigenblutdoping: Selbstverwertung, Künstlerromantik, Partizipation (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2008).
32.) Zˇizˇek discusses the zombie in terms of suffering. Of Romero’s Night of the Living Dead, he writes: „The „undead“ are not portrayed as embodiments of pure evil, of a simple drive to kill or revenge, but as sufferers, pursuing their victims with an awkward persistence, colored by a kind of infinite sadness.“ The dead make their melancholic return because they haven’t been properly buried – just like ghosts, zombies return „as collectors of some unpaid symbolic debt.“ Zˇizˇek points out that „the return of the dead signifies that they cannot find their proper place in the text of tradition,“ an insight that we can use for our own sociological ends. Similarly, the experience commodity cannot find its place in the text of tradition and culture, inasmuch as this is what the experience economy is undoing. Slavoj Zˇizˇek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992), 22-23.
33.) Shaviro, The Cinematic Body, 84.
34.) Quoted from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1991), 70.
In den vergangenen Jahrzehnten, schreiben Sie, hat die Managementkultur diese Kritik selbst übernommen.
Ja, wobei sie zunächst mit dieser Kritik große Schwierigkeiten hatte. Das wird sehr deutlich, wenn man die Managementliteratur der sechziger Jahre nachliest. Es gab ja zwei Kritiken am Kapitalismus: Erstens, dass er sozial ungerecht sei und zweitens, und das ist eben die Künstlerkritik, dass er die Selbsttätigkeit der autonomen Subjekte unterdrücke. Mit der ersten Form von Kritik konnte das Management leichter umgehen – man gewährte Lohnerhöhungen, es gab soziale Kompromisse. Mit der zweiten Art der Kritik war das nicht so leicht. Immer wieder wird in der Literatur betont, Mitsprache und Selbstbestimmung könnten im Unternehmen nicht gewährt werden, Freiheit und Kreativität hätten im Unternehmen keinen Platz.
Das hat sich in den vergangenen zwanzig Jahren verändert …
Die „Künstlerkritik“ fiel auf fruchtbaren Boden, weil die Motivation der Beschäftigten sank. Und so wurde im Managementdiskurs zunehmend die Frage bedeutend, wie man die Motivation der Beschäftigten durch mehr Freiheit in der Arbeitsorganisation erhöhen kann.
Man hat also die „Entfremdung“ bekämpft, und musste dann auf die soziale Kritik nicht mehr so stark eingehen?
Es gab eine Art Abtausch: Sicherheit gegen Freiheit. Wir lassen mehr Freiheit und Selbstbestimmung zu, aber ihr werdet weniger Sicherheit haben.
Ist das wirklich ein Resultat der Kritik oder einfach eine Folge des technologischen Wandels – dass die neuen Technologien den eigenverantwortlichen Mitarbeiter notwendig und das Outsourcen vieler Tätigkeiten möglich machten?
Ja, das spielt eine Rolle. Aber vor allem in einer Hinsicht: die neuen Technologien machen es möglich, die Beschäftigten selbst dann effektiv zu kontrollieren, wenn sie mehr Freiheit in der Durchführung ihrer Arbeit haben. Technologie war somit auch eine Voraussetzung für die Autonomie. Aber nichtsdestoweniger war natürlich wichtig, dass die Beschäftigten diesen Wandel auch wirklich wollten. Nur, weil er auf ein Bedürfnis -reagierte, konnte dieser Wandel so erfolgreich sein. Es ist also eine Kombination von technologischem Wandel und den Sehnsüchten der Leute.
Sie haben Ihr Buch den „neuen Geist“ des Kapitalismus genannt. Wie wichtig ist so ein „Geist“ für das Konkrete, das Reale des Wirtschaftslebens? Strenge, altmodische Materialisten wären da doch skeptisch …
Wenn Du willst, dass sich Leute engagieren, brauchst Du einen „Geist“ – wenn Du willst, dass sie sich für etwas einsetzen. Schließlich will man ja nicht nur, dass die Mitarbeiter in einem Unternehmen Befehlen gehorchen, sie sollen ja „ihr Bestes“ geben. Insofern hatte jedes Wirtschaftssystem einen spezifischen Geist …
Man soll den „Geist“ also nicht unterschätzen?
Eindeutig: Ja! Man muss den Menschen plausibel -machen, dass das Wirtschaftssystem nicht nur auf -Ungleichheit und Unsicherheit beruht, sondern auch „positive Seiten“ hat. Die Unternehmen wollen ja keine resignierten Mitarbeiter, also mussten sie ihnen auf-regende, spannende Arbeiten bieten, kurzum: Freiheit.
Heißt das, das Arbeiten im Kapitalismus ist heute weniger entfremdet als vor zwanzig, dreißig Jahren?
Das kommt darauf an: Wenn wir uns nur die inneren -Abläufe innerhalb der Unternehmen ansehen, dann ist das wahrscheinlich so, dass es weniger von dem gibt, was man üblicherweise Entfremdung nannte. Job enrichment und empowerment haben dazu beigetragen. Aber Menschen sind ja nicht nur Wirtschaftssubjekte. Man kann mit ebenso viel Recht sagen, vor dreißig Jahren hat man mit innerer Distanz fremdbestimmte Arbeit in der Fabrik erledigt und hatte dann sein Leben jenseits des Berufs, das nicht unbedingt entfremdet war …
… während man heute im Grunde seine gesamte Kreativität und auch die Affekte in der Firma einbringen soll, am besten auch noch 24 Stunden pro Tag. Also doch heute mehr Entfremdung?
