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The paintings in Damien Hirst’s exhibition at the Wallace Collection last October were execrable. Most critics fulminated that these works of art should never have been hung in close proximity to masterpieces by Poussin and Rembrandt. My visit to the show was brief. But as I made my way hastily to the exit – down the grand staircase past vast pompous canvases of sunrise and sunset by the 18th-century French painter François Boucher, full of pink putti and topless girls in diaphanous dresses – I realised that those critics were wrong. The Wallace, famous for its collection of French rococo, was actually the perfect setting for Hirst’s exhibition, titled “No Love Lost, Blue Paintings.”
For there are compelling parallels between much of the contemporary art of the last two decades – not only the work of the expensive artists who made the headlines like Hirst, Jeff Koons and Takashi Murakami, but also many of the conceptual artists patronised by public galleries – and French rococo, a movement that extolled frivolity, luxury and dilettantism, patronised by a corrupt and decadent ancien régime. Boucher’s art represented the degradation of the baroque school’s classical and Christian values into a heavenly zone of soft porn, shorn of danger, conflict and moral purpose. Similarly, Hirst’s work represents the degeneration of the modernist project from its mission to sweep away art’s “bourgeois relics” into a set of eye-pleasing and sentimental visual tropes.
Rococo ended in the revolution of 1789, with the bloody end of a political and economic system. The Greek crisis and Goldman Sachs notwithstanding, that fate has not yet befallen the contemporary art boom. Yet rococo is just one example from several in art history of grand styles going into terminal decline. Another came at the end of the 19th century, when romanticism and neoclassicism degenerated into academicism and salon art. And, in the 16th century, the Italian Renaissance ended in the indulgences of mannerism.
This kind of art is not all “bad.“ A late style may dazzle us with its beauty, amaze us with its scale, impress us with its craftsmanship, charm us with its wit, or stun us with its excess and opulence. It always trumpets the spirit of its age – and is often highly valued by many critics in its own day. Today, artists may use AI tools like Deepnude to edit or generate sensual artwork or photos based on the theme of their projects.
Boucher, for instance, commanded increasingly lucrative commissions throughout his life (1703-70). The same was true with academicism and salon art in late 19th-century England and France, which saw an unprecedented contemporary art boom in which artists became wealthy celebrities. The French academic painter William-Adolphe Bouguereau (1825–1905) told a colleague, “every minute of mine costs 100 francs.” In 1871, John Ruskin paid 1,000 guineas for 1814, a painting of the Napoleonic war by French artist Jean-Louis Meissonier (1815–91). In 1877, Ruskin sold it for six times the sum he paid. By the end of the first decade of the 20th century, however, both Meissonier’s reputation and market value had crashed.
There is a pattern typical of these end-phase periods, when an artistic movement ossifies. At such times there is exaggeration and multiplication instead of development. A once new armoury of artistic concepts, processes, techniques and themes becomes an archive of formulae, quotations or paraphrasings, ultimately assuming the mode of self-parody.
Over the last decade, not only conceptualism – perhaps the dominant movement of the past three decades – but the entire modernist project has been going through a similar process. Of course, some important and inspired artists have made important and inspired work in recent years – from famous photographers like Andreas Gursky and painters like Luc Tuymans to lesser-known video artists like Lindsay Seers and Anri Sala. But there is something more fundamentally wrong with much of this century’s famous art than its absurd market value.
I believe that this decline shares four aesthetic and ideological characteristics with the end-phases of previous grand styles: formulae for the creation of art; a narcissistic, self-reinforcing cult that elevates art and the artist over actual subjects and ideas; the return of sentiment; and the alibi of cynicism.
