Radikalität – what's next?

FORGET FEAR. Vorwort

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:49 +0000

Diese Publikation dokumentiert Schritte auf dem Weg hin zu echter Veränderung in unserer Kultur, hin zu künstlerischem Pragmatismus. Beschäftigt haben uns hierbei konkrete Handlungen, die zu greifbaren Ergebnissen führen. Statt nur Fragen zu stellen, haben wir nach Antworten und Situationen gesucht, die Lösungen verantwortungsvoll umsetzten. Wir sind weder daran interessiert, künstlerische Immunität aufrechtzuerhalten, noch daran, uns von der Gesellschaft zu distanzieren. Wir glauben, dass Politik eine der komplexesten und schwierigsten menschlichen Tätigkeiten ist. Wir haben KünstlerInnen, AktivistInnen und PolitikerInnen getroffen, die sich durch ihre Kunst nachhaltig politisch engagieren. Von den Begegnungen mit ihnen berichtet dieses Buch.

NULL POLITIK?
Seit Jahren lebe und arbeite ich mit und für die Kunst. Sie ist zu meinem Lebensinhalt, Lebenszweck und meiner Leidenschaft geworden. Ich beobachte ihre Möglichkeiten und ihre Grenzen, doch schon vor Langem habe ich aufgehört, sie zu »brauchen«. Früher habe ich gerne Galerien besucht und war ständig auf der Suche nach dem einzigartigen Gefühl, die Realität durch den Filter künstlerischer Denkweise zu betrachten. Heute fühle ich mich in so einer Situation eher erschöpft und der Depression nahe – ein Ergebnis wiederholter Enttäuschungen durch künstlerische Ansätze. Kunst ist ein Mechanismus, der durch die Macht des Intellekts und der Intuition in Kombination mit einem Verlangen nach Dissens angetrieben wird. Ergebnis solchen künstlerischen Handelns muss nicht zwangsläufig merkwürdige und schwer verständliche Kunst sein, es können ebenso Werkzeuge sein, die aktiv in die Welt eingreifen. Doch meistens ist das Gegenteil der Fall, der Berg der Kunst kreißt und gebiert eine Maus. Ansonsten überaus begabte Menschen – KünstlerInnen – produzieren paradoxe oder utopische Visionen und betreiben Sozialkritik, die weder sie noch ihre ZuschauerInnen in politische Praxis oder andere konkrete soziale Wertschöpfung umsetzen wollen. Vorherrschende kuratorische Praxis ist das Verwalten von Kunstobjekten: Sie werden auf Bestellung produziert, transportiert, versichert, man kümmert sich um die Urheberrechte und den Auf- und Abbau der Werke. Das gilt für die gesamte Kunstwelt, hier herrscht immer noch der Volksglaube an die magische Kraft des Objekts. Unter diesen Vorzeichen scheint es ausreichend, ein Objekt herzustellen und es unter die Leute zu bringen, um Veränderungen zu bewirken, auch politische Veränderungen. Das Kunstobjekt selbst, egal, was es außerdem noch sein mag, soll ohne menschliche Vermittlung, ohne Überzeugungsarbeit, ohne Meinungsaustausch und konfliktfrei, also im Grunde genommen ohne Politik die ihm aufgetragene soziale und politische Aufgabe erfüllen. Das ist im weitesten Sinne die heutige Definition eines Kunstobjekts. Natürlich erfüllen Kunstobjekte gewisse Aufgaben, doch diese beziehen sich eher auf die ästhetische Gestaltung der Realität, auf die Verwandlung von Ideen in Inszenierung und von politischen Aussagen in Appelle, denen niemand folgt. »Kunst ist nutzlos«; »Kunst ist autonom«; »Kunst genießt Immunität, deswegen können KünstlerInnen mehr wagen«; »Kunstschaffende können durch Wände sehen« – das sind gängige Ansichten. Aber uns sei es erlaubt, zu fragen, zu welchen handfesten und sichtbaren politischen Veränderungen die durch Immunität geschützten KünstlerInnen beigetragen haben. Und können wir überhaupt noch von künstlerischer Immunität sprechen, nachdem Juliano Mer-Khamis, Regisseur, Schauspieler, Aktivist und Leiter des von seiner Mutter gegründeten Freedom Theater in Jenin / Westjordanland, ermordet wurde; nachdem Ai Weiwei festgenommen und die Mitglieder des Sankt Petersburger Künstlerkollektivs Voina immer wieder verhaftet werden? Es scheint, dass die Kunstwelt mit nahezu jeder Ausstellung ihre Abneigung gegen direkte Politik erklärt. Doch wenn sich KünstlerInnen grundlegend politisch engagieren, sind sie mit Drohungen, Zensur, Repression und Haftstrafen konfrontiert. Der Pakt zwischen KünstlerInnen und der Obrigkeit wurde bereits gebrochen. Als er noch galt, lautete er folgendermaßen: »Der Herrscher sagt nicht mehr: du wirst denken wie ich oder sterben. Er sagt: du hast die Freiheit, nicht so zu denken wie ich. Dein Leben und Besitz gehören dir. Aber von diesem Tag an sollst du uns ein Fremder sein.« Die Machthabenden sind nicht dumm und wissen von den politischen Ambitionen der KünstlerInnen und KuratorInnen. Natürlich werden es PolitikerInnen nicht zulassen, dass ihre Konkurrenz durch jegliche Form von Immunität geschützt wird. Die jüngsten Entwicklungen im Bereich der Kulturfinanzierung – darunter die Forderungen des protofaschistischen Führers der niederländischen Freiheitspartei, der Kunst als nicht notwendig betrachtet und Kunstfinanzierung abschaffen will, oder die weitgehenden Kürzungen in Großbritannien – sind ebenfalls als Aufhebung künstlerischer Immunität zu deuten. Wir werden ZeugInnen eines Angriffs auf die finanziellen Stützen von Kultur. Für die Kunst bedeutet das die zukünftige Dominanz des kommerziellen Sektors und erwartbare Tendenzen hin zu politikfreier Kunst und ineffektiver, »samtener« Kritik. Die Mehrheit der KünstlerInnen wird dadurch, dass man sie vom Profit des Kunstmarktes fernzuhalten versucht, zu finanziellen DissidentInnen. Einfacher ausgedrückt: Die meisten KünstlerInnen gehören einem künstlerischen Proletariat an. Viele von ihnen verdienen kaum genug, um zu überleben.