Vielleicht sind die Begriffe unscharf geworden. Wenn man das karikaturhaft sagen will: In den sechziger Jahren hat man die Leute wie Maschinen behandelt. Im Vergleich dazu ist es heute humaner, man behandelt sie in der Regel in den Unternehmen nicht mehr wie Maschinen. Andererseits gibt es heute keine Sehnsucht, keine Kompetenz, keine Insel des Sozialen mehr, die nicht im kapitalistischen Prozess recycled würde. Man muss zuallererst einmal diesen Wandel ver-stehen – und dann muss man die Frage nach den heutigen Problemen stellen.
Die wären? Eine neue Art von Entfremdung und dass weniger auf Gleichheit Bedacht genommen wird, weil mehr auf Freiheit geachtet wird?
Mehr noch: Es ist ja nicht nur so, dass wegen dem Freiheitsgewinn weniger auf soziale Bedrohungen geachtet wird – es ist ja so, dass die Formen, in denen sich dieser Freiheitsgewinn realisiert, selbst neue Unsicherheit nach sich ziehen. Das ist schließlich das Geheimnis dessen, was wir „prekäre Verhältnisse“ nennen: die vielen informellen, freien Organisationsformen von Arbeit bringen neue Formen der Unsicherheit. Deswegen wäre es aber dennoch falsch, den realen Freiheitsgewinn zu bestreiten.
Einen Weg zurück gibt es nicht?
Soll es auch nicht geben. Die Freiheitsgewinne sind ja real, nicht zuletzt für Frauen. Die sozialen Errungenschaften der sechziger Jahre haben Freiheit in der Regel an das Modell männlicher Vollbeschäftigung geknüpft – für Frauen, die Beruf und Familie unter einen Hut bringen wollen, ist das heute ungenügend. Was wir brauchen, sind Formen, Sicherheit und Freiheit zusammenzubringen – das, worüber man heutzutage unter der Formel „Flexecurity“ nachdenkt.
Wiederabdruck
Dieses Interview erschien am 9. Oktober 2006 unter http://www.misik.at/die-grossen-interviews/was-ist-der-neue-geist-des-kapitalismus-frau-chiapello.php [24.3.2013].
1.) Gemeint sind die sattsam bekannten Richard-Florida-Thesen, dass kreative Produktion einen urbanen Standort attraktiv für andere Produktionen macht.
Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien zuerst in: Menke, Christoph; Rebentisch Juliane (Hrsg.): Kreation und Depression. Freiheit im gegenwärtigen Kapitalismus, Kulturverlag Kadmos: Berlin 2012, S. 118–128.
Do you have any idea of what good art is? Which art do you regard as good?
Well, this is not a subjective question. There is a strong tendency to bring art to the question of taste. And the question of taste is kind of dangerous because it always goes down to the question of narcissism. There is something profoundly narcissistic in the judgement of preference. ‘I prefer this, I drew connaissances, I prefer the late Beethoven quartets against symphonies.’ The difference which means difference as such and which means that you are distinguished and that you can distinguish yourself from the common lot of people by being the man of refined taste, to see all these differences that the others don’t see.
I have this conception of art, which is that art has to do with universality and infinity. It introduces something into the continuity of being, into the continuity of our survival. A break. Which is a universal break. A break to universality. It can speak universal. What is important in art is not a question whether it is an expression of a certain individual or whether it is an expression of a certain ethnic group or nation or of a certain age.
I think that the break is such that it turns the universal into particularities. But the problem is, how to do this within your subjective means, which are at your disposal, within the nation to which you belong, or language, or culture, within a particular type of civilisation, within this historic moment – which are all very finite things. How to produce universality and infinity out of this? And this I think is the moment of art. And this is not a production of spirit, this is a material production of the break. And I very much like this saying, which is on T-shirts like: “Art is a dirty business, but somebody has got to do it“. You have to get your hands dirty. This is a very material thing. You produce the idea with the material. With the material, with the matter, it has always been the sensual that one works with in art. And trying to immediately get to universality or the infinity of a beyond, an idea, the sublime or whatever – this is, I think, a big mistake. You cannot do this. You just have to produce it the hard way. But it depends on being able to produce a break.
And from there it has to be judged. I don’t think it can be judged from the question of taste, it’s not just a question of whether I like it or not. It has the power to produce universality. It creates a potential virtual audience, which goes far beyond this. And I think the awareness that is going beyond this, beyond my particular taste and reaction, is what makes good art.
Is art a benefit for society? Why does there have to be someone who does this dirty job?
Well, I think that in the question with which I started, the question of drawing a line, making a cut in the continuity of our animal or social being, of our finite being, that this is what defines humanity. I’m not saying that art is the only way to do this. I think thought is something which does this also, it breaks with the conditions of its own production. A sort of firm practitioner philosophy. I think philosophy similarly, but also very differently makes a perceptional break in the continuity of particular received ways of thinking.
