define('DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT', true);
define('DISALLOW_FILE_MODS', true);
2. Als Leere oder als Abgrund.
3. Als Entzug des gegebenen Sinns.
4. Als Verschwinden der Realität inmitten der Realität oder als Realität.
5. Die Realität, die in sich verschwindet, hat Jacques Lacan mit dem Begriff des Realen markiert.
6. Es handelt sich um ein immanentes Außen; nicht um eine externe Äußerlichkeit.
7. Zu abstrahieren heißt, von der Äußerlichkeit abzusehen, um auf ein Außen zu blicken, das innen ist.
8. Weil das nicht leicht ist, überspannt die Philosophie oft den Bogen und die Sehne reißt.
9. Das Denken zerreißt in dieser Überspannung und fällt in sich zusammen.
10. Aber es gibt kein Denken, das dieser Gefahr ausweichen könnte.
11. Zum Denken gehört, dass es sich nicht auf sich verlassen kann.
12. Es muss sich von sich selber lösen, um Denken zu sein.
13. Ein Denken, das sich nicht selbst verließe, wäre nichts als Rekapitulation des bereits Gewussten und -Adressierung des bloß Wissbaren.
14. Es erstreckte sich auf nichts Neues.
15. Ohne Neugierde bliebe es ganz bei sich.
16. Denken aber heißt Weiterdenken, heißt, nicht aufhören zu denken, heißt, sich und seine Ergebnisse in Frage zu stellen.
17. Aber das Denken kann nur Fragen stellen, indem es welche beantwortet.
18. Es muss sich eingestehen, dass jeder Frage Antworten vorausgehen und dass die Frage selbst bereits eine Antwort darstellt.
19. Hierin kommen Wittgenstein und Derrida überein: Dass es ein Ja gibt, das jedem Nein vorausspringt, dass jede Frage auf eine Antwort antwortet, indem sie sie in Frage stellt.
20. Weiterdenken bedeutet, aus der Enge der sozialen, kulturellen und akademischen Doxa auszubrechen, um ins Offene zu gehen, wie man in eine Wüste geht.
21. Wer weiterdenkt, kommt nicht an seinen Ausgangspunkt zurück.
22. Es gibt Denken nur als katastrophisches Denken.
23. Das griechische Wort katastrophé meint den Umschlag oder die Umwendung.
24. In seiner Interpretation von Platons Höhlengleichnis taucht zwar das Wort katastrophé nicht auf, dennoch spricht Heidegger in ihr von der Umwendung.
25. Sie sei das „Wesen der paideia“.1
26. Paideia übersetzen wir gewöhnlich mit Erziehung und Bildung.
27. Was also haben Bildung und Erziehung mit der Katastrophe zu tun?
28. Dass Bildung und Erziehung wesenhaft katastrophisch sind, heißt zunächst, dass sie vom Subjekt, das kein Kind (pais) mehr sein muss, eine Umwendung -fordern.
29. Im Höhlengleichnis impliziert diese Umwendung die Zuwendung zum Eigentlichen, das die Ideen sind.
30. Voraussetzung dieser Zuwendung ist die „Wegwendung des Blickes von den Schatten“.2
31. Heideggers Pädagogik setzt mit Platon die Möglichkeit der Unterscheidung des Wahren vom Unwahren voraus.
32. Ist es so einfach?
33. Derselbe Heidegger, der das „Wesen der ‚Bildung‘“ im „Wesen der ‚Wahrheit‘“3 gründen lässt, sagt von der Wahrheit (aletheia = Unverborgenheit), dass sie in die lethe (Verborgenheit) zurückreicht: „Das Unverborgene muß einer Verborgenheit entrissen, dieser im gewissen Sinne geraubt werden.“ 4
34. Aber Heidegger sagt an anderer Stelle auch, dass das „Feld der lethe […] jede Entbergung von Seiendem und also Geheurem [verwehrt]. Die lethe läßt an ihrem Wesensort, der sie selbst ist, alles verschwinden.“5
35. Man verfehlt Heideggers Katastrophenpädagogik, solange man sie nicht mit diesem Verschwinden konnotiert.
36. Die lethé, so scheint es, gleicht einem schwarzen Loch.
37. Sie absorbiert nicht nur das Seiende, sie bringt noch sein Erscheinen oder seine Unverborgenheit zum Verschwinden.
38. Das ist die eigentliche Katastrophe: der Umschlag des Seienden ins Nichts.
39. Dieser Umschlag verweist auf das, was Heidegger als „Kehre im Ereignis“ mit der Gegenwendigkeit der Wahrheit assoziiert.
40. Der Begriff der Gegenwendigkeit ist einer der Kernbegriffe von Heideggers Hölderlinvorlesung Der Ister.
41. Er verweist auf die inhärente Spannung im Sein selbst, das mit dem Ereignis zusammenfällt, mit dem Begriff also, der, wie Giorgio Agamben sagt, „zugleich Zentrum und äußerste Grenze von Heideggers Denken nach Sein und Zeit darstellt.“6
42. Agamben hat den Begriff des Zeitgenossen mit einer Dialektik von Licht und Dunkelheit assoziiert: „Der Zeitgenosse ist jener, der den Blick auf seine Zeit richtet, indem er nicht die Lichter, sondern die Dunkelheit wahrnimmt.“7
43. Wie die Aufklärung und die Les Lumières und die Enlightenment genannten Momente des westlichen und außerwestlichen Denkens, hat die belichtete Realität die Tendenz ihre dunklen Seiten zu verdunkeln. Realität ist Realitätsverdunkelung.
44. Was Agamben Zeitgenossenschaft nennt, markiert eine gegenüber der Realität genannten Realitätsverdunkelung kritische Position.
45. Realistisch zu sein, heißt folglich, statt sich an Realitäten zu klammern, um sich ihrer Konsistenz und Kohärenz zu versichern, sich von ihnen zu lösen, um ihre Dunkelheit zu erspähen.
46. Ich will diesen um die Wahrnehmung der Irrealität von Realität erweiterten Realismus gesteigerten Realismus nennen.
47. Es ist ein Realismus, der – statt realitätsgläubig zu sein – realitätskritisch ist.
48. Er versagt sich die Option der Unterwerfung unter die Tatsachenautorität.
49. Es ist diese Versagung, die Agamben zu denken gibt, indem er den Zeitgenossen als Resistenzfigur evoziert.
50. Wirkliche Zeitgenossenschaft verweigert sich den Zeitgeistimperativen.
51. Sie stellt noch ihre Infragestellung in Frage, die oft zu kulturkonservativem Elitismus führt.
52. „Der Zeitgenosse“, schreibt Agamben, „ist der, der die Dunkelheit seiner Zeit als eine Sache wahrnimmt, die ihn angeht und ohne Unterlass interpelliert …“.8
53. Das macht aus ihm einen Zeitdiagnostiker, der den Diagnosen seiner Zeit misstraut.
54. Seiner Zeit zu misstrauen, ohne aufzuhören, sein Verhältnis zu ihr zu intensivieren, ist, was man die Idee der Bildung nennen kann.
1.) Martin Heidegger, Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. Bern 1954 (2. Aufl.), S. 30.
2.) Ebd.
3.) Ebd.
4.) Ebd., S. 32.
5.) Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, GA 56. Frankfurt/M. 1982, S. 176.
6.) Giorgio Agamben, Kindheit und Geschichte. Frankfurt/M. 2004, S. 150.
7.) Giorgio Agamben, Qu’est-ce que le contemporain?, Paris 2008, S. 14.
8.) Ebd., S. 22.
[1] cf. Dirk Baecker, Studien zur nächsten Gesellschaft. Frankfurt/M. 2007.
[2] cf. Koert van Mensvoort, Hendrik-Jan Grievink, Next Nature: Nature Changes Along With Us. Barcelona/New York 2011.
1.) Terra incognita bezieht sich hier auf ein am Institut LGK HGK FHNW laufendes Projekt zum Zeichnen im Bildnerischen Gestalten, Sek II, siehe www.kunst-mobil.ch [4.1.2015]
2.) Wenn hier auch nicht weiter auf das kunstpädagogische Symposium -Zeichnen als Erkenntnis eingegangen wird, sei zumindest auf die Website verwiesen: www.zeichnen-als-erkenntnis.eu [10.3.2014]
3.) Zu Bourdieus Auseinandersetzung mit Panofsky siehe: Heinz Abels, „Die Zeit wieder in Gang bringen. Soziologische Anmerkungen zu einer unterstellten Wirkungsgeschichte der Ikonologie von Erwin Panofsky“, in: Bruno Reudenbach (Hg.), Erwin Panofsky. Beiträge des Symposiums Hamburg 1992, Berlin 1994, S. 21–22. Weiterführend hierzu siehe: Beate Florenz, „Kunstvermittlung: Eine epistemische Praxis“, in: Flavia Caviezel, et al. (Hg.), Einblicke in Forschungspraktiken der Hochschule für Gestaltung und Kunst FHNW, Zürich 2013, S. 41–46.
4.) Erwin Panofsky, Sinn und Deutung in der bildenden Kunst. Köln 1996. Ekkehard Kaemmerling (Hg.), Ikonographie und Ikonologie: Theorien – Entwicklung – Probleme. Köln 1994.
5.) Raymond Klibansky, Saturn und Melancholie: Studien zur Geschichte der Naturphilosophie und Medizin, der Religion und der Kunst. Frankfurt/M. 1990.
6.) Albrecht Dürer, Underweysung der messung mit dem zirckel un richtscheyt in Linien, ebnen unnd gantzen corporen [Unterweisung der Messung mit dem Zirkel und Richtscheit in Linien, Ebenen und ganzen Corporen]. Unterschneidheim 1972 [1525].
7.) So der Holzschnitt: Albrecht Dürer, „Zeichner, der einen liegenden Akt zeichnet“, um 1527 entstanden, 7,6 x 11,2 cm, Berlin, Staatliche Museen, Kupferstichkabinett.
