Revolution – what's next?

From Art Education to artEducation: making the education revolution into the visual arts teaching arena

admin — Mon, 05 Jan 2015 13:16:15 +0000

“At one very unfortunate moment in history some philistine or group of philistines in a position of power decided to isolate art from education and relegate it from its position in the metadiscipline of knowledge to the discipline and craft where it is today.”¹

Luis Camnitzer

The door of the bus opens and a group of twenty children and their teacher get off. They cross the big courtyard and approach Ship 16, which is located in the back to the left. The teacher knocks on the door and a short and very blonde woman wearing a blue, almost black, coat invites them in. The children feel the urge to run because of the magnitude of the clear space, merely splashed by the residents’ work cubicles, and, when they reach the end, they sit down forming a circle around the woman in the blue coat, because they have already recognized her: Essi Kaussalainen, the Finnish artist who had come to the school a week before and had asked them to work with her on Interior Landscape.
On the second day, to go back to our story about Hall 16, after explaining the rules of the game (do not touch the work of other residents with whom we shared space and do not harm one another), Essi asked the children to sign their artists’ contracts. After this, she disappears for a moment and comes back with a large container filled with flowers that she hands out to each participant. They each choose the flowers they like the most and connect them with themselves, transforming hereby the use of the plants as well as of their bodies and extending the latter in a vegetal form. By using the flowers, they shape part of their new corporal landscape. After this community collective action, Essi asks the children to sit down in a circle and to reflect on what had happened and what knowledge the community had created. Here, every participant explains the -elements that conform their Interior Landscape. After the activity, the children start running again, go through the door, cross the big courtyard and get on the bus empowered as cultural producers and with many questions with no answers.
The sequence that I just described: is it art or education? Is it Art Education or is it precisely the direction we have to go, an experience full of knowledge, process and creativity, an amazing and empowering step, a pleasant experience that connects us to reality, gives us knowledge and helps us critically reflect on what is happening in the world from the visual arts perspective?

Spending the imaginary: from Art Education to -artEducation
I have a very clear opinion on what has to come next in art education, and that is exactly what I am going to write about in this text. But I want to work from a point of possibilities, from the fact that in this moment there are professionals working towards change. I do not want to work only on the NOs, on what Art Education is NOT², I want to work on the YES and empower teachers of visual arts to carry out the paradigm shift that visual arts education needs.
Outside our field of work, the paradigm shift, the -educational revolution or how I call it, the #rEDUvolution, is already a common place. As of now, there are many voices, led by Ken Robinson, claiming for the change and it is absolutely evident that the change in methods in the world we live in is urgent and necessary.³ But, what happens in our field, in the didactics of visual arts? Art is a process inherent to the human being; therefore, this can be said about its teaching too. Throughout the history of mankind, new generations have been taught the forms and theories of artistic creation, mainly in oral form, and in each time and space adapted to their own contexts. In the present time, Art Education is anchored within a paradigm in which it does not belong. It is deeply rooted in school and dissociated from the world where contemporary art is created, and for various reasons it is bound to an obsolete model whose backbone is the production of so-called crafts. Today is the day when we have to reclaim the necessity of change in our field’s theories and practices and move from Art Education (I will use this term in this text in order to describe the most traditional practices that I consider need to be changed) to artEducation, a discipline founded on a series of main concepts.
The first key notion of this discipline is the idea of -removing the boundaries between Art and Education, bringing Bauman’s concept of liquidity into our field of work. In the perception of the most traditional Art Education, there is a tacit separation between that which is Art and what is Education, a notion which is definitely abandoned in artEducation. The second key idea is that Art Education does not mean KIDS painting. Our discipline is not intended to be exclusively for children; it is an area of knowledge whose practices are meant for individuals of any age and that, just as the rest of educational practices, has to be oriented towards intergenerationality.
The next main idea is to link two very concrete physical contexts: the school and the artist’s atelier. artEducation proposes that the learning related to arts and visual culture takes place anytime and anywhere, resulting in what we may call expanded artEducation, a concept that comes from the ideas of Dewey⁴ (Art as Experience) and Kaprow⁵ (The Education of the Un-Artist).
Besides, Art Education is not a discipline based on producing beautiful objects and pretty things. If we analyze the visual complexity in which societies will have to develop in the future, we are going to have to reclaim the work related to visual elements as one of the basic competences of every citizen.

Emancipatory knowledge
The previous ideas can be summarized in one statement: artEducation works on the basis of emancipatory knowledge, developed through a complex process and whose main way of working will be the creative remix. Let us analyze this statement in a more detailed way.
First of all, one of the main differences between Art Education and artEducation is that the latter accepts that any visual product surrounding us is an intellectual exercise whose true importance resides in the meanings that it generates; meanings that the spectators produce based on the body of knowledge they possess, their ability to associate and the context. The knowledge created from visual products is not trivial, it is knowledge that profoundly affects us; it is political and inclusive. ArtEducation not only addresses the color combination, but it addresses the question if a color combination is necessary. It asks who decides to carry out the color combination.⁶ It has to do with the reaction provoked by how my motivation for buying something unnecessary is influenced by the colors. In artEducation, manual and technical skills are part of the possibilities and very important competences, but they are not the axis of a world saturated by images.
In order to consider this intellectual implication of the visual worlds that surround us, artEducation works with macro-narratives as well as with micro-narratives on the same level. It incorporates the macro-narratives as basic knowledge in art class and emphasizes the importance of the analysis, and not only the construction of images. In both cases (analysis and production) we have to incorporate two essential elements: visual culture and contemporary art, both understood as visual macro- and micro-narratives. Visual language is the system mostly used in western societies today, because of its outstanding communication capabilities. ArtEducation promotes the incorporation of that group of images which are not considered artistic; contemporary visual culture understood as the channel that delivers the macro-narratives to us. This notion is part of the art curricula described in the 1996 book Postmodern Art Education: An Approach to Curriculum and is one of the strongest tendencies in our field of study, especially within the United States of America, where professionals like Kerry Freedman⁷ or Paul Duncum⁸ have developed a line of work called Art Education for Visual Culture.
But, let us not forget the micro-narratives. In spite of everything (and this is a reality that I face in every country I visit), when teachers dare to introduce art in the classroom, the artists and pieces selected very rarely would qualify as contemporary. Rubens or Picasso are probably the most commonly used artists, despite the fact that there are extraordinary visual representations made in our present time that we decide not to incor-porate into our practices. This leads to a complete ignorance on contemporary art within our societies, to its lack of appreciation and often to the most absolute disdain. In artEducation, just as we are using publicity in real time (the campaign that is being shown all around the city and during every commercial break), we have to incorporate contemporary artists, whose languages and techniques, even though we resist to accept it, perfectly fit with the aesthetics and the world envisioned by our students. Students who are educated through videos and who have no problems in understanding video art, students who instantly comprehend the message of Dignatario, Nadín Ospina’s pre-Colombian style sculpture made with terracotta that depicts Bart Simpson. Contemporary artists live immersed in social reality, so their work deals with current subjects: from pedophilia to maternity, from the destruction of nature to any sort of terrorism, from quantum physics to football. Contemporary art can therefore be linked to any topic and we can use it as an ideal way of beginning any content discussion in class. In short, contemporary art needs to be established as content in our daily work as educators, without eliminating the teaching of art from other periods.
It is easy to create hegemonic models of visual re-presentation. Because they are highly available, it is much easier to reproduce macro-narratives (images that were created by those in power, for example advertising, commercial cinema, many informative images and certain types of art) than to search for micro-narratives (images created by those not in power, for example counter-advertising and contemporary art, as well as craftwork or the visual products created by the students themselves, etc.). I still remember with astonishment a case repeated in several books dedicated to visual education: in these books, as an example to explain how a cross composition works, almost all authors chose a mythical piece, Rubens’s The Rape of the Sabine Women. In this painting, a group of terrified women, about to be raped, try to escape the torture and abuse, but, despite this incredible topic, teachers are still using it -(either on the book or by projecting it on the wall) to -explain how a specific form of composition works. By using it as didactic material, we are not only showing the students what a cross composition is, but we are teaching them to witness a future rape, we are telling them something like “this image is so perfect and its author is so important that its topic, sexual abuse on a group of women, is secondary”. This is what happens to images when we do not think of them in pedagogy, this is how they work when we are not able to reach the depths and only stay on the surface: we turn into transmitters of other’s ideas, which very often go against our own.
In order to make Art Education more contemporary, we have to start using symmetric images, that is to say we have to think about what we choose and project the same amount of macro-narratives as of micro-narratives. As professionals representing artEducation, we have to rethink the images that we work with and reorganize our selection based on the criterion of critical symmetry. The goal is to incorporate globalized as well as local images into our activities, created by men as well as by women, from the West and from other cultures, images that belong to high culture (museums, -scientific journals, renowned documentaries and official maps, etc.) and images from low culture (music videos, celebrity magazines, video games, etc.). We have to choose images from the past and the present, the ones that we like or we think are interesting, but also the ones that the students like and are interested in.
Finally, I would like to mention a process that we as 21^st century art educators have to refuse to participate in, and that is to decorate the institution where we work when our superiors want to look good in front of (mainly) the parents (when you have to organize “something pretty” to put on the wall, etc.). In dramatic contrast to the figure of the traditional art teacher, we have to create the figure of the artEducator, an intellectual who works on the interesting crossroads of art and education, where both fields meet and their borders dissolve. This is an expert who promotes art as a pedago-gical process and pedagogy as an artistic process, a professional with a hybrid profile who tears down the bipolarity of professional stereotypes that place artists and educators in opposite spheres, a professional whose work is genuinely intellectual, political and transfor-mative, along the same line as the Critical Pedagogy theorists who write about “teachers as transformative intellectuals”⁹ The next step is to visualize the intellectual value of the artEducator’s work and incorporate knowledge as the backbone of our practices.

Complex Process
The second important issue regards time, because traditional methods in art class inevitably teach the idea that artistic products are produced as if by magic: it is neither necessary to think about it nor to plan it and there are no different production stages. Everything is done spontaneously, in the moment, and this is why many people who visit museums think “I can do this too”, because no one has shown them the amount of effort, planning, time and energy that hide behind an apparently simple piece of art.
For this reason, the second key notion that we need in art education is the value of the process; the idea that any product requires planning and a lot of time from the moment it is designed to its exhibition. We urgently need the people involved in visual art related projects to understand the importance of transmitting exactly that, that all cultural producers work on projects and that a project is a temporal construct divided into different phases. In artEducation, just as it happens in the liquid world we live in, the true objective is to experience an object; an experience which is based on an intention and whose purpose is related to a socially relevant topic, committed to reality, developed with long term planning and produced in different phases. A work that is to be undertaken with passion and discipline and is created in a community, in a collaborative manner, the way todays artists work, in connection with other agents and combining the community’s different sources of knowledge in a rhizomic way, without privileging one knowledge over the other. This work comes into contact with the real professional world and therefore with its mechanisms of legitimization, which in the present day translates into the work’s exhibition in prestigious cultural institutions.
The process not only involves the production phase, but also analysis. While in traditional art education the emphasis is absolutely put on production, on the necessity to build an object that we can take home in order to temporally decorate our refrigerator, in art-Education, the analysis process is equally important. We support the notion that to analyze is an act of -cultural production, just as Spanish artist Joan Font-cuberta -proposes: “The most genuine and coherent -creative act of our time does not consist in producing new images, but in assigning meaning to the existing ones.”¹⁰ In -artEducation, we have to design at least 50% of activities related to analysis, because the processes of analyzing, deconstructing and reflecting are absolutely on the same level as producing. Moreover, it has to become a habit, it should become the recount that my daughters do when they watch a movie and estimate how many girls are shown and if they play secondary or leading roles.

Creative Remix
Emancipatory knowledge and process cannot move forward without creativity, but the latter understood in a contemporary way, as a remix. When creativity is mentioned within the context of art education, it always -refers to the students’ creativity. In artEducation, creativity will also be the teacher’s basic competence, a teacher who sees her or his role as a cultural producer. Nonetheless, in a hyper technical world where the figure of an expert has been entirely modified, to be a cultural producer is something very different to the notion we had in the past and it may be similar to how Nicolas Bourriaud defines a visual artist: “[For present artists] It is no longer a matter of elaborating a form on the basis of a raw material but working with objects that are already in circulation on the cultural market […]. Notions of originality (being at the origin of) and even of creation (making something from nothing) are slowly blurred in this new cultural landscape marked by the twin figures of the DJ and the programmer, both of whom have the task of selecting cultural objects and inserting them into new contexts.”¹¹Bourriaud is one of the most interesting theorists reflecting on the roles of today’s artist. Investigative and critical, his two books Relational Aesthetics¹² and Postproduction¹³ can be interpreted as essays on contemporary art or essays intimately related to pedagogy. According to Bourriaud, in the 21^st century the term author (regardless if we are musicians, chefs or teachers) acquires a new meaning: we create on the foundations of other people’s ideas. The notion of producing knowledge in a rhizomatic way, laid out by French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari,¹⁴ proposes that to copy is to (re)generate, such that a DJ generates a personal discourse when arranging other’s music in a specific way. In Postproduction, Bourriaud defends the theory of the artist as a DJ, a creator who works with what has been created, because “[a]ll these artistic practices […] have in common the recourse to already produced forms. They testify to a willingness to inscribe the work of art within a network of signs and significations, instead of considering it an autonomous or original form”.¹⁵Bourriaud’s conviction is clear: it is unthinkable for us to create something out of nothing, a notion that is directly linked to the rhizome concept. When creating, we always start from a previous input, in a way that we make (new) connections and the genuine and completely original creation loses its meaning. For present artists, to reprogram may be a new verb, but if we analyze it thoroughly, it is something that we teachers have always done, because the content that we work with has hardly ever been entirely ours. For this reason, educational work in the 21^st century has to be founded on the notion of the teacher as a DJ, specifying our work as producers of remixes and validating the idea that a remix is a creation, not a copy.

In the beginning of this text, I sustained that a paradigm shift within educational practices in visual arts is a basic necessity. This challenge is to be addressed on the basis of artEducation, a model which produces emancipatory knowledge developed through a complex process and whose main working method is the creative remix. What is yet to come is to make these ideas our own and to transform them in order to make them tangible in classrooms, museums and hospitals, out on the streets and in our homes. If visual art education is not transformed in an area of contemporary knowledge, its own obsolescence will eliminate it. This is what is yet to come.

Translation: Dana Ersig / 2014.

1.) Luis Camnitzer, Introducción. Educación para el arte. Arte para la educación. Porto Alegre 2009. (www.yumpu.com/es/document/view/14213328/arte-e-educacao-fundacao-bienal-do-mercosul/287; also: http://mariaacaso.blogspot.de/2013/10/2013-el-museo-es-una-escuela-i-la-9.html)
2.) María Acaso, La educación artística no son manualidades. Nuevas prácticas en la enseñanza de las artes y la cultura visual. Madrid 2009.
3.) María Acaso, rEDUvolution. Hacer la revolución en la educación. Barcelona 2013.
4.) John Dewey, Experience and education. New York 1883.
5.) Allan Kaprow, “The Education of the Un-Artist”, in: Idem, Essays on the Blurring of Art and Life, Berkeley 2003.
6.) María Acaso, La educación artística no son manualidades. Nuevas prácticas en la enseñanza de las artes y la cultura visual. Madrid 2009.
7.) Kerry Freedman, Teaching Visual Culture: Curriculum, Aesthetics and the Social Life of Art. NY/Reston 2003.
8.) Paul Duncum, Visual culture in the art class: case studies. Reston 2006.
9.) Henry Giroux, Teachers as Intellectuals: Toward a Critical Pedagogy of Learning. Santa Barbara 1988.
10.) Original Spanish quote: “El acto de creación más genuino y coherente en nuestros días no consiste en producir nuevas imágenes, sino en asignar sentido a las existentes” (Joan Fontcuberta et al., Contranatura, Barcelona 2001.)
11.) Nicolas Bourriaud, Postproduction: Culture as Screenplay: How Art Reprograms the World. New York 2002, p. 6. (http://faculty.georgetown.edu/irvinem/theory/Bourriaud-Postproduction2.pdf)
12.) Nicolas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics. Dijon 2002.
13.) Nicolas Bourriaud, Postproduction, 2002.
14.) Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, L’Anti-Œdipe. Paris 1972.
15.) Nicolas Bourriaud, Postproduction, 2002.

Lasst doch die Reichen reich sein

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:49 +0000

Die Krise hilft dem Kapitalismus, glaubt Slavoj Žižek, der «gefährlichste Philosoph des Westens». Im Gespräch erklärt der Marxist, warum er es dennoch für falsch hält, sich einzumischen.

SZ: Worüber wollen Sie überhaupt mit mir sprechen? Finanzkrise, Politik, Wirtschaft – das finde ich alles nicht interessant. Wir leben in einer Zeit, in der man sagen muss: Scheiss drauf! Die Welt wird untergehen, wir alle werden sterben, was solls? Es ist mir egal – das ist meine Einstellung. Ich glaube nicht an die Erpressung, dass sich die Theorie nicht in einem Elfenbeinturm verkriechen, sondern sich einmischen soll. Nein, das sollte sie eben nicht! Sich einzumischen, ist heute das Rezept der Mächtigen. Deshalb führen sie an den Universitäten die Bologna-Reform durch. Sie wollen uns zu Experten machen, die konkrete Probleme lösen. Aber seien wir ehrlich: Welches Problem hat Marx schon wirklich gelöst?

WOZ: Was dann? Rumsitzen und nichts tun?
Pure abstrakte Theorie! Geniesst sie. Alles Gute entstand schon immer als Kollateralschaden.

Sie sind ja richtig zynisch.
Wissen Sie, wer heute sagt, wir müssten uns engagieren und einmischen? Bill Gates! Humanitaristen sprechen so! Ihre Botschaft ist: Denke nicht zu viel, handle einfach …

Sie pfeifen jetzt also auf die Welt und machen nur noch reine Philosophie?
Jeder echte Theoretiker hat diese Einstellung, auch Marx. Mit der Bologna-Reform will man uns weismachen, Wissen müsse einen sozialen Nutzen haben, Probleme lösen und so weiter. Das ist ja der Trick der Mächtigen: Sie wollen Experten, die Probleme lösen, die sie definieren. Aber der erste Schritt der Theorie ist, selbst Probleme zu formulieren …

Nur zu, wie formulieren Sie das grösste Problem unserer Zeit?
Ich bin Marxist. Bei allen Ungewissheiten, die wir heute haben, ist das wesentliche Problem der Kapitalismus. Aber ich bin bereit, dem Teufel zu geben, was dem Teufel gehört: Der Kapitalismus ist mit Abstand das effizienteste Wirtschaftssystem, das wir kennen. Der bisherige Kommunismus hat in speziellen Momenten funktioniert, etwa während einer schnellen Industrialisierungsphase. Aber darauf folgte immer Stagnation – ausser man macht es wie China und übernimmt den Kapitalismus.

Eine schöne Ironie, finden Sie nicht? Ausgerechnet das sogenannt kommunistische China ist zum Vorbild für den kapitalistischen Westen des 21. Jahrhunderts geworden.
Marx dachte, dass die kapitalistische Ausbeutung am besten unter formaler Freiheit funktioniert. Ich muss also zum Beispiel meine Arbeitskraft in Ihrer Fabrik verkaufen, weil ich selbst keine besitze. Formal bin ich aber frei. Ich glaube, dass sich der Kapitalismus diese formale Freiheit immer weniger leisten kann. Die wahre Ironie ist: Für Marx war es beispielhafte Ausbeutung, dass man den ganzen Tag in einer dummen Fabrik arbeiten musste, regelmässige Arbeitszeiten hatte und dabei ausgebeutet wurde. Entschuldigung, aber heute ist es ein Privileg, regelmässige Arbeitszeiten zu haben. In den südeuropäischen Ländern gibt es eine junge Generation, die studiert und schon im Voraus weiss, dass sie keinen Job finden wird. Die haben nicht einmal die Chance, ausgebeutet zu werden.
Wissen Sie, dass die britische Regierung unter David Cameron von nun an in offiziellen Dokumenten nicht mehr das Wort «unemployed» (nicht angestellt) verwendet, sondern «workless» (arbeitslos)? Wunderbar, nicht? «Unemployed» heisst ja: Ich will arbeiten, aber niemand stellt mich an. «Workless» hingegen tönt sehr ähnlich wie «worthless» (wertlos) und heisst eben: Ich arbeite nicht.

Wie definieren Sie überhaupt «Kapitalismus»?
Kapitalismus ist für mich ein System, in dem der ganze Sinn des ökonomischen Kreislaufs dem Profit dient – der Kapitalbesitzer kann aber auch der Staat sein. Derzeit passiert etwas Interessantes: Es gibt einen Trend vom Profit – der Ausbeutung der Arbeit – zur Rente, also etwa dem Verdienst am Boden: China kauft das beste Land in Afrika. Dabei geht es China nicht mal mehr darum, die lokale Bevölkerung auszubeuten. In Sambia gab es eine Rebellion in einer Mine, die von Chinesen gekauft wurde. Die Chinesen hatten versprochen, der lokalen Bevölkerung Jobs zu geben. Dann verabschiedete die sambische Regierung ein Gesetz, wonach der Mindestlohn umgerechnet rund 240 Euro im Monat betragen sollte. Die Chinesen sagten: Fuck you, wir bringen unsere eigenen Arbeiter aus dem chinesischen Hinterland. Die machen das für 150.
Noch ein Beispiel: wieder Bill Gates. Wen beutet er aus? Seine Arbeiter? Nein, er hat die intellektuellen Gemeingüter monopolisiert. Wenn wir kommunizieren, zahlen wir ihm Miete. Das ist der Punkt: Wir müssen den Marxismus auf die heutigen Bedingungen übertragen. Was hat sich geändert? Das ist die Frage.

Als Philosoph definieren Sie all diese Probleme, schön. Doch was damit tun?
Ich kann nur sagen: Wir können nicht einfach rumsitzen und auf die grosse Revolution warten. Vor kurzem haben mich ein paar idiotische Linke als Prokapitalisten beschimpft, weil ich gesagt hatte, dass Barack Obama etwas ganz Grosses geleistet hat – trotz meiner Enttäuschung über ihn. Mit der Gesundheitsreform hat er eine entscheidende Debatte ausgelöst. Denn sie störte den Kern der amerikanischen Ideologie: diese falsche Vorstellung von Wahlfreiheit. Wahlfreiheit ist etwas Tolles. Aber damit sie funktioniert, braucht es ein komplexes System eines Staatsapparats, das einen Rahmen vorgibt. Deshalb war die Reaktion auf die Gesundheitsreform ja auch so panisch. Obama hat etwas vorgeschlagen, was in vielen anderen Staaten funktioniert. Man konnte ihn also nicht ernsthaft beschuldigen, er propagiere eine irre linke Idee.

Wir sind etwas erstaunt: In einem Ihrer Bücher kritisieren Sie den Philosophen John Caputo, weil er sagt, man könne innerhalb des Kapitalismus Reformen anstreben. Sie schreiben, Reformen seien innerhalb dieses Systems gar nicht möglich.
Ah, wer weiss? Freunde haben mich überzeugt, dass der Widerspruch zwischen bescheidener Reform und grosser Revolution bis zu einem gewissen Punkt gar keiner ist.

Aber genau das haben Sie dort geschrieben.
Ah, ah, ah, … vorsichtig, vorsichtig! Ich habe nie gesagt, jede Reform sei unnütz. Wenn Sie sich mit erfolgreichen Revolutionen befassen, sehen Sie, dass diese nie von Beginn weg als totaler Wandel daherkamen. Es geht immer um etwas ganz Spezifisches, und erst dann bemerkt man, dass es dafür viel mehr braucht: noch eine Änderung und noch eine und so weiter.
Ich erinnere mich an meine Zeit als gemässigter Dissident im kommunistischen Slowenien. Es war kein Problem zu sagen, der Kommunismus lege den Grundstein für den Nationalsozialismus. Ein Problem kriegte man, wenn man hier und da eine Änderung im Strafgesetz wollte. Verstehen Sie, was ich meine? Eine kleine präzise Änderung kann manchmal viel gefährlicher sein als der grosse metaphysische Umsturz.
Meine Antwort auf John Caputo ist ganz einfach: Wenn Reformen wirklich möglich sind, warum passieren sie dann nicht? Diese Krise wird dem Kapitalismus helfen! Das habe ich immer gesagt. Die Publizistin Naomi Klein würde sagen: «Die Krise wird als Schocktherapie gebraucht.» In vielen Ländern wird der Wohlfahrtsstaat derzeit zurückgedrängt. Und sogar die Linke akzeptiert die Agenda, nach der wir Sparprogramme brauchen.

Sie glauben nicht an eine soziale Demokratie?
Lassen Sie es uns versuchen! Ich bin nur pessimistisch, dass wir es schaffen können. Aber verstehen Sie mich nicht falsch. Ich bin kein linker Masochist, der sagt: Je schlimmer es uns geht, desto besser geht es unserer Sache. Nein, nein. Ich ziehe den brasilianischen Weg von Lula da Silva und jetzt Dilma Rousseff dem von Hugo Chávez in Venezuela vor.

Tatsächlich?
Ja, natürlich. Wissen Sie, ich habe meinen privaten KGB, der mir gewisse Informationen liefert (lacht). Chávez ist fürchterlich. Das Problem ist, dass er zu viel Geld hat. Und anstatt Probleme zu lösen, wirft er den Menschen Geld zu. Wenn Sie denken, ich sei ein irrer Totalitärer, wird Sie folgende Geschichte überraschen: Als ich in Griechenland Alexis Tsipras von der Syriza besuchte …

… warum unterstützen Sie als Kommunist eigentlich die linke Partei Syriza und nicht die griechischen Kommunisten?
Weil das Idioten sind. Die warten auf die grosse Revolution! Ihr Hauptfeind ist die Sozialdemokratie. Das sind Hardliner-Kommunisten. Und trotz meiner eigenen Exzentrizität sind sie mir ein bisschen zu verrückt. Es ist die einzige kommunistische Partei, die in ihrer eigenen Druckerei noch immer regelmässig Stalins komplettes Werk druckt und veröffentlicht.
Aber zurück zur Syriza: Tsipras erzählte mir eine tragische Geschichte, die ich bisher nicht publik gemacht habe, weil ich befürchtete, der Syriza zu schaden. Ich fragte ihn, ob er vor den Wahlen von Russland oder China kontaktiert worden sei. Von China habe er nichts gehört, sagte er, aber die Chinesen hätten den Hafen von Piräus gekauft, alle Angestellten gefeuert, Gewerkschaften verhindert und so weiter. Die Russen hingegen kamen – und Tsipras zitterte fast, als er mir das erzählte – und sagten: Wir sind bereit, euch zu retten. Und dann gaben sie ihm eine Liste mit all den profitablen staatlichen Telekommunikationsfirmen, die sie übernehmen wollten, plus – und hier kommt der grosse Clou – eine Insel, die sie für hundert Jahre als Militärbasis nutzen wollten. Tsipras sagte mir, er habe alle Illusionen verloren.
Was ich an der Syriza bewundere: Die sind nicht so wie andere Linke, die Angst vor der Macht haben. Die zwar von aussen Druck auf den Staat aufsetzen, sich aber die Hände nicht schmutzig machen wollen. Die Syriza wusste vor der Wahl, dass die Partei nach einem Sieg tief in der Scheisse stecken würde. Sie hätte den ganzen Staatsapparat gegen sich gehabt. Ich mag diesen authentischen Heroismus, auch wenn alles verloren ist. Und da zitiere ich sehr gerne Samuel Beckett: «Okay, wir werden scheitern, aber das nächste Mal scheitern wir besser.»