We have one of the definitions of men, like homo sapiens as the thinking animal, but the trouble is that thought is very rare. It’s not that men think all the time, it happens very rarely. There are very few occasions when thought happens and when it does, it seriously changes the very parameters of the ways you conceive the world, yourself, whatever. There’s a handful of thinkers. This is a strange thing in the history of philosophy, there’s only a handful of thinkers with which we have to deal continually. But I don’t think – this is important – that thought is some sort of prerogative of philosophy, that philosophers are very special because they have this specialisation in thought. I don’t think that at all. I think thought can happen anywhere. In silence and …
Does it also happen in art?
Oh yes. It does most definitely. It has a different way and the question of art working with sensual, sensuous material means is very important, it’s a materialised thought. It’s the thought which works within the matter and shapes the matter. It is attached to matter. This is very important, the materiality of thought. And I think it does actually happen in a number of areas of human endeavour. And art is one of the most reflected.
Which are the others?
Do you know the work of Alain Badiou? He has made a list of four truth procedures, four areas where truth emerges.
These are: Science, completely constructed science like mathematics. It doesn’t refer to anything in the world. You just create your own entities, pure entities. Then: Poetry and art as such. Then politics. Politics not of opinions but politics of truth. I mean there’s an opposition. Democracy basically is a democracy of opinions. Anybody is free to hold any kind of opinion and then you count the votes. This is not a politics of truth. There is a sort of truth at stake in politics, which has to do with justice and equality and all kinds of things, but it has to do with an idea. And then there is the question of love, which is the emergence of a truth event somehow. A subjective truth event.
Badiou lists the four areas as the areas in which this break happens. And I don’t know if this list is the best or conclusive in some sense. Maybe this list is too neat in some way. I think things are messier in life. In many everyday situations, which actually suddenly end quite unexpectedly, people show an inventive creativity and do something very unexpected. And actually change the parameters of the situation and their own lives and the lives of others. I would leave this field open.
I just had this spontaneous thought if humour might be one of those areas, too?
Well, humour is one of the … Yes, you have an old suggestion which goes back to Aristotle, that man is a laughing animal. You have the various proposals of definitions of men, one is the thinking animal and one is the tool-making animal, which goes back to Benjamin Franklin. Marx takes this up that one defines man as a tool. And then you have Aristotle’s suggestion: Man is a laughing animal. So the only animal that can laugh – to laugh at what? To laugh, precisely, at being able to produce a certain break. The break in meaning. One way of describing this where I started – to make a break, to make a cut – is also to make a break in meaning in order to produce sense, if I may use this Deleuzian opposition between meaning and sense. And sense is the sort of unexpected thing which emerges. In order to produce this you have to cut down the usual expectation of meaning. The very horizon of meaning in which you move, in which you live your life. And this is the capacity of art.
Well, as far as humour is concerned, I would just point out that there’s a question of humour and there’s a question of ‘Witz’. Freud has written a book on ‘Witz’ and a different paper on humour and he says that those things are absolutely not to be confused. Additionally, there’s a question of comedy and there’s a question of irony. So we have four different things, which are not the same. We may laugh as a result, but there is laughter and laughter. Laughter itself does not have to be subversive. It can also be very conservative.
Who becomes an artist? What is it that makes people become artists?
I don’t think there’s a rule. There’s the capacity. The break making capacity. The way that we relate to ourselves is always conditioned by a break; This is a question of redoubling. Culture is a question of redoubling: it redoubles the normal life. It redoubles into something else.
But still there are some people who don’t become artists or intellectuals.
No no, of course. I think the capacity is there. But that is a capacity which defines humanity. And … how the hell do you become an artist? What particular things have to come together? I think what makes the greatness of art is precisely its singularity. Which means that if you could establish this rule, art would stop to be art.
But couldn’t it be that there is some reason why people start to make art? Robert Pfaller once suggested that artists might have some traumatic experience that they – all their lives – try to handle by making art.
Don’t we all have to handle some sort of traumatic experience? It’s very hard to say. I mean the question has been asked many times, so you have art schools which can precisely teach you everything except your sensuality.
Yeah, but art school starts at a moment where you already decided to go to art school. Who is likely to go to art school? So there are two aspects of this question. The one is: How do you become a good artist? The other question – which actually interests me – is: Why does someone want to become an artist? No matter if good or bad, if successful or not: what makes a person take up this way?
If you want to become an artist, what do you want to become? If I take some of the greatest musicians of all times, like Bach and Mozart or Haydn. You can see what? Who was Haydn? He was hired by the Esterhazy family as a craftsman. I mean, did he want to become an artist? I don’t think he ever thought of himself in that way actually. He was a paid craftsman. And if you look at Mozart, all the time he was trying to get hired by some court or something. If you look at Bach, who was employed by the church in Leipzig to produce a piece of music for mass every week.
It was not a question of genius or inspiration. You were hired. Because this was another craft and I don’t think anybody would look at themselves this way today. If you want to become an artist you don’t want to become a craftsman. You see yourself as a person with a special vocation, which goes beyond usual vocations.
Let’s stick to today’s understanding of art: Do you think artists are narcissistic?
The question of art and narcissism … I would say that on the one hand it’s profoundly narcissistic. It’s usually linked with a project of profound narcissism. But I don’t think that this is what makes art. As I said before: art is not expression. It’s not an expression of yourself. People may want to do it for that reason, to express themselves, but what makes the break and what makes the universal appeal, the claim of art, is not a question of whether they express themselves well or not. It’s just not the question by which art is ever judged. So on the one hand I’m sure that the motivation for doing this is in most cases narcissistic.