8.) Jeff Wall, „Adrian Walker, artist, drawing from a specimen in a laboratory in the Dept. of Anatomy at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver“, Diapositiv im Leuchtkasten, 1992, 3 Abzüge + 1 Künstlerabzug, 119 x 164 cm.
9.) Siehe Max Imdahl, „Cézanne – Braque – Picasso. Zum Verhältnis zwischen Bildautonomie und Gegenstandssehen“ (1974), in: Ders., Gesammelte Schriften, hg. v. Gottfried Boehm, Frankfurt/M. 1996, S. 303–380. Imdahl erarbeitet ikonisches Denken in diesem Text an Malerei und Zeichnungen.
10.) Siehe Max Imdahl, „Zu einer Zeichnung von Norbert Kricke“ (1988), in: Ders., Gesammelte Schriften, hg. v. Angeli Janhsen-Vukicevic, Frankfurt/M. 1996, S. 539–546.
11.) Zur künstlerischen Forschung siehe insbesondere: Elke Bippus (Hg.), Kunst des Forschens: Praxis eines ästhetischen Denkens, Zürich 2009; Corina Caduff et al. (Hg.), Kunst und künstlerische Forschung, Zürich 2010, Isabelle Graw (Hg.), Artistic research, Berlin 2010.
12.) Auf der dOCUMENTA (13) war die folgende Arbeit zu sehen: Tacita Dean, „Fatigues“, 2012, Chalk on blackboard, 230 x 1110 cm; 230 x 557 cm; 230 x 744 cm; 230 x 1110 cm; 230 x 557 cm; 230 x 615 cm. Siehe auch: www.frithstreetgallery.com/works/view/fatigues [2.11.2014] sowie den Katalog: Theodora Vischer, Isabel Friedli (Hg.), Tacita Dean, Analogue: Zeichnungen 1991–2006, Göttingen 2006.
13.) Siehe zu diesen Arbeiten Khedooris: Toba Khedoori: Gezeichnete Bilder (Ausst.kat.), mit Textbeiträgen von Lane Relyea und Hans Rudolf Reust. Basel 2001.
14.) Siehe: Fanni Fetzer (Hg.), Kateřina Šedá. Talk to the sky ’cause the ground ain’t listening (Ausst.kat.), Luzern 2012. Sowie, zu „over and over“: Kateřina Šedá, Over and over, Zürich 2010.
The Old Man and the Wind: Joris Ivens’ Film
At the very beginning of Joris Ivens and Marceline Loridan’s film Une histoire de vent (A Tale of the Wind), we see a frail Joris Ivens sitting in a chair on a sand dune in the Gobi Desert, on the border between China and Mongolia, waiting for the arrival of a sandstorm.
Elsewhere in the film, an old woman – a wind shaman – talks about waiting for the wind.
Buffeted as we are by winds that blow from so many directions with such intensity, this image of an old man in a chair waiting for a storm is a metaphor for a possible response to the question “What is contemporaneity?”
It takes stubbornness, obstinacy, to face a storm, and yet also a desire not to be blown away by it. If Paul Klee’s Angelus Novus, celebrated in Benjamin’s evocation of the angel of history, with its head caught in turning between the storm of the future and the debris of the present, were ever in need of a more recent annotation, then old man Ivens in his chair, waiting for the wind, would do very nicely.
It is tempting to think of this dual obstinacy – to face the storm and not be blown away – as an acute reticence that is at the same time a refusal to either run away from or be carried away by the strong winds of history, of time itself.
We could see this “reticence,” this “refusal to historicize,” as a form of escape from the tyranny of the clock and the calendar – instruments to measure time, and to measure our ability to keep time, to keep to the demands of the time allotted to us by history, our contemporaneity. Any reflection on contemporaneity cannot avoid simultaneously being a consideration of time, and of our relation to it.
On Time
Time girds the earth tight. Day after day, astride minutes and seconds, the hours ride as they must, relentlessly. In the struggle to keep pace with clocks, we are now always and everywhere in a state of jet lag, always catching up with ourselves and with others, slightly short of breath, slightly short of time.
The soft insidious panic of time ticking away in our heads is syncopated by accelerated heartbeat of our everyday lives. Circadian rhythms (times to rise and times to sleep, times for work and times for leisure, times for sunlight and times for stars) get muddled as millions of faces find themselves lit by timeless fluorescence that trades night for day. Sleep is besieged by wakefulness, hunger is fed by stimulation, and moments of dreaming and lucid alertness are eroded with the knowledge of intimate terrors and distant wars.
When possible, escape is up a hatch and down a corridor between and occasionally beyond longitudes, to places where the hours chime epiphanies. Escape is a resonant word in the vocabulary of clockmaking. It gives us another word – escapement.
Escapement2
Escapement is a horological or clockmaking term. It denotes the mechanism in mechanical watches and clocks that governs the regular motion of the hands through a “catch and release” device that both releases and restrains the levers that move the hands for hours, minutes, and seconds. Like the catch and release of the valves of the heart that allow blood to flow between its chambers, setting the basic rhythm of life, the escapement of a watch regulates our sense of the flow of time. The continued pulsation of our hearts and the ticking of clocks denote our freedom from an eternal present. Each heartbeat, each passing second marks the here and now, promises the future, and recalls the resonance of the last heartbeat. Our heart tells us that we live in time.
The history of clockmaking saw a definite turn when devices for understanding time shifted away from the fluid principles of ancient Chinese water and incense clocks – for which time was a continuum, thus making it more difficult to surgically separate past and present, then and now – to clocks whose ticking seconds rendered a conceptual barricade between each unit, its predecessor and its follower. This is what makes now seem so alien to then. Paradoxically, it opens out another zone of discomfort. Different places share the same time because of the accident of longitude. Thus clocks in London and Lagos (with adjustments made for daylight savings) show the same time. And yet, the experience of “now“ in London and Lagos may not feel the same at all.
An escape from – or, one might say, a full-on willingness to confront – this vexation might be found by taking a stance in which one is comfortable with the fact that we exist at the intersection of different latitudes and longitudes, and that being located on this grid, we are in some sense phatically in touch with other times, other places. In a syncopated sort of way, we are “contemporaneous” with other times and spaces.
My Name is Chin Chin Choo
In Howrah Bridge, a Hindi film-noir thriller from 1958 set in a cosmopolitan Calcutta (which, in its shadowy grandeur resembled the Shanghai of the jazz age), a young dancer, the half-Burmese, half-Baghdadi-Jewish star and vamp of vintage Hindi film, Helen, plays a Chinese bar dancer. And in the song “My Name is Chin Chin Choo,” a big band jazz, kitsch orientalist, and sailor-costumed musical extravaganza, she expresses a contemporaneity that is as hard to pin down as it is to avoid being seduced by.
The lyrics weave in the Arabian Nights, Aladdin, and Sinbad; the singer invokes the bustle of Singapore and the arch trendiness of Shanghai; the music blasts a Chicago big band sound; the sailor-suited male backup dancers suddenly break into Cossack knee-bends. Times and spaces, cities and entire cultural histories – real or imagined – collide and whirl in heady counterpoint. Yesterday’s dance of contemporaneity has us all caught up in its Shanghai-Calcutta-Delhi-Bombay-Singapore turbulence. We are all called Chin Chin Choo. Hello, mister, how do you do?
Contemporaneity
Contemporaneity, the sensation of being in a time together, is an ancient enigma of a feeling. It is the tug we feel when our time pulls at us. But sometimes one has the sense of a paradoxically asynchronous contemporaneity – the strange tug of more than one time and place – as if an accumulation or thickening of our attachments to different times and spaces were manifesting itself in the form of some unique geological oddity, a richly striated cross section of a rock, sometimes sharp, sometimes blurred, marked by the passage of many epochs.
Now and Elsewhere
The problem of determining the question of contemporaneity hinges on how we orient ourselves in relation to a cluster of occasionally cascading, sometimes overlapping, partly concentric, and often conflictual temporal parameters – on how urgent, how leisurely, or even how lethargic we are prepared to be in response to a spectrum of possible answers.
Consider the experience of being continually surprised by the surface and texture of the night sky when looking through telescopes of widely differing magnifications. Thinking about “which contemporaneity” to probe is not very different from making decisions about how deep into the universe we would like to cast the line of our query.
A telescope powerful enough to aid us in discerning the shapes and extent of craters on the moon will reveal a very different image of the universe than one that unravels the rings of Saturn, or one that can bring us the light of a distant star. The universe looks different, depending on the questions we ask of the stars.
Contemporaneity, too, looks different depending on the queries we put to time. If, as Zhou Enlai famously remarked, it is still too early to tell what impact the French Revolution has had on human history, then our sense of contemporaneity distends to embrace everything from 1789 onwards. If, on the other hand, we are more interested in sensing how things have changed since the Internet came into our lives, then even 1990 can seem a long way away. So can it seem as if it were only recently that the printing press and movable type made mechanical reproduction of words and images possible on a mass scale. One could argue that time changed once and for all when the universal regime of Greenwich Mean Time imposed a sense of an arbitrarily encoded universal time for the first time in human history, enabling everyone to calculate for themselves “when,” as in how many hours ahead or behind they were in relation to everyone at every other longitude. This birthed a new time, a new sense of being together in one accounting of time. One could also argue that, after Hiroshima made it possible to imagine that humanity as we know it could auto-destruct, every successive year began to feel as long as a hundred years, or as an epoch, since it could perhaps be our last. This means that, contrary to our commonplace understanding of our “time” as being “sped up,” we could actually think of our time as being caught in the long “winding down,” the “long decline.” It all depends, really, on what question we are asking.