Sie schwanken zwischen Pessimismus und Optimismus …
Ich bin kein völliger Pessimist. Nehmen wir zum Beispiel 1968. Gut, ich mache mich oft lustig darüber: Die Achtundsechziger waren gegen unterdrückende Staatsbildung, gegen Serienarbeit und gegen familiäre Unterdrückung; heute haben wir stattdessen privatisierte Bildung, Kurzarbeitsverträge und billigen Hedonismus. Aber ein Ergebnis der sechziger Jahre ist auch, dass man heute nicht mehr so verächtlich über Frauen reden darf wie früher, auch dass man sich nicht mehr rassistisch äussern kann. In dieser Frage bin ich ein hegelianischer Idealist: Jaja, die Wirtschaft ist schon wichtig. Aber ebenso wichtig ist, was Hegel die «sittliche Substanz» nannte – diese ungeschriebenen Regeln.

Was meinen Sie damit?
In Europa sollte das Motto der Linken «Mehr Dogmatismus» sein. Als ich das kürzlich an einer Debatte sagte, dachten die Leute, ich werde langsam ein verrückter Stalinist. Aber mit Dogmen meine ich nicht, dass ein Zentralkomitee alles vorschreibt. Ich meine, dass gewisse Haltungen selbstverständlich sein müssen. 1968 hat uns einen neuen Dogmatismus gebracht. Danach konnte man nicht mehr öffentlich sagen: Vielleicht mögen es Frauen ja, vergewaltigt zu werden. Wenn man das heute sagt, erreicht man nicht einmal mehr eine Kontroverse, man steht nur als kompletter Idiot da. In diesem Sinn brauchen wir Dogmen. Ich mag nicht in einer Gesellschaft leben, in der man ständig darüber diskutieren muss, warum Frauen nicht vergewaltigt werden dürfen. Dasselbe gilt für Rassismus …

Gerade da gibt es heute aber gewisse Rückschritte.
Ja, und das bereitet mir Sorgen. Hier bin ich mit Jean-Marie Le Pen einig, dem Gründer des rechtsextremen Front National. Nachdem er zum ersten Mal die Wahlen verloren hatte, sagte er: «Ich habe verloren, weil ich gewonnen habe – meine Themen sind jetzt von allen akzeptiert.»
Die Linke ist in solchen Fragen sehr scheinheilig, gerade in Frankreich: Wie gross war die Aufregung, als Nicolas Sarkozy ein paar Roma ausschaffte. Aber François Hollande macht heute genau dasselbe, sogar noch viel systematischer. Das ist der Erfolg von Le Pen! In ähnlicher Weise antwortete Margaret Thatcher einmal, als sie gefragt wurde, was ihre grösste Errungenschaft gewesen sei: «New Labour!»

Umgekehrt werden heute selbst in grossen konservativen Zeitungen Debatten über den Kapitalismus geführt.
Ja, nehmen wir zum Beispiel den Philosophen Peter Sloterdijk. Er sagt: Im 20. Jahrhundert dachten wir, nur die vereinten Armen könnten uns retten – heute wissen wir, nur die Ultrareichen können uns retten. Okay, Sloterdijk ist etwas verrückt, aber das bin ich auch. Er kämpft allerdings mit den gleichen Problemen wie ich: Wie können wir die sozialdemokratischen Werte beibehalten? Wie die Reichen richtig besteuern? Nur, dann wird Sloterdijk völlig verrückt und macht einen Vorschlag, der natürlich nicht funktioniert: dass wir den Reichen mehr soziale Anerkennung schenken und ihre Erfolge nicht kritisieren sollen.

Was wäre denn Ihre Antwort: Was soll man mit den Reichen tun?
Keine Ahnung, das ist mir egal. Lassen wir sie doch reich sein.

Ist Ungleichheit für Sie kein Problem?
Selbstverständlich. Aber vergessen Sie nicht, ich bin Marxist. Marx betont, dass Gleichheit ein bourgeoiser Slogan ist. Das Problem ist nicht die Ungleichheit, sondern die marktorientierte kapitalistische Reproduktion. Kann dieses System weiter funktionieren, oder werden ihre Folgen zu seiner Selbstzerstörung führen?

Selbstzerstörung? Das behauptet die Linke schon seit über hundert Jahren, aber der Kapitalismus funktioniert wunderbar.
Ich weiss. Ich mache mich ja auch darüber lustig …

Aber eben haben Sie doch von Selbstzerstörung gesprochen.
Lassen Sie mich meinen Kronzeugen anführen: Francis Fukuyama.

Fukuyama? Der in den neunziger Jahren behauptete, die Heirat von Kapitalismus und Demokratie bedeute das Ende der Geschichte?
Genau. Aber Fukuyama ist kein Idiot, der sagte, alles sei vorüber. Er meinte nur: Das ultimative System ist eine sozial verantwortliche kapitalistische Demokratie, also sollten wir nicht mehr länger die grossen Fragen über den Kapitalismus und den Staat stellen. Wir sollten ihn in diesem Rahmen effizienter machen. Das letzte Mal, als ich Fukuyama traf, kam die Überraschung: Er ist kein Fukuyamaist mehr. Es sagte sogar, dass wir stärkere soziale Regulierungen bräuchten, einen radikalen Wandel.

Fukuyama glaubte, Kapitalismus und Demokratie gingen Hand in Hand, stattdessen höhlt der Kapitalismus die Demokratie aus.
Heute zweifelt er an seiner These. Wir mussten lachen, als ich Fukuyama sagte: «Okay, du hast recht, der Kommunismus hat verloren. Aber der Kommunismus hat seine Rache, die effizientesten Manager des Kapitalismus sind Exkommunisten!»
Ich mache mich nicht lustig über den Kapitalismus. Denn es ist wahr, dass die einzige stabile Demokratie, auch wenn sie eingeschränkt war, im Kapitalismus existierte. Der Kapitalismus tolerierte hie und da Diktaturen für ein Jahrzehnt oder so. Aber wenn die Dinge wirklich anfingen zu laufen, dann gab es eine explodierende Nachfrage nach Demokratie. Das war in Südkorea so, in Chile und so weiter. Doch nun gibt es eine beängstigende Entwicklung: Vielleicht erleben wir im Fernen Osten derzeit eine Scheidung dieser ewigen Hochzeit zwischen Kapitalismus und Demokratie. Peter Sloterdijk glaubt, in hundert Jahren würde ein Monument für Lee Kuan Yew errichtet werden, den Vater des autoritären Kapitalismus von Singapur.
Verstehen Sie mich nicht falsch. Ich glaube nicht, dass es morgen keine Demokratie mehr geben wird, aber sie wird immer mehr ihrer Substanz beraubt. Ich hasse linke Liberale, die nur alte Klischees hervorkramen und sagen: Oh, da entsteht ein neuer Faschismus. Das stimmt nicht! Es ist ein neues autoritäres System, in dem sich nicht alles um einen Führer dreht, eine Art permissiver Autoritarismus. Da zieht etwas wirklich Neues auf. Und wir haben keine überzeugende Theorie dafür. «Wissensgesellschaft», «Risikogesellschaft», «postmoderne Gesellschaft» – das sind nur Schlagwörter von Journalisten. Was ist China heute? Hat dort der Kapitalismus triumphiert? Oder ist China irgendein Hybrid?

Stört es Sie überhaupt, dass die Demokratie erodiert? In einem Dokumentarfilm entschuldigen Sie sich für eines Ihrer frühen Bücher mit den Worten: «O Gott, damals befürwortete ich die Demokratie.»
Gut, da spielte ich ein doppeltes Spiel. Mein Argument ist Folgendes: Die Journalistin Anne Applebaum machte sich nach Occupy Wallstreet zuerst lustig über die Bewegung, weil sie nur protestierte und sich nicht im parlamentarischen Prozess engagierte. Aber sie sagte auch, die heutige institutionelle nationalstaatliche Demokratie sei durch den globalen Kapitalismus gefährdet, weil immer mehr ausserhalb ihrer Kontrolle geschehe. In ihrer Schlussfolgerung kehrte Applebaum jedoch wieder zum ersten Argument zurück und sagte, der einzige Weg sei, geduldig in den Institutionen weiterzuarbeiten.
Logische Konsequenz wäre aber: Entweder akzeptieren wir, dass wir den globalen Kapitalismus nicht kontrollieren können, oder wir müssen die Demokratie neu erfinden.

Für welchen Weg sind Sie?
Wir sollten uns mit aller Kraft engagieren, wir müssen uns aber gleichzeitig darüber im Klaren sein, dass langfristig ein radikalerer Wandel nötig ist.

Aber Sie glauben nicht, dass der Wandel innerhalb der Demokratie erfolgen kann …
Nicht in dieser Demokratie, nein.

Haben wir nicht im 20. Jahrhundert gelernt, dass man schnell im Totalitarismus landet, wenn man sich nicht klar zur Demokratie bekennt?
Da bin ich skeptisch. Die Lehre aus dem 20. Jahrhundert ist, dass der Totalitarismus aus der Demokratie hervorging. Wie sieht die typische Geburt eines totalitären Systems aus? Normalerweise hat man zuerst eine Demokratie. Doch dann kommt eine Krise oder was auch immer, und die Demokratie kann diese Krise nicht kontrollieren. Österreich und Deutschland waren Demokratien, die sich in den Totalitarismus entwickelten.
Es geht also um die Frage, was man unter Demokratie versteht. Wenn man damit eine Art von Souveränität des Volks meint, bin ich absolut ein Demokrat. In dem Sinn, wie es der Philosoph Claude Lefort formuliert hat: Demokratie bedeutet, dass niemand a priori ein Recht hat, den Platz der Macht einzunehmen. Der Ort der Macht ist leer. Wir haben nur das Recht, den Ort für kurze Zeit zu besetzen.

Kommen wir auf Ihre spezifische Rolle als Philosoph zu sprechen …
Meine Rolle ist sehr komplex.

In einem Buch kritisieren Sie die Proteste gegen den Angriff der USA auf den Irak, weil die Protestierenden damit paradoxerweise den Krieg legitimierten. Sie zitieren dafür George Bush, der sagte: «Sehen Sie, genau dafür kämpfen wir: dass das, was Sie hier tun – gegen die Politik Ihrer Regierung zu protestieren –, auch im Irak möglich wird!»
Und Sie wollen sagen, dass ich dasselbe tue, oder wie?

Sagen Sie es uns.
Nein, das tue ich nicht! Schauen Sie doch nur einmal, welchen Anfeindungen ich ausgesetzt bin.

Trotz Ihrer radikalen Rhetorik werden Sie ja niemals wirklich gefährlich.
Warum greifen mich die Leute dann so an?! Ich werde nicht mehr länger als Clown angesehen: John Gray hat in der «New York Review of Books» behauptet, dass ich die Legitimation für einen neuen Holocaust liefere! Das ging wirklich zu weit. Das ist nicht lustig: In Ungarn beispielsweise kehrt der alte Antisemitismus ja gerade wirklich zurück. Neulich hatte ich einen Zusammenstoss mit dem französischen Philosophen Bernard Henri-Lévy, der die stupide Behauptung aufstellt, der neue Antisemitismus komme entweder von links, oder er verschwinde vollständig. Er griff gar das marxistische Argument auf, dass Antisemitismus eine primitive Form des Antikapitalismus ist.

Stimmt das etwa nicht?
Doch, damit bin ich einverstanden. Aber er kehrte es um: Er behauptete, heute sei der Antikapitalismus in Wahrheit ein verkappter Antisemitismus! Woher kommt dieser Drang, mich so zu porträtieren? Und Sie, Sie tun ja dasselbe, mein Gott! Jetzt sagen Sie, man halte mich für einen Clown. Aber vorhin sagten Sie noch: Äh, sind Sie nicht ein wenig antidemokratisch?

Das tun wir nicht. Wir haben lediglich gefragt, ob die grosse intellektuelle Kritik jemals gefährlich werden kann.
Versuchen Sie nicht, mir diesen linksliberalen Bullshit zu verkaufen, es habe im 20. Jahrhundert eine Art goldene Ära gegeben, in der die Menschen auf öffentliche Intellektuelle gehört hätten. Diese Ära gab es nicht, niemals. Nochmals: Ich werde ja oft von verschiedenen Seiten angegriffen. Eine israelische Zeitung hat mein Buch «Willkommen in der Wüste des Realen» als brutalsten offenen Antisemitismus verrissen. Oh, oh, oh! Aber die Beilage der ägyptischen Zeitung «Al-Ahram» bezeichnete das Buch als perfideste zionistische Propaganda!

Sie werden ja aber nicht nur angegriffen, sondern auch gelobt.
Wo? Das sind so wenige!

Wo immer Sie auftreten, erscheinen viele Leute, Sie füllen Hallen. Manchmal hat man den Eindruck, Sie seien so etwas wie der Jesus der Linken.
Und dennoch: Wenn sie sich dann ernsthaft mit meiner Theorie auseinandersetzen müssen, sagen die Leute: Okay, Zizek ist vielleicht unterhaltsam, aber da gibt es etwas Gefährliches an ihm.

Ärgert Sie das?
Nein, ich bin ein guter Psychotiker: Es ist mir egal. Das sieht man mir auch an. Schauen Sie sich mein Sweatshirt an. Sehen Sie, was das ist? Erhält man, wenn man in der Lufthansa in die erste Klasse heraufgestuft wird. Und meine Socken: Die habe ich von der Swiss. Die Hose habe ich für acht Dollar in Seoul gekauft, damit habe ich chinesische Gulags unterstützt …

Eher Kinderarbeit …
Ja, Kinderarbeit! Aber die einzige Möglichkeit zu überleben ist, sich nicht um die Kritik zu kümmern.

Sehen Sie Widersprüche zwischen Ihrem Denken und Ihrem Handeln?
Ja, vielleicht. Wenn es einen Widerspruch gibt zwischen meinem Denken und meinem Handeln, nimmt das dem Handeln nicht automatisch seinen Wert. Nehmen Sie Marx: Er war unmöglich arrogant, bürgerlich und so weiter. Aber das spielt keine Rolle.

Wenn man also das grosse Universale propagiert, darf man im Einzelnen tun, was man will? Ferien in Singapur zum Beispiel, so wie Sie?
Das ist typisch! Sie sind so ein bürgerlicher … Sind Sie sich eigentlich bewusst, dass dies ein typischer Vorwurf der mittelständischen Bourgeoisie ist?

Warum das?
Die armen Leute sagen dir: Du hast Geld? Geniess es! Nur Mittelstandsleute fühlen sich schuldig und glauben, wenn sie bescheiden leben, würden sie sich solidarisch mit den Armen zeigen.

Sie sehen darin also keinen Widerspruch?
Nein, nicht auf diesem tiefen Niveau. Nehmen Sie das Recycling als Beispiel. Natürlich mache ich Recycling, aber ich finde es scheinheilig. Es ist eine wundervolle Strategie grosser Unternehmen: Sie bringen dich dazu, dass du dich schuldig fühlst. Was hast du heute für Mutter Erde getan? Es funktioniert als Gutfühlstrategie. Man soll ein paar kleine Dinge tun, die sehr wenig nützen, damit man im Grossen nichts ändert. Okay, ich habe diese Hosen gekauft – und vielleicht unterstütze ich damit chinesische Gulags, wer weiss? Aber glauben Sie ernsthaft, dass ich die chinesischen Gulags bekämpfe, indem ich die Hose nicht kaufe? Ich bezweifle es.

Also doch ein Widerspruch.
Klar gibt es immer Widersprüche. Aber ich gehöre de facto nicht zur Oberschicht, dafür verdiene ich zu wenig. Aber wenn man sich so anzieht wie ich, dann kann man es sich leisten, ein- oder zweimal im Jahr nach Singapur zu gehen oder – oh, das wird Ihnen gefallen: Ich war sogar im Luxushotel Burdsch al-Arab in Dubai. Aber wissen Sie was? Ich habe auch dort meine marxistische Pflicht getan. Ich habe mich sofort mit einem Taxifahrer angefreundet. Er gab mir einen Schnellkurs: «In jenem Gebäude sind die Lichter aus, die Leute sind bankrott; siehst du die Arbeiter dort auf dem Hochhaus? Die sind nicht gesichert, arbeiten bei fünfzig Grad in der Sonne» und so weiter. Er führte mich ein in diese Halbsklavengesellschaft.

Ganz zu Beginn des Gesprächs sagten Sie, Politik interessiere Sie nicht mehr …
… gut, ich habe übertrieben. Was mich stört, ist dieses pseudohumanitäre Engagement von Leuten wie Bill Gates, die sagen: Wir haben unsere ideologischen Kämpfe gekämpft, wer schert sich heute darum? Kinder verhungern in Somalia, wir müssen etwas tun.
Nein, das ist falsch! «Lasst uns etwas tun» bedeutet «lasst uns nicht nachdenken».

Und wie soll sich etwas ändern, wenn niemand handelt?
Wunder geschehen! Nehmen Sie den Tahrirplatz in Kairo. Wer hätte vor drei Jahren geglaubt, dass es eine breite Bewegung in einem arabischen Land geben würde, die grundsätzlich säkular ist, nicht antisemitisch, nicht fundamentalistisch? Jeder hätte gesagt: Fuck off, das ist nicht möglich.

Was ist wirklich wichtig im Leben?
Denkarbeit. Wir haben in diesem Gespräch viele Probleme angesprochen: Was tun? Wie den Kapitalismus verändern? Aber wir befinden uns in der tragischen Situation, dass wir kein Rezept haben. Wir wissen es ganz einfach nicht. Als Philosoph kann ich nur zeigen, welche Fragen falsch gestellt werden. Ich habe keine Antworten, ich bluffe nur. Aber manchmal ist es wichtig, die richtigen Fragen zu stellen.
Bisher lautete die marxistische These: Philosophen haben die Welt nur interpretiert, wir müssen sie ändern. Vielleicht sollte unser Motto im 21. Jahrhundert sein: Wir haben zu oft versucht, die Welt zu ändern. Jetzt ist es Zeit, sie zu interpretieren.

Aus dem Englischen übersetzt.

Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschein zuerst in WOZ – Die Wochenzeitung Nr. 48/2012 vom 29.11.2012 unter http://www.woz.ch/1248/slavoj-zizek/lasst-doch-die-reichen-reich-sein [19.2.2013].

Manifest

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:46 +0000

Eine neue, durch den vorhandenen Rahmen nicht zu bezwingende menschliche Kraft wird mit der unaufhaltbaren technischen Entwicklung und dem Unbefriedigtsein gegenüber ihren möglichen Anwendungen in unserem jeden Sinnes beraubten gesellschaftlichen Leben jeden Tag größer.
Die gesellschaftliche Entfremdung und Unterdrückung kann unmöglich gestaltet werden, in keiner ihrer Varianten – sie kann nur en bloc mit dieser Gesellschaft selbst zurückgewiesen werden. Jeder wirkliche Fortschritt hängt selbstverständlich von der revolutionären Lösung der vielgestaltigen Krise der Gegenwart ab.
Welches sind die Perspektiven einer Organisation des Lebens in einer Gesellschaft, die „die Produktion auf der Grundlage freier und gleicher Assoziationen der Produzenten“ authentisch „neu gruppiert“? Die Automatisierung der Produktion und die Vergesellschaftung der lebenswichtigen Güter werden die Arbeit als äußere Notwendigkeit immer mehr beschränken und dem Individuum endlich die volle Freiheit geben. Der so von jeder ökonomischen Verantwortung, von jeder Schuld und Straffälligkeit der Vergangenheit und den Anderen gegenüber befreite Mensch wird über einen neuen Mehrwert verfügen, der nicht mit Geld berechnet werden kann, da er sich unmöglich auf das Maß der Lohnarbeit reduzieren lässt – den Wert des Spieles, des frei konstruierten Lebens. Die Ausübung dieser spielerischen Schöpfung ist die Garantie der Freiheit eines jeden und aller im Rahmen der einzigen durch die Nicht-Ausbeutung des Menschen durch den Menschen garantierten Gleichheit. Die Befreiung des Spiels ist seine schöpferische Autonomie, die über die alte Trennung zwischen aufgezwungener Arbeit und passiver Freizeit hinausgeht.
Früher hat die Kirche die angeblichen Zauberer verbrannt, um die primitiven Tendenzen zum Spiel zu unterdrücken, die sich in den Volksfeten aufrechterhalten hatten. In der jetzt herrschenden Gesellschaft, die massiv trostlose Pseudospiele der Nichtbeteiligung erzeugt, wird eine echte künstlerische Tätigkeit zwangsläufig als kriminell eingestuft. Sie ist halb geheim. Sie tritt als Skandal hervor.
Was ist die Situation? Sie ist die Verwirklichung eines höheren Spiels oder genauer gesagt die Aufforderung zum Spiel der menschlichen Anwesenheit. Die revolutionären Spieler aller Länder können sich innerhalb der S.I. vereinigen, um damit anzufangen, aus der Vorgeschichte des alltäglichen Lebens hinauszukommen.
Jetzt schon schlagen wir die autonome Organisation der Produzenten der neuen Kultur vor, unabhängig von den zur Zeit vorhandenen politischen und gewerkschaftlichen Organisationen, denen wir die Fähigkeit absprechen, etwas anderes als die Einrichtung des Bestehenden zu organisieren. In dem Augenblick, wo diese Organisation aus ihrem experimentellen Anfangsstadium hinausgeht und ihre erste öffentliche Kampagne starten will, setzen wir ihr die Besetzung der UNESCO als dringlichstes Ziel. Die auf Weltebene vereinheitlichte Bürokratisierung der Kunst und der gesamten Kultur ist ein neues Phänomen, das die tiefe Verwandtschaft der auf der Welt koexistierenden sozialen Systeme auf der Grundlage der eklektischen Aufbewahrung und der Reproduktion der Vergangenheit ausdrückt. Diesen neuen Bedingungen müssen die revolutionären Künstler durch eine Aktion neuen Typs entgegentreten. Da das Vorhandensein dieser konzentrierten und in einem einzigen Gebäude lokalisierten Führung der Kultur die Beschlagnahme durch einen PUTSCH begünstigt; da diese Einrichtung außerdem gar keinen anderen sinnvollen Gebrauch als unsere subversive Perspektive haben kann, halten wir uns unseren Zeitgenossen gegenüber für berechtigt, uns dieses Apparats zu bemächtigen. Und wir werden ihn bekommen. Wir sind entschlossen, von der UNESCO Besitz zu ergreifen, und wenn es nur für eine kurze Zeit sein sollte, da wir sicher sind, dort schnell ein Werk zu verrichten, das als bedeutungsvollstes Zeichen zur Erhellung einer langen Periode von Forderungen bleiben wird.
Welches sollen die Hauptkennzeichen der neuen Kultur sein – zunächst im Vergleich zur alten Kunst?
Gegen das Spektakel führt die verwirklichte situationistische Kultur die totale Beteiligung ein.
Gegen die konservierte Kunst ist sie eine Organisation des erlebten Augenblicks – ganz direkt.
Gegen die parzellierte Kunst wird sie eine globale, alle verwendbaren Elemente gleichzeitig umfassende Praxis sein. Sie strebt natürlich eine kollektive und zweifellos anonyme Produktion an (wenigstens insofern diese Kultur nicht durch das Bedürfnis, Spuren zu hinterlassen, beherrscht wird, da die Werke NICHT ALS WAREN GELAGERT WERDEN). Als minimale Absicht haben ihre Experimente eine Revolution des Verhaltens und einen dynamischen unitären Urbanismus vor, der dazu geeignet ist, sich auf der ganzen Welt auszudehnen, um dann über alle bewohnbaren Planeten verbreitet zu werden.
Gegen die einseitige Kunst wird die situationistische Kultur eine Kunst des Dialogs und der gegenseitigen Beeinflussung sein. Es ist jetzt schon so weit, dass die Künstler (und mit ihnen die ganze sichtbare Kultur) von der Gesellschaft vollkommen getrennt sind, wie sie auch untereinander durch Konkurrenz getrennt werden. Aber schon vor dieser Sackgasse des Kapitalismus war die Kunst im wesentlichen einseitig und ohne Reaktion. Sie wird über die abgeschlossene Ära ihres Primitivismus zugunsten einer vollständigen Kommunikation hinausgehen.
Da jeder zum Künstler auf einer höheren Ebene wird – d. h. auf untrennbare Weise zugleich zum Produzenten und Konsumenten einer totalen kulturellen Schöpfung – wohnt man einer schnellen Auflösung des linearen Wertmessers der Neuheit bei. Da jeder sozusagen zum Situationisten wird, wohnt man einer multidimensionalen Inflation der Tendenzen, der Experimente, der radikal verschiedenartigen ‘Schulen’ bei – NICHT MEHR NACHEINANDER, SONDERN GLEICH-ZEITIG.
Wir führen jetzt das ein, was historisch den letzte Beruf sein wird. Die Rolle des Situationisten, des Berufsamateurs, des Anti-Spezialisten bleibt noch eine Spezialisierung bis zur Zeit des ökonomischen und geistigen Überflusses, in der jeder zu einem solchen ‘Künstler’ wird, wie es den Künstlern nicht gelungen ist – für die Konstruktion seines eigenen Lebens. Der letzte Beruf der Geschichte steht der Gesellschaft ohne permanente Arbeitsteilung so nahe, dass der Titel eines Berufs ihm allgemein abgesprochen wird, wenn er in der S.I. in Erscheinung tritt.
Denjenigen, die uns nicht gut verstehen sollten, sagen wir mit trotziger Verachtung: „Die Situationisten, für deren Richter Ihr Euch vielleicht haltet, richten Euch früher oder später. Wir warten auf Euch an der nächsten Ecke – d. h. bei der unvermeidlichen Liquidierung der Welt der Beraubung in all ihren Formen. Das sind unsere Ziele, die die zukünftigen Ziele der Menschheit sein werden.“
Am 17. Mai 1960

Wiederabdruck
17 May 1960
reprinted in Internationale Situationniste #4 (June 1960)

Revolution statt Revue. Zwölf-Punkte-Programm von Karlheinz Schmid zur Neuordnung im Kunstbetrieb