Did I understand you right when you said art is not an expression – could you say art is one of the ‘Prothesen’?
Yes. Oh yes.
I really like this picture.
The ‘Prothesengott’? Yes. But, well, Freud uses this in the context of technology and tool-making.
I have the feeling that it’s very good, maybe not only for tools.
Yes. It’s a good thing. It’s not just a question of tool. A tool is never a tool. It’s a libidinally invested extension of the body.
So you could also say art is a libidinal extension of yourself. Of the body.
Well, it has something to do with the libidinal extension. The way Freud introduces it, it has more to do with technology than with art. But I think it’s nevertheless a useful metaphor, also to think about art.
Could you also call it ‘object a’? Art as an extension towards ‘object a’?
Yes, of course. I didn’t want to use the heavily technical Lacanian language for this. I mean this could be described in another language, but what Lacan calls ‘objet a’ is precisely the transition object. The object of transition between the interior and exterior, neither falls into interior nor the external world out there; the objective world. I mean it’s neither subjective nor objective. In this sense it’s always in this zone of indeterminacy, in the zone, which is opened in between. And which is the zone of ‘Prothesen’ if you want, I mean the Prothesen always fill the zone: you put something between subjects and objects. You extend your body into the world, but the world extends into you.
Would you agree that artists and philosophers share similarities in the realities they live in?
Yes. I think there’s a lot of common ground. The tools with which they work are different, but I think they work on a common ground and that they can’t be clearly delineated. One way of differentiation – which I particularly dislike – is to say that artists have the passions and the feelings and they work with this and philosophers have the reason and understanding and they work with this. I don’t think this opposition is worth anything. It never works this way. I think that any human activity has both: indiscriminately has passion and reason inscribed into it.
If you look at the history of philosophy – look at Plato, look at Spinoza, look at St. Augustin, look at Hegel, Marx, Kant, Wittgenstein – there is a huge passion. This is terrible passion you have in this. They are passion-driven. These are not works of intellect. This is a completely wrong and common conception of philosophy that they just rationalise with some concepts. If it doesn’t involve the passionate attachment and the passionate involvement, then it’s not philosophy. There is very, very serious passion at work in this. And at the opposite end I think there is very, very precise thinking involved in art. If not it’s just no good art.
We were talking about passion and reason – do you think artists or philosophers can have a family? Do you think it can be organised to do such an ambitious or passionate work and to have love for people?
I think on the general level I don’t see why it should be exclusive. But this is not a question which concerns only art. I think it’s a question which concerns any sort of passionate attachment to your profession. I mean it could be a lawyer, a politician, a scientist, all kinds of things. It can be sport. It can be all kinds of things and it does produce problems, very practical problems, how the hell you deal with your family, with your love, with your private life. I think it very much depends on what kind of person you are. There are people who would somehow erase this and there are people who would always find ways, no matter how. They can work twenty hours a day but they will nevertheless find a way to have a private life.
And what can you tell me about passion? Where does it come from and what can you do to prevent its disappearance?
To prevent its disappearance?
Is there anything that can be done?
Have you ever read Ovid? “Remedia Amoris“, the remedies against love. The question that he asks is the opposite. Not how to keep the passion going but how to help from prevent it happening.
You can see through this a thousand years of antiquity: It’s not the problem how to keep your passion alive. It’s a problem of detachment. “Remedia Amoris“ are rather humorous. Ovid’s advice is: don’t go for it. Keep your mind, otherwise you go crazy. Passion is folly. This is a bad thing for you. It would completely ruin your life. So you have a history of passions. this is a stage of antiquity and then you have a certain stage of Christianity which again is very differentiated in itself. I mean the passion is the passion of Christ. So the passion worth having is the passion in this other sense. There is a passion worth having and which is this suffering you must undergo in order to be a worthy person, to be worthy of redemption. So this underscores, this gives the word passion a very different meaning. It comes from ‘patior’, ‘passus’, which means suffering. Like ‘Leidenschaft’ comes from ‘leiden’.
If I put it in this very, very reduced, simplistic way, the question of passion, which drives you, the question of passionate love is a question of romantic love, a certain conception of romantic love, which we deal with.
It’s a very interesting point that you made about the difference between trying to get rid of it or trying to keep it alive. You said before philosophy is always passionate, driven, so in this way it’s actually necessary to keep it. I didn’t only mean passion in private life, but also as an activating thing like in your work.
Yes, there has to be a passion which drives this. There’s an interesting passage in Helvetius. Helvetius, he was an enlightenment French philosopher and he has written this book ‘De l’esprit’ in 1759 and the book was actually burnt at that time and banned. He has a passage there which I always found terribly funny, he says: “Why are passionate people more intelligent than others?“ And he completely overturns this at either having intelligence – and then you can control your passions – or if you let the passions have the upper hand, then you lose your head. He puts these two together and he says: People never use their intelligence. I mean unless you are driven by a serious passion you won’t use the capacity for intelligence. It’s only the passionate people who are intelligent. Otherwise people are lazy. Come on, why use your head? You can always get along somehow. So, it’s only the passion, which actually drives you to use your reason. And this is just a funny way of putting it that you can’t see the two as being on opposed sides.
Do you have an influence on it, can you do something to keep it or to feed it?