And so Marcel Duchamp can still seem surprisingly contemporary, and Net art oddly dated. The moon landing, whose fortieth anniversary we have recently seen, brought a future of space travel hurtlingly close to the realities of 1969. Today, the excitement surrounding men on the moon has already acquired the patina of nostalgia, and the future it held out as a promise seems oddly dated. Then again, this could change suddenly if China and India were to embark in earnest on a second-wave Cold War space race to the moon. Our realities advance into and recede from contemporaneity like the tides, throwing strange flotsam and jetsam onto the shore to be found by beachcombers with a fetish for signs from different times. The question then becomes not one of “periodizing” contemporaneity, or of erecting a neat white picket fence around it; rather, it becomes one of finding shortcuts, trapdoors, antechambers, and secret passages between now and elsewhere, or perhaps elsewhen. Time folds, and it doesn’t fold neatly – our sense of “when” we are is a function of which fold we are sliding into, or climbing out of.
A keen awareness of contemporaneity cannot but dissolve the illusion that some things, people, places, and practices are more “now” than others. Seen this way, contemporaneity provokes a sense of the simultaneity of different modes of living and doing things without a prior commitment to any one as being necessarily more true to our times. Any attempt to design structures, whether permanent or provisional, that might express or contain contemporaneity would be incomplete if it were not (also) attentive to realities that are either not explicit or manifest or that linger as specters. An openness and generosity toward realities that may be, or seem to be, in hibernation, dormant, or still in formation, can only help such structures to be more pertinent and reflective. A contemporaneity that is not curious about how it might be surprised is not worth our time.
Tagore in China
In a strange and serendipitous echo from the past, we find Rabindranath Tagore, the Bengali poet and artist who in some sense epitomized the writing of different Asian modernities in the twentieth century, saying something quite similar exactly eighty-five years ago in Shanghai, at the beginning of what was to prove to be a highly contested and controversial tour of China.
The poet [and here, all we need to do is to substitute “artist” for “poet”]’s mission is to attract the voice which is yet inaudible in the air; to inspire faith in a dream which is unfulfilled; to bring the earliest tidings of the unborn flower to a skeptic world.3
Tagore’s plea operates in three distinct temporal registers: the “as yet inaudible” in the future, the “unfulfilled dream” in the past, and the fragility of the unborn flower in the skeptic world of the present. In each of these, the artist’s work, for Tagore, is to safeguard and to take custody of – and responsibility for – that which is out of joint with its time, indeed with all time.
We could extend this reading to say that it is to rescue from the dead weight of tradition the things that were excluded from the canon, to make room for that to which the future may turn a deaf ear, and to protect the fragility of contemporary practice from present skepticism. Tagore’s argument for a polyvocal response to the question of how to be “contemporary” was misinterpreted, in some senses willfully, by two factions of Chinese intellectuals. One faction celebrated him as an uncritical champion of tradition (which he was not), while the other campaigned against him as a conservative and “otherworldly” critic of modernity (which he refused to be). Between them, these partisans of tradition and modernity in 1920s China missed an opportunity to engage with a sense of the inhabitation of time that refused to construct arbitrary – and, indeed, uncritical – hierarchies in either direction: between past and present, east and west, then and now.
On Forgetting
As time passes and we grow more into the contemporary, the reasons for remembering other times grow, while the ability to recall them weakens. Memory straddles this paradox. We could say that the ethics of memory have something to do with the urgent negotiation between having to remember (which sometimes includes the obligation to mourn), and the requirement to move on (which sometimes includes the need to forget). Both are necessary, and each is notionally contingent on the abdication of the other, but life is not led by the easy rhythm of regularly alternating episodes of memory and forgetting, canceling each other out in a neat equation that resolves itself and attains equilibrium.
Forgetting: the true vanity of contemporaneity. Amnesia: a state of forgetfulness unaware of both itself and its own deficiency. True amnesia includes forgetting that one has forgotten all that has been forgotten. It is possible to assume that one remembers everything and still be an amnesiac. This is because aspects of the forgotten may no longer occupy even the verge of memory. They may leave no lingering aftertaste or hovering anticipation of something naggingly amiss. The amnesiac is in solitary confinement, guarded by his own clones, yet secluded especially from himself.
Typically, forms of belonging and solidarity that rely on the categorical exclusion of a notional other to cement their constitutive bonds are instances of amnesia. They are premised on the forgetting of the many contrarian striations running against the grain of the moment and its privileged solidarity. On particularly bad days, which may or may not have to do with lunar cycles, as one looks into a mirror and is unable to recognize one’s own image, the hatred of the other rises like a tidal bore. Those unfaithful patches of self are then rendered as so much negative space, like holes in a mirror. Instead of being full to the brim with traces of the other, each of them is seen as a void, a wound in the self.
This void where the self-authenticated self lies shadowed and unable to recognize itself is attributed to the contagious corrosiveness of the other. The forgetting of the emptying-out of the self by its own rage forms the ground from which amnesia assaults the world. In trying to assert who we are, we forget, most of all, who we are. And then we forget the forgetting.
Kowloon Walled City and its Memory
Nowhere, unless perhaps in dreams, can the phenomenon of the boundary be experienced in a more originary way than in cities (Walter Benjamin4).
A few months ago we spent some time in Hong Kong, learning what it means to live in a city that distills its contemporaneity into a refined amnesia. We were interested in particular by what happened to the walled city of Kowloon and its memory.
Kowloon Walled City and its disappearance from the urban fabric of Hong Kong can be read as a parable of contemporary amnesia. The Walled City was once a diplomatic anomaly between China and the British Empire that functioned as a long-standing autonomous zone, a site of temporary near-permanence, an exclave within an enclave.
Kowloon Walled City is not just a border in space; it also marks a border in time – a temporary suspension of linear time by which the visitor agrees to the terms of a compact laid out by the current shape of the territory, a walled compound where a delicate game between memory and amnesia can be played out, apparently till eternity. This is the frontier where reality begins to cross over into an image.
Visiting the “Memorial Park” that stands on the former site of the Kowloon Walled City today is an uncanny experience. As with all “theme parks,” walking in this enclosure is like walking in a picture postcard spread over hectares rather than inches. The constructed, spacious serenity of the park, its careful gestures to the tumult of the walled city by means of models, oral-history capsules, artifacts, replicas, and remains intend to provoke in the visitor some of the frisson in the fact that he or she is standing at what was once both condemned as an urban dystopia of crime, vice, and insanitation, and hailed as an anarchist utopia. The neighborhood itself may have disappeared, but its footprint in popular culture can be discerned in the simulacral sites of action sequences in cyberpunk science fiction, gangster and horror films, manga, and multi-user computer games.
The walled city had approximately thirty thousand people living in one-hundredth of a square mile, which amounts roughly to an average population-per-unit-area density ratio of 3.3 million people to a square mile. This makes it the densest inhabited unit of space in world history.
If we think of this space as a repository of memories, it would be the most haunted place on earth.
Why do such spaces – sometimes crowded, sometimes empty (but apparently crowded with ghosts) – appear in a manner that is almost viral, such that the trope of empty, but haunted streets, set in the near future of global cities, begins to show the first signs of a cinematic epidemic of our times? Will we remember the cinema of the early twenty-first century as the first intimation of the global collapse of urban space under its own weight?
Or is this imaginary appearance of a haunting, suicidal metropolis more of an inoculation than a symptom, an early shoring-up of the defenses of citizens against their own obsolescence? How can we remember, or even represent, an inoculation that could be an obituary just as much as it could be a premonition or a warning?
The surrealist poet Louis Aragon, speaking of the disappearing neighborhoods of Paris as the city morphed into twentieth-century modernity, once wrote that
it is only today, when the pickaxe menaces them, that they have at last become the true sanctuaries of the cult of the ephemeral … Places that were incomprehensible yesterday, and that tomorrow will never know.5
What happens when someone from within these spaces that were “incomprehensible yesterday and that tomorrow will never know” decides to make themselves known? How does their account of the space square with its more legendary reportage?
I recall the Walled City as one big playground, especially the rooftops, where me and my friends would run and jump from one building to the next, developing strong calf muscles, a high tolerance of pain, and control of our fear, and our feet. The rooftops were our domain, shared only with the jets that passed overhead almost within reach of our outstretched arms as they roared down the final approach to Kai Tak Airport. Among the tangle of TV antennae we hid our kid-valuable things, toys and things we didn’t want our parents to know about because, well, most of them were stolen or bought with money we earned putting together stuff in the little one-room “factories” that were all over the Walled City – if our parents knew we had money, they’d have taken it. We were good at hiding things, and ourselves (Chiu Kin Fung6).
Disappearance and Representation: Haunting the Record
What does disappearance do to the telling of that which has disappeared? How do we speak to, of, and for the presence of absences in our lives, our cities?
Ackbar Abbas, in his book Hong Kong: Culture and the Politics of Disappearance, meditates at length on disappearance, cities, and images:
A space of disappearance challenges historical representation in a special way, in that it is difficult to describe precisely because it can adapt so easily to any description. It is a space that engenders images so quickly that it becomes nondescript – we can think about a nondescript space as that strange thing: an ordinary, everyday space that has somehow lost its usual system of interconnectedness, a deregulated space. Such a space defeats description not because it is illegible and none of the categories fit, but because it is hyperlegible and all the categories seem to fit, whether they are the categories of social sciences, cultural criticism, or of fiction. Any description then that tries to capture the features of the city will have to be, to some extent at least, stretched between fact and fiction … If this is the case, then there can be no single-minded pursuit of the signs that finishes with a systematic reading of the city, only a compendium of indices of disappearance (like the nondescript) that takes into account the city’s errancy and that addresses the city through its heterogeneity and parapraxis.7
A parapraxis is a kind of Freudian slip, an involuntary disclosure of something that would ordinarily be repressed. It could be a joke, an anomaly, a revealing slip-up, a haunting.