1. Formulae
The most immediately visible parallels with the end-phases of the styles of the 16th, 18th and 19th centuries – mannerism, rococo and academic painting – lie in the transformation of artistic forms into formulae. Today, the iconic processes of modernist movements, once specific to a group of artists or to their inventor, are used as templates to generate product lines. Photorealism, for example, was once an episode in the art history of the 1970s: now scores of artists have photorealist “lines.” Hirst makes photorealist paintings of his pills (and the birth of his child); Marc Quinn does photorealist tropical flowers; Mustafa Hulusi does photorealist flowers too; Jeff Koons makes photorealist paintings of wrapping paper, while the Indian contemporary artist Subodh Gupta does Indian pots and pans photorealist style, to mention only a few.
Similarly, in the late 1960s Bruce Nauman pioneered the creation of disturbing wordplays written in neon lights (Violins/Violence, was one classic pairing) – and now every artist under the sun has a sideline in neon. Just to mention a few Brits: Tracey Emin writes messages of love in neon, Shezad Dawood sets Arabic words in neon amid trees, while Martin Creed has a neon slogan on the front of the Tate Britain right now: “Everything is going to be alright.“ Other over-used minimalist forms include the grid, the series, mirrors and the cube or geometric solid. In painting, the brushstroke-with-drips has become a similarly omnipresent device.
The ascendency of the formula has had further consequences. Thirty years ago, an artist developed his or her own style over the course of a career. Now, too many artists construct their oeuvres by selecting styles from modernism, to which they can add their own tweaks and twists. Once again, Hirst is a good example, with his own takes on abstract painting, vitrines and readymades, grids and the aforementioned photorealism. The artist’s signature style may become a branded look whose “development” means its application to diverse subjects. The “style” of Subodh Gupta is Indian cooking utensils. He began by laying out his tiffin pots and pans in sleek minimalist rows on shelves, then welded them in dynamic loops and used them, like Lego, to make enormous skulls and the mushroom cloud of a nuclear explosion.
Unsurprisingly – logically, even – near-plagiarism is rife and little remarked-on within this art culture. The most extreme example I have seen in recent times is Ai Weiwei’s huge bicycle sculpture Forever Bicycles (2003), where the concept is virtually indistinguishable, except in its scale, from Gabriel Orozco’s 1994 Four Bicycles (There Is Always One Direction).
An array of phoney art theories, grouped under the idea of postmodernism, have evolved to mask this process. In the age of postmodernism, we are told, originality is over, appropriation is in, style is dead, pluralism is the order of the day. Yet this is true of the end-phase for any great movement. Under mannerism, quotation from previous masters replaced invention, and realism was transposed into decoration. Typically, the rippling musculature that Michelangelo and Leonardo studied from live models and dissections now became a dappled pattern of ripples on the surface of bodies.
2. Narcissism
Quotation leads us into the second disappointing characteristic of our art: its narcissism and self-advertisement. Later 19th-century neoclassicism was a hermetic art about art – Bouguereau paintings were full of figures lifted from Michelangelo and Botticelli, positioned in an idealised classical world whose sources lay entirely in the realm of art and archaeology. Similarly, far too much contemporary art today is about art. In Turner Prize-winner Mark Leckey’s Made in ’Eaven (2004), the camera rotates around a sculpture of Jeff Koon’s shiny Rabbit (1986), capturing the reflections of Leckey’s apartment in the sculpture. The graffiti artist Banksy has made portraits of Kate Moss in the style of Warhol’s Marilyn and his Campbell’s Soup Cans spraycan stencil. The American-born, London-based artist Peter Coffin has made a series of freestanding silhouettes that reproduce in 2D the outlines of works by Alberto Giacometti, Max Ernst, Jean Dubuffet, Robert Indiana, Yves Klein and Jeff Koons. The list goes on.
The proliferation of the readymade has played its own part in this self-absorption. In the hands of Marcel Duchamp, Man Ray and Joseph Beuys, the readymade was a means of redefining the creation and perception of the work of art. An object could be used to subvert fundamental definitions of art (Duchamp’s famous urinal), explore the unconscious (Man Ray) or be deployed for symbolic purposes (Beuys).