I think passion is what drives you, drives you towards something. And it’s not that passion as such is enough. It’s not that it just drives you and you let yourself be driven. It actually demands a hell of a lot if you want to pursue this passion! It demands that you put something at stake, to risk.
To risk the usual ways of your life, the ‘bequemes Leben’, if you are lucky enough to have a comfortable social position. You have reduced yourself to the question of biological and social survival within a certain slot. And this is where the question of break comes in. The passion is what makes a break. But the break, it conditions, it demands a hell of a lot of ‘Anstrengung’ and you have to put things at risk. Sometimes drastically at risk. You risk everything for the question of passion, to pursue your passion.
What Freud names ‘Todestrieb’ (death drive) in “Jenseits des Lustprinzips“ (“Beyond the Pleasure Principle“) is too much of life. There’s too much of life, more than you can bear. So this is the excessive moment which derails the usual course of things and in order to pursue this it takes a lot of courage or persistence, perseverance. I think most people give up at a certain point. There are many ways of giving up, also as an artist. One way of giving up is to somehow be content with your role or to … ‘übereinstimmen’. So that you consent to being that role. And this is a socially assigned role which can bring glories, which can bring awards. If it started with a break – the break starts functioning as the institution of the break. The break itself gets institutionalised and highly valued.
It has a place then.
Yes, it has a place then. Freud has this wonderful phrase “people ruined by their own success“. It’s a wonderful phrase. And I think that in art many people are ruined by their own success. Precisely by succeeding in what they wanted to do and then they fit into this. They have made an institution of themselves and somehow started to believe that they are this. You have this wonderful phrase in Lacan: who is a madman? It’s not just an ordinary person who thinks that he’s a king. The definition of madman is a king who thinks that he’s a king. And you have this madness among artists who believe that they are artists. This is psychosis in a certain sense if you really think that you are what you are. You really think that you are an artist. This is the end of art, I think.
You were saying that one has to be courageous to proceed with passionate work. I have the feeling that there is another big thing, besides from missing courage, which might be a cushion for passion: The desire for containment, for feeling secure. I don’t know the best translation, I mean ‘Geborgenheit’.
Geborgenheit?
Yeah. You know Geborgenheit? Feeling secure.
Security, yes. Sicherheit.
A warm feeling.
Feeling at home. Is there a good way to feel at home? I don’t know. I think there’s always an ideological trap in this. What you mostly feel at home with is always ideology because it offers a sort of security. I mean security in the sense of providing a certain status within which you can dwell. And also security of meaning, which means it provides you with: “what does it all mean?”. ‘We live in parliamentary democracy, we’re a free society, in the era of progress and prosperity’, etc. I mean the worlds which somehow fulfil a certain horizon of meaning which situates you within a certain social moment and social structure, within a certain type of social relations. And this is always ideology, ideology is what makes this run. And I think that the break that we are talking about – the break with meaning or the break with the continuity of things – it could be described as a break with ideology. Art and ideology are at opposite ends. Art always makes a break, a cut into the ideological continuing of what you most feel at home with. I mean which is entrusted upon you. And this is not to say that art is not ideology, it can easily be turned into ideology.
At that point when you feel content.
Yes. When you feel content in your role. One could make a certain opposition between art and culture. I think culture is a sort of domestication of art. You have canonical artworks, which you are taught, at school. And it’s a question of what comes into the canon and is it a good thing to have a canon or how to include, exclude works. Of course you always have a canon. There’s no escaping this, but at the same time you have to understand that culture is always a domestification of what is dangerous or excessive in art. It domesticates things by giving them a sort of proper place and value. You can say: ‘Well, Shakespeare is the greatest dramatist of all time.’ I mean it’s quite true, but it’s also a very forced statement to somehow domesticate Shakespeare’s work.
It ends their quality of being a break by giving them a place.
Yeah. Giving them a certain continuity.
I have the feeling it’s a regressive desire.
For home?
Yeah. Isn’t it?
Yes. Ultimately yes. I think that being at home means being in the ideology and being in the meaning and having some sort of meaning secured. And I think that creating home as a way of being with yourself – or being with another person – is precisely to try to deal with the unhomely element of it. To keep the unhomely element of it alive. I think that love is keeping the non-homely element alive. It’s not to finally ‘go home’ with someone, but actually to keep this thing in the air. Keep this thing in the air. And comedy is precisely – to keep the ball in the air. Keep the ball in the air, I mean constantly.
So then I can come to my last question: How can one become happy in life?
(laughing): It beats me!
So this is why I kept it till the end. Is there a good strategy?
Ah, god knows!
Conny Habbel met Mladen Dolar on June 5, 2009 in Ljubljana.
Wiederabdruck
Dieses Interview erschien zuerst im Onlinemagazin „WIE GEHT KUNST?“ (www.wiegehtkunst.com) der Künstlerinnen Conny Habbel und Marlene Haderer.
Symptome der Krise
Die Probleme, die uns zur Abkehr vom Bestehenden allen Anlaß geben, können als bekannt vorausgesetzt werden. Es mag genügen, in einer stichwortartigen Zusammenfassung die schwerwiegendsten Faktoren der Gesamtproblematik vor Augen zu rücken.