What does it mean to “haunt the record”? When does a presence or a trace become so deeply etched into a surface that it merits a claim to durability simply for being so difficult to repress, resolve, deal with, and put away? The endurance of multiple claims to land and other scarce material resources often rests on the apparent impossibility of arranging a palimpsest of signatures and other inscriptions rendered illegible by accumulation over a long time, and across many generations. In a sense, this is why the contingent and temporary character of the Kowloon Walled City endured for as long as it did. There is of course the delicate irony of the fact that the protection offered by its juridical anomaly with regard to sovereignty – a constitutional Freudian slip with consequences – was erased the moment Hong Kong reverted to China. The autonomy of being a wedge of China in the middle of Hong Kong became moot the moment Hong Kong was restored to Chinese sovereignty. Resolving the question of Hong Kong’s status automatically resolved all doubts and ambivalences with regard to claims over the custody and inhabitation of Kowloon Walled City.
A Chinese Sense of Time: Neither Permanence nor Impermanence
It is appropriate to end with a quotation from a Chinese text from the fourth century of the Common Era, a Madhyamika Mahayana Buddhist text, The Treatise of Seng Zhao.
When the Sutras say that things pass, they say so with a measure of reservation, for they wish to contradict people’s belief in permanence.
(And here we would gesture in the direction of the assumption that this contemporaneity is destined to be permanent; after all, this too shall pass).
And when the sutras say that things are lost, they say so with a mental reservation in order to express disapproval of what people understand by “passing.”
(And here we would gesture in the direction of the assumption that this contemporaneity is destined to oblivion; after all, something from this too shall remain).
Their wording may be contradictory, but not their aim. It follows that with the sages: permanence has not the meaning of the staying behind, while the wheel of time, or Karma, moves on. Impermanence has not the meaning of outpassing the wheel. People who seek in vain ancient events in our time conclude that things are impermanent. We, who seek in vain present events in ancient times, see that things are permanent. Therefore, Buddha, Liberation, He, it, appears at the proper moment, but has no fixed place in time.8
What more can we say of contemporaneity? It appears at the proper moment, but has no fixed place in time. In that spirit, let us not arrogate solely to ourselves the pleasures and the perils of all that is to be gained and lost in living and working, as we do, in these interesting times.
Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien zuerst im e-flux journal #12, Januar 2010 unter
http://www.e-f lux.com/journal/now-and-elsewhere/ [8.9.2013].
1.) Julieta Aranda, Brian Kuan Wood, Anton Vidokle, “What is Contemporary Art? Issue One“ e-flux journal, no. 11 (December 2009).
2.) See Raqs Media Collective, “Escapement,“ an installation at Frith Street Gallery, London, July 8, 2009–September 30, 2009.
3.) Rabindranath Tagore, “First Talk at Shanghai,“ in Talks in China (Calcutta: Visva-Bharati, 1925), quoted in Sisir Kumar Das, “The Controversial Guest: Tagore in China“ in Across the Himalayan Gap: An Indian Quest for Understanding China, ed. Tan Chung (Delhi: Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, 1998); online version at.
4.) Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 88.
5.) Louis Aragon, Paris Peasant in Art in Theory, 1900–1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas, ed. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood, (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1993), 456.
6.) Chiu Kin Fung, “Children of the Walled City,“ Asia Literary Review 10 (Winter 2008), 72–73.
7.) M. Ackbar Abbas, Hong Kong: Culture and the Politics of Disappearance (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 73–74.
8.) Chao Lun: The Treatise of Seng-chao, trans. Walter Liebenthal (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1968).
Movement
But the inexpressive, the inert, the unnervingly passive poses many problems to our modern understanding of the political. The hands in their pockets in terms of revolt, the lack of “movement” – action – is perceived as ambiguous, as equivocal because it is antipodal to our will of synchronizing with “our times.” The dysphoric provokes antagonism, it is not there with the rest of us, it is not opening the private into the public, is keeping away a space that belongs to us, is not circulating the same information as the rest, is stopping the circuit, is not transparent. It is the negative pole of empathy. For the lyric soul, for those who “burn with indignation” while witnessing the over-all proliferation of injustice, their hands in their pockets, or just elsewhere, painting monochrome surfaces on canvas, for example, are often seen as expressing a form of resentment, but why – would they not otherwise engage with what needs to be done? Why would they pretend they are living in different times?
Even Foucault, who vehemently rejects the idea of a sovereign, founding subject, a subject capable of experiences, of reasoning, of adopting beliefs and acting, outside all social contexts, even he preserves a form of sovereign autonomy under what he called the “agents.” In contrast to the modern misunderstanding of the autonomous subject, he defends that agents exist only in specific social contexts, but these contexts never determine how they try to construct themselves. Although agents necessarily exist within regimes of power/knowledge, these regimes do not determine the experiences they can have, the ways they can exercise their reason, the beliefs they can adopt, or the actions they attempt to perform. Agents are creative beings – like Jaromil, lyric – and their creativity occurs in a given social context that influences it.
So, not even Foucault dared to go for those not “attempting to perform”. Foucault went even further by arguing that we are free in so far as we adopt the ethos of enlightenment as permanent critique. This is why we assert our capacity for freedom by producing ourselves as works of art. As such, we are again faced with a more complex, more eloquent form of lyricism, where the goal is, after all, not only to be capable of producing sensuality of expression, but also for the self to become a sensual subject.
Therefore, the problem is not only that we identify action with the vivid, with life and that we want to be part of it, seeing withdrawal as a form of enfeeblement, a defect in affection that makes individuals step away from the stream of life. However, the question of lyricism points towards something much more important, methodologically speaking. It moves towards something that surpasses the aesthetic dimensions of our well-rehearsed ideological training: the possibility of conceiving time, historical time, as non-durational, and therefore breaking with our need to not only properly answer to what seems to be required by the force of the present, but also with the nervous tic of wanting to represent it.
Insofar as the understanding of history means delineating a chronological axis upon which events are ordered, the sole task of the historian is to ceaselessly insert the stories that have not yet been included in that great continuous narrative. Meanwhile, the institution (where an exhibition is understood as a way of institutionalising a material) is reduced to the place where the legitimacy of a right acquires a public form. The fact that the exercise of revision and the recovery of things forgotten provoke unanimous respect proves that a fitting vocabulary has been found, one that serves solely to avoid the unpredictable function of the experience of art.
Furthermore, the impact of this re-writing resembles the relationship between a text and a staggering number of footnotes that interrupt the reading process to remind us that writing eludes the author, and that countless parallel actions take place, and have taken place synchronously, with that great text. Those actions were hidden, but the time has come for a reordering, and that means finding a hole in the diachronic axis upon which history is written. “The well of the past,” to use Thomas Mann’s phrase, blossoms on the surface and drowns it. Nothing exists in the singular anymore. We can no longer speak, for instance, of a modernism, but rather of all its multiples. Yet, contemporary art seems to continue to be indivisible (perhaps that is the first symptom of its anachronism). Alongside this endless search for plurals, there lies in the bosom of history a second search: the search of those individuals – artists – who seem to be strangers to time, who escape the wanderings of the present. In the last decade, we have seen a heightening of the sensitivity to the exceptional in art, to those who at least appear to be unmoved by the logic of globalisation. The proliferation of projects on those others – those who think and act without us, so to speak – also forms part of this operation of recovery, which no longer symbolises justice, but the vast seductive power that myth, archetypical being and the genuine still hold in our culture. What these projects evidence is our fear of entering into a state of permanent instability.
The political importance of recovery as a tactic is directly proportional to the impossibility of formulating a more complex statement of the relationship between contemporary art and a discontinuous conception of time that is expressed in rhythms and cannot be represented as duration. In other words, a way of understanding time that is indifferent to the idea of progress and is therefore relieved of the imperative of innovation. This understanding of time has no qualms about repetition, about imitating what has already taken place. Generating doubt about these constant reincarnations and about the spontaneity of the contemporary would provide a way around the supposed sincerity with which it is believed that art and culture – but not, for instance, science – must speak.
In this dialectical interplay between great narrative and academic appendixes, the past and history are manifested as a new facet of culture and of its present power: this is not the power to delve into adventures of logic that might lead to a new episteme, but rather the de facto ability to include or exclude. Nonetheless, this explosion of voices and points of view has contributed to maintaining a degree of confidence in public opinion thanks to the constant effort at ceaseless expansion implied by historiographic revision and its relationship to contemporary art. The worst enemy of the enthusiasm inspired by the possibility of intervening on, interrogating, interfering with, modifying, amending, taking back and affecting hegemonic narration is the tendency to endlessness. Each footnote serves to both clarify and to obscure in a new way, one that, rather than providing a new consciousness of the issue at hand or of contributing to an understanding of the relationship between contemporary art and time, between production and the inextricable complexity of the contexts in which it appears, places us before endless windows through which we peer – always under the promise of completing history. We can assume the risk that disconcertion brings. What is harder, though, is to face the fact that there are those who attempt to replace this strain of research, not by adopting another logic, but by emulating this effort and reducing it to a mere gesture that credibly illustrates the choreography of this explosion of histories within history.
The problem lies in the fact that the politically correct is not a method, but rather a strategy to avoid confronting a technical difficulty: the understanding of times that cannot be reduced to duration, the grasping of rhythms that do not give rise to a continuity, that operate outside the melody of history. The desire to avoid incoherence by abandoning the philosophy of history stands in contrast to the need – one which Schelling insisted on long ago – to delve into other languages that formalise art objects, their ability to become facts and the role that individuals play along lines that distance us from the predictable. An exercise even more complex at a time when citizen-viewers are more passive than they are liberated in relation to what they expect from art.
On a social level, the language that has contributed to producing what is known as contemporary art partakes of the lyrical genre. It is a language geared towards creating enthusiasm, not method; a prose characterised by the careful choice of terms that defend the importance of teary eyes, the choreography of agency, the value of the hand on the heart rather than in the pocket. The inquisition of feelings – even “good” ones – is as much a part of the totalitarian world as the global economy, but it is cloaked in good will while, with true disdain, it attacks the “null” moments of life.