PRAKTIKER DER OHNMACHT
Meine Kritik an meinem eigenen Sujet ist im Prinzip sehr simpel und lässt sich in einem Satz zusammenfassen: Kunst handelt nicht und funktioniert nicht. Trotz ihres unglaublichen Potenzials, Realitäten zu kreieren und zu formen oder Politik zu betreiben, begnügt sich die Kunst mit der Präsentation von Ideen, die ohnehin niemand umzusetzen gedenkt. Wie kann man aus diesem »Teufelskreis der kreativen Ohnmacht« ausbrechen? Wie kann Kunst helfen, die Realität performativ zu gestalten? Eine der vorherrschenden Annahmen in der Kunstwelt besagt, dass die Kunst der Logik des Wunders folgt: Alles ist möglich. Eine Biennale kann langweilig und schlecht sein, schon die nächste ist möglicherweise toll und sexy. So, als würde die Möglichkeit, eine langweilige oder eine spannende Biennale zu machen, nicht aus dem bestehenden Kunstsystem als Ganzem resultieren, sondern aus den außergewöhnlichen Fähigkeiten der KuratorInnen oder KünstlerInnen. In den Augen derer, die mit Kunst arbeiten, kann Kunst von einem Moment zum anderen jegliche Beschränkungen überwinden. Doch tatsächlich hat sie genau die Möglichkeiten, die wir gemeinsam geschaffen haben. Das Wunder, also die Möglichkeit, alle Grenzen abzuschaffen, ist eine Illusion, denn wir müssen innerhalb eines Systems der Beschränkungen handeln, das überall vom selben »Neusprech« dominiert wird: Freiheit, Autonomie, Partizipation. Das Know-how liefern dabei reisende PhilosophInnen, die bereit sind, ihre intellektuellen Dienste für jeden künstlerischen Exzess anzubieten. Wenn nicht nur innerhalb der Kunstwelt immer wieder die Meinung laut wird, die Kunst sei zum Dekor des neoliberalen Systems verkommen, dann sind nicht nur die Kunstobjekte Teil dieses Dekors, sondern auch der dazugehörige intellektuelle Rahmendiskurs. Dieser Diskurs kreist um die Kunstwerke und ist wie ein schwarzes Loch, das jeden radikalen Vorschlag in sein Zentrum nimmt und ihn in Spekulation und theoretische Reflexion verwandelt, nicht aber in Taten. Die KünstlerInnen, TheoretikerInnen und PhilosophInnen in ihrer Umgebung sind zu »Praktikern der Ohnmacht« geworden. So schafft es die eingeschränkte Vorstellungskraft von KünstlerInnen und KuratorInnen heute nicht, die Schwelle hin zu echten Taten zu überschreiten. Die paradoxe Reaktion auf diese Lage sind »leere«, wirkungslose Werke und Ausstellungen. Alles, was der Kunst heute noch bleibt, ist inszeniertes Spektakel, in dem soziale und politische Probleme verhandelt werden – ohne jeglichen Einfluss auf die Realität, die AkteurInnen im Kunstbereich oder andere KünstlerInnen und KuratorInnen zu haben.