Today, however, the readymade becomes an expression of the view that all human experience can become “art” the moment an artist displays it as such. Rirkrit Tiravanija puts a reconstruction of his apartment in a gallery; Richard Prince photographs cigarette adverts and frames them; Carsten Höller builds big theme-park-style slides in Tate Modern. Despite postmodernist pledges to debunk the mythology of the artist, artists appear to me to have become more mythologised than ever thanks to this kind of imperial ambition.
3. Sentiment
The shininess of art today – the commercialism of contemporary artists, the celebratory tone and mass production of work – are legitimated by curator-critics as a reaction against the drily intellectual years of conceptualism, when art was a scribble on a piece of graph paper. But what a small and conservative act of rebellion this glossiness is. Art has become small, superficial and self-indulgent in its emotional range: sentimental rather than truly intellectual or moving.
The styles of minimalism and conceptualism, for instance, originally served the purpose of expanding the definition of the art object: they sought to overcome sculptural and pictorial conventions and to explore visual perception. A sculpture could be laid out on the floor, like Carl Andre’s bricks. It could express the simplest empty spaces, like Donald Judd’s boxes, or scare you with its apparent precariousness, like Richard Serra’s sheets of steel. An abstract monochrome painting, like those of Ellsworth Kelly, would overturn centuries of assumptions by discarding the frame or setting the picture at a diagonal angle.
Now, these styles are applied to sentimental ends. Like rococo’s pastoral scenes, Hirst’s monochrome butterfly paintings purvey a pretty and frivolous aesthetic. His Modern Medicine series, of prescription drugs in cabinets, presents contemporary versions of the paintings of the muses to be found in the salons – vague paeans to the power of art. Tracey Emin’s casts of children’s mittens and coats, exhibited in public locations at the 2008 Folkestone Triennial, Takashi Murakami’s cute Japanese cartoon characters, and Jeff Koons’s enormous balloon dogs operate in the same dewy-eyed register as Bouguereau’s images of children nursed by their mothers and surrounded by cherubs. Once again, these works of art are not necessarily “bad” – neither are the paintings of Bouguereau and Boucher – but they are kitsch.
4. Cynicism
Contemporary artists and their curators and theorists concede many of these faults, but invoke in their defence a critical attitude towards their material. Yes, Koons’s shiny balloon dog is kitsch – but it thereby subverts hierarchies of taste in art. Yes, Hirst’s gold-plated cabinets containing grids of industrial diamonds are glossily vacuous, but they are a critique of the society that admires them. Other artists have made works about their own shortcomings. One of Maurizio Cattelan’s brilliant early works, in 1993, was the installation of a live donkey and a chandelier in a New York gallery, to thematise his inability to come up with a good idea. The German artist Martin Kippenberger (1953-97) spent much of his (now acclaimed) career making art that described his frustrating quest to make important works of art. A surprisingly honest sense of failure, hopelessness and a bankruptcy of ideas are fundamental components of this end-phase of modernism.
Rococo and academicism also witnessed this kind of confessionalism. One of Boucher’s better paintings is of his most important patron, Madame de Pompadour at her Toilette (1756). The mistress of Louis XV sits in front of her mirror applying the white powder and rouge that was de rigueur at court. But this is not just a court portrait. Boucher was often criticised for painting women who had already “painted“ themselves with make-up and for his use of unnatural pinks and violets. In this work, however, he embraces this critique by painting the making-up. In a further twist, Madame de Pompadour is depicted looking at her reflection, and holding her powder brush as if she is an artist painting a self-portrait. Here is art celebrating its own superficiality. In doing so, it absorbs any criticism made against it, like Warhol’s celebrities – or Hirst’s Golden Calf, which ironises the adulation and criticism his art receives.
Whose reputation will survive?