How to find a way out of this melodic way of understanding history without losing sight of rigor or responsibility? The “null,“ that which seems to have strayed from meaning – idiocy, nonsense – merits our attention more than ever before. In these forms of absentmindedness lies a new imagination of the private, a way of resisting the power of empathy in all its strains, whether real or virtual. Mistrust of a thoroughly defined present allows a part of artistic intelligence to elude the desire for art and for institutions to be able to respond eloquently to their times. In other words, it allows an escape from responsibility understood as the imposed need to answer for, to clarify and not to expose ourselves to the exuberance and lightness of thought.1
Literary imagination is not, as he once commented on Kafka, “a dream-like evasion or a pure subjectivity, but rather a tool to penetrate real life, to unmask it, to surprise it.” It was Lessing who, in his “Laocoon. An essay upon the limits of painting and poetry” (1766) first made the principle of chronotopicity clearly apparent; that is, that things that are static in space cannot be statically described, but must be incorporated into the temporal sequence of represented events, into the story’s own representational field. Lessing gives us an example: the beauty of Helena is not so much described by Homer as demonstrated by the actions of the Trojans.
The question of method always becomes a question of time, that is, a question that must truly consider a term largely forgotten in philosophy and art theory: rhythm. The anachronic names a different rhythm, the possibility of straining an analysis of meaning from a different angle that forces the subject and the context – whether institutional or not – to review the conditions from which it puts forth the experience and the interpretation of artistic production. I purposefully leave out art itself, since no art can be considered “contemporary”; that is an institutional consideration, not a question of practice. Indeed, the thesis would be that art is always anachronic. And “what must be reconstructed is the very idea of anachronism as error about time.”2 One of the ultimate aims of artistic production is to transform our idea of time. The anachronic implies accepting the importance of rhythm as fundamental to understanding the relationship between matter and energy. “Rhythm” here has no connection whatsoever with the virtual or the cosmic. In relation to art we, like Gaston Bachelard,3 should speak of a rhythmic realism: the introduction of material and conceptual parameters geared towards freeing us from the need to construct a cultural identity in terms of the philosophy of history.
Insisting that the anachronic is not an aberration but a need means that we must distance ourselves from a method of reading and interpretation dominated by the notion of duration, and instead delve into another method, into a contingency of heterogeneous times that provide other keys to pursue the question of meaning.
Duration implies order; rhythm, intensity. This difference has epistemological consequences: it means forgetting hermeneutics, putting away philological tools and inventing a new critical imagination. Hence, the assertion that the anachronic entails a risk (a challenge that art faces) means rejecting a whole set of conceptual exigencies to be able to express oneself in a foreign language, to introduce another rhythm and to generate a strangeness that forces us to reassemble the current unease. The question now is whether academies and institutions are willing to give up the ironclad alliance between time and space and to assume once and for all that leaving the system behind is not synonymous with chaos.
1.) Nietzsche said that those who defended the notion that thinking was an arduous task should be attacked.
2.) Jacques Rancière: «Le concept d’anachronisme et la vérité de l’historien», L’Inactuel, nº 6, 1996, p. 53.
3.) Gaston Bachelard: La Dialectique de la durée. París: Quadriage/PUF, 1950 (in the chapter on the analysis of rhythm).
2.
Nothing would seem to so eloquently suggest the lack of substance in “contemporary art” than the facility with which it lends itself to practical adjustments. Museums, academic institutions, auction houses, and texts tend to circumvent the need to categorize recent artistic production by declaring the “contemporariness” of certain holdings or discourses on the basis of a chronological convention: the MOCA in Los Angeles takes into account everything made “after” 1940; the contemporary holdings of Tate Modern in London were all created sometime after 1965; Kristine Stiles and Peter Selz’s sourcebook Theories and Documents of Contemporary Art takes 1945 as its starting point. In other contexts – particularly on the periphery – the horizon of contemporaneity tends to be narrower, usually defined as appearing in the early 1990s and associated with the rise of the postcolonial debate, the collapse of the Euro-American monopoly over the narrative of modernism, or the end of the Cold War. In any case, “contemporary art” appears to be based on the multiple significance of an “after.”
3.
However, as is usually the case with chronological categories, this neutrality may soon unfold into a noun with a certain substance. As with “the modern,” it would not be hard to imagine “the contemporary” one day becoming oxymoronically fixed, specified, and dated as the signifier of a particular shift in the dialectics of culture. There are at least two senses in which the contemporariness of artistic culture involves a poignant turn. There is the blatant immediacy of the relationship between a contemporary practice and its host society, and then there is its integration into a critical apparatus.
Never since the advent of historical relativism at the end of the eighteenth century has the art of the day had a less contentious social reception. Claims concerning the esoteric nature of contemporary art in the West mostly derive from the density of theoretical discourse on the topic – discourse that actually operates on the basis of practices that involve a certain level of general legibility. It may well be that one of the main characteristics of contemporary art is to always demand, at least, a double reception: first as part of general culture, and later as an attempt at sophisticated theoretical recuperation. Nonetheless, the fact that contemporary practices are linked to a hypertrophy of discourse that tries to mobilize them against the grain of their social currency is itself an indication of the extent to which contemporary art is an integrated culture that makes use of widely available referents, involving poetic operations that are closely linked to the historical sensibility of the day. It is the interlocking of extreme popularity and the rarefaction of criticism and theory that define this phenomenon. “Contemporary art” is, therefore, a form of aristocratic populism – a dialogical structure in which extreme subtlety and the utmost simplicity collide, forcing individuals of varying class, ethnic, and ideological affiliations – which might have otherwise kept them separated – to smell each other in artistic structures.
4.
The ideal of modern beauty that Stendhal articulated in 1823 as “the art of presenting to the peoples . . . works which, in view of the present-day state of their customs and beliefs, afford them the utmost possible pleasure,” has finally been attained.1 As a consequence, a temporal rift between radical aesthetics and social mores no longer exists today. The question of the death of the avant-garde ought to be reformulated to account for this institutionalization of the contemporary. As we all know, the schism between the project of modern subjectivity and the modern bourgeois subject was defined in historical terms as consisting of advances, regressions, re-enactments, futurities, and anachronism, and summarized in the politics of the avant-garde, with all the militaristic implications of the term. More than the death of the avant-garde as a project of cultural subversion – always a ridiculous argument coming from the mouth of the establishment; such radicalism is sure to reemerge in one disguise or another every time a poetic-political challenge to the nomos and episteme of dominant society becomes necessary – the shock of the postmodern involved the realization that “the new” could no longer be considered foreign to a subjectivity constantly bombarded by media and burning with the desire for consumption.
In any case, the temporal dislocation characteristic of both modernism and the avant- garde – the way the art of the day constantly defied the notion of a synchronic present (not limited to the chronological trope of the avant, which encompasses any number of other historical folds, from the theme of primitivism to the negotiations with obsolescence and the ruin, the refusal of the chronology of industrial labor, and so forth) – seems to have finally found some closure. In a compelling and scary form, modern capitalist society finally has an art that aligns with the audience, with the social elites that finance it, and with the academic industry that serves as its fellow traveler. In this sense art has become literally contemporary, thanks to its exorcism of aesthetic alienation and the growing integration of art into culture. When, by the millions, the masses vote with their feet to attend contemporary art museums, and when a number of cultural industries grow up around the former citadel of negativity, fine art is replaced by something that already occupies an intermediary region between elite entertainment and mass culture. And its signature is precisely the frenzy of “the contemporary”: the fact that art fairs, biennales, symposia, magazines, and new blockbuster shows and museums constitute evidence of art’s absorption into that which is merely present – not better, not worse, not hopeful, but a perverted instance of the given.
5.
In this way, the main cultural function of art institutions and ceremonies in relation to global capitalism today is to instantiate the pandemic of contemporariness as a mythological scheme occurring (and recurring) each time we instigate this “program.” After all, the art world has surpassed other, more anachronistic auratic devices (the cult of the artist, of nationality or creativity) as the profane global religion for making “the contemporary manifest. The hunger to be part of the global art calendar has more to do with the hope of keeping up with the frenzy of time than with any actual aesthetic pursuit or interest. Mallarmé’s dictum that “one must be absolutely modern” has become a duty to stay up-to-date. But given the lack of historical occasions which could represent an opportunity to experience the core of our era – pivotal revolutionary moments of significant social change or upheaval – a participation in the eternal renewal of the contemporary might not be completely misguided, for it at least invokes a longing for the specter of an enthusiasm that asks for more than just the newest technological gadget.
6.
But, once again, the devil of contemporaneousness does its deed: whereas the system of modern art was territorialized in a centrifugal structure of centers and peripheries around modernity’s historical monopoly in the liberal-capitalist enclave of the North Atlantic, we now face a regime of international generalization transmitting the pandemic of the contemporary to the last recesses of the earth. In fact, the main reason for the craze surrounding the contemporary art market in recent years (and for its not having immediately collapsed after the plunge of global capitalism) has been the market’s lateral extension: bourgeoises who would previously buy work within their local art circuits became part of a new private jet set of global elites consuming the same brand of artistic products, ensuring spiraling sales and the celebration of an age in which endless “editions” allow artworks to be disseminated throughout an extended geography. In turn, each enclave of these globalized elites drives the development of a contemporary art infrastructure in their own city, using a standard mixture of global art references and local “emergent” schools. Contemporary art is defined by a new global social context in which disenfranchised wealthy individuals (who have abdicated their roles as industrial and commerce managers to the bureaucracy of CEOs) seek a certain civic identity through aesthetic “philanthropy.” In this fashion they interact with a new social economy of services performed by artists, critics, and curators – services with symbolic capital that rests on an ability to trade in a semblance of “the contemporary.” Contemporary art thus becomes the social new private jet set and a jet proletariat.
7.