EINSÄTZE DER KURATOR / INNEN, EINSÄTZE DER KÜNSTLER / INNEN
Wenn wir schon über Wunder sprechen: Die Abschaffung des die Kunst beschränkenden Systems und ihre Befreiung von ideologischer Impotenz wäre tatsächlich ein Wunder. Eine mögliche Lösung ist die Beschränkung der institutionellen Einflüsse auf KünstlerInnen. Die Kunst ist in ihrer radikalen, potenziell transformatorischen Form ein gesellschaftliches und politisches enfant terrible. Sie ist ein Fluch für jede Institution, insbesondere die großen, mit öffentlichen Mitteln finanzierten Häuser und professionellen White Cubes. Letztere kämpfen zuerst vor allem um ihr eigenes materielles Überleben und nicht unbedingt aufseiten der KünstlerInnen. Die Institutionen halten an bürokratischen Prozeduren und Produktionsregeln fest anstatt an Ideen. Es geht nicht um Demokratie, die mit den Regeln der Kunst erreicht werden kann. Manche KünstlerInnen bieten brutale, schockierende oder sogar perverse Abkürzungen – diese sind dann meist nicht vereinbar mit den Zielen von Institutionen und deren Vorgehen, sämtliche möglichen Gefahren zu beseitigen. Seit Jahren schon ist ein Lähmungsprozess zu beobachten, der künstlerische Radikalität in samtene Kritik verwandelt. Dieser Prozess kann in Verbindung mit dem Entstehen und der zunehmenden Dominanz des kuratorischen Berufs sowie mit der Institutionalisierung von Kunst in Verbindung gebracht werden. Der Einsatz von KünstlerInnen ist nicht mit dem Einsatz der KuratorInnen vergleichbar. KuratorInnen sind zu reisenden AusstellungsproduzentInnen geworden, die die sanfte Sprache vorgetäuschten sozialen Engagements sprechen. Für die KuratorInnen steht der nächste Auftrag auf dem Spiel, kein radikales gesellschaftliches oder politisches Ziel. Kunst wird durch ein Sieb finanzieller Interessen, institutioneller Ängste und beruhigend formulierter Ziele gepresst und verliert ihre ureigene Kraft. Der Status quo der Kunst hat sich im Bereich politisierender Ästhetik, ihrer Verneinung oder künstlerischer Ohnmacht etabliert. Einige künstlerische Desperados, wie zum Beispiel die Gruppe Voina, sind nicht genug. Sie sind eher die Ausnahme, die die Regel bestätigt, und bieten allen OpportunistInnen ein Alibi, durch das sie dann behaupten können, in einem so radikalen Bereich wie dem der Kunst tätig zu sein. Nebenbei richtet die Kunst ihre Kritik an Menschen, die nicht bereit sind, die kritische Herausforderung anzunehmen und ihre kritischen Ideen in den Alltag einzubringen. Auch wenn die Forderungen und Appelle auf den Punkt und gut durchdacht sind – was oft der Fall ist –, gibt es niemanden, der ihnen folgt.KuratorInnen sprechen normalerweise nicht mit KünstlerInnen und sind erst recht nicht zu Diskussionen mit ihnen bereit. Diskussion bedeutet Auseinandersetzung und führt möglicherweise zu Streit oder sogar zu einer Trennung. Das können sich KuratorInnen aber nicht leisten, und demzufolge können sie sich auch nicht auf eine tatsächliche Diskussion einlassen. KünstlerInnen sind zu einem unantastbaren Fetisch geworden und scheinen keine gleichberechtigten BewohnerInnen derselben Welt mehr zu sein; keine Menschen, mit denen man über gemeinsame Probleme sprechen kann. Die Ergebnisse dieser Situation sind oft zufallsbedingt und werden nicht nach Kriterien der Wirksamkeit bewertet, sondern nach den Regeln, die über »gute Kunst« und intellektuelles Spektakel bestimmen. Das Fehlen einer Diskussion zwischen KünstlerInnen und KuratorInnen wird oft damit gerechtfertigt, »den KünstlerInnen absolute Freiheit zu gewähren« – ganz so, als ob eine Diskussion Freiheiten einschränken würde.
Die Abneigung gegenüber der Politik hat dazu geführt, dass die Kunst zu einer Art »panic room« geworden ist, zu einem Rückzugsort von Politik und Ideen. Hier können sich KünstlerInnen sicher fühlen. Keine Lebenswahrheit und keine Handlung mit echter Konsequenz wird hier eindringen. Der vorherrschende Konsens besagt, dass die Hauptaufgabe von Kunstinstitutionen und der mit ihnen verbundenen KünstlerInnen darin besteht, den Menschen Kultur zu bringen. Die zugrundeliegenden Ideen sind zweitrangig, auf dem Spiel steht die – nicht näher definierte – »Kultur«; ein leeres Wort, das jeden beliebigen Inhalt annehmen kann.
Wenn die Aufgabe so formuliert wird, bedeutet sie im Kern die Selbstreproduktion des Systems. Gleichzeitig spielt die Welt mit ihren eigenen Einsätzen – Demokratie oder deren Abschaffung, Freiheit und ihre Grenzen im kapitalistischen Status quo. Es gibt keine Form von Kunst, die an diesem Spiel direkt beteiligt ist. Aber es gibt zumindest vereinzelte Ausnahmen: KünstlerInnen, die nicht nur bereit sind, ein künstlerisches Risiko einzugehen, sondern auch einen radikalen Bruch mit dem System zu vollziehen, das sie hervorgebracht hat.