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:46 +0000

Überall diese aus einem falsch interpretierten Toleranzbegriff heraus entwickelte Verhaltenheit, letztlich Gleichgültigkeit. Das vermeintliche Aufflammen von Anteilnahme, von Interesse an der Kunst und am Kunstbetrieb, ja, oft nichts weiter als ein vorübergehendes Phänomen. Ein bisschen Unterhaltung darf sein, die Künstler als Hofnarren wie einst, die Galeristen als willfährige Diener einer Gesellschaftsschicht, die ihre Villen und sich selbst mit Gegenwartskunst schmückt. Im Partygespräch bleiben, rechtzeitig wieder in die nächste Auktion geben, was gerade eben noch preisgünstig erworben wurde, weil man, clever, schlichtweg behauptet hat, ein weiteres Privatmuseum eröffnen zu wollen. Um Kapitalanlage geht’s, um persönliche Reputation mancher Leute, die sich Sammler nennen, aber eigentlich Jäger sind, Trophäenjäger. Wirkliche Auseinandersetzung mit Kunst? Meist Fehlanzeige. Und so nimmt überhand, was der Kunst dienen sollte, nämlich jene inzwischen marode Infrastruktur, die sich in einem zunehmenden Markt leicht austauschbarer Bilder verselbständigt hat.
Was bleibt, ist die Forderung, allemal der Wunschtraum, subversives Potenzial zu aktivieren, das allzu gut geschierte Kunstrevuetheater tüchtig aufzumischen, es revolutionär zu unterwandern. Denn der einst von Klaus Staeck editierte Sand fürs Getriebe ist zermahlen. Dieses Betriebskarussell dreht sich mit atemberaubender, alle Sinne tötender Geschwindigkeit, und weit und breit ist niemand zu sehen, der in der Lage wäre, die Bremse zu treten, das hochtourige Fahrgeschäft allein aus Sicherheitsgründen zu stoppen. Das dringend Handlungsbedarf auflösende Debakel beginnt bei Fragen einer falschen Besteuerung von Lichtkunst und endet keinesfalls dort, wo der 2010 aufgedeckte Kunstfälscherskandal um die Beltracchi-Bande bis heute zu keinerlei Konsequenzen im Gutachterwesen geführt hat, beinahe so, als habe man es verlernt, aus dem Schaden klug zu werden. Das ist der eigentliche Skandal am Skandal. Höchste Zeit also, mit einem naheliegenden Zwölf-Punkte-Programm etwas Juckpulver in Debatten zu streuen, die bislang keine sind, weil es um nichts oder nicht viel geht, weil kürzlich auch im Guggenheim Lab in Berlin mehr gebastelt, als gedacht wurde.
Erstens: Die überbordende Kunstproduktion muss reduziert werden. Natürlich kann jeder seinen persönlichen Bilderberg nach Gutdünken aufhäufen und Lager um Lager mit Relikten eigener Selbstverwirklichung füllen; aber warum soll für jedes mehr oder weniger gelungene Werk ein Käufer und Öffentlichkeit gefunden werden, warum laufend weitere Galerien eröffnen, sind doch heute schon genug qualitativ ungenügende Werke im Markt? Ergo: Die Zahl der Kunsthochschulen sinnvoll verringern, die Ausbildung strengeren Kriterien unterwerfen, um auch weniger Menschen in Arbeitslosigkeit und in die Armut zu treiben, was volkswirtschaftlich unverantwortlich ist.
Zweitens: Der seit Jahren in nahezu allen Bundesländern leidende, teils sogar abgeschaffte Kunst- und Musikunterricht an den Schulen muss vollumfänglich wieder aufgenommen und sogar verstärkt werden. Es kann nicht sein, dass eine Gesellschaft, die sich bei jeder passenden Gelegenheit als Land der Dichter und Denker vorstellt, dem Nachwuchs keine Chance gibt, sich kulturell zu bilden, etwas von jenen Energien zu inhalieren, die eben nur über die sinnliche Wahrnehmung und die anschließende intellektuelle Verarbeitung vermittelt werden.
Drittens: Insgesamt gilt es, die Ausbildungen zu verbessern. Mögen auch vereinzelt Bildungsangebote für angehende oder bereits tätige Galeristen, Kuratoren und Kritiker gemacht werden: Die gesamte Vermittlungsbrache ist unterbelichtet. Wie so oft: Ausnahmen bestätigen die Regel. Nicht zuletzt fehlen den meisten Museumsdirektoren, überwiegend Kunsthistoriker, die Voraussetzungen für ihre Führungsaufgabe, weil sie weder betriebswirtschaftliche noch sonstige Kenntnisse einbringen können, die über das rein Fachliche hinausgehen. Fortan sollte das Doppelstudium oder ein kombinierter Ausbildungsgang verpflichtend sein.
Viertens: Die Dominanz der Kuratoren ist unerträglich – zumal die Künstler selbst mittlerweile im Schatten dieser übermächtigen Ausstellungs- und Projektemacher stehen. Hier muss gegengesteuert werden. Kuratoren sind Dienstleister, die die Kommunikation zwischen den Produzenten und dem Publikum fördern sollen. Dass sie heutzutage meist selbst wie Künstler agieren führt beinahe automatisch dazu, dass sie, die Kuratoren, ihre „Vormund“-Stellung (lat. curator gleich Vormund) missbrauchen und mit Kunst das nicht aus der Kunst kommende illustrieren.
Fünftens: Vor allem in den Ländern und Kommunen müssten Politiker lernen, dass die Kultur keine Sparprogramme verträgt. Investition in die Zukunft, sollte die Devise lauten, wo so gerne über nicht ausreichende Besucherquoten, kostensparende Synergien und das Engagement seitens der Privatwirtschaft geredet wird. Die öffentliche Hand muss ihre Verantwortung deutlicher spüren. Selbstverpflichtung: Zehn Prozent des Gesamthaushalts für die Kultur!
Sechstens: Auch in Zeiten zunehmender Privatmuseen werden staatliche Institutionen gebaut oder wenigstens erweitert. Gut so. Was gar nicht so gut ist, sind die dann häufig offenen, zuvor wohl nicht kalkulierten Betriebskosten, die so manches Haus ins Abseits bringen. Weniger Ausstellungen, weniger Museumspädagogik, weniger Werbung – das kann keine Lösung sein.
Siebtens: Wo die Wirtschaft ihren Sponsoring-Beitrag leistet, wenn öffentliche kulturelle Institutionen finanzielle Unterstützung brauchen, müssen allgemein verbindliche Sp8ielregeln vorhanden sein. Transparenz lautet das Stichwort. Ein Kriterienkatalog, der überall anwendbar und einsehbar ist, verhindert dubiose Vereinbarungen, die zum verrat der Kunst und zur Desavouierung des Museums oder des Kunstvereins führen können.
Achtens: Im Zuge der anstehenden Mehrwertsteuer-Neuregelung nach Intervention der EU, die – nebenbei betrachtet – die Schwarzgeldmenge im Kunsthandel erhöhen wird, muss daran gedacht werden, dass die Lichtkunst und insbesondere die Fotografie bislang nach höchstrichterlichen Entscheidungen benachteiligt sind. Auch hier ist Nivellierung erforderlich.
Neuntens: Sämtliche Kunstwerke insbesondere der Klassischen Moderne, die in Auktionen laut Schätzpreis über 100 000 Euro bringen sollen, müssen von einem Gutachten begleitet werden, das nicht – wie bislang – von einem einzigen Kenner, oftmals den Werkverzeichnis-Verfasser, verantwortet wird. Vielmehr müssen Expertisen von einem Wissenschaftlerkreis erstellt werden, in dem sowohl Kunsthistoriker als auch Farb- und Materialanalysten vertreten sind, um Fälschungen frühzeitig entlarven zu können.
Zehntens: Die auch wegen der digitalen Verfügbarkeit im Internet grassierende Unsitte, das Urheberrecht zu missachten, muss energisch bekämpft werden. Der Schutz des geistigen Eigentums sollte nach wie vor unumgänglich sein. Jegliche Piraterie ist abzulehnen. Gegebenenfalls gibt es genug Lizenzmöglichkeiten, um Werke zu veröffentlichen oder anders zu verwerten.
Elftens: Kunstkritik ist Kunstkritik und damit unabhängig. Wer als Verleger dagegen lieber Public Relations betreibt, also seine Anzeigenkunden mit Werbetexten bedient oder sogar Pressemitteilungen der Veranstalter veröffentlicht, sollte fairerweise seine Leser schon auf Seite informieren. Verbraucherschutz quasi.
Zwölftens: Schafft die Kunstpreise ab! Lieber einen Fonds zur kollektiven Nachwuchsförderung nach dem Kunststudium gründen (berufliches Startgeld für alle Absolventen in gleicher Höhe), in den alle einzahlen, die bislang solche Auszeichnungen vergeben haben.

Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien in der KUNSTZEITUNG, September 2012, S. 13–14.

Contemp(t)orary: Eleven Theses

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:42 +0000

1.
It would appear that the notion of the “contemporary” is irredeemably vain and empty; in fact, we would not be entirely mistaken in suspecting “contemporary art” to be a concept that became central to art as a result of the need to find a replacement, rather than as a matter of legitimate theorizing. For above all, “contemporary” is the term that stands to mark the death of “modern.” This vague descriptor of aesthetic currency became customary precisely when the critique of “the modern” (its mapping, specification, historicizing, and dismantling) exiled it to the dustbin of history. At that point, when current art lost the word that had provided it with a programmatic stance, chronological proximity became relevant – even if it did not indicate anything of substance. To be sure, “contemporary” fails to carry even a glimmer of the utopian expectation – of change and possible alternatives – encompassed by “the new.”

2.
Nothing would seem to so eloquently suggest the lack of substance in “contemporary art” than the facility with which it lends itself to practical adjustments. Museums, academic institutions, auction houses, and texts tend to circumvent the need to categorize recent artistic production by declaring the “contemporariness” of certain holdings or discourses on the basis of a chronological convention: the MOCA in Los Angeles takes into account everything made “after” 1940; the contemporary holdings of Tate Modern in London were all created sometime after 1965; Kristine Stiles and Peter Selz’s sourcebook Theories and Documents of Contemporary Art takes 1945 as its starting point. In other contexts – particularly on the periphery – the horizon of contemporaneity tends to be narrower, usually defined as appearing in the early 1990s and associated with the rise of the postcolonial debate, the collapse of the Euro-American monopoly over the narrative of modernism, or the end of the Cold War. In any case, “contemporary art” appears to be based on the multiple significance of an “after.”

3.
However, as is usually the case with chronological categories, this neutrality may soon unfold into a noun with a certain substance. As with “the modern,” it would not be hard to imagine “the contemporary” one day becoming oxymoronically fixed, specified, and dated as the signifier of a particular shift in the dialectics of culture. There are at least two senses in which the contemporariness of artistic culture involves a poignant turn. There is the blatant immediacy of the relationship between a contemporary practice and its host society, and then there is its integration into a critical apparatus.
Never since the advent of historical relativism at the end of the eighteenth century has the art of the day had a less contentious social reception. Claims concerning the esoteric nature of contemporary art in the West mostly derive from the density of theoretical discourse on the topic – discourse that actually operates on the basis of practices that involve a certain level of general legibility. It may well be that one of the main characteristics of contemporary art is to always demand, at least, a double reception: first as part of general culture, and later as an attempt at sophisticated theoretical recuperation. Nonetheless, the fact that contemporary practices are linked to a hypertrophy of discourse that tries to mobilize them against the grain of their social currency is itself an indication of the extent to which contemporary art is an integrated culture that makes use of widely available referents, involving poetic operations that are closely linked to the historical sensibility of the day. It is the interlocking of extreme popularity and the rarefaction of criticism and theory that define this phenomenon. “Contemporary art” is, therefore, a form of aristocratic populism – a dialogical structure in which extreme subtlety and the utmost simplicity collide, forcing individuals of varying class, ethnic, and ideological affiliations – which might have otherwise kept them separated – to smell each other in artistic structures.

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4.
The ideal of modern beauty that Stendhal articulated in 1823 as “the art of presenting to the peoples . . . works which, in view of the present-day state of their customs and beliefs, afford them the utmost possible pleasure,” has finally been attained.¹ As a consequence, a temporal rift between radical aesthetics and social mores no longer exists today. The question of the death of the avant-garde ought to be reformulated to account for this institutionalization of the contemporary. As we all know, the schism between the project of modern subjectivity and the modern bourgeois subject was defined in historical terms as consisting of advances, regressions, re-enactments, futurities, and anachronism, and summarized in the politics of the avant-garde, with all the militaristic implications of the term. More than the death of the avant-garde as a project of cultural subversion – always a ridiculous argument coming from the mouth of the establishment; such radicalism is sure to reemerge in one disguise or another every time a poetic-political challenge to the nomos and episteme of dominant society becomes necessary – the shock of the postmodern involved the realization that “the new” could no longer be considered foreign to a subjectivity constantly bombarded by media and burning with the desire for consumption.
In any case, the temporal dislocation characteristic of both modernism and the avant- garde – the way the art of the day constantly defied the notion of a synchronic present (not limited to the chronological trope of the avant, which encompasses any number of other historical folds, from the theme of primitivism to the negotiations with obsolescence and the ruin, the refusal of the chronology of industrial labor, and so forth) – seems to have finally found some closure. In a compelling and scary form, modern capitalist society finally has an art that aligns with the audience, with the social elites that finance it, and with the academic industry that serves as its fellow traveler. In this sense art has become literally contemporary, thanks to its exorcism of aesthetic alienation and the growing integration of art into culture. When, by the millions, the masses vote with their feet to attend contemporary art museums, and when a number of cultural industries grow up around the former citadel of negativity, fine art is replaced by something that already occupies an intermediary region between elite entertainment and mass culture. And its signature is precisely the frenzy of “the contemporary”: the fact that art fairs, biennales, symposia, magazines, and new blockbuster shows and museums constitute evidence of art’s absorption into that which is merely present – not better, not worse, not hopeful, but a perverted instance of the given.

5.
In this way, the main cultural function of art institutions and ceremonies in relation to global capitalism today is to instantiate the pandemic of contemporariness as a mythological scheme occurring (and recurring) each time we instigate this “program.” After all, the art world has surpassed other, more anachronistic auratic devices (the cult of the artist, of nationality or creativity) as the profane global religion for making “the contemporary manifest. The hunger to be part of the global art calendar has more to do with the hope of keeping up with the frenzy of time than with any actual aesthetic pursuit or interest. Mallarmé’s dictum that “one must be absolutely modern” has become a duty to stay up-to-date. But given the lack of historical occasions which could represent an opportunity to experience the core of our era – pivotal revolutionary moments of significant social change or upheaval – a participation in the eternal renewal of the contemporary might not be completely misguided, for it at least invokes a longing for the specter of an enthusiasm that asks for more than just the newest technological gadget.

6.
But, once again, the devil of contemporaneousness does its deed: whereas the system of modern art was territorialized in a centrifugal structure of centers and peripheries around modernity’s historical monopoly in the liberal-capitalist enclave of the North Atlantic, we now face a regime of international generalization transmitting the pandemic of the contemporary to the last recesses of the earth. In fact, the main reason for the craze surrounding the contemporary art market in recent years (and for its not having immediately collapsed after the plunge of global capitalism) has been the market’s lateral extension: bourgeoises who would previously buy work within their local art circuits became part of a new private jet set of global elites consuming the same brand of artistic products, ensuring spiraling sales and the celebration of an age in which endless “editions” allow artworks to be disseminated throughout an extended geography. In turn, each enclave of these globalized elites drives the development of a contemporary art infrastructure in their own city, using a standard mixture of global art references and local “emergent” schools. Contemporary art is defined by a new global social context in which disenfranchised wealthy individuals (who have abdicated their roles as industrial and commerce managers to the bureaucracy of CEOs) seek a certain civic identity through aesthetic “philanthropy.” In this fashion they interact with a new social economy of services performed by artists, critics, and curators – services with symbolic capital that rests on an ability to trade in a semblance of “the contemporary.” Contemporary art thus becomes the social new private jet set and a jet proletariat.

7.
This new machinery of the dialectic between the global elites of financial capitalism and the nomadic agents of global culture would be easy to dismiss as critically meaningless were it not for the way “the contemporary” also stands for the leveling of the temporal perception of cultural geography and of a certain political orientation. Particularly for those who come from the so-called periphery (the South and the former socialist world), “the contemporary” still carries a certain utopian ring. For indeed, notwithstanding the cunning imbalances of power that prevail in the art world, the mere fact of intervening in the matrix of contemporary culture constitutes a major political and historical conquest. The global art circus of biennales, fairs, and global art museums has forced an end to the use of a metaphor that understood geography in terms of historical succession – it is no longer possible to rely upon the belatedness of the South in presuming that artistic culture goes from the center to the periphery. Although it probably does not seem so extraordinary now, the voicing of the need to represent the periphery in the global art circuits was, to a great extent, a claim to the right to participate in producing “the contemporary.” And while the critical consequences of the policies of inclusion are less central to the agenda of the South than the critique of stereotypes, the activation of social memory, and the pursuit of different kinds of cultural agency, it remains the case that “contemporary art” marks the stage at which different geographies and localities are finally considered within the same network of questions and strategies. Art becomes “contemporary” in the strong sense when it refers to the progressive obsolescence of narratives that concentrated cultural innovation so completely in colonial and imperial metropolises as to finally identify modernism with what we ought to properly describe as “NATO art.”

8.
This is not to say that such a process of inclusion is free from its own deformities: in many instances, a peculiar neurosis provoked by the stereotyping of ethnic, regional, or national authenticity and the pressures to accommodate art from the periphery into a subsidiary category of metropolitan referents produces so-called “alternative modernism” or “global conceptualism.” Nonetheless, the inclusion of the South in the narratives of “the contemporary” has already disrupted the genealogies of the present, such as the simplified concept of the “post-conceptual” that arose in the late 1980s to describe an apparent commonality between the radical artistic revolutions of the 1960s and the advanced art of its day. In its various historical and geographical settings, “contemporary art” claims a circularity between 1968, conceptualism, Brazilian Neo-Concretism or the French Nouvelle Vague, and recent works trapped in perpetual historical mirroring. In this sense, to paraphrase Walter Benjamin, “contemporary art” appears as the figure of a revolution in standstill, awaiting the moment of resolution.

9.
Complicated as this may be, however, it does not blur the radical significance of the cultural transformation that took place in artistic practice in the years after 1960. One crucial element of “contemporary art” is the embrace of a certain “unified field” in the concept of art. Beyond the de-definition of specific media, skills, and disciplines, there is some radical value in the fact that “the arts” seem to have merged into a single multifarious and nomadic kind of practice that forbids any attempt at specification beyond the micro-narratives that each artist or cultural movement produces along the way. If “contemporary art” refers to the confluence of a general field of activities, actions, tactics, and interventions falling under the umbrella of a single poetic matrix and within a single temporality, it is because they occupy the ruins of the “visual arts.” In this sense, “contemporary art” carries forward the lines of experimentation and revolt found in all kinds of disciplines and arts that were brought “back to order” after 1970, forced to reconstitute their tradition. “Contemporary art” then becomes the sanctuary of repressed experimentation and the questioning of subjectivity that was effectively contained in any number of arts, discourses, and social structures following the collapse of the twentieth century’s revolutionary projects. I suspect that the circularity of our current cultural narratives will only be broken once we stop experiencing contemporary culture as the déjà vu of a revolution that never entirely took place.

10.
By the same token, it is no coincidence that the institutions, media, and cultural structures of the contemporary art world have become the last refuge of political and intellectual radicalism. As various intellectual traditions of the left appear to be losing ground in political arenas and social discourses, and despite the way art is entwined with the social structures of capitalism, contemporary art circuits are some of the only remaining spaces in which leftist thought still circulates as public discourse. In a world where academic circuits have ossified and become increasingly isolated, and where the classical modern role of the public intellectual dwindles before the cataclysmic power of media networks and the balkanization of political opinion, it should come as no surprise that contemporary art has (momentarily) become something like the refuge of modern radicalism. If we should question the ethical significance of participating in contemporary art circuits, this sole fact ought to vindicate us. Just as the broken lineages of experimental music, cinema, and literature finally found themselves in the formless and undefined poetic space of contemporary art in general, we should not be shocked to find the cultural sector – apparently most compromised by the celebration of capitalism – functioning as the vicarious public sphere in which trends such as deconstruction, postcolonial critique, post-Marxism, social activism, and psychoanalytic theory are grounded. It would seem that, just as the art object poses a continuous mystery – a space of resistance and reflection leading towards enlightenment – so do the institutions and power structures of contemporary art also function as the critical self-consciousness of capitalist hypermodernity.

11.
However, given the negative relationship of art to its own time, one would suspect the current radicalization of art and the constant politicization of its practice to be dangerous symptoms. Just as modern art rescued forms of practice, sensibility, and skills that were crushed by the industrial system, so does contemporary art seem to have the task of protecting cultural critique and social radicalism from the banality of the present. Unlike theorists who lament the apparent co-opting of radicalism and critique by the official sphere of art, we would need to consider the possibility that our task may consist, in large part, of protecting utopia – seen as the necessary collusion of the past with what lies ahead – from its demise at the hands of the ideology of present time. This is, to be sure, an uncomfortable inheritance. At the end of the day, it involves the memory of failure and a necessary infatuation with the powers of history. I do not know a better way to describe such a genealogy than by offering a quotation from the Dada artist and historian Hans Richter, who summarized the experience of Dada as that of “the vacuum created by the sudden arrival of freedom and the possibilities it seemed to offer.”² And it may well be that contemporary art’s ethical imperative is to deal with the ambivalence of the experience of emancipation. If art has indeed become the sanctuary of revolutionary thought, it is because it deals with the memory of a number of ambiguous interruptions. With this, we hopefully find an advantage to the constant collision of perfume and theory that we experience in contemporary art events around the world.

WiederabdruckDieser Text erschien zuerst in: e-flux journal # 12, Januar 2010, http://www.e-flux.com/journal/contemptorary-eleven-theses/ [29.5.2013].

1.) Stendhal, Oeuvres complètes, ed. Georges Eudes (Paris: Larrive, 1954), 16:27, quoted in Matei Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avantgarde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism, 2nd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), 4.
2.) Hans Richter, Dada: Art and Anti-Art (New York: Thames & Hudson, 1997), 136.

Futuristisches Manifest

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:42 +0000

1.
Wir wollen die Liebe zur Gefahr besingen, die Vertrautheit mit Energie und Verwegenheit.

2.
Mut, Kühnheit und Auflehnung werden die Wesenselemente unserer Dichtung sein.

3.
Bis heute hat die Literatur die gedankenschwere Unbeweglichkeit, die Ekstase und den Schlaf gepriesen. Wir wollen preisen die angriffslustige Bewegung, die fiebrige Schlaflosigkeit, den Laufschritt, den Salto mortale, die Ohrfeige und den Faustschlag.

4.
Wir erklären, daß sich die Herrlichkeit der Welt um eine neue Schönheit bereichert hat: die Schönheit der Geschwindigkeit. Ein Rennwagen, dessen Karosserie große Rohre schmücken, die Schlangen mit explosivem Atem gleichen … ein aufheulendes Auto, das auf Kartätschen zu laufen scheint, ist schöner als die Nike von Samothrake.

5.
Wir wollen den Mann besingen, der das Steuer hält, dessen Idealachse die Erde durchquert, die selbst auf ihrer Bahn dahinjagt.

6.
Der Dichter muß sich glühend, glanzvoll und freigebig verschwenden, um die leidenschaftliche Inbrunst der Urelemente zu vermehren.

7.
Schönheit gibt es nur noch im Kampf. Ein Werk ohne aggressiven Charakter kann kein Meisterwerk sein. Die Dichtung muß aufgefasst werden als ein heftiger Angriff auf die unbekannten Kräfte, um sie zu zwingen, sich vor den Menschen zu beugen.

8.
Wir stehen auf dem äußersten Vorgebirge der Jahrhunderte! … Warum sollten wir zurückblicken, wenn wir die geheimnisvollen Tore des Unmöglichen aufbrechen wollen? Zeit und Raum sind gestern gestorben. Wir leben bereits im Absoluten, denn wir haben schon die ewige, allgegenwärtige Geschwindigkeit erschaffen.

9.
Wir wollen den Krieg verherrlichen – diese einzige Hygiene der Welt – den Militarismus, den Patriotismus, die Vernichtungstat der Anarchisten, die schönen Ideen, für die man stirbt, und die Verachtung des Weibes.

10.
Wir wollen die Museen, die Bibliotheken und die Akademien jeder Art zerstören und gegen den Moralismus, den Feminismus und jede Feigheit kämpfen, die auf Zweckmäßigkeit und Eigennutz beruht.

11.
Wir werden die großen Menschenmengen besingen, welche die Arbeit, das Vergnügen oder der Aufruhr erregt; besingen werden wir die vielfarbige, vielstimmige Flut der Revolution in den modernen Hauptstädten; besingen werden wir die nächtliche, vibrierende Glut der Arsenale und Werften, die von grellen elektrischen Monden erleuchtet werden; die gefräßigen Bahnhöfe, die rauchende Schlangen verzehren; die Fabriken, die mit ihren sich hochwindenden Rauchfäden an den Wolken hängen; die Brücken, die wie gigantische Athleten Flüsse überspannen, die in der Sonne wie Messer aufblitzen; die abenteuersuchenden Dampfer, die den Horizont wittern; die breitbrüstigen Lokomotiven, die auf den Schienen wie riesige, mit Rohren gezäumte Stahlrosse einherstampfen und den gleitenden Flug der Flugzeuge, deren Propeller wie eine Fahne im Winde knattert und Beifall zu klatschen scheint wie eine begeisterte Menge …

WiederabdruckDas Manifest/Der Text erschien in Auszügen in: Charles Harrison und Paul Wood: Kunsttheorie im 20. Jahrhundert. Künstlerschriften, Kunstkritik, Kunstphilosophie, Manifeste, Statements, Interviews. Band I. Hatje Cantz: Ostfildern-Ruit, S. 185–187.

Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei (Auszug)

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:42 +0000

Ein Gespenst geht um in Europa – das Gespenst des Kommunismus. […]
Der Kommunismus wird bereits von allen europäischen Mächten als eine Macht anerkannt. Es ist hohe Zeit, dass die Kommunisten ihre Anschauungsweise, ihre Zwecke, ihre Tendenzen vor der ganzen Welt offen darlegen und dem Märchen vom Gespenst des Kommunismus ein Manifest der Partei selbst entgegenstellen. […]
Die Geschichte aller bisherigen Gesellschaft ist die Geschichte von Klassenkämpfen. Freier und Sklave, Patrizier und Plebejer, Baron und Leibeigner, Zunftbürger und Gesell, kurz, Unterdrücker und Unterdrückte standen in stetem Gegensatz zueinander, führten einen ununterbrochenen, bald versteckten, bald offenen Kampf, einen Kampf, der jedes Mal mit einer revolutionären Umgestaltung der ganzen Gesellschaft endete oder mit dem gemeinsamen Untergang der kämpfenden Klassen. […]
Die aus dem Untergange der feudalen Gesellschaft hervorgegangene moderne bürgerliche Gesellschaft hat die Klassengegensätze nicht aufgehoben. Sie hat nur neue Klassen, neue Bedingungen der Unterdrückung, neue Gestaltungen des Kampfes an die Stelle der alten gesetzt. Unsere Epoche, die Epoche der Bourgeoisie, zeichnet sich jedoch dadurch aus, dass sie die Klassengegensätze vereinfacht hat. Die ganze Gesellschaft spaltet sich mehr und mehr in zwei große feindliche Lager, in zwei große, einander direkt gegenüberstehende Klassen: Bourgeoisie und Proletariat. […]
Die proletarische Bewegung ist die selbständige Bewegung der ungeheuren Mehrzahl im Interesse der ungeheuren Mehrzahl. Das Proletariat, die unterste Schicht der jetzigen Gesellschaft, kann sich nicht erheben, nicht aufrichten, ohne dass der ganze Überbau der Schichten, die die offizielle Gesellschaft bilden, in die Luft gesprengt wird. […]
Es kann dies natürlich nur geschehen vermittels despotischer Eingriffe in das Eigentumsrecht und in die bürgerlichen Produktionsverhältnisse, durch Maßregeln also, die ökonomisch unzureichend und unhaltbar erscheinen, die aber im Lauf der Bewegung über sich selbst hinaustreiben und als Mittel zur Umwälzung der ganzen Produktionsweise unvermeidlich sind.
1) Expropriation des Grundeigentums und Verwendung der Grundrente zu Staatsausgaben.
2) Starke Progressiv-Steuer.
3) Abschaffung des Erbrechts.
4) Konfiskation des Eigentums aller Emigranten und Rebellen.
5) Zentralisation des Kredits in den Händen des Staats durch eine Nationalbank mit Staatskapital und ausschließlichem Monopol.
6) Zentralisation alles Transportwesens in den Händen des Staats.
7) Vermehrung der Nationalfabriken, Produktions-Instrumente, Urbarmachung und Verbesserung der Ländereien nach einem gemeinschaftlichen Plan.
8) Gleicher Arbeitszwang für Alle, Errichtung industrieller Armeen besonders für den Ackerbau.
9) Vereinigung des Betriebs von Ackerbau und Industrie, Hinwirken auf die allmähliche Beseitigung des Gegensatzes von Stadt und Land.
10) Öffentliche und unentgeltliche Erziehung aller Kinder. Beseitigung der Fabrikarbeit der Kinder in ihrer heutigen Form. Vereinigung der Erziehung mit der materiellen Produktion usw., usw.
Sind im Laufe der Entwicklung die Klassenunterschiede verschwunden, und ist alle Produktion in den Händen der assoziierten Individuen konzentriert, so verliert die öffentliche Gewalt den politischen Charakter. Die politische Gewalt im eigentlichen Sinn ist die organisierte Gewalt einer Klasse zur Unterdrückung einer andern. Wenn das Proletariat im Kampfe gegen die Bourgeoisie sich notwendig zur Klasse vereint, durch eine Revolution sich zur herrschenden Klasse macht, und als herrschende Klasse gewaltsam die alten Produktions-Verhältnisse aufhebt, so hebt es mit diesen Produktions-Verhältnissen die Existenz-Bedingungen des Klassengegensatzes der Klassen überhaupt, und damit seine eigene Herrschaft als Klasse auf.
An die Stelle der alten bürgerlichen Gesellschaft mit ihren Klassen und Klassen-Gegensätzen tritt eine Assoziation, worin die freie Entwicklung eines Jeden, die Bedingung für die freie Entwicklung Aller ist. […]
Die Kommunisten verschmähen es, ihre Ansichten und Absichten zu verheimlichen. Sie erklären es offen, dass ihre Zwecke nur erreicht werden können durch den gewaltsamen Umsturz aller bisherigen Gesellschaftsordnung. Mögen die herrschenden Klassen vor einer Kommunistischen Revolution zittern. Die Proletarier haben nichts in ihr zu verlieren als ihre Ketten. Sie haben eine Welt zu gewinnen.
Proletarier aller Länder, vereinigt euch!

Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text ist ein Ausschnitt aus: Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, veröffentlicht im Februar 1848, London. Gedruckt in der Office der „Bildungs-Gesellschaft für Arbeiter“ von I. E. Burghard, 46, Liverpool Street, Bishopsgate. Wiederveröffentlicht unter: http://de.wikisource.org/wiki/Manifest_der_Kommunistischen_Partei_(1848) [18.8.2013].

The Fabbing Revolution

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:41 +0000

Am Anfang stand das Unikat. Als unsere Urvorfahren die ersten Figuren, Teller und Schalen aus Lehm formten, schufen sie Dinge, die stets in einer unmittelbaren Beziehung zu ihrem Produzenten standen. Die Welt der Dinge war gleichzeitig die Welt der Ideen und Vorstellungen. Jeder, der etwas schuf, schrieb seine eigene Geschichte, seine personale Magie in Materie hinein. Die Hand, das Holz, der Stein: Diese intime Beziehungskiste zwischen dem Menschen und seinen Artefakten dauerte Zigtausende von Jahren. Noch in der Agrargesellschaft blieb jedes Ding ein Einzelstück. Ein Bett, ein Stuhl, ein Kleidungsstück stammte aus der unmittelbaren Anstrengung eines Einzelnen oder einer kleinen Gruppe von Handwerkern. Produziert wurde zumeist im „ganzen Haus“, dem um Gesinde, Abhängige, Anverwandte ergänzten Haushalt.
Dann, im späten 18. Jahrhundert mit der Dampfmaschine und dem mechanischen Webstuhl „Spinning Jenny“, kam die erste Industrielle Revolution, die die mechanisierte Arbeitsteilung in Manufakturen mit sich brachte. Die zweite Industrielle Revolution – ab 1910 setzte Henry Ford erstmals Fließbänder in seinen Fabriken ein, und Frederick Winslow Taylor stand mit der Stoppuhr daneben – skalierte dieses Prinzip hoch zur industriellen Massenproduktion. In gigantischen Fabrikanlagen, die im Zuge des globalisierten Offshoring zu mehrfach um den Globus gewickelten Wertschöpfungsketten zusammengestöpselt wurden, entstanden Abermillionen von Autos, DVD-Playern, Monoblocsesseln und in scheinbar verbesserter Qualität und zu immer günstigeren Preisen, eine „ungeheure Warenansammlung“, wie sie schon Marx und Engels in Aussicht gestellt hatten.
Die Skalenvorteile dieser „entfesselten Produktivkräfte“ sorgen bis heute dafür, dass die Inflationsraten in den westlichen Ländern im Rahmen bleiben – und dies obwohl die Volkswirtschaften im Zuge der Finanzkrise mit billigem Geld nur so geflutet werden: Ein Vorgang, der eigentlich der Theorie widerspricht und nur durch das chinesische Lohn- und Wechselkursdumping erklärt werden kann. Der Fortschritt folgte dabei auf stupende Weise Ruskins Gesetz – formuliert von John Ruskin, einem frühen Gegner der industriellen Produktionsweisen und romantischem Verfechter handwerklicher Qualität –, das da lautet: „Es gibt kaum etwas auf dieser Welt, das nicht irgend jemand ein wenig schlechter machen und etwas billiger verkaufen könnte, und die Menschen, die sich nur am Preis orientieren, werden die gerechte Beute solcher Machenschaften.“
Die dritte industrielle Revolution, von der wir künden, lenkt das Pendel erneut in eine andere Richtung. An die Stelle des industriellen Immer-mehr-vom-Gleichen-zu-immer-günstigeren-Preisen treten individuellere Produkte, hergestellt in flexibler und kleinteiliger Produktionsweise mit universell einsetzbaren Werkzeugen.
Auch hinter dieser ökonomischen Umwälzung steckt eine technologische: die Digitalisierung der Produktion. Aber diesmal arbeitet die Technologie nicht vom Menschen weg in Richtung golemhafter Monstrosität, sondern sie arbeitet auf den Menschen zu im Sinne eines individuellen „Empowerment». Sie wird zu einer mittleren oder vermittelnden Technologie im menschlichem Maßstab, wie sie schon Mahatma Ghandi vorgeschwebt hatte. Vieles, wofür man früher einen kleinen Betrieb oder ein mittelständisches Unternehmen benötigte, lässt sich heute vom Laptop aus erledigen.
Einiges in der kommenden Epoche entfalteter digitaler Produktivkräfte wird sogar an die Zeit vor der industriellen Revolution erinnern – nur unter High-Tech-Vorzeichen. „Auf gewisse Weise sind die Produktionsmittel wieder prä-industriell geworden“, schreibt Daniel Pink in seinem herzerwärmenden Manifest „Free Agent Nation“. Oder noch pointierter: „Technology is taking the capital out of capitalism.” Der technologische Wandel wird einen Kapitalismus hervorbringen, in dem Kapital nicht mehr der Engpassfaktor ist.

Die Fabbing-Revolte
Jede Revolution beginnt mit einer schwelenden Revolte, engagierten Vorkämpfern und einem gemeinsamen Slogan. Fabbing, das Ausdrucken von dreidimensionalen Gegenständen, ist das Herz dieser Revolte. Und „Atoms are the new bits“, lautet die griffige Formel, mit der Visionäre des kommenden Aufstandes wie Neil Gershenfeld vom MIT nun schon seit Jahren die bevorstehende Disruption durch Fabbing-Technologien ankündigen. Gemeint ist damit, dass sich der Trend zu Personal Fabrication, die Demokratisierung der Produktion, exakt in den Bahnen ereignen wird, die durch die PC-Revolution vorgezeichnet wurden. 2005 schrieb Gershenfeld in seinem Buch „FAB: The Coming Revolution on Your Desktop“: „Wie beim früheren Übergang von Mainframe-Computern zu PCs werden die Potentiale von maschinellem Werkzeug nun für den Normalmenschen erschwinglich in Form von Personal Fabricators (PFs). Die Auswirkungen sind wahrscheinlich diesmal aber noch gravierender, weil das, was hier personalisiert wird, unsere physische Welt der Dinge ist, nicht die digitale Welt der Computer-Bits.“
Um einen Vorgeschmack zu geben, haben Gershenfeld und sein Centre for Bits and Atoms die FabLabs entwickelt, kleine Produktionseinheiten, in denen von Alltagsgütern des täglichen Bedarfs bis zu Hightech-Produkten fast alles dezentral produziert (und repariert) werden kann. Über 50 dieser FabLabs sind mittlerweile weltweit im Einsatz, vom ländlichen Indien bis Boston, von Südafrika bis Nord-Norwegen. Aber Gershenfeld geht es um mehr als nur ein neues Werkzeug, um damit Industrieproduktion dorthin zu bringen, wo sie vorher nicht war. Eigentlich geht es dem Revoluzzer darum, die Trennung von Handwerkskunst und Produktion im Gefolge der Industriellen Revolution zu korrigieren. Der eigentliche Sprengstoff dafür schlummerte in der Weiterentwicklung der 3D-Drucker, die damals noch gar nicht richtig begonnen hatte, als Gerschenfeld schrieb: „Ein programmierbarer Personal Fabricator wird in der Lage sein alles mögliche inklusive sich selbst herzustellen indem er Atome kombiniert. Es wird eine sich selbst reproduzierende Maschine sein.“
Kurze Zeit später, im September 2006, stellte Adrian Bowyer, ein exzentrischer Brite, an der Universität von Bath im Westen Englands den ersten Prototypen einer solchen Maschine vor, die neben allem möglichen anderen auch die meisten Bauteile für sich selbst herstellen konnte – und sich so theoretisch endlos fortpflanzen könnte. Der RepRap, kurz für „replicating rapid-prototyper“, ein würfelförmiges Gebilde aus Gewindestangen, Computerchips und simplen Plastikteilen, die auf einer ebensolchen Maschine hergestellt werden können. Auch Bowyer glaubte von Anfang an fest an die durchschlagende gesellschaftliche Wirkung seiner Maschine; sie werde „ein revolutionäres Eigentum an den Produktionsmitteln durch das Proletariat ermöglichen – ohne den chaotischen und gefährlichen Revolutionskram.“

Das nächste Apple
Bowyers RepRap, der von einer Open-Source-Hardware-Community permanent weiterentwickelt wird, ist gleichzeitig Urahn der meisten billigen 3D-Drucker, die heute auf dem Markt sind oder gerade auf den Markt drängen. 2009 machten drei Jungs aus Brooklyn den Anfang und brachten mit dem „Makerbot“ den ersten Bausatz für einen 3D-Drucker unter 1.000 US-Dollar auf den Markt. Obwohl die Eigenbau-Montage zeitraubend und knifflig war, war die Nachfrage auf Anhieb so groß, dass die Firma ihre Erstkunden bitten musste, auf ihren Makerbots gegen Bezahlung Komponenten für weitere Bausätze zu fertigen. Nur halb im Spaß wurde das bescheidene Start-up ganz in der Atoms-Bits-Analogie bereits als „das nächste Apple“ gehandelt, erinnert man sich, wie handgemacht die erste PC-Generation aussah.
Seit Anfang dieses Jahres gibt es das neueste Modell „Replicator“ zum Preis von 1.749 US-Dollar im Makerbot-Webshop zu bestellen. Es kommt vorfabriziert ins Haus, sieht bereits wie ein richtiges Produkt aus und richtet sich damit an weniger technikbegabte Amateure. Die Wartezeit beträgt allerdings zehn bis zwölf Wochen. Und Makerbot bekommt derzeit mächtig Konkurrenz im niederpreisigen Home-Segment. Eine Reihe von 3D-Druckern in ähnlicher Preisklasse sind bereits lieferbar oder angekündigt. Der Markt fühlt sich ein bisschen so an, wie der PC-Markt um 1980 zu Zeiten des Commodore VC-20 oder des Atari ST. Was lange Zeit blumige Versprechung war, steht nun anscheinend vor einem breiteren Durchbruch beim Publikum: Der erschwingliche 3D-Drucker für jeden Schreibtisch als Teil der PC-Infrastruktur.
Wenn Makerbot sich tatsächlich als das nächste Apple herausschälen sollte, dann wäre die angegliederte Website Thingiverse.com das nächste iTunes. Hier kann man sich die CAD-Datensätze herunterladen, mittels derer der Makerbot – oder jedes andere Modell – dann den eingespeisten Plastikdraht über eine Heißdüse Schicht für Schicht in die gewünschte Form modelliert. Der Vergleich mit Apple hinkt allerdings, weil auf Thingiverse alle Datensätze umsonst zu haben sind – so wie das ganze Feld noch sehr nach Open-Source-Regeln funktioniert. Bisher, und das ist das große Manko der Szene, ist allerdings wenig Weltbewegendes dabei: Das Spektrum reicht von der Trillerpfeife bis zur Schneckenfalle für den Garten. Vieles erinnert an Überraschungsei-Schnickschnack. Das liegt zum einen an den begrenzten Volumina, als auch an den zu verarbeitenden Materialien. Die meisten Geräte können nur minderwertige Thermoplaste verarbeiten und in Einzel-Objekte bis zur Größe eines Tennisballs verwandeln. Damit lässt sich die Welt kaum aus den Angeln hebeln.
Aber auch das ändert sich gerade. Immerhin kann der „Replicator“ bereits zweifarbige Objekte ausdrucken, und es tun sich immer mehr sinnvolle praktische Anwendungsfelder auf – nicht mehr lieferbare Ersatzteile für historische Geräte und Oldtimer sind bereits heute eins. Per 3D-Scanner lassen sich Alltagsobjekte in Datensätze verwandeln und werden so zur Software für eine Reparatur-Ökonomie „Marke Eigenbau“. Wie beim PC, mit dem anfangs auch überwiegend gespielt wurde, wird die Bewegung eines Tages das Experimentierstadium überwunden haben und das Nichtschwimmerbecken verlassen.

Ding-Hacking und Bio-Hacking
Als Menetekel und historischer Kick-off könnte sich in der Rückschau etwa ein scheinbar unbedeutendes Ereignis im Januar 2012 erweisen: der Zeitpunkt, als The Pirate Bay die Kategorie „Physibles“ zu seinen bestehenden Kategorien hinzufügt. Damit rüstet sich die Filesharing-Plattform, die schon der Software-, Musik- und Filmindustrie gehörig zugesetzt hat, für eine Zukunft, in der auch die CAD-Daten physischer Objekte auf breites Interesse von Raubkopierern stoßen, und das verarbeitende Gewerbe nicht mehr nur chinesische Kopien und Plagiate fürchten muss, sondern eine Ding-Piraterie durch Amateure. Die Erläuterung der Piraten dazu liest sich ähnlich vollmundig-visionär wie die Sätze der ersten Fabbing-Propheten: „Wir versuchen immer, die Zukunft vorauszusehen […] Wir glauben, der nächste Schritt beim Kopieren wird der von der digitalen zur physischen Form sein. Es werden physische Objekte sein. Oder, wie wir sie nennen: Physibles. Datenobjekte, die bereit und in der Lage sind, sich zu vergegenständlichen. Wir glauben, 3D-Drucker, -Scanner und dergleichen sind nur der erste Schritt. Wir glauben, in der nahen Zukunft wird man Ersatzteile für Fahrzeuge drucken. Und in 20 Jahren seine Sneakers herunterladen.“
Was passiert, wenn sich die Hacker auf die reale Welt stürzen und beginnen, die Lücken zu stopfen und Nischen zu füllen, die die industrielle Massenproduktion bietet? Auch Chris Anderson, Chefredakteur von Wired, „Long Tail“-Erfinder und Kurator der TED-Konferenz sieht – ausgehend von einer Renaissance der Garagenbastler – eine neue industrielle Revolution heraufziehen, die sich am Vorbild der Digitalisierung orientiert. In einer WIRED-Titelgeschichte zum Thema schreibt er: „Peer Production, Open Source, Crowdsourcing, user-generated Content – all diese digitalen Trends übertragen sich nun auf die reale Welt.“
Analog zu den Hackern der PC-Revolution bildet in den USA die wachsende Maker-Szene die Speerspitze der Bewegung. Sie trifft sich seit 2006 in Kalifornien auf den Maker Faires, einer Art Erfinder-Weltkongress 2.0, der mittlerweile Ableger in Kanada, Afrika und Korea ausgebildet hat. Bei der letzten Flagship-Messe im Mai 2012 im San Mateo County Event Center kamen über 100.000 Teilnehmer. Die Szene reicht von den traditionellen Bastlern und Schraubern, die in klassischer Do-it-yourself-Manier vom getunten Toaster bis zur lebensgroßen Dinosaurier-Attrappe alles mögliche selbst herstellen, bis zu den Hardhackern, deren Ehrgeiz darin liegt, eigene Computer-Hardware und -Peripherie zu entwickeln und anzupassen. Letztere haben durch die Entwicklung des Arduino einen ziemlichen Zustrom erlebt. Diese von Interface-Designern in Norditalien entwickelte „Electronic Prototyping Plattform“ ist nach Open-Source-Regeln anpassbar und frei bestückbar mit Sensoren, LEDs, Elektromotoren etc. Damit ist der Arduino, den es in der Basisvariante bereits ab 20 Euro zu kaufen gibt, zum Herzstück vieler Hardware-Eigenentwicklungen bis hin zu marktreifen Produkten in Kleinserie geworden. Selbst versiertere Laien können damit nach Anleitung einen webfähigen Feuchtigkeitsmesser bauen, der ihnen über Twitter mitteilt, wenn die Zimmerpflanzen Wasser brauchen. Ambitioniertere Bastler haben damit bereits einen Open-Source-Gameboy fabriziert.
Die Ultra-Pioniere der Bewegung haben sich allerdings bereits von der Hardware abgewendet und richten ihre Energien auf die „Wetware“, biologische Materialien, Mikroorganismen und DNA. Bio-Hacking heißt das neue Zauberwort. Hobby-Frankensteine, die sich selbst „Bio-Punks“ nennen, machen den Einrichtungen der Spitzenforschung ihr Monopol auf die synthetische Biologie streitig. Die Labor-Ausstattung dafür kaufen sie billig auf Ebay, die Gen-Sequenzen, sogenannte „Biobricks“, erhalten sie von den gleichen Laboren, die ansonsten für Profi-Forscher die Sequenzierungen im industriellen Maßstab übernehmen. Bislang hat noch kein lebensfähiger, von Amateuren designter Organismus den Bastelkeller verlassen. Das heute erreichbare Niveau, das fanden kürzlich auch Wissenschaftsredakteure der FAZ im Eigenexperiment heraus, liegt etwa bei der Isolierung und Analyse einzelner Genabschnitte des eigenen Erbmaterials.
Dagegen stehen die vollmundigen Ankündigungen von Biohacking-Visionären wie Freeman Dyson von der Harvard-Universität: „Die domestizierte Biotechnik wird uns, steht sie erst einmal Hausfrauen und Kindern zur Verfügung, eine explosionsartige Vielfalt neuer Lebewesen bescheren statt der Monokulturen, die die Großunternehmen bevorzugen.“ Und weiter: „Genome designen wird eine persönliche Angelegenheit werden, eine neue Kunstform, die so kreativ wie Malen oder Bildhauern sein wird. Nur wenige der neuen Kreationen werden Meisterwerke sein, viele aber werden ihren Schöpfern Freude bereiten und unsere Fauna und Flora bereichern.“
Ob irgendetwas davon jemals Realität wird, scheint mehr als fraglich. Dass überhaupt darüber nachgedacht und daran herumexperimentiert wird, zeigt aber, dass heute kein Bereich mehr vor herandrängenden Hackern sicher ist. Und keine Industrie dagegen gefeit, dass sich ambitionierte Amateure und DIY-Bastler in ihr Geschäftsfeld einmischen.

Distributed Manufacturing
Die nächste Industrielle Revolution bedeutet nicht, dass eine neue Form der High-Tech-Subsistenzwirtschaft an die Stelle der industriellen Massenproduktion tritt. Das Szenario, dass die neue Konkurrenz für Konzerne aus Garagen, Hobbykellern und Hinterhöfen erwächst – und auch dort produziert – ist ebenso unrealistisch wie der populäre Kurzschluss, dass wir eines Tages alle 3D-Drucker auf unseren Schreibtischen stehen haben werden, die die Güter des täglichen Bedarfs ausspucken. Dafür sind heutige Herstellungsverfahren schlicht zu komplex, die Leistungsfähigkeit von Home-3D-Druckern zu limitiert, beispielsweise scheitern sie auf absehbare Zeit an der Metallverarbeitung, und die Oberflächenqualität lässt auch noch sehr zu wünschen übrig.
Zwar hat im Tokyoter Hipster-Stadtteil Shibuya gerade das erste FabCafe eröffnet. Während man seinen Frapuccino trinkt, kann man sich dort die auf einem USB-Stick mitgebrachten CAD-Datensätze als Objekte ausdrucken lassen. Aber auch das Szenario, dass es in Zukunft Fabshops an jeder zweiten Ecke geben wird wie heute Copyshops, ist wohl eher zu kurz gedacht.
Was indes blüht und wächst, besonders in den USA, sind Gemeinschaftswerkstätten, die nach dem Modell von Co-Working-Spaces eine Werkbank bereitstellen und Zugriff auf den Maschinenpark auf Stunden- oder Tagesbasis ermöglichen. Die Kette TechShop verfügt landesweit bereits über fünf Standorte, weitere sind in Planung. Ähnlich wie die FabLabs ausgestattet, bieten sie den Mitgliedern Zugriff auf CNC-Laserfräsgeräte, 3D-Drucker, Geräte zur Bestückung von Elektronikplatinen, Verarbeitung von Carbonfasern etc. Neben Hobbybastlern fertigen hier einzelne oder kleine Teams hochspezialisierte Produkte in Kleinserien. Die Stückzahlen und Umsätze dieser virtuellen Unternehmen sind oft zu groß für die Garage, jedoch zu klein, um wirklich eine eigene Firma mit eigenem Maschinenpark zu gründen – deshalb sind sie in den TechShops genau richtig angesiedelt. Chris Anderson selbst ist an einem Unternehmen beteiligt, das unbemannte Drohnen für nichtmilitärische Einsatzzwecke herstellt, die im TechShop in Menlo Park entwickelt wurden: „Was diese kleinen Businesses von der Reinigung oder dem Tante-Emma-Laden an der Ecke, die die Mehrheit der Kleinunternehmen im Land bilden, unterscheidet, ist, dass wir global und High-Tech sind“, schreibt Anderson: „Zwei Drittel unserer Bestellungen kommen von außerhalb der USA. Wir konkurrieren am unteren Ende mit Waffenlieferanten wie Lockheed Martin oder Boeing.“ In Europa ist die Welle noch nicht ganz angekommen, auch wenn das Betahaus in Berlin mit der „Open Design City“ bereits über eine Gemeinschaftswerkstatt verfügt, und die Dingfabrik in Köln mit ihrem Projekt „Dingfabrik+“ demnächst sogar ein noch größeres Rad drehen will.
Was sich ferner abzeichnet, ist, dass ganze globale Wertschöpfungsketten von einzelnen Individuen und vom Laptop aus dirigiert und kontrolliert werden können. Die virtuelle Ein-Mann- oder Eine-Frau-Fabrik kombiniert lokale Produktion mit spezialisierten Remote-Dienstleistungen und Support-Services: „Die Werkzeuge der Fabrikproduktion von der Elektronikmontage bis zum 3D-Drucken sind jetzt für Individuen in kompakten Einheiten verfügbar. Jeder mit einer Idee kann in China Fließbänder in Bewegung setzen“, schreibt Chris Anderson. Heimische 3D-Drucker dienen demnach, wie bislang in F&E-Abteilungen von Konzernen und Mittelständlern, vorwiegend dem Design von Prototypen. Die Herstellung von der Kleinserie bis zum Massenartikel wird – ebenfalls nach dem Vorbild der Konzerne – über Plattformen wie Alibaba.com in Offshoring-Zentren ausgelagert. Auch das gesamte Fulfillment vom Versand bis zur Fakturierung lässt sich mittlerweile bequem an Drittanbieter outsourcen.
Spezialisierte Web-Plattformen wie I.materialise.com, Fabberhouse.de, Sculpteo.com, Razorlab.co.uk oder Formulor.de bieten über das Internet vom Lasercutting-Service bis zu aufwendigeren 3D-Druck-Verfahren wie Stereolithographie und Lasersintern, womit sich Objekte mit glatter Oberfläche herstellen und auch Metall verarbeiten lässt. Viele der Anbieter haben auf ihrer Website gleich einen Webshop integriert, über den sich die Gegenstände und Designs an Dritte verkaufen lassen. Im Shop von Shapeways.com, einer Tochter des Philipps-Konzerns, finden sich so neben Schmuck, Tand und iPhone-Hüllen auch eine Reihe von Gadgets, Technik-Zubehör, und Auto-Ersatzteile.
Auf einer Vielzahl dieser Angebote setzt das Geschäftsmodell von Ponoko.com auf, einem ursprünglich aus Neuseeland stammendes Start-up. Ponoko aggregiert lokale Anbieter und kontrahiert Produktdesigner, Käufer, Materiallieferanten und Herstellungsbetriebe vor Ort zu einem Vier-Seiten-Geschäft. Ponoko selbst nennt das „distributed manufacturing“. „Wir versuchen, ‘Made in China’ über den ganzen Globus zu schmieren“, sagt David ten Haven, einer der Gründer: „Wir sind dabei, die Fabrik des 21. Jahrhunderts zu bauen.“ Im Wikipedia-Eintrag zu Ponoko liest sich das nur unwesentlich verhaltener: „Viele glauben, dass solch distribuiertes on-demand Manufacturing einen größeren Paradigmenwechsel im verarbeitenden Gewerbe bedeuten könnte.“ Gemeint ist: Die Produktion wandert nicht von China auf den heimischen Schreibtisch – aber sie wandert doch in die Nähe, zu einer Produktionsstädte vor der eigenen Haustür. Das hat Implikationen für die Stoffkreisläufe, Logistikwege und die gesamte Wirtschaftsstruktur