This new machinery of the dialectic between the global elites of financial capitalism and the nomadic agents of global culture would be easy to dismiss as critically meaningless were it not for the way “the contemporary” also stands for the leveling of the temporal perception of cultural geography and of a certain political orientation. Particularly for those who come from the so-called periphery (the South and the former socialist world), “the contemporary” still carries a certain utopian ring. For indeed, notwithstanding the cunning imbalances of power that prevail in the art world, the mere fact of intervening in the matrix of contemporary culture constitutes a major political and historical conquest. The global art circus of biennales, fairs, and global art museums has forced an end to the use of a metaphor that understood geography in terms of historical succession – it is no longer possible to rely upon the belatedness of the South in presuming that artistic culture goes from the center to the periphery. Although it probably does not seem so extraordinary now, the voicing of the need to represent the periphery in the global art circuits was, to a great extent, a claim to the right to participate in producing “the contemporary.” And while the critical consequences of the policies of inclusion are less central to the agenda of the South than the critique of stereotypes, the activation of social memory, and the pursuit of different kinds of cultural agency, it remains the case that “contemporary art” marks the stage at which different geographies and localities are finally considered within the same network of questions and strategies. Art becomes “contemporary” in the strong sense when it refers to the progressive obsolescence of narratives that concentrated cultural innovation so completely in colonial and imperial metropolises as to finally identify modernism with what we ought to properly describe as “NATO art.”
8.
This is not to say that such a process of inclusion is free from its own deformities: in many instances, a peculiar neurosis provoked by the stereotyping of ethnic, regional, or national authenticity and the pressures to accommodate art from the periphery into a subsidiary category of metropolitan referents produces so-called “alternative modernism” or “global conceptualism.” Nonetheless, the inclusion of the South in the narratives of “the contemporary” has already disrupted the genealogies of the present, such as the simplified concept of the “post-conceptual” that arose in the late 1980s to describe an apparent commonality between the radical artistic revolutions of the 1960s and the advanced art of its day. In its various historical and geographical settings, “contemporary art” claims a circularity between 1968, conceptualism, Brazilian Neo-Concretism or the French Nouvelle Vague, and recent works trapped in perpetual historical mirroring. In this sense, to paraphrase Walter Benjamin, “contemporary art” appears as the figure of a revolution in standstill, awaiting the moment of resolution.
9.
Complicated as this may be, however, it does not blur the radical significance of the cultural transformation that took place in artistic practice in the years after 1960. One crucial element of “contemporary art” is the embrace of a certain “unified field” in the concept of art. Beyond the de-definition of specific media, skills, and disciplines, there is some radical value in the fact that “the arts” seem to have merged into a single multifarious and nomadic kind of practice that forbids any attempt at specification beyond the micro-narratives that each artist or cultural movement produces along the way. If “contemporary art” refers to the confluence of a general field of activities, actions, tactics, and interventions falling under the umbrella of a single poetic matrix and within a single temporality, it is because they occupy the ruins of the “visual arts.” In this sense, “contemporary art” carries forward the lines of experimentation and revolt found in all kinds of disciplines and arts that were brought “back to order” after 1970, forced to reconstitute their tradition. “Contemporary art” then becomes the sanctuary of repressed experimentation and the questioning of subjectivity that was effectively contained in any number of arts, discourses, and social structures following the collapse of the twentieth century’s revolutionary projects. I suspect that the circularity of our current cultural narratives will only be broken once we stop experiencing contemporary culture as the déjà vu of a revolution that never entirely took place.
10.
By the same token, it is no coincidence that the institutions, media, and cultural structures of the contemporary art world have become the last refuge of political and intellectual radicalism. As various intellectual traditions of the left appear to be losing ground in political arenas and social discourses, and despite the way art is entwined with the social structures of capitalism, contemporary art circuits are some of the only remaining spaces in which leftist thought still circulates as public discourse. In a world where academic circuits have ossified and become increasingly isolated, and where the classical modern role of the public intellectual dwindles before the cataclysmic power of media networks and the balkanization of political opinion, it should come as no surprise that contemporary art has (momentarily) become something like the refuge of modern radicalism. If we should question the ethical significance of participating in contemporary art circuits, this sole fact ought to vindicate us. Just as the broken lineages of experimental music, cinema, and literature finally found themselves in the formless and undefined poetic space of contemporary art in general, we should not be shocked to find the cultural sector – apparently most compromised by the celebration of capitalism – functioning as the vicarious public sphere in which trends such as deconstruction, postcolonial critique, post-Marxism, social activism, and psychoanalytic theory are grounded. It would seem that, just as the art object poses a continuous mystery – a space of resistance and reflection leading towards enlightenment – so do the institutions and power structures of contemporary art also function as the critical self-consciousness of capitalist hypermodernity.
11.
However, given the negative relationship of art to its own time, one would suspect the current radicalization of art and the constant politicization of its practice to be dangerous symptoms. Just as modern art rescued forms of practice, sensibility, and skills that were crushed by the industrial system, so does contemporary art seem to have the task of protecting cultural critique and social radicalism from the banality of the present. Unlike theorists who lament the apparent co-opting of radicalism and critique by the official sphere of art, we would need to consider the possibility that our task may consist, in large part, of protecting utopia – seen as the necessary collusion of the past with what lies ahead – from its demise at the hands of the ideology of present time. This is, to be sure, an uncomfortable inheritance. At the end of the day, it involves the memory of failure and a necessary infatuation with the powers of history. I do not know a better way to describe such a genealogy than by offering a quotation from the Dada artist and historian Hans Richter, who summarized the experience of Dada as that of “the vacuum created by the sudden arrival of freedom and the possibilities it seemed to offer.”2 And it may well be that contemporary art’s ethical imperative is to deal with the ambivalence of the experience of emancipation. If art has indeed become the sanctuary of revolutionary thought, it is because it deals with the memory of a number of ambiguous interruptions. With this, we hopefully find an advantage to the constant collision of perfume and theory that we experience in contemporary art events around the world.
WiederabdruckDieser Text erschien zuerst in: e-flux journal # 12, Januar 2010, http://www.e-flux.com/journal/contemptorary-eleven-theses/ [29.5.2013].
1.) Stendhal, Oeuvres complètes, ed. Georges Eudes (Paris: Larrive, 1954), 16:27, quoted in Matei Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avantgarde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism, 2nd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), 4.
2.) Hans Richter, Dada: Art and Anti-Art (New York: Thames & Hudson, 1997), 136.
Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe: We all share the same dream. The dream that one day 100% of humanity will take an interest in, enjoy and sometimes be thrilled and moved by contemporary art – that every major town will have its own major contemporary art institution. That everyone will buy and collect some kind of contemporary art, maybe printed off the internet, maybe bought from art car boot sales. And that art will become a kind of intelligent mass entertainment. In my ideal world a cross between Baywatch and Heidegger.
Yes we are on our way! Millions more people are interested in art than were once! There are plans announced every day it seems for big new art institutions. But we are not there yet. Not 100% not even 98%. Far from it. The vote today in this house is actually between those of us who live in a utopian dreamworld – and those of us who can acknowledge reality. I am pleading for realism today. Ladies and Gentlemen, I love contemporary art but I do not believe in it. Art is not Jesus. It will not rise on the third day and be the salvation of mankind. Art is not a God to worship, or a religion to follow, OR a political programme to believe in. At the moment it is a cultural and commercial activity conducted by a tiny minority of human beings.
I was scared
Ladies and Gentlemen, when I was invited to speak in favour of this motion, my first thought was No Way. I’d spent the day queing for an hour to get into a Biennale or the Pompidou or Frieze or something, and inside you could hardly see the art there were so many people. And I thought I can’t argue this. 1% that’s tiny! Couldn’t they have made the motion like ‘excludes the 75%? I thought: I remember the eighties. It was a cultural desert. Galleries and art show are twice as full today as they were thirty years ago. Do you remember, sir? And then I picked up a newspaper. And the headline said World’s population – seven billion – doubled since 1970. And I thought – oh yes that’s why! And I got out my calculator and I thought what is 1% of seven billion, and it’s – any guesses – seventy million – that’s quite a lot. I’ve never seen seventy million people at an art gallery – and it’s a hundred time more than the number of subscribers to all the world’s art magazines combined.
This isn’t really a motion about concrete figures, of course, it’s about the spirit, about the idea that really very very few people today are interested in contemporary art.
Inequality today
I know you probably think I am going to start with criticising the elitism of the art market, and I will soon, I promise I will try to make you all squirm in your seats. Particularly you sir! I made a documentary in 2008 called ‘The Great Contemporary Art Bubble’ which followed the art market from its peak in May 2008 until the crash, and revealed the way it was stage-managed by tiny elite. But that is not the only reason why I have a perspective that qualifies me to talk to you here now. For the past two years I have been making another documentary about the opposite of the art market – about poverty, an animated history of poverty, and my words to you tonight are based on what I have learnt making these two radically different – but connected – films.
Ladies and Gentlemen in 2010, the renowned economist Joseph Stiglitz wrote an article which defined the economics of the age in which we are now living. Riffing on the famous line from the American constitution it was called “For the One Per Cent. By the One Percent. Of the One Percent.’ Stiglitz’s complaint is that we are living in an ever more unequal society, where 1% of Americans own 25% of the wealth, and controll 40% of it. In 2010, China’s Gini-coefficient – a measure of how wealth is distributed in a society – stood at 0.47 (a value of 0 suggests total equality, a value of 1 extreme inequality). In other words, inequality in China has now surpassed that in the United States. Today 45% of the world lives on less than two dollars a day. Everywhere we look we see inequality on the rise. There are exceptions, Brazil, India, countries which had far greater inequality than anywhere else, are getting a bit less unequal.
Today contemporary art is for the one per cent by the one percent and of the one percent.
Contemporary art doesn’t exclude
But Let me tell you a few things that I think a few ways that contemporary art does NOT exclude 99%. Personally, I don’t think contemporary art is difficult to understand. Most of it is not much more difficult to understand than a movie or rap video. Some of it is as exciting – Omer Fast film. Some of it even looks like a graphic novel or cartoon. Art is not as complicated as people in the art world like to think it is
Also I don’t think all art excludes 99% of people. There are big figures today for people going to museums and modernist exhibitions – some art only excludes say 75% of people. My point is not that poor people don’t understand art, it’s that the nature of contemporary art today as a social system is what is excluding.