DIE EINSÄTZE DER NEOLIBERALEN ELITEN
In Russland habe ich mich mit Boris Kagarlitsky unterhalten, einem Linksintellektuellen, der die Meinung vertritt, Kunst würde heutzutage um Einsätze spielen, die von neoliberalen Eliten gesetzt werden, auch wenn diese Einsätze rein symbolisch sind: eine stärkere Position auf dem Ideenmarkt, die Aufrechterhaltung des Gruppenstatus oder Selbstreproduktion. Aber die realen und gesellschaftlich relevanten Spieleinsätze sind anderswo zu finden und werden durch Abgrenzung von wirtschaftlicher Ausbeutung und Armut definiert. Am Spiel um eine Verwandlung dieser Armut in minimalen Wohlstand wird sich die Kunst nicht mehr beteiligen, auch wenn sie selbst extreme ökonomische Ungleichheit in ihrem Bereich hervorbringt: prominente KünstlermillionärInnen stehen dem künstlerischen Proletariat gegenüber, das seine ökonomische Verarmung mit symbolischen Gewinnen zu kompensieren versucht. Die Frage, die sich der Kunstmarkt stellen muss, ist eine moralische Frage. Sie betrifft die radikalen finanziellen Ungleichheiten, die der Kunstmarkt hervorbringt, genauso wie eine Kritik an den Mechanismen der ökonomischen Ausgrenzung außerhalb der Kunstwelt.
Kagarlitsky hat noch etwas anderes gesagt: dass die Kunst ihr eigenes Ghetto so lange nicht verlassen kann, bis jemand beginnt, sie zu brauchen. Das könnten soziale Bewegungen sein, die weltweit an Lösungen für ökonomische und politische Bedürfnisse der Gesellschaft arbeiten. Leider scheinen diese Bewegungen zum Erreichen ihrer Ziele keine KünstlerInnen zu benötigen. Kunst muss neu erfunden werden, aber nicht als handwerkliche Variante, die menschliche Probleme auf eine neue Art ästhetisiert, indem sie sie in Inszenierung verwandelt. Was wir brauchen, ist eine Kunst, die ihre Werkzeuge, Zeit und Ressourcen anbietet, um die wirtschaftlichen Probleme einer verarmten Mehrheit zu lösen. Die tatsächliche Grenze der Möglichkeiten linksgerichteter Kunst ist wirkungsvolles Engagement bei materiellen Problemen wie Arbeitslosigkeit, Verarmung und Armut.

INDIVIDUELLE POLITIK DES ÜBERLEBENS
Was KünstlerInnen tun, alles, was in Gestalt von Kunst vor uns steht, kann als individuelle Überlebensstrategie bezeichnet werden. Künstlerische Freiheit bedeutet im Grunde nichts anderes als die ständige Notwendigkeit, sich an die Vorgaben des Kunstsystems mit seinen wechselnden Trends und Interessen anzupassen. Ergebnis dieses Mimikriprozesses ist die Verwandlung künstlerischen Bestrebens in eine egoistische Überlebensstrategie. Was wie Kunst aussehen mag, ist im Grunde eine Strategie, um auf dem Markt bestehen zu können. Wie viel Zögern, Existenzangst und Furcht muss unter KünstlerInnen herrschen! Angst, einen Fehler zu machen, Standards von Institutionen nicht zu erfüllen oder den Erwartungen des Marktes nicht gerecht werden zu können. Zu dieser Situation haben wir alle gemeinsam beigetragen. Die institutionalisierte Kunstwelt, die zuerst ihre eigenen Interessen vertritt (Fundraising, Überleben in Konkurrenz mit anderen Institutionen), nimmt den KünstlerInnen ihr radikales und gestalterisches politisches Potenzial. Hinzu kommt ein permanentes Bedürfnis, dem künsterischen Ego zu schmeicheln. KünstlerInnen wurden dazu trainiert, so gut wie keine Diskussionen mehr zu akzeptieren. Sie sind dazu fähig, nur ihren eigenen Vorstellungen und ihrem Ego zu folgen. Das eigentliche Ziel jeder noch so edlen künstlerischen Handlung ist nicht mehr der soziale Organismus, für dessen Sache man arbeitet, sondern nur noch das Kunstwerk, das in diesem Prozess entsteht. Wenn die Kunst entpolitisiert wird, bedeutet das, dass sie nicht die Interessen von Menschen vertritt, sondern die individuellen Karrieren der KünstlerInnen antreibt. Kunst zu politisieren bedeutet, gemeinsam mit anderen die Einsätze festzulegen und diese für eine Öffentlichkeit deutlich zu repräsentieren. Ich möchte, dass der Kunstbereich stark und sich seiner Macht bewusst ist. Ich möchte, dass er willens und fähig ist, diese Macht politisch einzusetzen, nicht um eine Inszenierung zu schaffen, sondern um die Realität fundamental zu lenken. Unser wichtigster Einsatz, etwas, um das wir heute spielen wollen, ist eine Kunst, die verändert; Kunst, die nicht leer, sondern kritisch ist, die keine Pseudo-Kritik produziert, sondern tatsächlich transformiert und gestaltet. Daher suchen wir Menschen, die sich in die Kunst »verirrt« haben, als sie eigentlich in anderen Bereichen arbeiten sollten – in der Politik, beispielsweise in Parlamenten und Regierungen, in den Medien oder möglicherweise als Volkstribune, SozialwissenschaftlerInnen, TherapeutInnen oder ÄrztInnen. Eins ist zumindest sicher – sie sollten dort »draußen« sein, wo auch immer sozialer und politischer Wandel auf dem Spiel steht.
Eine Sache möchte ich klarstellen: Ich fordere nicht, dass alle Kunst so sein soll. Sie soll ganz im Gegenteil noch pluralistischer sein. Dabei dürfen wir aber nicht vergessen, dass die Spaltung innerhalb der Kunst bereits existiert und eine politische Wende auf dem Weg ist.
»Was war die Essenz der ›politischen Wende‹ in der Kultur? Widerstand gegen die Notwendigkeit, etablierte ›Unterschiede‹ zu reproduzieren; die Weigerung, auf das postmoderne Karussell des kulturellen Pluralismus aufzusteigen; langsame Reformen und die sukzessive Entwicklung neuer Sprachen, die alle zufriedenstellen; einer Erklärung des Ungehorsams gegenüber Falschheit in den Bereichen Ästhetik, Existenz und Menschlichkeit der Künste; es war ein Moment, an dem Künstler das Schiff namens ›freier Markt der Ideen‹ und ›postpolitisches Festmahl der Unterschiede‹ verließen und begannen, eine eigene Bewegung zu gründen.«