Fabbing Society
Distribuiertes Manufacturing bedeutet: Weg von den globalisierten Long-Haul-Wirtschaftsketten, hin zur dezentralen Produktion, der stärkeren regionalen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen und geschlossenen Stoffkreisläufen. In ihrem Buch „Vom Personal Computer zum Personal Fabricator“ schreiben Andreas Neef, Klaus Burmeister, Stefan Krempl, drei Forscher des Institutes z_Punkt, über die disruptive Kraft dieses Paradigmenwechsels: „Eine dezentralisierte Produktionslandschaft wird zwangsläufig zu einem neuen Wirtschaftsspiel führen, einem ‘Whole New Game’, in dem die Rollen zwischen Entwickler, Produzent, Händler und Konsument neu verteilt werden. Produktion und Konsum rücken enger zusammen, und der Kunde wird zum aktiven Teil der Wertschöpfungskette. Die industriellen Geschäftsmodelle werden in der Fabbing Society der Zukunft auf den Kopf gestellt.“
Dass das nicht bloße Zukunftsmusik ist – und wie ganze Industrien dadurch umgekrempelt werden könnten – demonstriert Local Motors, ein Unternehmen, das, wie der Name schon sagt, Automobile lokal in den USA produziert. Ganz nebenbei handelt es sich dabei um das erste Open-Source-Car der Welt, das Marktreife erlangt. Wie das funktioniert? Zunächst einmal stammen die Entwürfe und Designs für die Fahrzeuge von einer Crowdsourcing-Community. Am Entwurf des ersten Models Namens „Rally Fighter“ waren 2.400 Fahrzeugdesigner, Ingenieure und Amateure beteiligt. Die Innereien stammen freilich von Local Motors selbst bzw. sind eine geschickte Kombination von am Markt erhältlichen Bauteilen. Der Antrieb etwa ist ein sauberer Diesel von BMW. Die Firma Local Motors selbst hat nur eine Handvoll Angestellte und baut die Fahrzeuge nicht selbst zusammen. Stattdessen werden die Teile an eine Werkstatt in der Nähe des Kunden geliefert, wo sie nach Anleitung von Automechanikern (oder den Kunden selbst) zusammenmontiert werden. Mittelfristig will Local Motors ein landesweites Netzwerk von eigenen „Mikro-Factories“ aufbauen, so jedenfalls die Planung. Bislang sind nur wenige Stücke des 50.000 Dollar teuren, martialisch anmutenden Spaßgefährtes ausgeliefert. Und Local Motors will es auch gar (noch) nicht mit den Automobilriesen aufnehmen, sondern eher lukrative Nischen besetzen. Sieben Millionen Dollar Venture Capital und ein erfolgreich absolvierter Entwicklungsauftrag für ein Wüstenfahrzeug für das US-Militär sprechen dafür, dass Local Motors keine Eintagsfliege ist.
Unabhängig davon stehen die Zeichen der Zeit im produzierenden Gewerbe auf Dezentralisierung, kleinere Einheiten und Mass-Customization. „Flexible Spezialisierung“ nannten Michael J. Piore und Charles F. Sable schon Mitte der 1980er in „Das Ende der Massenproduktion“ ihre große Idee, statt Massenfertigung in Großbetrieben die Produktion in innovativen und flexiblen Klein- und Mittelbetrieben zu organisieren, die lokal vernetzt sind.
Mit der Digitalisierung der Produktion, sind die entscheidenden Werkzeuge vorhanden, die diese alternative Strategie, von mittelständischen Manufakturbetrieben seit jeher verfolgt, zu einer insgesamt überlegenen werden lassen könnten.
Im April 2012 rief auch der altehrwürdige und besonnene Economist in einer Titelgeschichte „The third industrial Revolution“ aus. Das Heft handelt davon, wie Unternehmen und mittelständische Betriebe profitieren können, indem sie nicht nur auf Fabbing-Technologien, sondern in eine ganze Reihe von Trends einsteigen, die mit der Digitalisierung in Verbindung stehen und die klassische Industrieproduktion verändern: „Eine Zahl von bemerkenswerten Technologien konvergieren: clevere Software, neuartige Materialien, geschicktere Roboter, neue Prozesse (allen voran das 3D-Drucken) und eine ganze Bandbreite Web-basierter Services.“ Auch wie die Fabriken der Zukunft aussehen, haben die Economist-Autoren bereits klar vor Augen: „Sie werden nicht mehr voll mit schmutzigen Maschinen sein, gewartet von Männern in ölverschmierten Overalls. Viele werden blitzblank sauber sein – und fast menschenleer. (…) Die meisten Jobs werden nicht in der Maschinenhalle angesiedelt sein, sondern in den angegliederten Büros, die voll sein werden mit Designern, Ingenieuren, IT-Spezialisten, Logistik-Experten, Marketingmenschen und anderen Vollprofis. Die Industrieberufe der Zukunft werden mehr Skills erfordern. Viele langweilige und monotone Tätigkeiten werden obsolet sein: Wenn nichts mehr genietet wird, braucht man auch keine Nieten mehr.“
Die gute Nachricht der nächsten Industriellen Revolution: Teile der Wertschöpfung kommen zurück aus China und rücken wieder enger an die Orte des Verbrauchs. Wenn Lohnkosten aufgrund einer neuen Automatisierungswelle immer weniger ins Gewicht fallen, schwinden auch die Kostenvorteile der Niedriglohn-Standorte. Die schlechte Nachricht (die nicht notwendigerweise schlecht sein muss): Die Arbeit kehrt nicht in Form von Jobs zurück, sondern als smarte Software und Programme, die zunehmend auch algorithmische Dienstleistungstätigkeiten und Supportfunktionen in Unternehmen wahrnehmen können. Wie die letzten beiden, so wird auch die dritte industrielle Revolution Verwerfungen mit sich bringen, Gewinner und Verlierer kennen und die Arbeitswelt so nachhaltig transformieren, dass wir sie nicht wiedererkennen werden. Wertschöpfung wird kleinteiliger, granularer sein und in häufig wechselnden, zeitlich befristeten Konstellationen stattfinden – und so werden auch die Jobs aussehen. Großkonzerne sind dafür tendenziell schlechter aufgestellt als Soloselbständige, Start-ups und wendige Mittelständler.
In seinem Sach-Roman „Makers“ beschreibt der Science-Fiction-Autor und Web-Aktivist Cory Doctorow, welche strukturellen Verschiebungen sich durch den von der Maker-Szene angezettelten Umbau der Industriegesellschaft ergeben: „Die Tage von Firmen mit Namen wie ‘General Electric’, ‘General Mills’ oder ‘General Motors’ sind gezählt. Das Geld, das auf dem Tisch liegt, ist wie Krill: Eine Milliarde kleiner Chancen für Entrepreneure, die von smarten und kreativen Leuten entdeckt und ausgebeutet werden können.“ Um im Bild zu bleiben: Selbst Pottwale können von Krill satt werden. Für diejenigen, die sich evolutionär an die neuen Verhältnisse und sich wandelnden Ökosysteme anpassen, bietet die nächste Industrielle Revolution mehr Chancen als Risiken. Die Dinosaurier freilich werden aussterben.

Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien in „Trend Update“, Monatsmagazin des Zukunftsinstituts, Frankfurt, August 2012.

Literatur
Neil Gershenfeld: FAB: The Coming Revolution on Your Desktop 2005
Andreas Neef, Klaus Burmeister, Stefan Krempl: Vom Personal Computer zum Personal Fabricator. Points of Fab, Fabbing Society, Homo Fabber, 2006
Daniel Pink: Free Agent Nation. The Future of working for yourself. 2002
Holm Friebe und Thomas Ramge: Marke Eigenbau. Der Aufstand der Massen gegen die Massenproduktion. 2008
Chris Anderson: „Atoms Are the New Bits“. In Wired, 3/10.
Freeman Dyson: „Visionen Grüner Technik“. In Lettre, Herbst 2007
John F. Sable und Charles Piore: Das Ende der Massenproduktion. 1984
Cory Doctorow: Makers. 2009

Bodies in Alliance and the Politics of the Street

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:38 +0000

In the last months there have been, time and again, mass demonstrations on the street, in the square, and though these are very often motivated by different political purposes, something similar happens: bodies congregate, they move and speak together, and they lay claim to a certain space as public space. Now, it would be easier to say that these demonstrations or, indeed, these movements, are characterized by bodies that come together to make a claim in public space, but that formulation presumes that public space is given, that it is already public and recognized as such. We miss something of the point of public demonstrations if we fail to see that the very public character of the space is being disputed, and even fought over, when these crowds gather. So though these movements have depended on the prior existence of pavement, street, and square and have often enough gathered in squares, such as Tahrir, whose political history is potent, it is equally true that the collective actions collect the space itself, gather the pavement, and animate and organize the architecture. As much as we must insist on there being material conditions for public assembly and public speech, we have also to ask how it is that assembly and speech reconfigure the materiality of public space and produce, or reproduce, the public character of that material environment. And when crowds move outside the square, to the side street or the back alley, to the neighborhoods where streets are not yet paved, then something more happens.
At such a moment, politics is not defined as taking place exclusively in the public sphere distinct from a private one, but it crosses that line again and again, bringing attention to the way that politics is already in the home, or on the street, or in the neighborhood, or indeed in those virtual spaces that are equally unbound by the architecture of the house and the square. So when we think about what it means to assemble in a crowd, a growing crowd, and what it means to move through public space in a way that contests the distinction between public and private, we see some ways that bodies in their plurality lay claim to the public, find and produce the public through seizing and reconfiguring the matter of material environments; at the same time, those material environments are part of the action, and they themselves act when they become the support for action. In the same way, when trucks or tanks are rendered inoperative and suddenly speakers climb on them to address the crowd, the military instrument itself becomes a support or platform for a nonmilitary resistance, if not a resistance to the military itself; at such moments, the material environment is actively reconfigured and refunctioned, to use the Brechtian term. And our ideas of action then need to be rethought.
In the first instance, no one mobilizes a claim to move and assemble freely without moving and assembling together with others. In the second instance, the square and the street are not only the material supports for action, but they themselves are part of any account of bodily public action we might propose. Human
action depends upon all sorts of supports – it is always supported action. We know from disability studies that the capacity to move depends upon instruments and surfaces that make movement possible and that bodily movement is supported and facilitated by nonhuman objects and their particular capacity for agency. In the case of public assemblies, we see quite clearly the struggle over what will be public space, but also an equally fundamental struggle over how bodies will be supported in the world – a struggle for employment and education, equitable food distribution, livable shelter, and freedom of movement and expression, to name a few.
Of course, this produces a quandary. We cannot act without supports, and yet we must struggle for the supports that allow us to act or, indeed, that are essential components of our action. It was the Roman idea of the public square that formed the background for Hannah Arendt’s understanding of the rights of assembly and free speech, of action and the exercise of rights. Hannah Arendt surely had both the classical Greek polis and the Roman Forum in mind when she claimed that all political action requires the “space of appearance.” She writes, for instance, “the polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be.” The “true” space then lies “between the people” which means that as much as any action takes place in a located somewhere, it also establishes a space which belongs properly to alliance itself. For Arendt, this alliance is not tied to its location. In fact, alliance brings about its own location, highly transposable. She writes: “action and speech create a space between the participants which can find its proper location almost anywhere and anytime.”¹
So how do we understand this highly if not infinitely transposable notion of political space? Whereas Arendt maintains that politics requires the space of appearance, she also claims that space brings politics about: “it is the space of appearance in the widest sense of the word, namely, the space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men (sic) exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly.”² Something of what she says here is clearly true. Space and location are created through plural action. And yet, in her view, action, in its freedom and its power, has the exclusive capacity to create location. Such a view forgets or refuses that action is always supported and that it is invariably bodily, even, as I will argue, in its virtual forms. The material supports for action are not only part of action, but they are also what is being fought about, especially in those cases when the political struggle is about food, employment, mobility, and access to institutions. To rethink the space of appearance in order to understand the power and effect of public demonstrations for our time, we will need to consider more closely the bodily dimensions of action, what the body requires, and what the body can do,³ especially when we must think about bodies together in a historical space that undergoes a historical transformation by virtue of their collective action: What holds them together there, and what are their conditions of persistence and of power in relation to their precarity and exposure?
I would like to think about this itinerary by which we travel from the space of appearance to the contemporary politics of the street. Even as I say this, I cannot hope to gather together all the forms of demonstration we have seen, some of which are episodic, some of which are part of ongoing and recurrent social and political movements, and some of which are revolutionary. I hope to think about what might gather together these gatherings, these public demonstrations. During the winter of 2011, they included demonstrations against tyrannical regimes in North Africa and the Middle East, but also against the escalating precaritization of working peoples in Europe and in the Southern Hemisphere, the struggles for public education throughout the United States and Europe, and, most recently, in Chile, and struggles to make the street safe for women and for gender and sexual minorities, including trans people, whose public appearance is too often punishable by legal and illegal violence. In public assemblies by trans and queer people, the claim is often made that the streets must be made safe from the police who are complicit in criminality, especially on those occasions when the police support criminal regimes or when, for instance, the police commit the very crimes against sexual and gender minorities that they were supposed to prevent. Demonstrations are one of the few ways that police power is overcome, especially when those assemblies become at once too large and too mobile, too condensed and too diffuse, to be contained by police power and when they have the resources to regenerate themselves on the spot.
Perhaps these are anarchist moments or anarchist passages, when the legitimacy of a regime or its laws is called into question, but when no new legal regimen has yet arrived to take its place. This time of the interval is one in which the assembled bodies articulate a new time and space for the popular will, not a single identical will, not a unitary will, but one that is characterized as an alliance of distinct and adjacent bodies whose action and whose inaction demands a different future. Together they exercise the performative power to lay claim to the public in a way that is not yet codified into law and that can never be fully codified into law. And this performativity is not only speech, but the demands of bodily action, gesture, movement, congregation, persistence, and exposure to possible violence. How do we understand this acting together that opens up time and space outside and against the established architecture and temporality of the regime, one that lays claim to materiality, leans into its supports, draws from its material and technical dimensions to rework their functions? Such actions reconfigure what will be public and what will be the space of politics.
I push against Hannah Arendt even as I draw upon her resources to clarify my own position. Her work supports my action here, but I also refuse it in some ways. Arendt’s view is confounded by its own gender politics, relying as it does on a distinction between the public and private domains that leaves the sphere of politics to men and reproductive labor to women. If there is a body in the public sphere, it is presumptively masculine and unsupported, presumptively free to create, but not itself created. And the body in the private sphere is female, ageing, foreign, or childish, and always prepolitical. Although she was, as we know from the important work of Adriana Cavarero, a philosopher of natality, Arendt understood this capacity to bring something into being as a function of political speech and action. Indeed, when male citizens enter into the public square to debate questions of justice, revenge, war, and emancipation, they take the illuminated public square for granted as the architecturally bounded theatre of their speech. And their speech becomes the paradigmatic form of action, physically cut off from the private do-micile, itself shrouded in darkness and reproduced through activities that are not quite action in the proper and public senses. Men make the passage from that private darkness to that public light and, once illuminated, they speak, and their speech interrogates the principles of justice it articulates, becoming itself a form of critical inquiry and democratic participation. For Arendt, rethinking this classical scene within political modernity, speech is understood as the bodily and linguistic exercise of rights. Bodily and linguistic – how are we to reconceive these terms and their intertwining here against and beyond that presumption of a gendered division of labor?
For Arendt, political action takes place on the condition that the body appear. I appear to others, and they appear to me, which means that some space between us allows each to appear. One might expect that we appear within a space or that we are supported by a material organization of space. But that is not her argument. The sphere of appearance is not simple, since it seems to arise only on the condition of a certain intersubjective facing off. We are not simply visual phenomena for each other – our voices must be registered, and so we must be heard; rather, who we are, bodily, is already a way of being “for” the other, appearing in ways that we can neither see nor hear; that is, we are made available, bodily, for another whose perspective we can neither fully anticipate nor control. In this way, I am, as a body, not only for myself, not even primarily for myself, but find myself, if I find myself at all, constituted and dispossessed by the perspective of others. So, for political action, I must appear to others in ways I cannot know, and in this way, my body is established by perspectives that I cannot inhabit, but that, surely, inhabit me. This is an important point because it is not the case that the body only establishes my own perspective; it is also what displaces that perspective and makes that displacement into a necessity. This happens most clearly when we think about bodies that act together. No one body establishes the space of appearance, but this action, this performative exercise, happens only “between” bodies, in a space that constitutes the gap between my own body and another’s. In this way, my body does not act alone when it acts politically. Indeed, the action emerges from the “between.”
It is both problematic and interesting that, for Arendt, the space of appearance is not only an architectural given: “the space of appearance comes into being,” she writes, “wherever men are together in the manner of speech and action, and therefore predates and precedes all formal constitution of the public realm and the various forms of government, that is, the various forms in which the public realm may be organized.”⁴ In other words, this space of appearance is not a location that can be separated from the plural action that brings it about; it is not there outside of the action that invokes and constitutes it. And yet, if we are to accept this view, we have to understand how the plurality that acts is itself constituted. How does a plurality form, and what material supports are necessary for that formation? Who enters this plurality, and who does not, and how are such matters decided?
How do we describe the action and the status of those beings disaggregated from the plural? What political language do we have in reserve for describing that exclusion and the forms of resistance that crack open the sphere of appearance as it is currently delimited? Are those who live on the outside of the sphere of appearance the deanimated “givens” of political life? Are they mere life or bare life? Are we to say that those who are excluded are simply unreal, disappeared, or that they have no being at all – shall they be cast off, theoretically, as the socially dead and the merely spectral? If we do that, we not only adopt the position of a particular regime of appearance, but ratify that perspective, even if our wish is to call it into question. Do such formulations describe a state of having been made destitute by -existing political arrangements, or is that destitution unwittingly ratified by a theory that adopts the perspective of those who regulate and police the sphere of appearance itself?
At stake is the question of whether the destitute are outside of politics and power or are they in fact living out a specific form of political destitution along with specific forms of political agency and resistance that expose the policing of the boundaries of the sphere of appearance itself. If we claim that the destitute are outside of the sphere of politics – reduced to depoliticized forms of being – then we implicitly accept as right the dominant ways of establishing the limits of the political. In some ways, this follows from the Arendtian position that adopts the internal point of view of the Greek polis on what politics should be, who should gain entry into the public square, and who should remain in the private. Such a view disregards and devalues those forms of political agency that emerge precisely in those domains deemed prepolitical or extrapolitical and that break into the sphere of appearance as from the outside, as its outside, confounding the distinction between inside and outside. For in revolutionary or insurrectionary moments, we are no longer sure what is the space of politics, just as we are often unsure about exactly in what time we are living, since the established regimes of both space and time are upended in ways that expose their violence and their contingent limits. We see this when undocumented workers gather in the city of Los Angeles to claim their rights of assembly and of citizenship without being citizens, without having any legal right to do so. Their labor is supposed to remain necessary and shrouded from the view, and so when these laboring bodies emerge on the street, act like citizens, they make a mimetic claim to citizenship that alters not only how they appear, but how the sphere of appearance works. Indeed, the sphere of appearance is both mobilized and disabled when an exploited and laboring class emerges on the street to announce itself and express its opposition to being the unseen condition of what appears as political.
The impetus for Giorgio Agamben’s notion of “bare life“ derives from this very conception of the polis in Arendt’s political philosophy and, I would suggest, runs the risk of this very problem: if we seek to take account of exclusion itself as a political problem, as part of politics it-self, then it will not do to say that once excluded, those beings lack appearance or “reality“ in political terms, that they have no social or political standing or are cast out and reduced to mere being (forms of givenness precluded from the sphere of action). Nothing so metaphysically extravagant has to happen if we agree that one reason the sphere of the political cannot be defined by the classic conception of the polis is that we are then deprived of having and using a language for those forms of agency and resistance that focus on the politics of exclusion itself or, indeed, that operate against those regimes of power that maintain the stateless and disenfranchised in conditions of destitution. Few matters could be more politically consequential.
Although Agamben borrows from Foucault to articulate a conception of the biopolitical, the thesis of “bare life” remains untouched by that conception. As a result, we cannot within that vocabulary describe the modes of agency and action undertaken by the stateless, the occupied, and the disenfranchised, since even the life stripped of rights is still within the sphere of the political and is thus not reduced to mere being, but is, more often than not, angered, indignant, rising up and resisting. To be outside established and legitimate political structures is still to be saturated in power relations, and this saturation is the point of departure for a theory of the political that includes dominant and subjugated forms, modes of inclusion and legitimation as well as modes of delegitimation and effacement.
Luckily, I think Arendt did not consistently follow this model from The Human Condition, which is why, for instance, in the early 1960s, she turned her attention to the fate of refugees and the stateless, and came to assert in that context the right to have rights. The right to have rights is one that depends on no existing particular political organization for its legitimacy. Like the space of appearance, the right to have rights predates and precedes any political institution that might codify or seek to guarantee that right; at the same time, it is derived from no natural set of laws. The right comes into being when it is exercised, and exercised by those who act in concert, in alliance. Those who are excluded from existing polities, who belong to no nation-state or other contemporary state formation, may be deemed “unreal“ only by those who seek to monopolize the terms of reality. And yet even after the public sphere has been defined through their exclusion, they act. Whether they are abandoned to precarity or left to die through systematic negligence, concerted action still emerges from their acting together. And this is what we see, for instance, when undocumented workers amass on the street without the legal right to do so, when squatters lay claim to buildings in Argentina as a way of exercising the right to livable shelter, when populations lay claim to a public square that has belonged to the military, or when the refugees take part in collective uprisings demanding shelter, food, and rights of sanctuary, when populations amass, without the protection of the law and without permits to demonstrate, to bring down an unjust or criminal regime of law or to protest austerity measures that destroy the possibility of employment and education for many. Or when those whose public appearance is itself criminal, transgendered people in Turkey or women who wear the niqa-b in France, appear in order to contest that criminal status and assert the right to appear.
Indeed, in the public demonstrations that often follow from acts of public mourning, as in Syria in recent months, where crowds of mourners became targets of military destruction, we can see how the existing public space is seized by those who have no existing right to gather there, who emerge from zones of disappearance to become bodies exposed to violence and death in the course of gathering and persisting publically as they do. Indeed, it is their right to gather free of intimidation and the threat of violence that is systematically attacked by the police, the army, hired gangs, or mercenaries. To attack those bodies is to attack the right itself, since when those bodies appear and act, they are exercising a right outside, against, and in the face of the regime.
Although the bodies on the street are vocalizing their opposition to the legitimacy of the state, they are also, by virtue of occupying and persisting in that space with-out protection, posing their challenge in corporeal terms, which means that when the body “speaks“ politically, it is not only in vocal or written language. The persistence of the body in its exposure calls that legitimacy into question and does so precisely through a performativity of the body. Both action and gesture signify and speak, both as action and claim; the one is not finally extricable from the other. Where the legitimacy of the state is brought into question precisely by that way of appearing in public, the body itself exercises a right that is no right; in other words, it exercises a right that is being actively contested and destroyed by military force and that, in its resistance to force, articulates its way of living, showing both its precarity and its way to persist. This right is codified nowhere. It is not granted from elsewhere or by existing law, even if it sometimes finds support precisely there. It is, in fact, the right to have rights, not as natural law or metaphysical stipulation, but as the persistence of the body against those forces that seek its debilitation or eradication. This persistence that requires breaking into the established regime of space with a set of material supports both mobilized and mobilizing.
Just to be clear: I am not referring to a vitalism or a right to life as such. Rather, I am suggesting that political claims are made by bodies as they appear and act, as they refuse and as they persist under conditions in which that fact alone is taken to be an act of delegitimation of the state. It is not that bodies are simply mute life forces that counter existing modalities of power. Rather, they are themselves modalities of power, embodied interpretations, engaging in allied action. On the one hand, these bodies are productive and performative. On the other hand, they can persist and act only when they are supported, by environments, by nutrition, by work, by modes of sociality and belonging. And when these supports fall away and precarity is exposed, they are mobilized in another way, seizing upon the supports that exist in order to make a claim that there can be no embodied life without social and institutional support, without ongoing employment, without networks of interdependency and care, collective rights to shelter and mobility. Not only do they struggle for the idea of social support and political enfranchisement, but their struggle is its own social form. And so, in the most ideal instances, an alliance begins to enact the social order it seeks to bring about by establishing its own modes of sociability. And yet that alliance is not reducible to a collection of individuals, and it is, strictly speaking, not individuals who act. Moreover, action in alliance happens precisely between those who participate, and this is not an ideal or empty space. That interval is the space of sociality and of support, of being constituted in a sociality that is never reducible to one’s own perspective and to being dependent on structures without which there is no durable and livable life.
Many of the massive demonstrations and modes of resistance we have seen in the last months not only produce a space of appearance, they seize upon an already established space permeated by existing power, seeking to sever the relations between the public space, the public square, and the existing regime. So the limits of the political are exposed and the link between the theatre of legitimacy and public space is severed; that theatre is no longer unproblematically housed in public space, since public space now occurs in the midst of another action, one that displaces the power that claims legitimacy precisely by taking over the field of its effects. Simply put, the bodies on the street redeploy the space of appearance in order to contest and negate the existing forms of political legitimacy – and just as they sometimes fill or take over public space, the material history of those structures also works on them, becoming part of their very action, remaking a history in the midst of its most concrete and sedimented artifices. These are subjugated and empowered actors who seek to wrest legitimacy from an existing state apparatus that depends upon the regulation of the public space of appearance for its theatrical self-constitution. In wresting that power, a new space is created, a new “between” of bodies, as it were, that lays claim to existing space through the action of a new alliance, and those bodies are seized and animated by those existing spaces in the very acts by which they reclaim and resignify their meanings.
Such a struggle intervenes in the spatial organization of power, which includes the allocation and restriction of spatial locations in which and by which any population may appear, which implies a spatial regulation of when and how the “popular will” may appear. This view of the spatial restriction and allocation of who may appear – in effect, of who may become a subject of appearance – suggests an operation of power that works through both foreclosure and differential allocation.
What, then, does it mean to appear within contemporary politics, and can we consider this question at all without some recourse to the media? If we consider what it is to appear, it follows that we appear to someone and that our appearance has to be registered by the senses, not only our own, but someone else’s. If we appear, we must be seen, which means that our bodies must be viewed and their vocalized sounds must be heard: the body must enter the visual and audible field. But is this not, of necessity, a laboring body and a sexual body, as well as a body gendered and racialized in some form? Arendt’s view clearly meets its limits here, for the body is itself divided into the one that appears publically to speak and act and another, sexual and laboring, feminine, foreign, and mute, that generally is relegated to the private and prepolitical sphere. Such a division of labor is precisely what is called into question when precarious lives assemble on the street in forms of alliance that must struggle to achieve a space of appearance. If some domain of bodily life operates as the sequestered or disavowed condition for the sphere of appearance, it becomes the structuring absence that governs and makes possible the public sphere.
If we are living organisms who speak and act, then we are clearly related to a vast continuum or network of living beings; we not only live among them, but our persistence as living organisms depends on that matrix of sustaining interdependent relations. And yet, our speaking and acting distinguishes us as something separate from other living beings. Indeed, we do not need to know what is distinctively human about political action, but only finally to see how the entrance of the disavowed body into the political sphere establishes at the same time the essential link between humans and other living beings. The private body thus conditions the public body in theories such as Arendt’s, but in political organizations of space that continue in many forms. And even though the public and private body are necessarily the same, the bifurcation is crucial to maintaining the public and private distinction and its modes of disavowal and disenfranchisement.
Perhaps it is a kind of fantasy that one dimension of bodily life can and must remain out of sight, and yet another, fully distinct, appears in public. Is there no trace of the biological in the sphere of appearance? Could we not argue, with Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers, that negotiating the sphere of appearance is, in fact, a biological thing to do, one of the investigative capacities of the organism? After all, there is no way of navigating an environment or procuring food without appearing bodily in the world, and there is no escape from the vulnerability and mobility that appearing in the world implies, which explains forms of camouflage and self-protection in the animal world. In other words, is appearance not a necessarily morphological moment where the body risks appearance not only in order to speak and act, but suffer and move, as well, to engage others bodies, to negotiate an environment on which one depends, to establish a social organization for the satisfaction of needs? Indeed, the body can appear and signify in ways that contest the way it speaks or even contest speaking as its paradigmatic instance. Could we still understand action, gesture, stillness, touch, and moving together if they were all reducible to the vocalization of thought through speech?
This act of public speaking, even within that problematic division of labour, depends upon a dimension of bodily life that is given, passive, opaque, and so excluded from the conventional definition of the political. Hence, we can ask: What regulation keeps the given or passive body from spilling over into the active body? Are these two different bodies, and if so, what politics is required to keep them apart? Are these two different dimensions of the same body, or are these, in fact, the effect of a certain regulation of bodily appearance that is actively contested by new social movements, struggles against sexual violence, for reproductive freedom, against precarity, for the freedom of mobility? Here we can see that a certain topographical or even architectural regulation of the body happens at the level of theory. Significantly, it is precisely this operation of power – the foreclosure and differential allocation of whether and how the body may appear – that is excluded from Arendt’s explicit account of the political. Indeed, her explicit account of the political depends upon that very operation of power that it fails to consider as part of politics itself.
So what I accept from Arendt is the following: Freedom does not come from me or from you; it can and does happen as a relation between us, or, indeed, among us. So this is not a matter of finding the human dignity within each person, but rather of understanding the human as a relational and social being, one whose action depends upon equality and articulates the principle of equality. Indeed, there is no human, in her view, if there is no equality. No human can be human alone. And no human can be human without acting in concert with others and on conditions of equality. I would add the following: The claim of equality is not only spoken or written, but is made precisely when bodies appear together, or, rather, when through their action, they bring the space of appearance into being. This space is a feature and effect of action, and it works, according to Arendt, only when relations of equality are maintained.
Of course, there are many reasons to be suspicious of idealized moments, but there are also reasons to be wary of any analysis that is fully guarded against idealization. There are two aspects of the revolutionary demonstrations in Tahrir Square that I would like to -underscore. The first has to do with the way a certain sociability was established within the square, a division of labor that broke down gender difference, that involved rotating who would speak and who would clean the areas where people slept and ate, developing a work schedule for -everyone to maintain the environment and to clean the -toilets. In short, what some would call “horizontal relations” among the protestors formed easily and methodically, alliances struggling to embody equality, which -included Ωn equal division of labor between the sexes – these became part of the very resistance to the Mubarak regime and its entrenched hierarchies, including the extraordinary differentials of wealth between the military and corporate sponsors of the regime and the working people. So the social form of the resistance began to incorporate principles of equality that governed not only how and when people spoke and acted for the media and against the regime, but how people cared for their various quarters within the square, the beds on pavement, the makeshift medical stations and bathrooms, the places where people ate, and the places where people were exposed to violence from the outside. We are not just talking about heroic actions that took enormous physical strength and the exercise of compelling political rhetoric. Sometimes the simple act of sleeping there, on the square, was the most eloquent political statement – and even must count as an action. These actions were all political in the simple sense that they were breaking down a conventional distinction between public and private in order to establish new relations of equality; in this sense, they were incorporating into the very social form of resistance the principles they were struggling to realize in broader political forms.
Second, when up against violent attack or extreme threats, many people chanted the word silmiyya which comes from the root verb salima, which means “to be safe and sound,” “unharmed,” “unimpaired,” “intact,” and “secure”; but also “to be unobjectionable,” “blameless,” “faultless”; and yet also “to be certain,” “established,” “clearly proven”.⁵ The term comes from the noun silm, which means “peace, “ but also, interchangeably and significantly, “the religion of Islam.” One variant of the term is hubb as-silm, which is Arabic for “pacifism.” Most usually, the chanting of silmiyya comes across as a gentle exhortation: “peaceful, peaceful.” Although the revolution was for the most part non-violent, it was not necessarily led by a principled opposition to violence. Rather, the collective chant was a way of encouraging people to resist the mimetic pull of military aggression – and the aggression of the gangs – by keeping in mind the larger goal: radical democratic change. To be swept into a violent exchange of the moment was to lose the patience needed to realize the revolution. What interests me here is the chant, the way in which language worked not to incite an action, but to restrain one: a restraint in the name of an emerging community of equals whose primary way of doing politics would not be violence.
Finally, then, to what extent was the revolution a media revolution, and how does that make actual bodies less central to the political action? How important was the locatedness of bodies to the events that took place? Of course, Tahrir Square is a place, and we can locate it quite precisely on the map of Cairo. At the same time, we find questions posed throughout the media: Will the Palestinians have their Tahrir Square? Where is the Tahrir Square in India? That’s to name but a few. So it is located, and it is transposable; indeed, it seemed to be transposable from the start, though never completely. And of course, we cannot think the transpos-ability of those bodies in the square without the media. In some ways, the media images from Tunisia prepared the way for the media events in Tahrir, then those that followed in Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, and Libya, all of which took different trajectories and take them still. As you know, many of the public demonstrations of these last months have not been against military dictatorships or tyrannical regimes. They have also been against the monopoly capitalism, neoliberalism, and the suppression of political rights and in the name of those who are abandoned by neoliberal reforms that seek to dismantle forms of social democracy and socialism, that eradicate jobs, expose populations to poverty, and undermine the basic right to a public education.
The street scenes become politically potent only when and if we have a visual and audible version of the scene communicated in live or proximate time, so that the media does not merely report the scene, but is part of the scene and the action; indeed, the media is the scene or the space in its extended and replicable visual and audible dimensions. One way of stating this is simply that the media extend the scene visually and audibly and participate in the delimitation and transposability of the scene. Put differently, the media constitute the scene in a time and place that includes and exceeds its local instantiation. Although the scene is surely and emphatically local, those who are elsewhere have the sense that they are getting some direct access through the images and sounds they receive. That is true, but they do not know how the editing takes place, which scene conveys and travels and which scenes remain obdurately outside the frame. When the scene travels, it is both there and here, and if it were not spanning both locations – indeed, multiple locations – it would not be the scene that it is. Its locality is not denied by the fact that the scene is communicated beyond itself and so constituted in a global media; it depends on that mediation to take place as the event that it is. This means that the local must be recast outside itself in order to be established as local, and this means that it is only through globalizing media that the local can be established and that something can really happen there. Of course, many things do happen outside the frame of the camera or other digital media devices, and the media can just as easily implement censorship as oppose it. There are many local events that are never recorded and broadcast, and some important reasons why. But when the event travels and manages to summon and sustain global outrage and pressure, which includes the power to stop markets or to sever diplomatic relations, then the local will have to be established time and again in a circuitry that exceeds the local at every instant.
And yet, there remains something localized that cannot and does not travel in that way, and the scene could not be the scene if we did not understand that some people are at risk, and the risk is run precisely by those bodies on the street. If they are transported in one way, they are surely left in place in another, holding the camera or the cell phone, face to face with those they oppose, unprotected, injurable, injured, persistent, if not insurgent. It matters that those bodies carry cell phones, relaying messages and images, and so when they are attacked, it is more often than not in some relation to the camera or the video recorder. It can be an effort to destroy the camera and its user, or it can be a spectacle for the media produced as a warning or a threat. Or it can be a way to stop any more organizing. Is the action of the body separable from its technology, and is the technology not helping to establish new forms of political action? And when censorship or violence is directed against those bodies, are they not also directed against their access to media and in order to establish hegemonic control over which images travel, and which do not?
Of course, the dominant media is corporately owned, exercising their own kinds of censorship and incitement. And yet, it still seems important to affirm that the freedom of the media to broadcast from these sites is itself an exercise of freedom and so a mode of exercising rights, especially when they are rogue media, from the street, evading the censor, where the activation of the instrument is part of the bodily action itself. This is doubtless why both Hosni Mubarak and Michael Cameron, eight months apart, both argued for the censorship of social media networks. At least in some instances, the media not only report on social and political movements that are laying claim to freedom and justice in various ways; the media also are exercising one of those freedoms for which the social movement struggles. I do not mean by this claim to suggest that all media are involved in the struggle for political freedom and social justice (we know, of course, that they are not). Of course, it matters which global media do the reporting and how. My point is that sometimes private media devices become global precisely at the moment in which they overcome modes of censorship to report protests and in that way become part of the protest itself.
What bodies are doing on the street when they are demonstrating is linked fundamentally to what communication devices and technologies are doing when they “report” on what is happening in the street. These are different actions, but they both require the body. The one exercise of freedom is linked to the other, which means that both are ways of exercising rights and that, jointly, they bring a space of appearance into being and secure its transposability. Although some may wager that the exercise of rights now takes place quite at the expense of bodies on the street, that Twitter and other virtual technologies have led to a disembodiment of the public sphere, I disagree. The media requires those bodies on the street to have an event, even as those bodies on the street require the media to exist in a global arena. But under conditions when those with cameras or Internet capacities are imprisoned or tortured or deported, the use of the technology effectively implicates the body. Not only must someone’s hand tap and send, but someone’s body is on the line if that tapping and sending gets traced. In other words, localization is hardly overcome through the use of a media that potentially transmit globally. And if this conjuncture of street and media constitutes a very contemporary version of the public sphere, then bodies on the line have to be thought as both there and here, now and then, transported and stationery, with very different political consequences following from those two modalities of space and time.
It matters that it is public squares that are filled to the brim, that people eat and sleep there, sing and refuse to cede that space, as we saw in Tahrir Square and continue to see on a daily basis. It matters, as well, that it is public educational buildings that have been seized in Athens, London, and Berkeley. At Berkeley, buildings were seized and trespassing fines were handed out. In some cases, students were accused of destroying private property. But these very allegations raised the question of whether the university is public or private. The stated aim of the protest – to seize the building and to sequester themselves there – was a way to gain a platform, indeed, a way to secure the material conditions for appearing in public. Such actions generally do not take place when effective platforms are already available. The students there, but also at Goldsmiths College in the UK more recently, were seizing buildings as a way to lay claim to buildings that ought properly, now and in the future, to belong to public education. That doesn’t mean that every time these buildings are seized it is justifiable, but let us be alert to what is at stake here: the symbolic meaning of seizing these buildings is that these buildings belong to the public, to public education, and it is precisely the access to public education that is being undermined by fee and tuition hikes and budget cuts. We should not be surprised that the protest took the form of seizing the buildings, performatively laying claim to public education, insisting on gaining literal access to the buildings of public education precisely at a moment, historically, when that access is being shut down. In other words, no positive law justifies these actions that oppose the institutionalization of unjust or exclusionary forms of power. Can we then say that these actions are nevertheless an exercise of a right, a lawless exercise that take place precisely when the law is wrong or the law has failed?
Let me offer you an anecdote to make my point more concrete. Last year, I was asked to visit Turkey on the occasion of the International Conference against Homophobia and Transphobia. This was an especially important event in Ankara, the capital of Turkey, where transgendered people are often served fines for appearing in public, are often beaten, sometimes by the police, and where murders of transgendered women in particular have happened nearly once a month in recent years. If I offer you this example of Turkey, it is not to point out that Turkey is “behind“ – something that the embassy representative from Denmark was quick to point out to me and that I refused with equal speed. I assure you that there are equally brutal murders outside of Los Angeles and Detroit, in Wyoming and Louisiana, or even in New York. It is rather because what is astonishing about the alliances there is that several feminist organizations have worked with queer, gay/lesbian, and transgendered people against police violence, but also against militarism, against nationalism, and against the forms of masculinism by which they are supported. So on the street, after the conference, the feminists lined up with the drag queens, the genderqueer with the human rights activists, and the lipstick lesbians with their bisexual and heterosexual friends – the march included secularists and Muslims. They chanted, “We will not be soldiers, and we will not kill.“ To oppose the police violence against trans people is thus to be openly against military violence and the nationalist escalation of militarism; it is to be against the military aggression against the Kurds, but also to act in the memory of the Armenian genocide and against the various ways that violence is disavowed by the state and the media.
This alliance was compelling for me for all kinds of reasons, but mainly because in most Northern European countries, there are now serious divisions among feminists, queers, lesbian and gay human rights workers, antiracist movements, freedom-of-religion movements, and antipoverty and antiwar mobilizations. In Lyon, France, last year, one of the established feminists had written a book on the “illusion” of transsexuality, and her public lectures had been “zapped” by many trans activists and their queer allies. She defended herself by saying that to call transsexuality “psychotic” was not the same as pathologizing transsexuality. It is, she said, a descriptive term and makes no judgment or prescription. Under what conditions can calling a population “psychotic” for the particular embodied life they live not be pathologizing? This feminist called herself a materialist, a radical, but she pitted herself against the transgendered community in order to maintain certain norms of masculinity and femininity as prerequisites for a nonpsychotic life. These are arguments that would be swiftly countered in Istanbul or Johannesburg, and yet these same feminists seek recourse to a form of universalism that would make France, and their version of French feminism, into the beacon of progressive thought.
Not all French feminists who call themselves universalists would oppose the public rights of transgendered people or contribute to their pathologization. And yet, if the streets are open to transgendered people, they are not open to those who wear signs of their religious belonging openly. Hence, we are left to fathom the many universalist French feminists who call upon the police to arrest, detain, fine, and sometimes deport women wearing the niqāb or the burqa in the public sphere in France. What sort of politics is this that recruits the police function of the state to monitor and restrict women from religious minorities in the public sphere? Why would the same universalists (such as Elisabeth Badinter) openly affirm the rights of transgendered people to freely appear in public while denying that right to women who happen to wear religious clothing that offends the sensibilities of die-hard secularists? If the right to appear is to be honored “universally“, it would not be able to survive such an obvious and insupportable contradiction.
Perhaps there are modalities of violence that we need to think about in order to understand the police functions in operation here. After all, those who insist that gender must always appear in one way or in one clothed version rather than another, who seek either to criminalize or to pathologize those who live their gender or their sexuality in nonnormative ways, are themselves acting as the police for the sphere of appearance, whether or not they belong to any police force. As we know, it is sometimes the police force of the state that does violence to sexual and gendered minorities, and sometimes it is the police who fail to investigate, fail to prosecute as criminal the murder of transgendered women or fail to prevent violence against transgendered members of the population.
If gender or sexual minorities are criminalized or pathologized for how they appear, how they lay claim to public space, the language through which they understand themselves, the means by which they express love or desire, those with whom they openly ally, choose to be near, engage sexually, or how they exercise their bodily freedom, what clothes they wear or fail to wear, then those acts of criminalization are themselves violent, and in that sense, they are also unjust and criminal. In Arendtian terms, we can say that to be precluded from the space of appearance, to be precluded from being part of the plurality that brings the space of appearance into being, is to be deprived of the right to have rights. Plural and public action is the exercise of the right to place and belonging, and this exercise is the means by which the space of appearance is presupposed and brought into being.
Let me return to the notion of gender with which I began, both to draw upon Arendt and to resist Arendt. In my view, gender is an exercise of freedom, which is not to say that everything that constitutes gender is freely chosen, but only that even what is considered unfree can and must be claimed and exercised in some way. I have, with this formulation, taken a certain distance from the Arendtian formulation. This exercise of freedom must be accorded the same equal treatment as any other exercise of freedom under the law. And politically, we must call for the expansion of our conceptions of equality to include this form of embodied freedom.
So what do we mean when we say that sexuality or gender is an exercise of freedom? To repeat: I do not mean to say that all of us choose our gender or our sexuality. We are surely formed by language and culture, by history, by the social struggles in which we participate, by forces both psychological and historical – in interaction, by the way with biological situations that have their own history and efficacy. Indeed, we may well feel that what and how we desire are quite fixed, indelible or irreversible features of who we are. But regardless of whether we understand our gender or our sexuality as chosen or given, we each have a right to claim that gender and to claim that sexuality. And it makes a difference whether we can claim them at all. When we exercise the right to appear as the gender and to claim them at all. When we exercise the right to appear as the gender we already are – even when we feel we have no other choice – we are still exercising a certain freedom, but we are also doing something more.
When one freely exercises the right to be who one already is and one asserts a social category for the purposes of describing that mode of being, then one is, in fact, making freedom part of that social category, discursively changing the very ontology in question. It is not possible to separate the genders that we claim to be and the sexualities that we engage from the right that any of us has to assert those realities, in public, or in private, or in the many thresholds that exist between the two, freely, that is, without threat of violence. When, long ago, one said that gender is performative, that meant that it is a certain kind of enactment, which means that one is not first one’s gender and then one decides how and when to enact it. The enactment is part of its very ontology, is a way of rethinking the ontological mode of gender, and so it matters how and when and with what consequences that enactment takes place, because all that changes the very gender that one “is”.
To walk on the street without police interference is something other than assembling there en masse. And yet, when a transgendered person walks there, the right that is exercised in a bodily form does not only belong to that one person. There is a group, if not an alliance, walking there, too, whether or not they are seen. It is a person there who walks, who takes the risk of walking there, but it is also the social category that traverses that embodied movement in the world, and the attack, when it comes, is clearly on both at once. Perhaps we can still call “performative” both this exercise of gender and the embodied political claim to equality and protection from violence so as to be able to move with and within this social category in public space. To walk is to say that this is a public space in which transgendered people walk, that this is a public space where people with various forms of clothing, no matter how they are gendered or what religion they signify, are free to move without threat of violence. But this performativity applies more broadly to the conditions by which any of us emerge as bodily creatures in the world.
If we are thinking well, and our thinking commits us to the preservation of life in some form, then the life to be preserved takes a bodily form. In turn, this means that the life of the body – its hunger, its need for shelter and protection from violence – all become major issues of politics. Even the most given or nonchosen features of our lives are not simply given; they are given in history and in language, in vectors of power that none of us chose. Equally true is that a given property of the body or a set of defining characteristics depends upon the continuing persistence of the body. Those social categories we never chose traverse this given body in some ways rather than in others, and gender, for instance, names that traversal as well as its transformations. In this sense, those most urgent and nonvolitional dimensions of our lives, which include hunger and the need for shelter, medical care, and protection from violence, natural or humanly imposed, are crucial to politics. We cannot presume the enclosed and well-fed space of the polis, where all the material needs are somehow being taken care of elsewhere by beings whose gender, race,
or status render them ineligible for public recognition. Rather, we have not only to bring the material urgen-cies of the body into the square, but to make those needs central to the demands of politics.
In my view, a shared condition of precarity situates our political lives, even as precarity is differentially distributed. And some of us, as Ruthie Gilmore has made very clear, are disproportionately more disposed to injury and early death than others. Building on the importance of local expertise, there’s something to be said about attorneys who’ve earned respect within the courthouse walls. During my cousin’s case two years ago, we learned that experienced Jersey City criminal defense lawyers with prosecutorial backgrounds can identify weaknesses in the state’s evidence that others might miss. These professionals understand the burden of proof required and know when prosecutors haven’t met it, which becomes crucial during negotiations. Their familiarity with programs like Pre-Trial Intervention and Drug Court opened doors we didn’t know existed, ultimately resulting in charges being downgraded significantly. The transparency they provided throughout the process—keeping us informed at every decision point—made an incredibly stressful situation feel manageable and gave us confidence in the legal strategy being employed.