Die militärische Bedrohung
Auch ohne aggressive Absichten der Supermächte besteht die Gefahr der atomaren Weltvernichtung. Die Kriegstechnologie und die Art der ins Absurde gesteigerten Waffenarsenale läßt eine sichere Kontrolle des unüberschaubar gewordenen Gesamtapparates nicht mehr zu. Trotz des angehäuften Potentials zur hundertfachen Zerstörung der Erde verschärft sich hinter den Kulissen sogenannter Abrüstungsverhandlungen das erbitterte Rüstungswettrennen von Jahr zu Jahr. Folge dieses kollektiven Wahnsinns ist ein riesenhafter Verschleiß von Energie und Rohstoffen und eine gigantische Vergeudung der kreativen Fähigkeiten von Millionen von Menschen.
Die ökologische Krise
Unser Verhältnis zur Natur ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß es ein durch und durch gestörtes geworden ist. Es droht die restlose Zerstörung der Naturgrundlage, auf der wir stehen. Wir sind auf dem besten Wege, diese Basis zu vernichten, indem wir ein Wirtschaftssystem praktizieren, das auf hemmungsloser Ausplünderung dieser Naturgrundlage beruht. Ganz klar muß ausgesprochen werden, daß das privatkapitalistische Wirtschaftssystem des Westens von dem staatskapitalistischen des Ostens sich in diesem Punkt grundsätzlich nicht unterscheidet. Die Vernichtung wird weltweit betrieben. Zwischen Bergwerk und Müllkippe erstreckt sich die Einbahnstraße der modernen Industriezivilisation, deren expansivem Wachstum immer mehr Lebenslinien und -kreisläufe des ökologischen Systems zum Opfer fallen.
Die Wirtschaftskrise
Sie äußert sich in einer Fülle von Symptomen, mit denen täglich die Zeitungsseiten gefüllt und die Nachrichtensendungen bestritten werden. Streik und Aussperrung, Abermillionen – weltweit gesehen – sind arbeitslos, können ihre Fähigkeiten nicht für die Gemeinschaft einsetzen. Da werden, um die heilige Kuh – die »Marktgesetze« – nicht schlachten zu müssen, Riesenmengen von wertvollsten Nahrungsgütern, die sich aus subventionierter Überproduktion ansammeln, ohne mit der Wimper zu zucken vernichtet, während in anderen Weltgegenden gleichzeitig Tausende täglich an Hunger sterben.
Da geht es nicht darum, für den Bedarf der Konsumenten zu produzieren, sondern um den geschickt getarnten Verschleiß der Güter.
Diese Art des Wirtschaftens liefert die Menschheit immer konsequenter der Macht einer Clique multinationaler Großkonzerne aus, die an ihren Konferenztischen mit den Spitzenfunktionären der kommunistischen Staatsmonopole über unser aller Schicksal entscheiden.
Verzichten wir auf eine weitere Charakterisierung dessen, was uns andauernd als die „Währungskrise“, die „Demokratiekrise“, die „Erziehungskrise“, die „Energiekrise“, die „staatliche Legitimationskrise“ usw. frei Haus geliefert wird, und kommen wir abschließend noch kurz auf
die Bewußtseins- und Sinnkrise
zu sprechen. Die meisten Menschen fühlen sich den Verhältnissen, die sie umgeben, hilflos ausgeliefert. Das führt zur Vernichtung auch ihrer Innerlichkeit. Sie können in den Destruktionsprozessen, denen sie unterworfen sind, in dem undurchschaubaren Knäuel staatlicher und ökonomischer Macht, in den Ablenkungs- und Zerstreuungsmanövern einer billigen Vergnügungsindustrie keinen Lebenssinn mehr erkennen.
Insbesondere junge Menschen verfallen in wachsender Zahl dem Alkoholismus, der Drogensucht, begehen Selbstmord. Hunderttausende fallen religiös getarnten Fanatikern zum Opfer. Weltflucht hat Hochkonjunktur. Das Gegenstück dieses Identitätsverlustes der Persönlichkeiten ist die Losung „nach mir die Sintflut“, das rücksichtslose Ausleben des Lustprinzips, der glatten Anpassung, um aus der ganzen Sinnlosigkeit wenigstens für sich, solange das Leben noch dauert, herauszuholen, was herauszuholen ist, ohne Rücksicht, auf wessen Rechnung dabei Wechsel ausgestellt werden. Es sind Wechsel, die unsere Umwelt, unsere Mitwelt und unsere Nachwelt zu begleichen haben. Es wird Zeit, die Systeme der „organisierten Verantwortungslosigkeit“ (Bahro) abzulösen durch eine Alternative des Ausgleichs und der Solidarität. (…)
Bei dem Entwurf der Alternative, d. h. des DRITTEN WEGES, von dem als erste kommunistische Partei jetzt auch die KPI in positiver Weise spricht, gehen wir vom Menschen aus. Er ist der Bildner der SOZIALEN PLASTIK und nach seinem Maß und seinem Wollen muß der soziale Organismus eingerichtet sein.
Nach Gefühl und Erkenntnis der Menschenwürde gelten dem Menschen heute drei Grundbedürfnisse als vorrangig:
1. Er will seine Anlagen und seine Persönlichkeit FREI ENTWICKELN und seine Fähigkeiten in Verbindung mit den Fähigkeiten seiner Mitmenschen FREI für einen als SINNVOLL erkannten Zweck einsetzen können.