GESPRÄCHE MIT PRAKTISCH HANDELNDEN
Wir alle – Joanna Warsza, Igor Stokfiszewski, Zofia Wa´slicka, das künstlerische Büro der 7. Berlin Biennale und ich – haben nach einer Kunst gesucht, die in effektiven Veränderungsprozessen handelt und funktioniert und so bleibenden Einfluss auf die Realität hat. Das ist es, worum es in der Politik schließlich geht – um einen endlosen Prozess von Reaktionen auf Veränderungen und um den Versuch, die bestehende Ordnung entweder beizubehalten oder zu ändern. Sogar die Verteidigung des Status quo setzt aktives Handeln voraus, denn es gibt so viele, die ihn gerne ändern würden. Daher muss er aktiv verteidigt werden.
Wir haben nach praktisch handelnden Menschen gesucht, die durch ihre öffentlichen Handlungen Politik betreiben. Wir haben mit Menschen gesprochen, die ein Kunstmuseum gestalten, dessen Zielgruppe in der zivilgesellschaftlichen Politik liegt und das seine Kraft in der basisdemokratischen Graswurzelpolitik gewöhnlicher Menschen findet: ein Museum, das progressive Ideen vertritt, sein Publikum zu einer kritischen Haltung gegenüber staatlichen Institutionen erziehen und zur Durchsetzung demokratischer Rechte ermutigen will.
Wir haben mit einem Kulturvermittler gesprochen, der die Meinung vertritt, Kunst sei zu einer Repräsentation des herrschenden Machtsystems geworden. Sie unterstütze das System dadurch, dass sie ZuschauerInnen zu Passivität in Ausstellungen und Konzerten erzogen hat. Der Egoismus von Menschen in der Kunstwelt hat sie blind gegenüber allem außerhalb ihrer eigenen Geschichte gemacht. In dieser Geschichte gibt es keinen Raum mehr für die Wertschätzung einer vom Publikum oder von sozialen Randgruppen geschaffenen Kultur. Laut unserem Gesprächspartner ist Kunst zum größten Teil eine Fassade des Systems, Zelebrierung der falschen Ausnahmeposition von KünstlerInnen und Werkzeug leerer politischer Repräsentanz. Ziel der Kunst sollte es aber nicht sein, eigene Illusionen aufrechtzuerhalten, sondern ihre Instrumente beispielsweise für Bildungszwecke zu nutzen.
Wir haben mit einem Künstler-Politiker gesprochen, der künstlerische Intuition und Performancefähigkeiten in seiner politisch-administrativen Arbeit als Bürgermeister einer südamerikanischen Metropole genutzt hat. Wir haben mit KünstlerInnen gesprochen, die sich zum Ziel gesetzt haben, Wladimir Putin demokratisch zu entmachten und die politische Mentalität der russischen BürgerInnen zu verändern.
Wir haben mit einer Kuratorin gesprochen, die vor einiger Zeit eine Galerie in Israel für das Ende der Besetzung im Westjordanland und im Gazastreifen gegründet hat und die exklusive Demokratie nach dem Prinzip »nur für Israelis« abschaffen möchte. Wir haben mit KünstlerInnen gesprochen, die in ihrer künstlerischen Praxis den Klassenkampf darstellen und diesen auf der Straße aufführen.
Bei unserem Versuch, direkter in den praktischen Bereich einzudringen, haben wir mit vielen weiteren Menschen gesprochen. Wir wollten eine Möglichkeit zur grundsätzlichen und praktischen Einflussnahme auf die Realität finden, einen Weg aus der Falle der einfachen Anwendung künstlerischer Freiheit. Außerdem wollten wir eine Bestätigung dafür, dass praktisches Handeln tatsächlich gleichwertig mit theoretischem Handeln, Theorieproduktion und deren Verifizierung ist.
Wir brauchen keinen philosophischen »Neusprech«, um auf die Straßen zu gehen und das Alphabet der Freiheit an Hauswände zu sprayen. Kunstproduktion, Politik und politische Philosophie sind durch künstlerische Vorstellungskraft miteinander in einem Knoten aus Vorstellungskraft und aktivem Handeln verbunden. Das Ziel aber ist pragmatisch: die Schaffung sozialer und politischer Fakten; Verantwortung für Entscheidungen und öffentlich geäußerte Meinungen übernehmen und tragen; reale Taten in einer realen Welt und ein endgültiger Abschied von der Illusion künstlerischer Immunität.
Das Modell kuratorischer Arbeit, das ich angenommen habe, basiert nicht darauf, Kunstobjekte zu verwalten, sie aus dem Gesamtwerk von KünstlerInnen zu fischen, sie zu transportieren, zu versichern und an die Wand zu hängen. Es basiert auf Moderation und auf Verhandlung zwischen konträren politischen Standpunkten in Form von künstlerischem Handeln. Das Einzige, was diese Arbeitsweise tatsächlich zunichte machen kann, ist Angst, die lähmende Furcht vor realen Folgen und davor, für diese Folgen Verantwortung zu tragen. Angst macht es unmöglich, sich ein pragmatisches Handlungsschema überhaupt vorzustellen.
Auch ich fürchte mich, aber ich versuche, die Angst zu vergessen.