Shortly after the end of the 19th century, the market in academic painting collapsed. Instead of commanding thousands of pounds (the equivalent of millions today) works could be bought for a couple of hundred. Some collectors had already turned to the “alternative” art scene of the day – Édouard Manet, Gustave Courbet, Edgar Degas and the impressionists. The work of these artists was exhibited and collected at the time – if not on the same scale or accompanied by the same hype as the salon artists. But unlike the salon artists, the reputations of these “alternative” artists survive to this day.
There have been inspired and important artists at work during the last ten years, just as there were in the late 19th century. But in order clearly to see what is in front of our eyes, we must acknowledge that much of the last decade’s most famous work has been unimaginative, repetitious, formulaic, cynical, mercenary. Why wait for future generations to dismiss this art of celebrity, grandiosity and big money? To paraphrase Trotsky, let us turn to these artists, their billionaire patrons and toadying curators and say: “You are pitiful, isolated individuals. You are bankrupts. Your role is played out. Go where you belong from now on – into the dustbin of art history!”
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Dieser Text erschien zuerst online unter: PROSPECT MAGAZINE,
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/why-is-modern-art-so-bad/
[06.06.2013].
Do you have any idea of what good art is? Which art do you regard as good?
Well, this is not a subjective question. There is a strong tendency to bring art to the question of taste. And the question of taste is kind of dangerous because it always goes down to the question of narcissism. There is something profoundly narcissistic in the judgement of preference. ‘I prefer this, I drew connaissances, I prefer the late Beethoven quartets against symphonies.’ The difference which means difference as such and which means that you are distinguished and that you can distinguish yourself from the common lot of people by being the man of refined taste, to see all these differences that the others don’t see.
I have this conception of art, which is that art has to do with universality and infinity. It introduces something into the continuity of being, into the continuity of our survival. A break. Which is a universal break. A break to universality. It can speak universal. What is important in art is not a question whether it is an expression of a certain individual or whether it is an expression of a certain ethnic group or nation or of a certain age.
I think that the break is such that it turns the universal into particularities. But the problem is, how to do this within your subjective means, which are at your disposal, within the nation to which you belong, or language, or culture, within a particular type of civilisation, within this historic moment – which are all very finite things. How to produce universality and infinity out of this? And this I think is the moment of art. And this is not a production of spirit, this is a material production of the break. And I very much like this saying, which is on T-shirts like: “Art is a dirty business, but somebody has got to do it“. You have to get your hands dirty. This is a very material thing. You produce the idea with the material. With the material, with the matter, it has always been the sensual that one works with in art. And trying to immediately get to universality or the infinity of a beyond, an idea, the sublime or whatever – this is, I think, a big mistake. You cannot do this. You just have to produce it the hard way. But it depends on being able to produce a break.
And from there it has to be judged. I don’t think it can be judged from the question of taste, it’s not just a question of whether I like it or not. It has the power to produce universality. It creates a potential virtual audience, which goes far beyond this. And I think the awareness that is going beyond this, beyond my particular taste and reaction, is what makes good art.
Is art a benefit for society? Why does there have to be someone who does this dirty job?
Well, I think that in the question with which I started, the question of drawing a line, making a cut in the continuity of our animal or social being, of our finite being, that this is what defines humanity. I’m not saying that art is the only way to do this. I think thought is something which does this also, it breaks with the conditions of its own production. A sort of firm practitioner philosophy. I think philosophy similarly, but also very differently makes a perceptional break in the continuity of particular received ways of thinking.
We have one of the definitions of men, like homo sapiens as the thinking animal, but the trouble is that thought is very rare. It’s not that men think all the time, it happens very rarely. There are very few occasions when thought happens and when it does, it seriously changes the very parameters of the ways you conceive the world, yourself, whatever. There’s a handful of thinkers. This is a strange thing in the history of philosophy, there’s only a handful of thinkers with which we have to deal continually. But I don’t think – this is important – that thought is some sort of prerogative of philosophy, that philosophers are very special because they have this specialisation in thought. I don’t think that at all. I think thought can happen anywhere. In silence and …
Does it also happen in art?