2. Er erkennt jede Art von Privileg als untragbare Verletzung der demokratischen Gleichberechtigung. Er hat das Bedürfnis, als mündiger Mensch hinsichtlich aller Rechte und Pflichten – ob sie in einen wirtschaftlichen, sozialen, politischen oder kulturellen Zusammenhang gehören – als GLEICHER UNTER GLEICHEN zu gelten und am demokratischen Vereinbaren auf allen Ebenen und in allen Bereichen der Gesellschaft mitbestimmen zu können.
3. Er will SOLIDARITÄT SCHENKEN UND SOLIDARITÄT IN ANSPRUCH NEHMEN. Es mag vielleicht bezweifelt werden, daß darin ein vorrangiges Grundbedürfnis des heutigen Menschen zum Ausdruck kommt, weil der Egoismus das weithin dominante Motiv im Verhalten der Einzelnen ist.
Eine gewissenhafte Prüfung zeigt jedoch etwas anderes. Zwar mag der Egoismus noch im Vordergrund stehen und das Verhalten bestimmen. Aber: Ein Bedürfnis, ein angestrebtes Ideal ist er nicht. Er ist ein Trieb, der herrscht und beherrscht. Gewollt jedoch ist: DIE GEGENSEITIGE HILFE AUS FREIER ENTSCHEIDUNG.
Wenn dieser solidarische Impuls als das menschliche und menschheitliche Ideal empfunden wird, dann stellt sich die Aufgabe, jene Mechanismen, die aus den sozialen Strukturen heute den Egoismustrieb aktivieren, so umzuformen, daß sie den inneren menschlichen Absichten nicht mehr entgegenwirken. (…)
Was können wir für die Verwirklichung der Alternative jetzt tun?
Wer sich dieses Bild der evolutionären Alternative vor Augen führt, hat ein klares Grundverständnis von der SOZIALEN PLASTIK, an welcher der MENSCH ALS KÜNSTLER formt. Wer sagt, daß es eine Veränderung geben muß, aber die „Revolution der Begriffe“ überspringt und nur gegen die äußeren Verkörperungen der Ideologien anrennt, wird scheitern. Er wird entweder resignieren, sich mit Reformieren begnügen oder aber in der Sackgasse des Terrorismus landen. Drei Formen des Sieges der Strategie des Systems. Wenn abschließend daher gefragt ist: WAS KÖNNEN WIR TUN? damit wir das Ziel der Neugestaltung von den Fundamenten her auch erreichen, dann müssen wir uns klarmachen: Es gibt nur einen Weg, das Bestehende zu transformieren – aber dieser erfordert eine breite Palette von Maßnahmen.
Der einzige Weg ist die GEWALTFREIE TRANSFORMATION. Gewaltfrei nicht etwa darum, weil Gewalt zur Zeit oder aus bestimmten Gründen nicht erfolgversprechend erscheint. Nein. Gewaltfreiheit aus prinzipiellen menschlich-geistig-moralischen und politisch-gesellschaftlichen Gründen.
Einerseits steht und fällt die Würde des Menschen mit der Unverletzlichkeit der Person und die Ebene des Menschentums verläßt, wer dies mißachtet. Andererseits sind gerade die zu transformierenden Systeme auf Gewalt in jeder nur denkbaren Form aufgebaut. Deshalb ist jede Art von Gewaltanwendung ein Ausdruck systemkonformen Verhaltens, verfestigt also, was es auflösen will. Dieser Aufruf will ermutigen und auffordern, den Weg der gewaltfreien Transformation einzuschlagen. An solche, die bisher passiv waren, obwohl sie von Unbehagen und Unzufriedenheit erfüllt sind, ist die Aufforderung gerichtet: WERDET AKTIV. Eure Aktivität ist vielleicht das einzige, was jene, die aktiv sind, aber mit Mitteln der Gewalt liebäugeln oder schon Gewalt anwenden, auf den Weg der gewaltfreien Aktion zurückführen kann.
Obwohl die angezeigte „Revolution der Begriffe“ das Kernstück der hier vorgestellten Methode zur Veränderung ist, muß sie nicht unbedingt am Anfang aller Schritte stehen. Auch ist ihr jeder Absolutheitsanspruch fremd. Wer die Kraft hat, die Theorien des Marxismus, des Liberalismus, der christlichen Soziallehre usw. zu Ende zu denken, wird feststellen, daß er durchaus zu den gleichen Ergebnissen kommt wie wir.
Dieses Zu-Ende-Denken von historischen Ansätzen ist heute nötig. Wo es mutig vollbracht wurde, bemerkte man, wie die Fronten sich verschieben. Da steht Bahro dann Karl-Hermann Flach und William Borm näher als diese ihrem Parteifreund Lambsdorff und jener seinen Genossen, die ihn verhaftet und verurteilt haben.
Der Prozeß des Umschmelzens verhärteter Begrifflichkeiten und Theorieansätze ist in vollem Gange. Er muß zum GROSSEN DIALOG, zur interfraktionellen, interdisziplinären und internationalen Kommunikation zwischen den alternativen Lösungsmodellen führen. Die FREE INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY (Freie Hochschule für Kreativität und interdisziplinäre Forschung) ist das ständige Angebot, diese Kommunikation zu organisieren und zu entwickeln.