Aus dem Polnischen von Marcin Zastro.zny

Dieser Text erschien anlässlich der Publikation „Forget Fear“ der 7. Berlin Biennale für zeitgenössische Kunst (27. April bis 1. Juli 2012), hrsg. von Artur .Zmijewski und Joanna Warsza, Köln 2012, S. 10–19.

Anti-Manifesto

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:48 +0000

The Manifesto is made up of a selection of the right-wing radicals’ comments to the Voina actions.

Contemporary Art
– Contemporary art is a spit into the face of normal people.
– Contemporary art insults our dignity and perverts juveniles.
– Contemporary art is an idiotic company of dishonest fanatics with a weird ideology.Contemporary art is a wild porno for wretched freaks.Contemporary art is a gathering of pederasts and lesbians!Contemporary art is a vomitive fuck.Contemporary art is a shit-eating!Contemporary art destroys morality, evolutional potential of humanity, destroys chastity and family, and mankind.
– Contemporary art is a dick without head. The dick of contemporary art means nothing in compare with the dick of Michelangelo’s David. It is no more than weak attempts.Contemporary art is a cheap stuff. Fake and bullshit. It’s incredible that people still react to this kind of miserable experiment.

Contemporary Artist
– Contemporary artists are a sensual mould, which eats up and smacks social reality.
– Contemporary artists are mutants, a batch of moral monsters and degenerates.
– Contemporary artists are stupid whores and brainless morons!Contemporary artists are cattle and brutes.Contemporary artists are pig-fuckers!Contemporary artists spoiled everything! Museums, temples, icons, belief, people’s dignity and moral. The only thing contemporary artist is able to do is to defecate in the museum. I’m sick of such art.
– Contemporary artists are idiots, schizophrenics, hysteric men and deviant persons. They are to be kept in mental hospital.
– Contemporary artists are a batch of idiots and block-heads, who spoil the reputation of the country.
– Contemporary artists are enemies. They took away bright dream from everybody. They doomed the whole nation to slavery. I’d like to send them to mines. Contemporary artists are the shit of the nation!Contemporary artists are fucking freaks. I’d like to burn them in the blast furnaces or crush them with a heavy caterpillar tractor. We have way too many fucking premature bustards! Morons are now to be called artists. Eat shit! You better kill yourselves in full view of everybody. It will be more useful.
– Shoot all contemporary artists. Only then the motherland will gain peace and order. If it won’t help, the procedure should be repeated.

Goals and objectives of the Art-Group Voina
1. Creation of innovative topical media-art-language, which is producing for pure art, but not for a money. It is mean language, which is adequate for today’s cultural and socio-political context, which is can show actual of the new epoch. Creating of real left front of art in Russia in traditions of futurism and DADA, which is radically shift all ideological poles by the facts of its being. Rebirth of political protest art all over the world.
2. Creation of political street-art in Russia in the best traditions of absurdity and sarcasm, of carnival middle-age art. Creation of image of artist as romantic hero, who prevail over the evil in today’s soulless commercial conceptual art. Rebirth of lively expressive art, which is sincere and honest and provoking observers’ deep emotional experience.
3. War with “werewolves in straps“ for the freedom of contemporary art. War with socio-political obscurantism and ultra-right reaction. Subversion and destruction of outdated repressive-patriarchal socio-political symbols and ideologies.