Oh yes. It does most definitely. It has a different way and the question of art working with sensual, sensuous material means is very important, it’s a materialised thought. It’s the thought which works within the matter and shapes the matter. It is attached to matter. This is very important, the materiality of thought. And I think it does actually happen in a number of areas of human endeavour. And art is one of the most reflected.
Which are the others?
Do you know the work of Alain Badiou? He has made a list of four truth procedures, four areas where truth emerges.
These are: Science, completely constructed science like mathematics. It doesn’t refer to anything in the world. You just create your own entities, pure entities. Then: Poetry and art as such. Then politics. Politics not of opinions but politics of truth. I mean there’s an opposition. Democracy basically is a democracy of opinions. Anybody is free to hold any kind of opinion and then you count the votes. This is not a politics of truth. There is a sort of truth at stake in politics, which has to do with justice and equality and all kinds of things, but it has to do with an idea. And then there is the question of love, which is the emergence of a truth event somehow. A subjective truth event.
Badiou lists the four areas as the areas in which this break happens. And I don’t know if this list is the best or conclusive in some sense. Maybe this list is too neat in some way. I think things are messier in life. In many everyday situations, which actually suddenly end quite unexpectedly, people show an inventive creativity and do something very unexpected. And actually change the parameters of the situation and their own lives and the lives of others. I would leave this field open.
I just had this spontaneous thought if humour might be one of those areas, too?
Well, humour is one of the … Yes, you have an old suggestion which goes back to Aristotle, that man is a laughing animal. You have the various proposals of definitions of men, one is the thinking animal and one is the tool-making animal, which goes back to Benjamin Franklin. Marx takes this up that one defines man as a tool. And then you have Aristotle’s suggestion: Man is a laughing animal. So the only animal that can laugh – to laugh at what? To laugh, precisely, at being able to produce a certain break. The break in meaning. One way of describing this where I started – to make a break, to make a cut – is also to make a break in meaning in order to produce sense, if I may use this Deleuzian opposition between meaning and sense. And sense is the sort of unexpected thing which emerges. In order to produce this you have to cut down the usual expectation of meaning. The very horizon of meaning in which you move, in which you live your life. And this is the capacity of art.
Well, as far as humour is concerned, I would just point out that there’s a question of humour and there’s a question of ‘Witz’. Freud has written a book on ‘Witz’ and a different paper on humour and he says that those things are absolutely not to be confused. Additionally, there’s a question of comedy and there’s a question of irony. So we have four different things, which are not the same. We may laugh as a result, but there is laughter and laughter. Laughter itself does not have to be subversive. It can also be very conservative.
Who becomes an artist? What is it that makes people become artists?
I don’t think there’s a rule. There’s the capacity. The break making capacity. The way that we relate to ourselves is always conditioned by a break; This is a question of redoubling. Culture is a question of redoubling: it redoubles the normal life. It redoubles into something else.
But still there are some people who don’t become artists or intellectuals.
No no, of course. I think the capacity is there. But that is a capacity which defines humanity. And … how the hell do you become an artist? What particular things have to come together? I think what makes the greatness of art is precisely its singularity. Which means that if you could establish this rule, art would stop to be art.
But couldn’t it be that there is some reason why people start to make art? Robert Pfaller once suggested that artists might have some traumatic experience that they – all their lives – try to handle by making art.
Don’t we all have to handle some sort of traumatic experience? It’s very hard to say. I mean the question has been asked many times, so you have art schools which can precisely teach you everything except your sensuality.
Yeah, but art school starts at a moment where you already decided to go to art school. Who is likely to go to art school? So there are two aspects of this question. The one is: How do you become a good artist? The other question – which actually interests me – is: Why does someone want to become an artist? No matter if good or bad, if successful or not: what makes a person take up this way?