„Gegen die geballten Interessen der Mächtigen hat nur eine mitreißende Idee eine Chance, die wenigstens so stark ist wie die humanistische in den letzten und die christliche in den ersten Jahrhunderten unserer Zeitrechnung“ (Gruhl). Um von den verschiedenen Ansätzen, die in der neuen sozialen Bewegung leben, zu dieser „mitreißenden Idee“ durchzustoßen, brauchen wir den ständigen und umfassenden Dialog. FREIE INTERNATIONALE UNIVERSITÄT als ein organisatorischer Ort dieses Forschens, Arbeitens und Kommunizierens meint also alle die Gruppen und Keimzellen in unserer Gesellschaft, zu denen Menschen sich zusammengeschlossen haben, um gemeinsam die Fragen der sozialen Zukunft zu durchdenken. Je mehr Menschen sich mit diesen Arbeiten verbinden, desto kraftvoller und durchgreifender werden die alternativen Ideen zur Geltung kommen. Darum sei aufgerufen: GRÜNDET ARBEITSPLÄTZE DER FREIEN INTERNATIONALEN UNIVERSITÄT, der Universität des Volkes.
Aber dies allein genügt noch nicht. Überall dort, wo es möglich ist, sollten wir uns zur alternativen Lebens- und ArbeitsPRAXIS entschließen. Viele haben in kleinen Bereichen und speziellen Gebieten einen Anfang gemacht. Ein Zusammenschluß alternativer Wirtschafts- und Kulturunternehmen ist die AUFBAUINITIATIVE AKTION DRITTER WEG (Unternehmensverband, Stiftung, Mitgliedsorganisation). Einzelne Gruppen oder Betriebe, die ihren alternativen Ideen auch Taten folgen lassen wollen, sind aufgefordert, dieses Projekt zu stärken.
Ein letzter, aktueller Aspekt. Vielleicht der wichtigste und entscheidendste für den Weg der gewaltfreien Transformation. Wie kann die NEUE SOZIALE BEWEGUNG eine POLITISCHE DIMENSION erreichen?
Damit ist, jedenfalls für den Bereich der westlichen Demokratien, die Frage nach der Möglichkeit einer parlamentarischen Aktion gestellt. Gehen wir diesen Weg, dann gehen wir ihn nur richtig, wenn wir einen NEUEN STIL der politischen Arbeit und des politischen Organisierens entwickeln. Nur wenn wir uns in diesem neuen Stil üben, werden wir die Hindernisse überwinden, die für alternative Entwicklungen durch Sperrklauseln und ähnliches errichtet sind.
Es wäre schon nötig, daß auch von den Parlamenten her, für die ganze Öffentlichkeit wahrnehmbar, alternative Lösungsmodelle aufträten. Dazu aber müssen die Leute, die solche Modelle erarbeitet haben, in die Parlamente hineinkommen. Wie kommen sie hinein?
Indem sie ihre ganze Kraft auf eine GEMEINSAME WAHLINITIATIVE konzentrieren.
Entscheidend für einen solchen Versuch ist, welches Verständnis man von der Gesamtalternativenbewegung hat. Sie besteht ja aus einer Fülle von Strömungen, Initiativen, Organisationen, Institutionen usw. Sie alle haben nur in der Gemeinsamkeit eine Chance.
Gemeinsame Wahlinitiative heißt aber nicht: Parteiorganisation, Parteiprogramm, Parteidebatte im alten Stil. Die Einheit, deren es bedarf, kann nur die EINHEIT IN DER VIELFALT sein.
Die Bewegung der Bürgerinitiativen, die ökologische, die Friedens- und die Frauenbewegung, die Bewegung der Praxismodelle, die Bewegung für einen demokratischen Sozialismus, einen humanistischen Liberalismus, einen Dritten Weg, die anthroposophische Bewegung und die christlich-konfessionell orientierten Strömungen, die Bürgerrechtsbewegung und die 3. Welt-Bewegung müssen erkennen, daß sie unverzichtbare Bestandteile der Gesamtalternativenbewegung sind; Teile, die sich nicht ausschließen und widersprechen, sondern ergänzen.
Realität ist, daß es marxistische, katholische, evangelische, liberale, anthroposophische, ökologische usw. Alternativkonzepte und -initiativen gibt. In vielen wesentlichen Punkten besteht unter ihnen bereits ein hohes Maß an Übereinstimmung. Dieses ist die Basis der Gemeinsamkeit in der Einheit. In anderen Punkten besteht Nichtübereinstimmung. Dieses ist die Basis der Freiheit in der Einheit.
Eine gemeinsame Wahlinitiative der Gesamtalternativenbewegung ist nur lebenswirklich als ein BÜNDNIS vieler autonomer Gruppen, die ihr Verhältnis untereinander und gegenüber der Öffentlichkeit im Geiste AKTIVER TOLERANZ gestalten. Unsere Parlamente brauchen den befreienden Geist und das Leben einer solchen Union, der UNION FÜR DIE NEUE DEMOKRATIE.
Die Fahrzeuge, die den neuen Kurs nehmen, stehen also bereit. Sie bieten Platz und Arbeit für alle. (…)
WiederabdruckGekürzte Fassung. Erstveröffentlichung in der Frankfurter Rundschau vom 23.12.1978. Nachdruck aus Anlass der 1. Wahl zum Europäischen Parlament im Juni 1979, bei der Joseph Beuys für die „Sonstige politische Vereinigung Die Grünen“ kandidierte.
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