The author of the Voina Group manifesto – A. Plutser-Sarno, group ideologist and chief media artist

Manifest

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:46 +0000

Eine neue, durch den vorhandenen Rahmen nicht zu bezwingende menschliche Kraft wird mit der unaufhaltbaren technischen Entwicklung und dem Unbefriedigtsein gegenüber ihren möglichen Anwendungen in unserem jeden Sinnes beraubten gesellschaftlichen Leben jeden Tag größer.
Die gesellschaftliche Entfremdung und Unterdrückung kann unmöglich gestaltet werden, in keiner ihrer Varianten – sie kann nur en bloc mit dieser Gesellschaft selbst zurückgewiesen werden. Jeder wirkliche Fortschritt hängt selbstverständlich von der revolutionären Lösung der vielgestaltigen Krise der Gegenwart ab.
Welches sind die Perspektiven einer Organisation des Lebens in einer Gesellschaft, die „die Produktion auf der Grundlage freier und gleicher Assoziationen der Produzenten“ authentisch „neu gruppiert“? Die Automatisierung der Produktion und die Vergesellschaftung der lebenswichtigen Güter werden die Arbeit als äußere Notwendigkeit immer mehr beschränken und dem Individuum endlich die volle Freiheit geben. Der so von jeder ökonomischen Verantwortung, von jeder Schuld und Straffälligkeit der Vergangenheit und den Anderen gegenüber befreite Mensch wird über einen neuen Mehrwert verfügen, der nicht mit Geld berechnet werden kann, da er sich unmöglich auf das Maß der Lohnarbeit reduzieren lässt – den Wert des Spieles, des frei konstruierten Lebens. Die Ausübung dieser spielerischen Schöpfung ist die Garantie der Freiheit eines jeden und aller im Rahmen der einzigen durch die Nicht-Ausbeutung des Menschen durch den Menschen garantierten Gleichheit. Die Befreiung des Spiels ist seine schöpferische Autonomie, die über die alte Trennung zwischen aufgezwungener Arbeit und passiver Freizeit hinausgeht.
Früher hat die Kirche die angeblichen Zauberer verbrannt, um die primitiven Tendenzen zum Spiel zu unterdrücken, die sich in den Volksfeten aufrechterhalten hatten. In der jetzt herrschenden Gesellschaft, die massiv trostlose Pseudospiele der Nichtbeteiligung erzeugt, wird eine echte künstlerische Tätigkeit zwangsläufig als kriminell eingestuft. Sie ist halb geheim. Sie tritt als Skandal hervor.
Was ist die Situation? Sie ist die Verwirklichung eines höheren Spiels oder genauer gesagt die Aufforderung zum Spiel der menschlichen Anwesenheit. Die revolutionären Spieler aller Länder können sich innerhalb der S.I. vereinigen, um damit anzufangen, aus der Vorgeschichte des alltäglichen Lebens hinauszukommen.
Jetzt schon schlagen wir die autonome Organisation der Produzenten der neuen Kultur vor, unabhängig von den zur Zeit vorhandenen politischen und gewerkschaftlichen Organisationen, denen wir die Fähigkeit absprechen, etwas anderes als die Einrichtung des Bestehenden zu organisieren. In dem Augenblick, wo diese Organisation aus ihrem experimentellen Anfangsstadium hinausgeht und ihre erste öffentliche Kampagne starten will, setzen wir ihr die Besetzung der UNESCO als dringlichstes Ziel. Die auf Weltebene vereinheitlichte Bürokratisierung der Kunst und der gesamten Kultur ist ein neues Phänomen, das die tiefe Verwandtschaft der auf der Welt koexistierenden sozialen Systeme auf der Grundlage der eklektischen Aufbewahrung und der Reproduktion der Vergangenheit ausdrückt. Diesen neuen Bedingungen müssen die revolutionären Künstler durch eine Aktion neuen Typs entgegentreten. Da das Vorhandensein dieser konzentrierten und in einem einzigen Gebäude lokalisierten Führung der Kultur die Beschlagnahme durch einen PUTSCH begünstigt; da diese Einrichtung außerdem gar keinen anderen sinnvollen Gebrauch als unsere subversive Perspektive haben kann, halten wir uns unseren Zeitgenossen gegenüber für berechtigt, uns dieses Apparats zu bemächtigen. Und wir werden ihn bekommen. Wir sind entschlossen, von der UNESCO Besitz zu ergreifen, und wenn es nur für eine kurze Zeit sein sollte, da wir sicher sind, dort schnell ein Werk zu verrichten, das als bedeutungsvollstes Zeichen zur Erhellung einer langen Periode von Forderungen bleiben wird.
Welches sollen die Hauptkennzeichen der neuen Kultur sein – zunächst im Vergleich zur alten Kunst?
Gegen das Spektakel führt die verwirklichte situationistische Kultur die totale Beteiligung ein.
Gegen die konservierte Kunst ist sie eine Organisation des erlebten Augenblicks – ganz direkt.
Gegen die parzellierte Kunst wird sie eine globale, alle verwendbaren Elemente gleichzeitig umfassende Praxis sein. Sie strebt natürlich eine kollektive und zweifellos anonyme Produktion an (wenigstens insofern diese Kultur nicht durch das Bedürfnis, Spuren zu hinterlassen, beherrscht wird, da die Werke NICHT ALS WAREN GELAGERT WERDEN). Als minimale Absicht haben ihre Experimente eine Revolution des Verhaltens und einen dynamischen unitären Urbanismus vor, der dazu geeignet ist, sich auf der ganzen Welt auszudehnen, um dann über alle bewohnbaren Planeten verbreitet zu werden.
Gegen die einseitige Kunst wird die situationistische Kultur eine Kunst des Dialogs und der gegenseitigen Beeinflussung sein. Es ist jetzt schon so weit, dass die Künstler (und mit ihnen die ganze sichtbare Kultur) von der Gesellschaft vollkommen getrennt sind, wie sie auch untereinander durch Konkurrenz getrennt werden. Aber schon vor dieser Sackgasse des Kapitalismus war die Kunst im wesentlichen einseitig und ohne Reaktion. Sie wird über die abgeschlossene Ära ihres Primitivismus zugunsten einer vollständigen Kommunikation hinausgehen.
Da jeder zum Künstler auf einer höheren Ebene wird – d. h. auf untrennbare Weise zugleich zum Produzenten und Konsumenten einer totalen kulturellen Schöpfung – wohnt man einer schnellen Auflösung des linearen Wertmessers der Neuheit bei. Da jeder sozusagen zum Situationisten wird, wohnt man einer multidimensionalen Inflation der Tendenzen, der Experimente, der radikal verschiedenartigen ‘Schulen’ bei – NICHT MEHR NACHEINANDER, SONDERN GLEICH-ZEITIG.
Wir führen jetzt das ein, was historisch den letzte Beruf sein wird. Die Rolle des Situationisten, des Berufsamateurs, des Anti-Spezialisten bleibt noch eine Spezialisierung bis zur Zeit des ökonomischen und geistigen Überflusses, in der jeder zu einem solchen ‘Künstler’ wird, wie es den Künstlern nicht gelungen ist – für die Konstruktion seines eigenen Lebens. Der letzte Beruf der Geschichte steht der Gesellschaft ohne permanente Arbeitsteilung so nahe, dass der Titel eines Berufs ihm allgemein abgesprochen wird, wenn er in der S.I. in Erscheinung tritt.
Denjenigen, die uns nicht gut verstehen sollten, sagen wir mit trotziger Verachtung: „Die Situationisten, für deren Richter Ihr Euch vielleicht haltet, richten Euch früher oder später. Wir warten auf Euch an der nächsten Ecke – d. h. bei der unvermeidlichen Liquidierung der Welt der Beraubung in all ihren Formen. Das sind unsere Ziele, die die zukünftigen Ziele der Menschheit sein werden.“
Am 17. Mai 1960