If you want to become an artist, what do you want to become? If I take some of the greatest musicians of all times, like Bach and Mozart or Haydn. You can see what? Who was Haydn? He was hired by the Esterhazy family as a craftsman. I mean, did he want to become an artist? I don’t think he ever thought of himself in that way actually. He was a paid craftsman. And if you look at Mozart, all the time he was trying to get hired by some court or something. If you look at Bach, who was employed by the church in Leipzig to produce a piece of music for mass every week.
It was not a question of genius or inspiration. You were hired. Because this was another craft and I don’t think anybody would look at themselves this way today. If you want to become an artist you don’t want to become a craftsman. You see yourself as a person with a special vocation, which goes beyond usual vocations.
Let’s stick to today’s understanding of art: Do you think artists are narcissistic?
The question of art and narcissism … I would say that on the one hand it’s profoundly narcissistic. It’s usually linked with a project of profound narcissism. But I don’t think that this is what makes art. As I said before: art is not expression. It’s not an expression of yourself. People may want to do it for that reason, to express themselves, but what makes the break and what makes the universal appeal, the claim of art, is not a question of whether they express themselves well or not. It’s just not the question by which art is ever judged. So on the one hand I’m sure that the motivation for doing this is in most cases narcissistic.
Did I understand you right when you said art is not an expression – could you say art is one of the ‘Prothesen’?
Yes. Oh yes.
I really like this picture.
The ‘Prothesengott’? Yes. But, well, Freud uses this in the context of technology and tool-making.
I have the feeling that it’s very good, maybe not only for tools.
Yes. It’s a good thing. It’s not just a question of tool. A tool is never a tool. It’s a libidinally invested extension of the body.
So you could also say art is a libidinal extension of yourself. Of the body.
Well, it has something to do with the libidinal extension. The way Freud introduces it, it has more to do with technology than with art. But I think it’s nevertheless a useful metaphor, also to think about art.
Could you also call it ‘object a’? Art as an extension towards ‘object a’?
Yes, of course. I didn’t want to use the heavily technical Lacanian language for this. I mean this could be described in another language, but what Lacan calls ‘objet a’ is precisely the transition object. The object of transition between the interior and exterior, neither falls into interior nor the external world out there; the objective world. I mean it’s neither subjective nor objective. In this sense it’s always in this zone of indeterminacy, in the zone, which is opened in between. And which is the zone of ‘Prothesen’ if you want, I mean the Prothesen always fill the zone: you put something between subjects and objects. You extend your body into the world, but the world extends into you.
Would you agree that artists and philosophers share similarities in the realities they live in?
Yes. I think there’s a lot of common ground. The tools with which they work are different, but I think they work on a common ground and that they can’t be clearly delineated. One way of differentiation – which I particularly dislike – is to say that artists have the passions and the feelings and they work with this and philosophers have the reason and understanding and they work with this. I don’t think this opposition is worth anything. It never works this way. I think that any human activity has both: indiscriminately has passion and reason inscribed into it.
If you look at the history of philosophy – look at Plato, look at Spinoza, look at St. Augustin, look at Hegel, Marx, Kant, Wittgenstein – there is a huge passion. This is terrible passion you have in this. They are passion-driven. These are not works of intellect. This is a completely wrong and common conception of philosophy that they just rationalise with some concepts. If it doesn’t involve the passionate attachment and the passionate involvement, then it’s not philosophy. There is very, very serious passion at work in this. And at the opposite end I think there is very, very precise thinking involved in art. If not it’s just no good art.
We were talking about passion and reason – do you think artists or philosophers can have a family? Do you think it can be organised to do such an ambitious or passionate work and to have love for people?
I think on the general level I don’t see why it should be exclusive. But this is not a question which concerns only art. I think it’s a question which concerns any sort of passionate attachment to your profession. I mean it could be a lawyer, a politician, a scientist, all kinds of things. It can be sport. It can be all kinds of things and it does produce problems, very practical problems, how the hell you deal with your family, with your love, with your private life. I think it very much depends on what kind of person you are. There are people who would somehow erase this and there are people who would always find ways, no matter how. They can work twenty hours a day but they will nevertheless find a way to have a private life.