Many of you will be latching on to the verb ‘excludes’. Contemporary art you will say does not exclude anyone – the institutions or the market does. Contemporary Art is free you will be thinking. Yes Ladies and Gentlemen, that is because if they charged for it, it wouldn’t be 1% of went – it would be 0.0000001%. Yes there may be queues for the latest show by Damien Hirst in London and it costs a tenner to get in. But imagine if it cost the same as a show by a rockstar, like Prince or Bowie – $100. How many people would go then?
Some artists participate in this exclusioon – creating inflated luxury objects – the shiny stuff – others don’t. But the point is the 99% don’t experience contemporary art as something purely offered up by artists – for them it is the bigger experience
Once they are inside these exhibitions, the experience often has little to do with art. The big new museums built by Starchitects like Gehry and Herzog and De Meuron are experiences of space not art – thrilling cavernous temples, often offering funfair like experiences on a scale that could not be obtained anywhere else – Carsten Höller’s slides, Murakami’s cartoons, Anish Kapoor’s crazy mirrors. Even if you think that 7% of humanity – a huge half a billion people go to art exhibitions, then I would argue few of them are there for an artistic experience.
In fact it is in the way the art experience is structured now that we can understand exclusion. First the thrill of empty spaces, awe at scale, then a funfair ride … then the exhibitions… Most of us wander round these institutions like serfs in Tsarist Russia, mud-spattered peasants, gazing at over-sized trophies funded by banks and billionaires. Appropriately, the most famous works of art today are actually the ones that carry messages about wealth and exclusion – of which Hirst’s £50m diamond skull is one obvious example. This art offered by the nought-point-one-per-cent for the voyeuristic titillation of the one percent.
Why do we feel that? The art market and its record-breaking prices – that keep on rising and rising, while the 99% get poorer and poorer. Let me introduce you to Lewis’s Law, a bit like Moore’s law. – the more unequal the society, the higher the prices paid for art.
Most of us wander round these institutions like mud-spattered serfs in Tsarist Russia, gazing at over-sized trophies funded by banks and billionaires. Appropriately, the most famous works of art today are actually the ones that carry messages about wealth and exclusion – of which Hirst’s £50m diamond skull is one obvious example. This art is offered by the nought-point-nought-nought-one-per-cent for the voyeuristic titillation of the one percent.
Perhaps, ladies and gentlemen, contemporary art could have profound meanings, or even raise interesting issues in the minds of the all those art lovers who see it. But the puffed-up market has overshadowed all those possibilities with a new almost repulsive meaning, that obliterates all the other subtler ones are could have, used to have – and that meaning is that we are living ever more in a society of emperors and slaves.
And that brings me onto my main point. Contemporary art today does not just exclude the 99%, it actually embodies their exclusion.
All these new art institutions, all these incredible prices paid for works of art, all these spaces so full of art – they are all made possibly economically because of the concentration of wealth in the top one per cent of humanity. The growth of art today is based on the exclusion, economic and social, of the 99%. It is significant that the guy who paid a record price for Warhol’s green car crash in 2007 was a Greek shipping billionaire. Now when I think about the suffering of the Greek people, I think how the art world today is built on exclusion.
That is the tragedy of art today. The more inflated the market, the richer the art world becomes, the more the majority art excluded. We need to reverse that.
Wiederabdruck
Die Rede erschien zuerst online unter http://www.benlewis.tv/artcrit/contemporary-art-excludes-99/ [29.01.2013].
1.) http://www.intelligencesquared.asia/hong-kong-debates/contemporary-art-excludes-the-99-percent.html
]]>Wie unterscheidet sich dein Blick als Künstler auf die Gegenwartskunst von deiner Sicht als Forscher?
Eigentlich gar nicht so stark. Seit bald 20 Jahren erklärt mir zwar immer mal wieder ein Galerist, Kurator oder sonstiger Experte, dass ich mich für die eine oder andere Seite entscheiden müsse. Aber a) gibt es nicht nur zwei Seiten und b) ergeben mehrere Perspektiven auch mehr Dimensionen und Komplexität. Mit einer gezielten Tiefenbohrung käme man vermutlich schneller zum sogenannten Ziel. Ich bin aber ein Anhänger des Breitwandhorizontes und der transdisziplinären Vielstimmigkeit.
Was bedeutet das genau?
Wer Umwege geht, wird ortskundig! Je länger man unterwegs ist, desto mehr kommt alles zusammen, ergibt mehr Sinn. Natürlich ist das schizophren, aber produktiv. Künstlerische Praxis, Forschung, Lehrtätigkeit, Vermittlung, Gespräche wie dieses hier und das Leben überlagern sich bei mir ständig.
Du hast gesagt, du seiest «vergnügt» aus Kassel zurückgekommen. Warum?
Die Kuratorin Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev hat anders als ihre drei Vorgänger weder an die postkoloniale Debatte angedockt, geopolitische Missstände aufgedeckt, noch formaltheoretische Seminare abgehalten. Auch die in der Kunst ständig wiederaufgekochten Theorien und Philosophien der Postmoderne wurden höflich verabschiedet. Man experimentiert und blickt neugierig in die Zukunft, das ist sehr erfreulich.
Konkreter?
Die documenta-Chefin pfeift auf Codes und Diskurstheorie, verschickt lieber Hundekalender, mischt scheinbar kunstferne Positionen aus Quantenphysik bis Agrarwirtschaft ins Teilnehmerfeld und versteht die documenta als Ort «kollektiven und anonymen Gemurmels». Statt Programm ist Prozess angesagt, Christov-Bakargiev fordert einen offenen, urteilsfreien Umgang und propagiert den «degrowth», eine Wachstumsrücknahme, sowie den «kognitiven Kapitalismus». Sie habe kein Konzept, kokettierte Christov-Bakargiev wiederholt – und dieser Plan geht ziemlich gut auf. Bei der «documenta 13» stehen politisches Engagement und das Laissez-faire der Natur unverkrampft nebeneinander. Zudem hatte ich noch bei keiner der vier letzten Ausgaben so sehr das Gefühl, endlich mal in Kassel zu sein und nicht auf einer x-beliebigen, globalen Biennale oder Kunstmesse.
Woran lag das?
Vielleicht an einer weiteren Tendenz der Gegenwartskunst: anstelle des ausgestellten Objektes rückt wieder vermehrt der Betrachter in den Fokus. Ein Trend, der wegführt vom Artefakt und Referenziellen, hin zum Aktionistischen, Situativen, ja vielleicht gar zum Romantischen, Auratischen und Einzigartigen. Nach 40 Jahren Video und 20 Jahren Internet hat die Gegenwartskunst eine Wende hin zum Realen und zur Natur eingeleitet. Die Erfahrung des Betrachters wird zunehmend wichtig. Und ohne nun allzu sehr Schiller und Kant zu reanimieren: Der Mensch darf endlich wieder Mensch sein.
Einen ähnlichen Turn habt ihr selbst mit eurer künstlerischen Arbeit mit Com&Com vollzogen, als ihr vor rund drei Jahren das postironische Manifest veröffentlicht habt. Um was geht es und wie kam es dazu?
Eine ironische Haltung steht seit ihrem letzten Höhepunkt in der Postmoderne nur noch dafür, Wahrheiten zu verschleiern, Problemen aus dem Weg zu gehen und jeden Schwachsinn damit zu rechtfertigen, dass es ja nicht ernstgemeint sei. Ironie verkam mehr und mehr zu einer Art Haftungsausschluss oder Fluchtmanöver angesichts jeder denkbaren Verantwortung. Ironie spielte Ende der 1990er Jahre eine wichtige Rolle in unserer Arbeit, aber wir wurden bald mal müde, ständig mit den Augen zu zwinkern, kunstvoll zu zweifeln und alles mindestens im zweiten Grad zu dekonstruieren. Viele Menschen wollen heute wieder ungebrochen, direkt und positiv bejahend durchs Leben gehen, die Dinge sehen, wie sie sind, Nähe und Emotionalität zulassend Wahrheiten suchen und Verantwortung übernehmen. Mit dem distanzierenden Gestus der Ironie ist dies nicht machbar. Postironie ist eine Haltung, ein Statement, eine Positionierung.
Wie ironisch ist das gemeint: Kann Com&Com überhaupt ohne Ironie auskommen?
Postironie heisst nicht todernst. Unsere neuen Arbeiten sind nicht komplett ironiefrei, auch der Humor bleibt, nur geht es weniger um Dekonstruktion, sondern um das aktive, neugierige Erforschen von Unbekanntem bzw. um das Zusammenbringen von verschiedenen Welten und Kontexten. Nachdem wir uns jahrelang hinter dem industriellen und oft digital hergestellten Werk verbergen konnten, nehmen wir nun selbst Stift, Pinsel oder Messer in die Hand. Für uns war «Postironie» eine Befreiung, eine Neuausrichtung unseres Kunstbegriffes, ein Paradigmenwechsel. Seit 2009 steht praktisch der gesamte Output unter diesem Verständnis, sowohl die einzelnen Kunstwerke als auch die mehrteiligen Projekte, Texte, Vermittlung etc. Zuerst war Postironie nur ein Name, eine Behauptung. Heute ist es eine gelebte Realität, auch wenn wir diese teils erst schaffen mussten. Oder mit Walter Benjamin: «Es ist von jeher eine der wichtigsten Aufgaben der Kunst gewesen, eine Nachfrage zu erzeugen, für deren volle Befriedigung die Stunde noch nicht gekommen ist.»
In eurem aktuellen Projekt «Bloch» reist ihr mit einem Baumstamm um die Welt. Um was geht es und wo seid ihr auf eurer Reise?