Racial difference can be tracked precisely through looking at statistics on infant mortality, for example. This means, in brief, that precarity is unequally distributed and that lives are not considered equally grievable or equally valuable. If, as Adriana Cavarero has argued, the exposure of our bodies in public space constitutes us fundamentally and establishes our thinking as social and embodied, vulnerable and passionate, then our thinking gets nowhere without the presupposition of that very corporeal interdependency and entwinement. The body is constituted through perspectives it cannot inhabit; someone else sees our face in a way that none of us can and hears our voice in a way that we cannot. We are in this sense, bodily, always over there, yet here, and this dispossession marks the sociality to which we belong. Even as located beings, we are always elsewhere, constituted in a sociality that exceeds us. This establishes our exposure and our precarity, the ways in which we depend on political and social institutions to persist.
After all, in Cairo, it was not just that people amassed in the square: they were there; they slept there; they dispensed medicine and food; they assembled and sang; and they spoke. Can we distinguish those vocalizations emanating from the body from those other expressions of material need and urgency? They were, after all, sleep-ing and eating in the public square, constructing toilets and various systems for sharing the space, and thus not only refusing to disappear, refusing to go or stay home, and not only claiming the public domain for themselves – acting in concert on conditions of equality – but also maintaining themselves as persisting bodies with needs, desires, and requirements: Arendtian and counter-Arendtian, to be sure, since these bodies who were organizing their basic needs in public were also petitioning the world to register what was happening there, to make its support known, and in that way to enter into revolutionary action itself. The bodies acted in concert, but they also slept in public, and in both these modalities, they were both vulnerable and demanding, giving political and spatial organization to elementary bodily needs. In this way, they formed themselves into images to be projected to all who watched, petitioning us to receive and respond and so to enlist media coverage that would refuse to let the event be covered over or to slip away. Sleeping on that pavement was not only a way to lay claim to the public, to contest the legitimacy of the state, but also quite clearly, a way to put the body on the line in its insistence, obduracy, and precarity, overcoming the distinction between public and private for the time of revolution. In other words, it was only when those needs that are supposed to remain private came out into the day and night of the square, formed into image and discourse for the media, did it finally become possible to extend the space and time of the event with such tenacity as to bring the regime down. After all, the cameras never stopped; bodies were there and here; they never stopped speaking, not even in sleep, and so could not be silenced, sequestered, or denied – revolution happened because everyone refused to go home, cleaving to the pavement as the site of their convergent temporary, awkward, vulnerable, daring, revolutionary bodily lives.

Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien zuerst in: McLagan, Meg; McKee, Yates (Ed.): Sensible Politics. The Visual Culture of Nongovernmental Activism, ZONE BOOKS: New York 2012, S. 117–137.

1.) Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 198.
2.) Ibid., p. 199.
3.) “The point of view of an ethics is: of what are you capable, what can you do? Hence a return to this sort of cry of Spinoza’s: what can a body do? We never know in advance what a body can do. We never know how we’re organized and how the modes of existence are enveloped in somebody.“ Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1992), pp. 217–34. This account differs from his in several respects, but most prominently by virtue of its consideration of body in their plurality.
4.) Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 199.
5.) Hans Wehr, Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, 4th ed., ed. J. Milton Cowan (Ithaca: Spoken Language Services, 1994), s. v. „salima“.

Towards a Futurology of the Present: Notes on Writing, Movement, and Time1

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:38 +0000

‘Tomorrow never happens, man’ – Janis Joplin²

Has there ever been a revolution without its musicians, artists, and writers? Could we imagine the Zapatista movement, for example, without its poetry and lyricism? At this moment, I am writing from the specific location of the west coast of Australia, on land known to Aboriginal Australians as Beeliar Boodjar. Across the Indian Ocean, remarkable things are happening in North Africa. I listen on the internet to the songs of freedom being sung in Tahrir Square, as well as to the young hip-hop artists who provided the soundtrack to the revolution in Tunisia. But their YouTube videos are not the only things going viral. Significantly, their mutant desires, of which their music is an expression, are also beginning to ripple outwards. I feel it here at my kitchen table as I type, as viscerally as the caffeine flowing through my body. I also see it on the evening news in Spain and Greece. Perhaps the alterglobalisation movement never died, but was simply laying in wait. Perhaps we are only at the beginning. And perhaps there is little real difference in our movements between making music and making change; between the creation of art and the creation of new social relations through our activisms. Our common art is the crafting of new ways of being, of seeing, of valuing; in short, the cultivation of new forms of life, despite and beyond the deadening, ossified structures all around us.
What I would like to focus on most especially in this piece is the art of writing; more specifically, on the relationship between nonfiction writing and social movements. Movement produces writing which produces movement which produces writing, and so the loop turns; a constant feedback loop between action and reflection, experience and expression. To the relationship between writing and movement, I would like to introduce the added factor of time. Until very recently, radical writing practices have tended to operate in accordance with, and uncritically reproduce, some very particular ideas about time. One such idea is that it is compartmentalised into discrete units. Another is that it is linear and moves only in one direction. These understandings are part and parcel of Gottfried Hegel’s dialectical logic³, which, via Karl Marx, has become the unthinking, taken-for-granted folk theory of generations of activists. They are also part of Enlightenment, or modernist, rationality more broadly – that particular way of knowing that has predominated across the world for the past few centuries. Linear, compartmentalised time has meant that we have come to see past, present, and future as three separate things – a division that lies at the root of the means-ends distinction in traditional leftist politics. It is only when present and future are treated as mutually exclusive entities that means and ends can be regarded likewise. Furthermore, for Hegel and Marx, one must always negate in order to create; that is, the present must firstly be negated before the future is ever able to come into being.⁴ Revolutionary politics is therefore conceived of in purely negative terms, and the job of building a new world deferred until after the revolution. Social movements become equivalent to war rather than creation. When the ends justify the means, the present effectively becomes sacrificed at the altar of The Future – and this for the sake of utopian designs fabricated in the minds of a self-appointed few.
The kind of temporal sensibility outlined above lies at the heart of the manifesto genre.⁵ It seems today, however, that people have grown tired of manifestos. The same is true for any such exhortation from above of what people should or should not be doing. My argument is that the present context of postmodernity⁶ demands of radical writers a fundamental rethinking of their (our) modus operandi. I will, in this article, present a critique not just of the manifesto, but also of the jeremiad – another one of the literary forms most commonly produced by radical writers. Where the manifesto is concerned with the future, the jeremiad centres on the present. The intention of the latter, however, is usually only to serve as a diagnostic description upon which a prescription must be founded; an ‘is’ that must be followed by an ‘ought’. In this way, we are hence led back into the domain of the manifesto. But what happens to radical writing once we reject those dichotomies upon which the jeremiad-manifesto distinction is predicated – namely, those of is-ought, means-ends, and present-future? What happens when the writer treats the present and future not as two separate things, but as conjoined in an indivisible flow within which means and ends are consonant? What I would like to propose, then, is a new writerly practice; one which I have chosen to call the futurology of the present.
Such a practice would involve an unearthing of the many living futures constantly coming into being in the present. Unlike the jeremiad, it does not solely describe what is, but also what is becoming. In other words, it entails not simply ‘a negation of what exists, but also an affirmation of what springs forth’⁷. And it does not prescribe a single path forward, as with the manifesto, but tries instead to reveal the multifarious pathways fanning outwards from any given moment. It starts with the novel innovations and creative insurgencies happening everywhere in our midst, and from there works to build affinities between them. In this endeavour, I find inspiration in Rebecca Solnit’s assertion that ‘the revolution exists in little bits everywhere, but not much has been done to connect its dots. We need to say that there are alternatives being realized all around us and theorize the underlying ideals and possibilities’⁸. This is, of course, an endeavour that necessarily requires a heightened sensitivity toward those ‘moments when things do not yet have a name’; in short, toward newness. The new here is not meant to mean the same thing as ‘fashionable’, but rather refers to those becomings that are constitutive of alternative realities.¹⁰ This kind of sensibility has become especially important of late, given that ours is an era of accelerated social change, pregnant with germinal, as-yet-unnamed phenomena. One cannot continue imposing anachronistic grids upon our ever-complexifying present without exacting an extremely violent and myopic reductionism. Instead, as Félix Guattari writes, the upheavals that define our current conditions of existence call for a method attuned ‘towards the future and the emergence of new social and aesthetic practices’¹¹. My proposal for a futurology of the present is one attempt to concretely think through what such a method might look like. I have certainly not been alone in these efforts. Besides Solnit, other fellow travellers include the members of Colectivo Situaciones whose practice of ‘militant research’ they characterise as the search for ‘emerging traces of a new sociability’¹². Consider too the mode of ethnographic practice proposed by the anarchist anthropologist, David Graeber. One role ‘for a radical intellectual’, he writes, might be ‘to look at those who are creating viable alternatives, try to figure out what might be the larger implications of what they are (already) doing, and then offer those ideas back, not as prescriptions, but as contributions, possibilities – as gifts’¹³.
As has already been hinted at, the articulation of these ideas will necessarily require a confrontation with Hegelian dialectics and ‘the damage it has caused, and continues to cause in political movements’¹⁴. One of the principle reasons for this is that, to really understand the future appearing in the present, it is necessary to strip away the sedimented habits of thought under which becomings are subsumed or rendered invisible. As will be seen over the course of this essay, Hegel’s method could be considered as precisely one of these habits (certainly, capitalism an issue here too, but I take it for granted that my readers are already convinced of this). My contention is that even those who do not consider themselves as having anything to do with Marx or Hegel still unwittingly reproduce many of their assumptions. Indeed, as far as traditional forms of radical politics are concerned, the Hegelian-Marxist dialectical schema has become the Sun around which all the other heavenly bodies orbit. For 150 years, we believed this Sun would give us clarity and deliver us from darkness to light. It turns out, however, that it has only served to obscure more than it has revealed. All those other stars, old and new, that have been shielded from view by the blinding, sun-soaked sky are today beginning to demand our attention and sparkle anew. This essay seeks to assist in this efflorescence, since, as Hardt suggests, we cannot hope to achieve any kind of liberation unless we first liberate ourselves from Hegel.¹⁵ One thing must be made clear, though, and that is that I confront Hegel’s legacy not purely by way of negation, which would only mean a perverse reproduction of his dialectical straightjacket, but by proposing and affirming an escape route. My goal is a re-imagining of radical politics and a re-tooling of radical writerly practice.
Having thus far skimmed the surface of my argument, what I would like to do now is go deeper. I will start out by introducing the concept of the ‘perpetual present’ – the temporality within which the futurology of the present is situated. From this basis, I will proceed to elucidate the ways in which such a practice overcomes the limitations of previous modes of radical writing; namely, those premised on compartmentalised, linear time. In the second half of the article, I will link the futurology of the present to a politics of hope, before concluding with some thoughts on the nexus between activist and artistic practices – the very note on which I began.