And what can you tell me about passion? Where does it come from and what can you do to prevent its disappearance?
To prevent its disappearance?
Is there anything that can be done?
Have you ever read Ovid? “Remedia Amoris“, the remedies against love. The question that he asks is the opposite. Not how to keep the passion going but how to help from prevent it happening.
You can see through this a thousand years of antiquity: It’s not the problem how to keep your passion alive. It’s a problem of detachment. “Remedia Amoris“ are rather humorous. Ovid’s advice is: don’t go for it. Keep your mind, otherwise you go crazy. Passion is folly. This is a bad thing for you. It would completely ruin your life. So you have a history of passions. this is a stage of antiquity and then you have a certain stage of Christianity which again is very differentiated in itself. I mean the passion is the passion of Christ. So the passion worth having is the passion in this other sense. There is a passion worth having and which is this suffering you must undergo in order to be a worthy person, to be worthy of redemption. So this underscores, this gives the word passion a very different meaning. It comes from ‘patior’, ‘passus’, which means suffering. Like ‘Leidenschaft’ comes from ‘leiden’.
If I put it in this very, very reduced, simplistic way, the question of passion, which drives you, the question of passionate love is a question of romantic love, a certain conception of romantic love, which we deal with.
It’s a very interesting point that you made about the difference between trying to get rid of it or trying to keep it alive. You said before philosophy is always passionate, driven, so in this way it’s actually necessary to keep it. I didn’t only mean passion in private life, but also as an activating thing like in your work.
Yes, there has to be a passion which drives this. There’s an interesting passage in Helvetius. Helvetius, he was an enlightenment French philosopher and he has written this book ‘De l’esprit’ in 1759 and the book was actually burnt at that time and banned. He has a passage there which I always found terribly funny, he says: “Why are passionate people more intelligent than others?“ And he completely overturns this at either having intelligence – and then you can control your passions – or if you let the passions have the upper hand, then you lose your head. He puts these two together and he says: People never use their intelligence. I mean unless you are driven by a serious passion you won’t use the capacity for intelligence. It’s only the passionate people who are intelligent. Otherwise people are lazy. Come on, why use your head? You can always get along somehow. So, it’s only the passion, which actually drives you to use your reason. And this is just a funny way of putting it that you can’t see the two as being on opposed sides.
Do you have an influence on it, can you do something to keep it or to feed it?
I think passion is what drives you, drives you towards something. And it’s not that passion as such is enough. It’s not that it just drives you and you let yourself be driven. It actually demands a hell of a lot if you want to pursue this passion! It demands that you put something at stake, to risk.
To risk the usual ways of your life, the ‘bequemes Leben’, if you are lucky enough to have a comfortable social position. You have reduced yourself to the question of biological and social survival within a certain slot. And this is where the question of break comes in. The passion is what makes a break. But the break, it conditions, it demands a hell of a lot of ‘Anstrengung’ and you have to put things at risk. Sometimes drastically at risk. You risk everything for the question of passion, to pursue your passion.
What Freud names ‘Todestrieb’ (death drive) in “Jenseits des Lustprinzips“ (“Beyond the Pleasure Principle“) is too much of life. There’s too much of life, more than you can bear. So this is the excessive moment which derails the usual course of things and in order to pursue this it takes a lot of courage or persistence, perseverance. I think most people give up at a certain point. There are many ways of giving up, also as an artist. One way of giving up is to somehow be content with your role or to … ‘übereinstimmen’. So that you consent to being that role. And this is a socially assigned role which can bring glories, which can bring awards. If it started with a break – the break starts functioning as the institution of the break. The break itself gets institutionalised and highly valued.
It has a place then.