«Bloch» ist ein Projekt, das Volkskultur und zeitgenössische Kunst verbindet und auf einem alten Appenzeller Fastnachtsbrauch basiert, bei dem der letzte im Winter gefällte Fichtenstamm in einer eintägigen Prozession zwischen zwei Dörfern hin- und hergezogen und am Ende an den Meistbietenden versteigert wird. Meistens wird der Baum von Einheimischen gekauft und zu Schindeln oder zu Möbeln verarbeitet. Diesmal hat jedoch Com&Com das Bloch – so nennt man die unteren fünf astlosen Meter eines Baumes – erworben und geht mit ihm auf eine Weltreise mit Stationen auf allen Kontinenten. Nach ersten Stops in Bern und Berlin bereiten wir uns derzeit auf die Reise nach China vor, wo Bloch im Rahmen der kommenden Shanghai Biennale auftreten wird.
Einen Baum um die Welt reisen lassen? Das kann nicht die ganze Idee sein …
Der Baum ist Bindeglied und Kristallisationskern. An jedem Ort wird dann in Zusammenarbeit mit lokalen Künstlern eine völlig neue Bloch-Aktion entwickelt, die auf lokalen Traditionen und Bräuchen basiert. Dadurch wandelt sich der ursprüngliche Brauch und seine Bedeutung, Kulturaustausch findet statt und etwas Neues wird geschaffen. Die künstlerischen Aktionen werden teils von Gesprächen, Ausstellungen und gesellschaftlichen Veranstaltungen sowie einer Website und einem Dokumentarfilmteam begleitet.
Exportiert ihr den Brauch oder den Baum, quasi ein «Ready Made 2.0»?
Es geht nicht darum, kulturimperialistisch eine fertige Produktion oder einen bestehenden Brauch rund um den Globus zu senden, sondern einzig diesen Baum. Das alleine löst bei jedem eine eigene Assoziationskette aus. Daran können dann neue Geschichten und Dialoge andocken. «Bloch» ist ein offenes, unfertiges Werk. Wir wissen heute noch nicht, wie es in China oder in zwei Jahren aussieht. «Bloch» ist eine Einladung, eine Bühne und Experiment. Man könnte auch den Begriff «Postproduktion» verwenden: Ein durch den ursprünglichen Brauch bereits aufgeladenes Kulturobjekt wird mit Hilfe vieler weiterentwickelt. Im Zuge dieser Bedeutungsaufladung werden wir zu Kuratoren, Stichwortgebern, Regisseuren und Produzenten. «Bloch» ist eine Inszenierung mit vielen Kapiteln und einem offenen Ende. Am Ende der Tour soll das Bloch zwar wieder in die Heimat zurückkehren, eventuell stellen wir es gar wieder in den Wald, woher es kam. Vielleicht wird «Bloch» aber auch nie fertig sein, ewig reisen oder in der Antarktis verlorengehen.
Der Baumstamm wiegt rund zwei Tonnen. Was bedeutet das für eure Reise nach China?
Reisen und arbeiten mit «Bloch» entschleunigt. Es ist relativ umständlich, mit zwei Tonnen Übergewicht eine Weltreise zu planen. Da gibt es viele Probleme, von denen man teils erst an der Grenze erfährt. Fast jedes Land hat unterschiedliche Zollauflagen oder verlangt ein anderes Schädlingszertifikat, Australien lässt theoretisch gar kein Holz ins Land, das ist nun eine Herausforderung. In Europa reisten wir mit einem Anhänger und eigenem Zugfahrzeug auf der Strasse, nach Asien wird Bloch samt Anhänger im Container verschifft. Dieser Anhänger ist nun aber in China wieder nicht zugelassen usw. – Solche Prozesse formen die Arbeit unweigerlich. Und nicht selten führen logistische oder andere Zwänge zu ästhetischen Entscheidungen. So hat uns etwa die Schädlingsproblematik dazu genötigt, das Bloch zu schälen.
Ist so eine administrative Einschränkung künstlerisch produktiv?
Ja. Es gibt einen Punkt, an dem dich das Material in eine Richtung führt, die du nicht kontrollierst. Auf einem bestimmten Level macht das Ding, das du machst, dich. Selbst bei immaterieller Arbeit. Das ist gut so.
Man kann in euer «Bloch»-Projekt investieren und «Bloch Shares» kaufen. Wo seht ihr den Return on Investment?
Zu Finanzierungszwecken gründeten wir die internationale Bloch- Gesellschaft IBG und gestalteten eine auf 100 Exemplare limitierte, nummerierte und handsignierte Bloch-Kunstedition. Mit dem Erwerb erhält der Käufer ein Wert-Papier im doppelten Sinne: einerseits ein Kunstwerk von Com&Com mit dem ihm eigens zugeschriebenen Wert, andererseits einen Anteilsschein am Bloch. Wird Bloch dereinst nach seiner Weltreise verkauft, erhält der Inhaber einen Hundertstel des Verkaufserlöses. Die Kunstedition darf auch nach Auszahlung behalten werden.
So finanziert ihr auch die Weltreise des Stammes?
Nur teilweise. Die reinen Produktions- und Betriebskosten werden sich am Ende auf weit über 200 000 CHF belaufen, unsere Arbeit nicht miteingerechnet. Nicht zu vergessen die bis heute rund 40 Kollaborateure, die Bloch nicht nur mit Energie, sondern auch mit Wert aufladen. Eigentlich ist Bloch heute schon fast unbezahlbar. (lacht)
Ihr präsentiert aktuell in St. Gallen eine Auswahl eurer jüngsten Arbeiten unter dem Titel «Holzweg»: Auf welchen Holzwegen ist Com&Com unterwegs?
Holzwege sind scheinbar zufällige, von Holzfällern und Jägern geschaffene Wege im Wald, die oft unvermittelt abbrechen oder sich im Dickicht verlieren. Der Titel der Ausstellung verweist zudem auf eine Sammlung von Schriften Martin Heideggers, die uns lehren, die gewohnten Wege zu verlassen und uns auf Holzwege zu begeben, wenn wir in den Wald des Seins eindringen möchten. Es gibt eine Anekdote, wonach Martin Heidegger und Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker auf einem Spaziergang durch den Stübenwasener Wald feststellten, dass sie sich auf einem Holzweg befinden. Erstaunt stellen sie fest, dass sie an der Stelle, an welcher der Weg endet, auf Wasser gestossen waren. Da soll Heidegger gelacht haben: «Ja, es ist der Holzweg – der führt zu den Quellen!»
Passt diese Geschichte tatsächlich zu eurer künstlerischen Arbeit?
Das «Postironische Manifest» markierte für uns einen solchen Weg ins Ungewisse, der uns letztlich zu einer Quelle führte. Ohne diesen radikalen Bruch, alles Alte hinter uns zu lassen, wären wir nie auf ein Projekt wie «Bloch» gekommen. Auch dass wir seit ein paar Jahren vermehrt mit Bäumen und Holz arbeiten, klingt im Titel an.
Verfolgt ihr eigentlich mit eurer Kunst einen bestimmten Zweck?
Persönlich glaube ich, dass Kunst autonom ist gegenüber dem praktischen Zweck. Der einzige Zweck von Kunst sollen die Aufrechterhaltung geistiger Freiheit und die Herstellung von Kommunikation sein. Dazu zähle ich auch ästhetische Erfahrung. Das Kunstwerk als Körper ermöglicht dabei eine praktische Form von Erkenntnis. Es ist aber nicht mein Ziel, die Erwartung an Kunst vollständig neu zu programmieren; das wäre nur ein Aufguss aller Avantgardevorstellungen. Mit der teile ich allerdings den Wunsch, Gewissheiten zu erschüttern.
Wie kann ich mir das konkret vorstellen?
Mich interessiert, wo ich die Bilder oder Objekte finde, die nicht nur auf eine Vergangenheit verweisen, sondern formal wie inhaltlich auf der Höhe der Zeit sind; die eine Autorität haben, die über den Moment hinausragt und die Fähigkeit hat, Sinnhaftigkeit, Gegenwartsanalyse und Massenappeal in sich zu vereinen. Dafür schaffen wir Laboratorien voller kreativen Dilettantismus – wie Bloch. Das Projekt scheint als Ganzes sinnlos, ist aber in seiner Art abgeschlossen, ganz im Sinne von Kant: zweckhaft, ohne Zweck.
Wie wird sich deiner Meinung nach das Kunstsystem in Zukunft weiterentwickeln?
Im Zuge der Globalisierung wurde Kunst grenzüberschreitend und zu einer lingua franca, die einem gemeinsamen Anliegen auf eine Weise entgegenkommt, wie es den an Sprache gebundenen kulturellen Äusserungen kaum möglich wäre. Alte Bindungen wie Religion, Dorfstruktur usw. sind weitgehend aufgebrochen. Die metropolitane Gegenwartskunst ist im Begriff, eine Weltreligion zu werden. Kunstevents schaffen ein Gemeinschaftsgefühl quer über soziale Schichten hinweg. Systemisch wird uns der Kunstmarkt noch eine ganze Weile erhalten bleiben – und noch mächtiger werden. Aber es formieren sich Gegenmodelle, neue Formate, Methoden, Schauplätze und Akteure entwickeln sich. Der Kreationsprozess und der Autorenbegriff wird noch weiter gedehnt, Gattungen und Künste noch stärker gemischt, Ordnungen und Formate durchbrochen und mit dem Leben verschränkt.
Wenn du den Kunstbegriff derart erweiterst, wird Kunst dann nicht beliebig?
Vielleicht brauchen wir die Disziplin namens Kunst gar nicht. Die documenta-Chefin spricht denn auch nicht mehr von Künstlern, sondern Teilnehmern: «Wir brauchen nur einen Haufen Teilnehmer, die tun, was sie wollen, und diese Sorte Kultur produzieren.» Der amerikanische Kunstkritiker Jerry Saltz gab dieser Sorte im «NY Magazine» denn auch bereits einen Namen: «Post Art».
Wiederabdruck
Das Interview erschien zuerst in: Schweizer Monat, Ausgabe 999 / September 2012. S. 64–67. Was macht die Kunst?
Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien zuerst in: e-f lux journal # 12, January 2010, http://www.e-f lux.com/journal/what-is-contemporary-art-issue-two/ [3.4.2013].