The Perpetual Present
In today’s social movements, there is an increasing call for a harmonisation between means and ends, now widely understood by way of the notion of ‘prefigurative politics’¹⁶. Such a sensibility cannot but imply a radically different, even ‘amodern’¹⁷, temporal schema. Present and future cease to be treated as two distinct entities (the former but an instrument for the realisation of the latter), but instead become rendered as simply two linguistic signs referring to a common, indivisible flow. Such is also the case with the past. Drawing on Guattari, we could well say that both past and future inhere together in the ‘perpetual present’¹⁸, an enduring liquid moment containing both memory and potentiality; traces of what has been, but also intimations of what could be, each indissolubly connected to the other. With this perspective in mind, there can no longer be said to be a revolutionary before, during, and after. Instead of activist strategy being determined by a stark delineation between discrete stages, means and ends become consonant within a permanent revolutionary process; a continual freeing up of life, desire and the imagination wherever they happen to be imprisoned. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri write: ‘We must think of [pre-revolutionary] resistance, [revolutionary] insurrection and [post-revolutionary] constituent power as an indivisible process, in which these three are melded into a full counter-power and ultimately a new, alternative formation of society’.¹⁹
It has occurred to me that the Roman god, Janus, could be taken as figurative of the perpetual present. He had one face looking forward towards the future and one face looking backward towards the past, and yet both belonged to a single head. The term ‘Janus-faced’ has, in modern times, become a synonym for ‘two-faced’ or ‘duplicitous’, carrying with it negative connotations, and yet, for the ancient Romans, Janus had an altogether different meaning. He was the god of thresholds; ‘an important Roman god who protected doorways and gateways’, primarily symbolising change and transition.²⁰ The perpetual present is always a threshold between that which is ceasing to be and that which is coming into being; at once the repository of memories and the font of potentialities; a record of the past and a map to the future. Friedrich Nietzsche is of critical import here: ‘I am of today and of the has-been’, he writes, ‘but there is something in me that is of tomorrow and of the day-after-tomorrow and of the shall-be’.²¹ This may well have been uttered by Janus himself.
A word on Michel Foucault is apposite here as well, particularly regarding his notion of the ‘history of the present’, which was how he described his genealogical method.²² Despite first appearances, the history and futurology of the present are not at all in conflict. Both, in fact, are immanent within the perpetual present. The multifarious routes by which the present is constructed are simultaneously one and the same with those processes by which alternative futures continually come into being. Hence, the history and futurology of the present are not unlike the two faces of Janus. One casts its gaze upstream towards the tributaries and the other downstream towards the delta, but both belong to a common body bobbing upon a single river. While the history of the present challenges linear history and its obsession with the origin, the futurology of the present does likewise with respect to linear futurology and its drive toward the projected end-point of history, or telos. There is no Future with a capital ‘F’; only the delta, opening out onto the infinite expanse of the ocean.
At this point, it must also be made clear that the perpetual present has nothing at all to do with the kind of endless present postulated by neoliberal ideologues. Where the former is the font of infinite alternative futures, of a variable creativity that continually issues forth from the free play of difference, the latter is a present condemned to futurelessness, to an endless reproduction of the status quo. It was in this context that, in response to Margaret Thatcher’s infamous doctrine that ‘There is No Alternative’, the World Social Forum first proposed its counter-slogan of ‘Another World is Possible’. Alterglobalisation activists have since been vindicated in this idea, with the global financial crash of 2008 serving to irreparably discredit the neoliberal experiment. The state bail-out of banks to the tune of trillions revealed the neoliberal discourse (particularly its insistence on minimal state intervention in the economy) to have been fallacious all along. Capital needs the state and has always needed it, not least of all in its policing of unruly citizens. Neoliberalism was never really realised as a system, but functioned only as a legitimating discourse that, in practice, never aligned with what it professed in theory. Following these embarrassing revelations, global elites are increasingly eschewing the concept of neoliberalism, and find themselves conflicted about the way forward. As such, we have now entered into a brand new historical moment; one in which the futurology of the present arguably becomes more important than ever. With neoliberalism staggering along ‘zombie-like’ and ‘ideologically dead’²³, the space has now become wide open for the assertion and enactment of alternatives.
Tying together some of the points I have made thus far, the perpetual present is forever the site of ‘unconsciouses that protest’²⁴, of insubordinate creativity and disobedient desire, of emergent values and practices that lead outwards onto alternative horizons, beyond the mirages conjured up by capitalism, the state, the traditional Left, and all similar such boring and life-denying institutions. It is the work of the futurologist of the present to tease these out from the tangle of everyday life, help increase their visibility, and thereby participate in their propagation. Below, I will seek to expand on these ideas and to further articulate their implications for radical scholarship and writing practices. In so doing, I will focus, first of all, on the challenges that the futurology of the present poses to compartmentalised time (and those modes of writing premised on such a temporality), before proceeding to do likewise with respect to linear time.

Beyond Compartmentalised Time
As touched upon earlier, my contention is that the past-present-future schema of time has been at the root of a profound disarticulation between means and ends in traditional revolutionary politics. Means and ends have only come to be regarded as mutually exclusive entities because present and future have been treated likewise. There has, as such, been a failure to recognise the necessary correspondence between the two; that is, between how we act in the present and the kind of world we wish to see in the future. It is for this reason that we have ended up with such abominations as the Leninist vanguard party, whereby dictatorial practices are supposed to somehow lead to a democratic society.²⁵
Owing to the fact that the idea of compartmentalised time has been little reflected upon in the past, radical nonfiction has tended to take three principle forms; namely, historical treatises, jeremiads, and manifestos, each mapping with its own discrete domain within the past-present-future trinary. The notion of the historical treatise needs little introduction, and the other two have already been briefly discussed. What I would like to do here, however, is to zoom in a little more closely on the jeremiad form. Diagnostic jeremiads like Marx’s three-volume Das Kapital²⁶ are meant to function only as a set of ‘is’ claims upon which prescriptive ‘oughts’ can be based. Marx’s jeremiad- and manifesto-style writings therefore go hand-in-hand. Had David Hume been alive in Marx’s time, he no doubt would have critiqued Marx for assuming that it is even possible to make valid ‘ought’ statements on the basis of descriptive ‘is’ claims.²⁷ For Hume, all such prescriptions are dubious at best. And yet, the assumption that an ‘is’ must necessarily precede an ethical ‘ought’ is still rife amongst radical scholars. There is an unthinking assumption that a complete and ‘objective’ understanding of the present is a necessary prerequisite for effective political action.²⁸ Some jeremiad writers in fact become so consumed with this task, that they fail to even try to imagine alternative possible futures. What matters to them is to first negate the present; to limit themselves to mere resistance, in other words.
Hence, aside from those jeremiads which function within the is-ought framework, there are also those based on ‘is’ descriptions alone; pure lamentations of, or fulminations against, the present configuration of things.²⁹ For the most part, the intention of the lamentative jeremiad is to raise consciousness about this or that issue, such that the reader might somehow, magically, be spurred into action, as if a detailed knowledge of the evils of society was all that was required for this to happen. Precisely how to act on this knowledge is left up to the reader. Often, however, these works have the unintended and reverse effect of leaving the reader feeling overwhelmed and helpless, even despite their politicisation or conscientisation. The futurology of the present, in contrast, aims not to be merely descriptive or prescriptive, but rather, demonstrative. By this I mean that its concern is with fostering inspiration and hope through the demonstration of alternatives. So many contemporary writers and scholar-activists dedicate their lives, as Marx did, to writing about what is wrong with the world, but far fewer have cared to write about what people are already doing to change the world or to bring to light the many living, breathing examples all around us of how things can always be otherwise. Indeed, Harry Cleaver’s observation that Marx’s ‘historical analysis provided much more detail on capitalist domination than on working class subjectivity’³⁰ is an understatement to say the least. This is one reason that radicals so often end up with a perverse fascination for the ‘creativity’ and ‘dynamism’ of capitalism, thereby reifying that which they claim to oppose. One of the ironies here is that capitalists do not create; they simply orchestrate and marshal the creativity of the commons for their own ends.³¹
In contrast to the jeremiad, the futurology of the present starts not with capitalism (or any other kind of domination), but with the ideas and practices of those challenging it. That is not to say, however, that it fails to offer a critique of the various apparatuses of domination. On the contrary, it offers a critique of a radically different kind – one that operates via the presentation of alternatives, of ‘yeses’ that already carry within them a ‘no’. Every innovation, every ‘yes’, embodies a proposal for a different kind of world, but one that is defined, from the outset, against the world that it is leaving behind. The point is to commence with the affirmative, rather than defer it until after the negative. It is in this way that the futurology of the present becomes a project of fomenting hope. It destabilises the taken-for-grantedness of the present, albeit not in a way which disowns it, as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels do when they celebrate the communist movement as that ‘which abolishes the present state of things’³². Disavowing oneself of the present in this manner could be seen to be part and parcel of the disastrous disconnect between means and ends, as discussed earlier. Unlike the jeremiad form, the futurology of the present centres not on the negation of the present-day so much as on its continual reinvention. It necessarily remains within the temporality of the perpetual present. It aligns itself, as such, with the radical challenge that Nietzsche poses to Hegelian thought. In Hegel, negation invariably precedes creation, but in the work of Nietzsche, we are presented with the alternative possibility of creation itself as a means of negation.³³ One creates in order to negate, and not vice versa. In prefigurative politics, we prefigure the world we wish to create through our actions in the present, while simultaneously rendering redundant that which we leave behind. And in our futurologies of the living present, we offer an exposition of these other worlds already in construction without having to first negate. Such texts, furthermore, are themselves self-conscious creations. They are not just about the world, but are also added to it, thereby becoming a part of its workings. The creative act – whether on the streets or on the page – is already subversive. To practice creative subversion is not to overthrow, as with mere resistance, but to undercut and displace. Most importantly of all, it is to cultivate alternative futures in the living present and therefore to affirm life despite capitalism.

Beyond Linear Time
Aside from the compartmentalisation of time, we have also inherited from Hegel the idea that time moves in a straight line from an identifiable origin toward an ultimate end-point. Where the historical treatise usually draws a rigid straight line between the origin and the present, the manifesto does likewise between the present and the projected telos. The origin and the telos alike are both employed in the construction of linear timelines in which the progressions from past to present and from present to future are cast as somehow natural and inevitable. The way in which Marx adapted these ideas is by now the stuff of undergraduate textbooks: Guided by the invisible hand of History with a capital ‘H’, we pass through certain inevitable stages, one of which is our capitalist present, in order to eventually arrive at communism. Hence, even as Marxists angrily denounce capitalism, they ironically naturalise the social injustices that it produces as necessary by-products of the inexorable forward impetus of time. This became ludicrously apparent to me in a recent Facebook debate in which one Marxist tried to reason with me that ‘slavery was a necessary stage in human history’. The history and futurology of the present, as mentioned earlier, each seek to disrupt this kind of linearity in their own ways. The former cares not for the single origin, but for the multiple tributaries which have converged upon the present. The latter, meanwhile, concerns itself not with the single telos, but with the deltaic openings spilling out on to oceanic infinity. In each case, past, present and future – and the pathways between them – are denaturalised and rendered contingent. Here, I will focus most especially on the movement between present and future. Hence, while in the previous section, I sought primarily to problematise the jeremiad, I will now endeavour to do likewise with respect to the manifesto.
The manifesto could be thought of as akin to a children’s colouring book. When we are issued a colouring book with all of the designs already pre-determined, all that remains for us to do is to colour them in. Exactly such an idea was expressed by Marx himself when he wrote: ‘It is not enough that thought strive to actualize itself; actuality must itself strive toward thought’³⁴. What he meant by this was that the telos of history was already known in thought and all that was required was for reality to catch up; that is, for the proletariat to fulfill its historic mission. This is a temporality in which the future, paradoxically enough, actually precedes the present, since the telos is always given a priori. As the French-Russian Hegelian philosopher, Alexandre Kojève, puts it, ‘the historical movement arises from the Future and passes through the Past in order to realize itself in the Present’.³⁵ The present is thus held in tow by someone or other’s personal utopia, usually cast as universal. As such, it might well be argued that the manifesto form is inherently authoritarian. Martin Luther King had a dream, but so did Mao Tse-Tung. The difference in the latter case was that the dream had rigidified into a nightmarish Plan. The telos upon which such plans are predicated becomes a transcendental ideal; a mirage on the horizon dictating a single path we are to follow if ever we are to reach it. The question is: Who decides upon such ideals and who is enslaved by them? Do those enslaved by other people’s ideals not have dreams of their own? How might we avoid these dreams being steamrolled in the rationalist march of History?
The tyranny of linear time, according to Rosi Braidotti, is that it ‘functions like a black hole into which possible futures implode and disappear’³⁶. To reject this conception of time is therefore to make ‘an ethical choice in favour of the richness of the possible’³⁷. It means to move from the World Social Forum slogan of ‘Another World is Possible’ to the more open idea that many worlds are possible. In addition to the image of the delta invoked earlier, let us also consider Jorge Luis Borges’ evocation of the ‘garden of forking paths’; a garden in which ‘time forks perpetually toward innumerable futures’³⁸. Change at any given point in time occurs through the aleatory and contingent actualisation of any one of these countless possible futures, not through any kind of rational progression. To proceed in this garden is not to progress, since the paths lead not so much forward, but outward. Contra Hegel and Marx, then, history does not consist of a series of logical stages, nor does it move in only one direction. There is only perpetual movement; a processual and protean creativity that wells unceasingly out of the perpetual present. The kind of writing appropriate to this movement is precisely that which I have been calling the futurology of the present. When revolution no longer has anything to do with linear timelines or the realisation of a pre-ordained telos, those self-proclaimed prophets of the hidden god of History cease to have any relevance. The futurology of the present, as such, could well represent a possible new form of non-vanguardist writerly practice. There are no experts or professional revolutionaries diagnosing the present or prescribing the future, as with the jeremiad and manifesto forms respectively. Rather, the writer takes her lead from the autonomous and creative participation of people in the making of their worlds, in social movements and countercultures of all kinds; ‘those crucibles of human sociability and creativity out of which the radically new emerges’³⁹.
Here, it will be worth lingering for a moment with the question of the new. In the introduction to this piece, I emphasised the point that the futurology of the present necessarily requires a special sensitivity toward newness. This stands in stark contrast to past modes of radical writing, which usually subordinated the new to the ostensibly eternal. In the linear temporal schema of the manifesto, there is no such thing as novelty, since the work of activists is not conceptualised as the creation of new forms of life so much as the gradual fulfilment of an essential humanness, or ‘species-being’⁴⁰. This set of essences is deemed to have always been there, hidden beneath the veil of false consciousness.⁴¹ It is the difference between drawing and simply colouring-in. My contention is that the production of novelty needs to be understood on its own terms. As Maurizio Lazzarato puts forth, ‘the conjunctions and disjunctions between things are each time contingent, specific and particular and do not refer back to an essence, substance or deep structure upon which they would be founded’⁴². Once radical writing is able to successfully dissociate itself from any kind of hidden god or pre-ordained telos, it can become instead a valuable means with which to bring to light the open-ended and indeterministic ways that everyday actors at the grassroots creatively negotiate and construct their worlds. The value of this sensibility towards newness lies in the fact that it charges the imagination with an enriched sense of possibilities and demonstrates how the world is forever open to reinvention. This is an antidote, not just to the sense of historical duty preached by the vanguardists and manifesto writers, but also to the pervasive sense of hopelessness peddled by those whose interests lie with the present configuration of things.

A Note on Hope
In the context of this discussion, hope is that intangible but very real feeling that our struggles remain worthwhile; that it is still worth resisting assimilation into the soul-crushing tedium of the system and persisting in our efforts to prefigure alternative futures. However, it is in the interests of the political and economic elite to maintain and reproduce the status quo from which they benefit – and a huge part of this is the effort to ‘destroy any sense of possible alternative futures’; to stamp out any initiatives which hint to how the world might be otherwise or at least ‘to ensure that no one knows about them’⁴³ As such, the capitalists, politicians, police, media, and so on could even be said to constitute ‘a vast bureaucratic apparatus for the creation and maintenance of hopelessness’⁴⁴. As Graeber succinctly puts it, ‘hopelessness isn’t natural. It needs to be produced’⁴⁵.
I would like to argue, though, that capitalism has not been alone in producing hopelessness.
Revolutionaries too have been just as culpable. From the perspective of the traditional Left, the story of the twentieth century is one of dashed hopes and unfulfilled dreams. It is not that the prophets of History overlooked the importance of hope to our movements, but rather that they propagated endless false hopes in a tomorrow which never comes. Reality was never really able to live up to their manifestos. The prophets will usually fault reality for failing to fulfill their version of utopia, but it is instead their utopia that must be faulted for failing to correspond to reality. It was situated in the distant future, completely cut off from the living present. It was thought, furthermore, that it could be achieved only by means of negation. In practice, negating the present also meant negating oneself. Sacrifice and discipline were what was commanded. Revolutionaries came to conceive of their practice as war, rather than creation, and their creative desires were endlessly deferred until after the revolution. The point I am getting at is that if people today are mired in cynicism and feel helpless to change the world, it is not only because the elites have perfected their bureaucratic apparatus for the production of hopelessness, but also because the traditional Left offers absolutely no alternative. Many people have grown wary of the vanguardists and self-appointed prophets, whose faith in the inevitability of historical progress now seems more misguided than ever, but at the same time have yet to be convinced that alternative revolutionary practices are viable, worthwhile, or even possible. The result is apathy, but an apathy that could very well be political⁴⁶ – a sensibility, perhaps, of profound antipathy towards the authoritarianism of both capitalism and the traditional Left, but one that lacks sufficient hope to be able to be enacted in alternatives.
Many writers who wish to avoid the authoritarianism of the manifesto tradition might very well feel that their solution is to offer simple critiques, sans prescriptions. I would like to argue here, however, that failing to offer any hope at all is no alternative to offering false hope. Even Foucault, whom earlier I identified as an ally, oftentimes falls into this trap. A detailed knowledge about the workings of various forms of power, most notably ‘discipline’⁴⁷, can only take us so far. What then? What about counterpower? Foucault tends to give the impression that the reach of power is total. His concept of the ‘carceral continuum’⁴⁸ means that we are forever on the backfoot, only ever able to resist in a scattered and piecemeal way. But there are some profound ironies here. The first is that, despite Foucault’s philosophical emphasis on contingency, his writings often leave the reader (well, at least this reader) with the impression that relations of force are an inevitable aspect of social life. The second irony is as follows: Foucault knew as much as anyone that our discourses do not simply emerge from the world, but also serve to produce it. Therefore, if we do not allow enough discursive space in our work for resistance, subversion, and counterpower, we only end up reproducing the very conditions of our own incarceration. What is perhaps needed, then, is to make a subtle, yet profound inversion: that it is power on the backfoot, forever in an attempt to contain our uncontainable vitality.⁴⁹ Where things do cohere together and take on the character of something resembling an insurmountable power structure, we would do well to remind ourselves that the longevity of such social formations is, historically-speaking, much more exceptional than the event of their break-up and dissolution – not vice versa. Certainly, it is of paramount importance to understand the world and the systems of oppression and exploitation that we are up against, but if our writing stops there and avoids giving due attention to what people are doing to undo the status quo, then there is the risk that we will only end up leaving our readers feeling disempowered – armed with knowledge, but starved of the hope necessary to act on this knowledge. An example drawn from personal experience – even despite it being in the context of teaching, rather than writing – will illustrate well the point I am attempting to make here.
A few years ago, I was helping to teach an undergraduate course entitled ‘Environmental Issues in Asia’ – one of my earliest experiences as a university educator. In the last class of the semester, I asked each student, as we went around the room, to share one thing that they would be taking away with them from the course. The response that most stood out to me was that of a young Asian Australian man, the gist being more or less as follows:
Well, I came into this really interested in the environment; interested in learning more about the issues and exploring how I could get involved to make a difference. But I’m left feeling really overwhelmed. The issues are just so big and the scale of the challenges so great that I’ve almost lost hope. We’re all doomed. Indeed, there seems these days to be more and more of an apocalyptic zeitgeist about the place, especially when it comes to the environment and issues around climate change. What I realised from this feedback was that, as educators, myself and my colleagues had given too little thought to mitigating against this kind of counter-productive, fatalistic resignation. The course content covered things like dam construction in China, the effects of glacier melt and rising sea levels in Bangladesh, deforestation and oil palm monocultures in Malaysian Borneo, and so on, but gave scant attention to what can be done about such issues (including what we in Australia can do, especially considering the record of some Australian companies in the Asia-Pacific region), or how indigenous peoples and others are already fighting back. On this last point, local peoples have rarely been treated as agents acting on the stage of world history, only as helpless victims. This, however, must change. I realised through this experience how mistaken I had been in thinking that it was enough to simply convey content about the issues, without also conveying hope – not a false hope premised on some transcendental future utopia, but an immanent hope, grounded in real-life, real-world futures already in construction in the present. I hence resolved from then on that, in both my teaching and writing, I would not limit myself to trying to conscientise people simply by pointing out what is wrong with the world. Equally important would be showing what can be done – indeed what already is being done – about injustices everywhere; that relations of force are never total or inevitable and that new worlds are always in construction. Hope (in the very specific sense in which I have been using the term here) is what makes the difference between empowerment and mere conscientisation. And the propagation of such hope, through the exposition of alternative futures already in construction, is one very important role that both radical educators and writers can play.
The futurology of the present, then, might fruitfully be characterised as a practice of hope. It is not simply about the transfer of knowledge, but more significantly of ‘affect’⁵⁰. It is animated by revolutionary desire, while at the same time acting as a relay for this desire to spread. It does not speak about movements, but with them. It thinks with them, moves with them, and tries to inspire movement in turn. This is exactly what happened with a recent article by the North American-based CrimethInc Collective on the Really Really Free Market (RRFM)⁵¹ – an anarchist initiative best described as a kind of celebratory potlatch in which nothing is bartered or sold and everything is free. The idea is that people bring food, clothes, books, art, music, skills, services, or whatever else to share, and the rest takes care of itself. This is a perfect example of prefigurative politics in that it embodies, in the here and now, what an alternative commons-based society would look like. There is no question of having to wait until after the revolution to begin building a new world. And it demonstrates that we do not have to choose between Josef Stalin and Milton Friedman, but rather, can opt for an alternative politics of liberating the commons from both the state and the market. Indeed, the RRFM (along with other such cooperativist initiatives) acquires a new poignancy in light of the Crash of 2008 – its very name being an irreverent poke at neoliberal free market ideology. Soon after the appearance of the CrimethInc article in print and online, RRFMs began popping up across North America, Australia, Indonesia, and elsewhere. The latest I have heard is that Philippine anarchists are now beginning to organise such events as well, of course adapting them to local conditions. As the idea parachutes into a new context, it immediately enters into a new set of relations and necessarily emerges transformed in the process. It is a becoming and not a matter of simple repetition (unless, however, we are talking about a McDonalds franchise). I should also add here that it is never a matter of initiatives flowing in a one-way direction from the ‘West’ to the ‘Rest’, since there is also considerable cultural traffic in the opposite direction. Consider, for instance, the sheer global influence of the Zapatista movement or of the World Social Forum initiative originating from Brazil. A more recent example might be the affective vector that traversed the Mediterranean from Tahrir Square, Cairo, to Puerta del Sol Square, Madrid, from there emanating throughout the rest of Spain and beyond.
In each of the above cases, the role of the writer in acting as a relay for hope and inspiration cannot be discounted or underestimated. To foment affect in this way is especially revolutionary considering the ‘veritable obsession on the part of the rulers of the world with ensuring that social movements cannot be seen to grow, to flourish, to propose alternatives’⁵². To actively help in circulating, amplifying and making visible the alternatives being realised all around us is to shatter any sense of inevitability. And by this, I am really referring to two things: firstly, to the inevitability of the present promoted by the political-economic elite, and secondly, to the inevitability of the future posited by the traditional Hegelian-Marxist Left. The former would say that there is no alternative to the present; the latter that there is no alternative to their prescribed future. The futurology of the present, in contrast, emphasises that there are always alternatives. It offers examples of creative subversion, while at the same time refusing to channel movement in a particular direction, as with the manifesto form. To participate in the cultivation and propagation of new liberatory potentials – the ‘production of production’⁵³, in short – is enough. What matters is that creativity, desire and the imagination remain free to flourish, rather than be shut down, domesticated, canalised, or stultified.
In addition to the aforementioned CrimethInc article, another work that I would consider as exemplary of the futurology of the present is The Take⁵⁴, a documentary by Avi Lewis and Naomi Klein on the workers’ rebellion in Argentina that followed the financial meltdown of 2001. Here, I depart from my focus on writing for a moment, since the futurologist of the present need not necessarily be bound by the written word. The Take’s activist filmmakers aimed to mobilise their audience not solely by rousing in them an indignation against the local elites and International Monetary Fund, but more importantly by highlighting the real alternatives to capitalist social relations that Argentinian workers are already building in the present. Through their appropriation and collective self-management of abandoned factories, these workers are setting about the task of building a new and different kind of economy without having to first take state power. The bosses are not overthrown, but simply made redundant – completely surplus to the needs of society. This is another instance, like the RRFM, of creative subversion. In demonstrating real alternatives and emergent futures, The Take stands in stark contrast to the long tradition of documentary realism amongst radical filmmakers, the goal of which is simply to raise consciousness and bear witness to a given situation of injustice, in much the same vein as the jeremiad. In this style of documentary, the creative autonomy of people on the ground in responding to their situation is submerged or rendered irrelevant – perhaps because it is deemed a priori that local people are incapable of self-organisation and hence that solutions need to come from elsewhere and be imposed from the outside. It is the self-legitimating discourse of vanguardists and professional revolutionaries. The Take, however, partakes of no such nonsense, nor does it limit itself to merely communicating information about what is wrong with the world. Rather, it offers an inspiring, concrete example of how the world can be, and already is becoming, otherwise. In conveying an immanent hope, it too is exemplary of that which I have been calling the futurology of the present.
Graeber’s Direct Action is also worth mentioning.⁵⁵ Graeber, who sometimes likes to refer to himself as a ‘professional optimist’, describes in his book the proposals for a new society embodied in the practices of North American activists in the alterglobalisation movement. His work takes the form of an ethnography, albeit one that centres not on some supposedly static culture (as with traditional ethnographies), but on culture-in-motion. It strikes me that ethnography in the latter mode seems particularly well-suited to the futurology of the present. This is because embodied participation in people’s social worlds arguably allows us to grasp newness in its very contexts of production and at the very moments of its inception. The ethnographer starts with small things in small places and, from there, learns to appreciate their wider significance and connect the dots between them. The small, therefore, is never to be confused with the insignificant or trifling, since, arguably, it is only ‘through attention to detail that we can find different kinds of collectivity in formation’⁵⁶. Social theorists of the more conventional, desk-bound kind have typically overlooked the small details on the ground in favour of abstract theory, but in so doing, they have often also overlooked those formative processes by which newness enters the world.
Without wishing to indulge too much, my own research project at present is one which combines an ethnographic and futurological sensibility. In short, my work is concerned with the fate of national liberation movements under conditions of globalisation, focussing, most importantly, on the tentative green shoots that are beginning to emerge from their ashes.⁵⁷ My primary case study is that of the Philippines, which, although having been granted formal independence from the United States (US) in 1946, is still considered by many Filipin@s⁵⁸ to be under the thumb of US imperialist control – and with good reason. As such, the Maoist insurgency against the US-backed Marcos dictatorship in the 1970s and early 1980s – led by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and their armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA) – was imagined as a war of national liberation, in much the same vein as those which arose in Nicaragua and El Salvador during the same period. Despite having mobilised hundreds of thousands of people on countless fronts for almost two decades, the CPP-NPA was ironically absent in the developments which finally brought down the Marcos regime in February 1986. What toppled the dictator in the end was a military mutiny, accompanied by a popular though bloodless uprising. This dramatic turn of events became known as the People Power Revolution. In adherence with Maoist orthodoxy, the CPP-NPA’s focus was guerrilla war in the countryside, and yet the popular uprising that had swept Marcos from power had taken place in urban Manila. Long accustomed to proclaiming themselves as the vanguard of the movement, these developments came as a severe shock to many. The CPP-NPA’s absence in the midst of an insurrection meant that what replaced Marcos was not the long-prophesised communist seizure of state power, but the restoration, at least nominally, of liberal democracy. These events plunged the entire Philippine Left (in which the Maoist CPP had for so long been hegemonic) into a full-blown crisis. This was only further compounded by the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and Soviet Union in the years between 1989 and 1991, therefore dovetailing with the generalised Crisis of the Left that had, by that point, become a global phenomenon. By that time, too, the national liberation movements that had won political independence had proven themselves utterly incapable of improving the lot of the populations they now presided over. One set of bureaucrats was simply replaced by another. The same old problems associated with statism persisted, and imperialist logics were indigenised and perpetuated in the form of exclusionary nationalisms.
In 1993, the CPP-NPA imploded, with two-thirds of its members choosing to defect en masse, rejecting not only its increasingly authoritarian leadership, but also Maoist ideology as a whole. Although many of the defectors still find themselves shackled by old habits, their response to the crisis of the Left, for the most part, is not the rectification and reconsolidation of old orthodoxies (as is the case with those who remained loyal to the Party), but an effort to invent new subjectivities more in consonance with the times. Indeed, in my ethnographic fieldwork in both the Philippines and Filipin@ diaspora, these two contrasting responses to the Crisis of the Left – rectification and reinvention – were what I found to constitute the most significant fault-line in Philippine radical politics today. The flipside to the Crisis of the Left, then, has been a vibrant regeneration of radical political culture. With the Marcos dictatorship gone and the Maoists a spent force, there occurred a veritable flowering of new ideas and practices throughout the 1990s, continuing through to the present day. The disintegration of the CPP-NPA in 1993 in fact coincided with the beginning of a boom period for the environmentalist, feminist, and anarchist movements in the Philippines. Today, the Philippine social movement landscape is home to a diverse array of nascent subjectivities, constitutive of efforts to re-found transformative politics on new grounds. During my fieldwork, I sought out those former CPP activists who had broken with Maoism; those who were rethinking all of the old certainties and endeavouring to enact new modes of activism in tune with contemporary realities. I also sought out the younger generation of Filipin@ activists in order to get a sense of both the continuities and discontinuities between their ideas and those of the older generation. In each of these cases, what I paid special attention to was the new; that is, to intimations of alternative futures arising in the present, which I took to be the same thing. These intimations included all manner of emergent, even insurgent, subjectivities – new political tendencies and ways of seeing, innovations in practices and methods, new modes of cultural identification, alternative values, and so on. It is important to point out, though, that these were most often elemental or larval in form – small becomings that did not necessarily add up to fully-baked ideas or practices, nor to formal theory that was written down or codified into political programmes. This did not mean, however, that they were any less significant. On the contrary, these larval subjectivities turned out to be of paramount importance in my work, since it was at the micropolitical level of identity and desire that some of my most significant insights were gleaned. In addition, the concept of hope that I detailed earlier remained, at all times, extremely pertinent, since the novel imaginings, identities, values, practices, and experiments that I picked up on already point the way beyond the impasse within which many activists have floundered in recent decades. From the ruins of the traditional Left, a new radical politics for the twenty-first century is in the process of being born.
Although having presented a number of examples of the kinds of things that the futurology of the present concerns itself with, each in relation to the idea of immanent hope, I do wish to leave a degree of openness in my formulation so that readers can remain free to take up the practice and carry it in their own directions. Social movements, often the hotbeds of cultural innovation, have been my main focus in this article, but they certainly need not constitute the entirety of what the futurologist of the present looks at. Glimpses and intimations of other worlds in the making are indeed all around us. There is, in all spheres of life, an ‘unceasing creation’ and ‘uninterrupted upsurge of novelty’⁵⁹. Anywhere where there is an autonomous cultural production taking place, outside of the habituated channels by which the status quo reproduces itself, is a potential site for the futurologist of the present to involve herself in and draw inspiration from. Wherever there is disobedience, insubordination, creative maladjustment, play, experimentation, or creation, no matter whether at the micro or macro scale, there is something happening which deserves our attention.