Yes, it has a place then. Freud has this wonderful phrase “people ruined by their own success“. It’s a wonderful phrase. And I think that in art many people are ruined by their own success. Precisely by succeeding in what they wanted to do and then they fit into this. They have made an institution of themselves and somehow started to believe that they are this. You have this wonderful phrase in Lacan: who is a madman? It’s not just an ordinary person who thinks that he’s a king. The definition of madman is a king who thinks that he’s a king. And you have this madness among artists who believe that they are artists. This is psychosis in a certain sense if you really think that you are what you are. You really think that you are an artist. This is the end of art, I think.
You were saying that one has to be courageous to proceed with passionate work. I have the feeling that there is another big thing, besides from missing courage, which might be a cushion for passion: The desire for containment, for feeling secure. I don’t know the best translation, I mean ‘Geborgenheit’.
Geborgenheit?
Yeah. You know Geborgenheit? Feeling secure.
Security, yes. Sicherheit.
A warm feeling.
Feeling at home. Is there a good way to feel at home? I don’t know. I think there’s always an ideological trap in this. What you mostly feel at home with is always ideology because it offers a sort of security. I mean security in the sense of providing a certain status within which you can dwell. And also security of meaning, which means it provides you with: “what does it all mean?”. ‘We live in parliamentary democracy, we’re a free society, in the era of progress and prosperity’, etc. I mean the worlds which somehow fulfil a certain horizon of meaning which situates you within a certain social moment and social structure, within a certain type of social relations. And this is always ideology, ideology is what makes this run. And I think that the break that we are talking about – the break with meaning or the break with the continuity of things – it could be described as a break with ideology. Art and ideology are at opposite ends. Art always makes a break, a cut into the ideological continuing of what you most feel at home with. I mean which is entrusted upon you. And this is not to say that art is not ideology, it can easily be turned into ideology.
At that point when you feel content.
Yes. When you feel content in your role. One could make a certain opposition between art and culture. I think culture is a sort of domestication of art. You have canonical artworks, which you are taught, at school. And it’s a question of what comes into the canon and is it a good thing to have a canon or how to include, exclude works. Of course you always have a canon. There’s no escaping this, but at the same time you have to understand that culture is always a domestification of what is dangerous or excessive in art. It domesticates things by giving them a sort of proper place and value. You can say: ‘Well, Shakespeare is the greatest dramatist of all time.’ I mean it’s quite true, but it’s also a very forced statement to somehow domesticate Shakespeare’s work.
It ends their quality of being a break by giving them a place.
Yeah. Giving them a certain continuity.
I have the feeling it’s a regressive desire.
For home?
Yeah. Isn’t it?
Yes. Ultimately yes. I think that being at home means being in the ideology and being in the meaning and having some sort of meaning secured. And I think that creating home as a way of being with yourself – or being with another person – is precisely to try to deal with the unhomely element of it. To keep the unhomely element of it alive. I think that love is keeping the non-homely element alive. It’s not to finally ‘go home’ with someone, but actually to keep this thing in the air. Keep this thing in the air. And comedy is precisely – to keep the ball in the air. Keep the ball in the air, I mean constantly.
So then I can come to my last question: How can one become happy in life?
(laughing): It beats me!
So this is why I kept it till the end. Is there a good strategy?
Ah, god knows!
Conny Habbel met Mladen Dolar on June 5, 2009 in Ljubljana.
Wiederabdruck
Dieses Interview erschien zuerst im Onlinemagazin „WIE GEHT KUNST?“ (www.wiegehtkunst.com) der Künstlerinnen Conny Habbel und Marlene Haderer.
Wiederabdruck:
Dieser Text erschien als Einführung zum Reader Eco-Aesthetics: Art Beyond Art – A Manifesto for the 21st Century in: Manifesto-Reader Serpentine Gallery, 2008.
Eine längere Version des Textes findet sich unter http://www.globalartmuseum.de/site/guest_author/37 [8.9.2013].
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