Revisiting the Art-Activism Nexus
Apart from hope, another point that has resurfaced throughout this article is the vital place of creativity. This idea, however, will now need to be unpacked and expanded upon. It turns out that the ways in which I have been using the terms ‘creation’ and ‘creativity’ have really been operating on three distinct levels. There is, first of all, the ontological creativity of the ‘chaosmos’⁶⁰ – a point alluded to upon my introduction of the concept of the perpetual present. Secondly, there is the creativity of activists and countercultural deviants. Thirdly, there is the creativity of artists and writers in their production and relaying of affect. Although each of these forms of creativity are able to be distinguished from one another, it is the relationships between them, and not the categorical divisions, which are of paramount importance here. To begin with, activist practice aligns with creativity in the first sense in that to forge new forms of life outside of prevailing apparatuses of domination is to allow ontological processes of creation to continue flourishing without blockage or curtailment. From the moment there is an imposition of relations of force, or a reduction of life to either state or market logics, there is creative subversion. ‘Life revolts against everything that confines it’⁶¹, as Suely Rolnik felicitously puts it. The same could certainly be said of creativity in the artistic sense.
Activists and artists alike converge in the figure of the creator – that inventor of new values of the kind celebrated by Nietzsche⁶² as well as by autonomist theorists of ‘self-valorization’⁶³ – in that they self-consciously endeavour to bring newness into the world. Each intervenes into the material-semiotic realm that we have become accustomed to calling ‘culture’ and there, works to shake up and reinvent conventional ways of seeing, thinking, feeling, valuing, doing. Hence, to revisit a point I made in the beginning of this article, perhaps there is little real difference between making art and making change. Perhaps the production of new forms of life by activists is itself an art – not art that simply represents life, but art that is utterly indistinguishable from it.⁶⁴ As such, the futurologist of the present does not simply observe and describe at a distance the alternative futures arising in social movements and countercultural milieux, but rather, participates politically in their production and propagation. In other words, to write of countercultural practice, broadly conceived, need not take the form of a detached reportage, but can alternately become a countercultural practice in its own right. Before there was ever such a thing as viral YouTube videos, there were contagions of revolutionary desire of the kind that spread with lightning speed in 1848, 1968, 1989–1991, and 1999–2001, not to mention the Arab Spring currently underway. The principle, though, is the same. One important role that the radical writer can play, as I have suggested, is to act as a relay through which such contagions can spread – not as a spokesperson or representative of a given initiative or movement, but as a participant; an element amongst others, animated only by the winds of collective desire that fill her sails.
At this point, yet further unpacking of the concept of creativity will be required. Implicit in this article to date has been an idea of creativity defined in opposition to two separate, albeit related, aspects of Hegelian dialectics. The first is the primacy that Hegel accords to negation, which relates to the past-present-future trinary of compartmentalised time. The second, meanwhile, is Hegel’s faith in an ultimate telos, inextricably related to the notion of linear time. I will discuss each of these in turn, zooming in first of all on creation beyond negation, before then turning my attention to creation beyond teleology.
It is only owing to the dialectical schema imported into radical politics by Marx that we have come to conceptualise movement practice as war rather than as creation. Had radical politics been based upon an alternative set of premises, the history of the recent past might have looked very different. From today’s standpoint, Tristan Tzara’s quip in the early twentieth century that ‘dialectics kills’⁶⁵ seems strangely prescient of what was to ensue. ‘It lives by producing corpses, which lie strewn across an empty field where the wind has ceased to blow’, he continued.⁶⁶ Tzara was a key figure in the Dada movement, and what set the Dadaists apart from other avant-garde groups was precisely their staunch anti-Hegelianism. In fact, the Dada Manifesto of 1918 was not really a manifesto at all.⁶⁷ Instead, what Tzara produced was a parody of the very manifesto form, mocking his contemporaries for the Hegelian sense of historical self-importance which they accorded themselves.
Tzara’s distaste for Hegel was likely to have been inherited from Nietzsche, a well-known influence on Dada. The idea that dialectics kills has echoes of Nietzsche all through it, perhaps no better illustrated than when he affirmed: ‘We have art in order not to die of the truth’⁶⁸. For Hegel, truth meant dialectics and the law of negation, to which Nietzsche counterposed an affirmative philosophy of creation. He upheld creativity and the artistic sensibility as alternatives to those modes of thought which attempt to reduce reality to a stable set of laws, axioms, and equations. For Marx and Hegel, creation is always suspended until after the moment of negation, but Nietzsche’s radical contribution was to free creativity from the negative, while at the same time freeing temporality from the past-present-future trinary. Jeremiad writers and documentary realists are amongst those who continue to enslave their creative sensibilities to the negative, their practice bound by an unthinking adherence to Hegelian folk theories. Their overarching imperative of needing to first negate the present means that they fail to appreciate the creativity happening all around them. Blinded by the Sun of Hegel, they lose sight all those other stars out there; those ideas, practices, and intimations of alternative futures continually coming into being in our midst. Once we are able to regain our vision, our actions in the present cease to be rendered simply as means to an end, but instead become ‘means without end’⁶⁹ – a protean creativity and endless becoming that knows no discrete temporal stages, no telos, no hidden god. When means and ends become discordant, we forget that both are in fact immanent within the perpetual present. Creativity needs to be able to flourish, and to do so it must be liberated from negation. This is the place of means without end, of prefigurative politics, of the futurology of the present, and of all art that ceases to become abstracted from life and instead becomes life itself.
Having just discussed the possibility of creation beyond negation, I will now direct my critical gaze to creation beyond teleology. To free temporality from the telos of linear time is to do away with the idea that there is any kind of intrinsic point to history. Earlier, I recounted a Facebook debate I had with one particular Marxist who insisted that slavery was a necessary stage in human history. In this case, the African peoples brought to the Americas were quite literally the slaves of someone else’s future. This trans-Atlantic trade in human lives, however, was a contingent and non-inevitable event, not a progression along a linear timeline toward some ultimate telos – no matter whether the telos of colonial masters or Marxist historiographers. For the prophets of the hidden god of History to naturalise the entire past as inevitable only makes them the strange bedfellows of the slave-masters. And their naturalisation of the future only makes all of us slaves, condemned to playing catch-up with their version of what the future should look like.
In this schema, there can never be anything new, since everything is already given a priori. The future is foreordained and simply awaits realisation. Only when we can unmoor ourselves from hidden gods, illusory tomorrows, and other such stultifying ideas, can we really embrace creativity and appreciate the production of novelty on its own terms. From the instant that the god of History is dethroned by Janus, infinite horizons fan out in all directions. And our creativity suddenly becomes creativity per se, not the mere fulfilment of a telos. This is an idea I characterised earlier in terms of drawing, rather than merely colouring-in. The blank sketchbook knows no a priori designs; only the a posteriori marks that we leave behind as we move. In the realm of activism, this sensibility is embodied in the practice of prefigurative politics – a break not only from the cult of negation, but also from the idea that revolution has to mean fulfilling some programme handed down from on high. As Graeber writes, ‘we’re all already revolutionaries when we make something genuinely new’⁷⁰. What this means for radical writing, meanwhile, is to do away with manifestos and instead tune our attention into the profound creativity everywhere in our midst. Unlike in the manifesto tradition, the futurology of the present does not prescribe a single monolithic future, but tries instead to articulate the many alternative futures continually emerging in the perpetual present. The goal of such an endeavour is to make visible the living, breathing alternatives all around us, while at the same time fomenting an immanent hope that can spread virally and be enacted in other places elsewhere.
To sacrifice today in the name of an illusory tomorrow is just not the point anymore. It is for this reason that I chose to open with those extraordinary words from Janis Joplin – tomorrow never happens. The point is to draw, not simply to colour-in or fulfill some pre-ordained utopian future. It is to continually re-invent reality from within reality, rather than from some external, transcendental standpoint such as that mystical realm where invisible hands and hidden gods reside. As an aside, it has occurred to me, as I sit here at my kitchen table punching out these final words, what a happy coincidence it is that the names Janis and Janus bear such a striking resemblance to one another. If I was a visual artist (not just a writer-cum-artist manqué), I would no doubt enjoy experimenting with ways to combine the two in some sort of installation – perhaps a stone bust of Janus, singing in the unmistakably raw and passionate voice of one of the legends of the hippie movement. But it matters not that I am no artist in any formal sense, since each of us are already artists of the present in our own ways. ‘One creates new modalities of subjectivity in the same way that an artist creates new forms from the palette’, writes Guattari.⁷¹ The parallel he draws between art and social transformation is not to be taken as mere metaphor, however. What he calls for is a merging of art with life, his contention being that global warming and the other great issues of our times cannot be adequately addressed ‘without a mutation of mentality, without promoting a new art of living in society’⁷². To the ends of forging a more habitable and convivial present, the cross-fertilisations between artistic and activist practices need to continue proliferating, and creativity in general must remain free to flourish. Just as the economic crisis in Argentina in 2001 was quickly and creatively responded to by way of a slew of liberatory initiatives at the grassroots (including the occupied factory movement discussed earlier), the same is now happening in response to the current economic crisis, albeit at a global scale. In these conditions, the futurology of the present is needed now more than ever. The question becomes whether to resign ourselves to the life-denying ossification of creativity under capitalism and the traditional Left alike, or, to liberate life wherever it is imprisoned and to participate passionately and deliberately in the production of the new.

1.) Acknowledgements are due first of all to Anamaine Asinas for all her love, support, and inspiration. Ana – I cannot help but think that the kind of intensely passionate, nurturing and mutually-liberating relationship we share is the very stuff that revolutions are made of. I would also like to extend my warmest thanks to Eric Pido and Marta Celletti, since it was in many a conversation with these dear friends that some of the ideas presented in this article were first formed. Sincere thank yous must also go out to Marc Herbst, Rosi Braidotti, Steven Morgana, Suzanne Passmore, and Elmo Gonzaga, each of whom kindly read various incarnations of this work and provided some very helpful and encouraging feedback. Lastly, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to all of the many activists whom I have worked with over the years, since it is really the collective imagination of our movements that is the true author of this work.
2.) Janis Joplin, ‘Ball and Chain’ in Janis Joplin’s Greatest Hits, CBS Records, 1973.
3.) See Gottfried Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977 [1807].
4.) As the Hegelian philosopher Alexandre Kojève put it: ‘Time in which the Future takes primacy can be realized, can exist, only provided that it negates or annihilates’. See Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Basic Books, New York, 1969, p. 136. Hegel’s ideas on negation are drawn, in no small part, from physics: ‘In modern physical science the opposition, first observed to exist in magnetism as polarity, has come to be regarded as a universal law pervading the whole of nature’ (Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 223). Here he takes the positive-negative opposition found in electrical and magnetic phenomena and adapts it to social relations, elevating it as a mechanical law governing all of history.
5.) See, for example, Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992 [1848]; Michael Albert, Moving Forward: Program for a Participatory Economy, AK Press, San Francisco, 2000; and George Monbiot, Manifesto for a New World Order, New Press, New York, 2004. The manifestos of the twentieth century avant-gardes (Futurist, Surrealist, Situationist, and so on) are perfectly exemplary too – with the exception, perhaps, of the Dada Manifesto of 1918, which was more a parody of the manifesto form.
6.) See, for example, Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992 [1848]; Michael Albert, Moving Forward: Program for a Participatory Economy, AK Press, San Francisco, 2000; and George Monbiot, Manifesto for a New World Order, New Press, New York, 2004. The manifestos of the twentieth century avant-gardes (Futurist, Surrealist, Situationist, and so on) are perfectly exemplary too – with the exception, perhaps, of the Dada Manifesto of 1918, which was more a parody of the manifesto form.
7.) Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, Labor of Dionysus: A critique of the state-form, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1994, p. 6.
8.) Rebecca Solnit, 2009, ‘The Revolution Has Already Occurred’, The Nation, viewed 19 April 2009, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090323/solnit, p. 13.
9.) Dimitris Papadopoulos, Niamh Stephenson & Vassilis Tsianos, Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century, Pluto Press, London, 2008, p. xiii.
10.) Gilles Deleuze, ‘What is a dispositif?’, in T. J. Armstrong (ed), Michel Foucault: Philosopher, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1992, p. 163.
11.) Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1995, p. 12.
12.) Colectivo Situaciones, 2003, ‘On the Researcher-Militant’, European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies, viewed 28 January 2011, http://eipcp.net/transversal/0406/colectivosituaciones/en, p. 3.
13.) David Graeber, Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology, Prickly Paradigm Press, Chicago, 2004, p. 12.
14.) Maurizio Lazzarato, ‘Multiplicity, Totality, Politics’, Parrhesia, iss. 9, 2010, p. 24.
15.) Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1993, pp. ix–xv.
16.) See Uri Gordon, Anarchy Alive!: Anti-Authoritarian Politics from Practice to Theory, Pluto Press, London, 2008; and Jeffrey S. Juris, Networking Futures: The Movements Against Corporate Globalization, Duke University Press, Durham, 2008.
17.) Bruno Latour, ‘Postmodern? No, Simply Amodern!: Steps Towards an Anthropology of Science’, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 21, iss. 1, 1990, pp. 145–171.
18.) Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 92. Here, Guattari draws from the concept of ‘duration’ as found in Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, Dover Publications, Mineola, 1998 [1911].
19.) Cited in Gerald Raunig, Art and Revolution: Transversal Activism in the Long Twentieth Century, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007, p. 47.
20.) Scott Littleton, Gods, Goddesses, and Mythology, Vol. 6, Marshall Cavendish, Tarrytown, 2005, p. 770.
21.) Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Penguin Books, London, 2003 [1885], p. 150.
22.) Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, Penguin, London, 1991 [1977], p. 31; Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, in P. Rabinow (ed), The Foucault Reader, Penguin Books, London, 1984, pp. 76–100.
23.) Free Association, 2010, How to generate a generation, viewed 25 February 2011, http://freelyassociating.org/2010/10/how-to-generate-a-generation/, p. 1.
24.) Gilles Deleuze cited in Félix Guattari & Suely Rolnik, Molecular Revolution in Brazil, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2008 [1986], p. 19.
25.) See Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, What is to be Done?, Oxford University Press, Clarendon, 1963 [1902].
26.) Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1, Penguin Books, London, 1986 [1867]; Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 2, Penguin Books, London, 1985 [1885]; Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 3, Penguin Books, London, 1981 [1894].
27.) See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007 [1740].
28.) An analogy might help to illustrate the problematic I am dealing with here: Imagine that you are a houseguest at the home of a friend and you get up in the middle of the night to use the bathroom. The only problem is that there is an electrical storm outside and the power has failed. All is dark. Would it be necessary to have a complete map of the entire household in your mind in order to be able to reach the bathroom, or might it also be possible to feel your way there through the dark? The futurology of the present is not concerned with the map of the house; only with those feeling their way through the dark. Instances of the latter kind are what Maurice Merleau-Ponty has referred to as ‘absorbed coping’. See Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, Merleau-Ponty and ‘Phenomenology of perception’, Routledge, Abingdon, 2011, pp. 96–97.
29.) Examples include Jean Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact, Berg, Oxford, 2005; Paul Virilio 2005, The Information Bomb, Verso, London; and Annie Le Brun 2008, The Reality Overload: The Modern World’s Assault on the Imaginal Realm, Inner Traditions, Rochester.
30.) Harry Cleaver, 1992, ‘Kropotkin, Self-Valorization and the Crisis of Marxism’, Libcom, viewed 9 March 2010, http://libcom.org/library/kropotkin-self-valorization-crisis-marxism, p. 4.
31.) The commons could be considered as capitalism’s constitutive outside. It is the very lifeblood of capital and yet, even as it is harnessed, it must simultaneously be negated lest it threaten the calcified order necessary for capitalism’s own reproduction. The concept of the ‘constitutive outside’ has been drawn here from Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex“, Routledge, New York, 1993, pp. 3, 8.
32.) Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976 [1847], p. 57.
33.) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. See also Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, Athlone Press, London, 1983 [1962].
34.) Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982 [1844], p. 138.
35.) Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 136.
36.) Rosi Braidotti, Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 167.
37.) Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 29.
38.) Jorge Luis Borges, ‘The Garden of Forking Paths’ in D. Yates & J. Irby (eds), Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings, New Directions, New York, 1964, p. 28.
39.) Richard Day, Gramsci is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements, Pluto Press, London, 2005, p. 183.
40.) Karl Marx, ‘Estranged Labour’ in K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1961 [1844], pp. 67–83.
41.) This is an idea expressed in Gottfried Hegel, ‘The doctrine of essence’ in W. Wallace (ed), The logic of Hegel, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1892 [1817], pp. 207–286. ‘[T]hings really are not what they immediately show themselves … there is a permanent in things, and that permanent is in the first instance their Essence’ (pp. 208–209).
42.) Lazzarato, ‘Multiplicity, Totality, Politics’, p. 24.
43.) David Graeber, 2008, ‘Hope in Common’, The Anarchist Library, viewed 1 July 2011, http://theanarchistlibrary.org/HTML/David_Graeber__Hope_in_Common.html, pp. 1, 4.
44.) Graeber, ‘Hope in Common’, p. 1.
45.) Graeber, ‘Hope in Common’, p. 1
46.) This formulation of a ‘political apathy’ is indebted to the work of Feeltank Chicago. See Jerome Mast Grand, Amber Hasselbring & Corndog Brothers, 2008, ‘Renaming Bush Street’, Journal of Aesthetics and Protest, iss. 6, viewed 5 July 2011, http://www.journalofaestheticsandprotest.org/6/antiwar/renamingbushstreet.html.
47.) Foucault, Discipline and Punish.
48.) Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 293–308.
49.) Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, Empire, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2000.
50.) My thinking on affect is primarily sourced from Brian Massumi, Parables for the virtual: Movement, affect, sensation, Duke University Press, Durham, 2002. In short, affect is the capacity to affect and be affected. It is not a personal feeling, but a pre-personal intensity that exists only in flows between people and things.
51.) CrimethInc., 2008, ‘The Really Really Free Market: Instituting the Gift Economy’, CrimethInc. Ex-Workers’ Collective, viewed 8 July 2011, http://www.crimethinc.com/texts/atoz/reallyreally.php.
52.) Graeber, ‘Hope in Common’, p. 1.
53.) Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, Penguin, New York, 2009 [1972], pp. 4–8.
54.) Avi Lewis & Naomi Klein, The Take, Barna-Alper Productions, New York, 2004.
55.) David Graeber, Direct Action: An Ethnography, AK Press, Oakland, 2009.
56.) Penny Harvey & Soumhya Venkatesan, ‘Faith, Reason and the Ethic of Craftsmanship: Creating Contingently Stable Worlds’, in M. Candea (ed), The Social After Gabriel Tarde: Debates and Assessments, Routledge, Abingdon, p. 130.
57.) The bulk of my research results are still in the process of being written up, although a few preliminary sketches have so far been published. See, for instance, Marco Cuevas-Hewitt, ‘Sketches of an Archipelagic Poetics of Postcolonial Belonging’, Budhi: A Journal of Culture and Ideas, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2007, pp. 239–246; and Marco Cuevas-Hewitt, ‘The Figure of the “Fil-Whatever“: Filipino American Trans-Pacific Social Movements and the Rise of Radical Cosmopolitanism’, World Anthropologies Network E-Journal, no. 5, 2010, pp. 97–127.
58.) I seek to neutralise gender here by synthesising both the feminine and masculine suffixes (‘-a’ and ‘-o’, respectively) into the new suffix of ‘-@’. The reason that I have chosen this form over the standard ‘Filipino’ is that I wish to avoid using a gender-specific descriptor to stand in for all Filipin@s. This is an unfortunate grammatical inheritance from Spanish colonialism, since pre-Hispanic indigenous languages in the Philippine archipelago were, by and large, gender-neutral. I might have chosen to use the alternative suffix of ‘-a/o’ but decided against it, not just because it reads somewhat clumsily, but more importantly because it perpetuates the rigid binary notion of gender by which genderqueer individuals are marginalised.
59.) Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 29.
60.) Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, Continuum, London, 2004 [1987], p. 7.
61.) Cited in Guattari & Rolnik, Molecular Revolution in Brazil, p. 87.
62.) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra; Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1989 [1886].
63.) Harry Cleaver, Reading Capital Politically, Anti/Theses, Leeds, 2000 [1979], p. 18; Antonio Negri, Books for Burning: Between Civil War and Democracy in 1970s Italy, Verso, London, 2005, pp. 198–207, 215–230.
64.) See John Jordan, ‘Deserting the Culture Bunker’, Journal of Aesthetics and Protest, iss. 3, viewed 10 July 2011, http://www.joaap.org/new3/jordan.html.
65.) Cited in Lee Scrivner, ‘How to Write an Avant-Garde Manifesto (A Manifesto)’, London Consortium, viewed 9 July 2011, http://www.londonconsortium.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/scrivneripmessay.pdf, p. 13.
66.) Cited in Scrivner, ‘How to Write an Avant-Garde Manifesto (A Manifesto)’, p. 13.
67.) Tristan Tzara, 2006 [1918], ‘Dada Manifesto’, Wikisource, viewed 4 July 2011, http://www.freemedialibrary.com/index.php/Dada_Manifesto_(1918,_Tristan_Tzara).
68.) Cited in Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, Penguin Books, London, 2005 [1942], p. 90.
69.) Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End: Notes on Politics, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2000.
70.) Graeber, ‘Hope in Common’, p. 4.
71.) Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 7. To interpret Guattari here as saying that the production of novelty is simply a straightforward matter of human intent and free will would be gravely mistaken. Becomings can only occur through ‘heterogenesis’ (pp. 33–57); that is, through a multiplicity of elements in symbiosis. In the case of multiplicities in which human beings play a part, subjectivity is certainly one ingredient in the mix, but it does not assume the role of primary causal determinant. There is always an unpredictability to heterogenesis and we often we end up with entirely different outcomes to what we originally intended. It must furthermore be stressed that human subjectivity does not exist on some separate plane of reality as René Descartes presumed, but must rather be seen to be part of matter.
72.) Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 20.

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