Wiederabdruck
17 May 1960
reprinted in Internationale Situationniste #4 (June 1960)

Contemp(t)orary: Eleven Theses

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:42 +0000

1.
It would appear that the notion of the “contemporary” is irredeemably vain and empty; in fact, we would not be entirely mistaken in suspecting “contemporary art” to be a concept that became central to art as a result of the need to find a replacement, rather than as a matter of legitimate theorizing. For above all, “contemporary” is the term that stands to mark the death of “modern.” This vague descriptor of aesthetic currency became customary precisely when the critique of “the modern” (its mapping, specification, historicizing, and dismantling) exiled it to the dustbin of history. At that point, when current art lost the word that had provided it with a programmatic stance, chronological proximity became relevant – even if it did not indicate anything of substance. To be sure, “contemporary” fails to carry even a glimmer of the utopian expectation – of change and possible alternatives – encompassed by “the new.”

2.
Nothing would seem to so eloquently suggest the lack of substance in “contemporary art” than the facility with which it lends itself to practical adjustments. Museums, academic institutions, auction houses, and texts tend to circumvent the need to categorize recent artistic production by declaring the “contemporariness” of certain holdings or discourses on the basis of a chronological convention: the MOCA in Los Angeles takes into account everything made “after” 1940; the contemporary holdings of Tate Modern in London were all created sometime after 1965; Kristine Stiles and Peter Selz’s sourcebook Theories and Documents of Contemporary Art takes 1945 as its starting point. In other contexts – particularly on the periphery – the horizon of contemporaneity tends to be narrower, usually defined as appearing in the early 1990s and associated with the rise of the postcolonial debate, the collapse of the Euro-American monopoly over the narrative of modernism, or the end of the Cold War. In any case, “contemporary art” appears to be based on the multiple significance of an “after.”

3.
However, as is usually the case with chronological categories, this neutrality may soon unfold into a noun with a certain substance. As with “the modern,” it would not be hard to imagine “the contemporary” one day becoming oxymoronically fixed, specified, and dated as the signifier of a particular shift in the dialectics of culture. There are at least two senses in which the contemporariness of artistic culture involves a poignant turn. There is the blatant immediacy of the relationship between a contemporary practice and its host society, and then there is its integration into a critical apparatus.
Never since the advent of historical relativism at the end of the eighteenth century has the art of the day had a less contentious social reception. Claims concerning the esoteric nature of contemporary art in the West mostly derive from the density of theoretical discourse on the topic – discourse that actually operates on the basis of practices that involve a certain level of general legibility. It may well be that one of the main characteristics of contemporary art is to always demand, at least, a double reception: first as part of general culture, and later as an attempt at sophisticated theoretical recuperation. Nonetheless, the fact that contemporary practices are linked to a hypertrophy of discourse that tries to mobilize them against the grain of their social currency is itself an indication of the extent to which contemporary art is an integrated culture that makes use of widely available referents, involving poetic operations that are closely linked to the historical sensibility of the day. It is the interlocking of extreme popularity and the rarefaction of criticism and theory that define this phenomenon. “Contemporary art” is, therefore, a form of aristocratic populism – a dialogical structure in which extreme subtlety and the utmost simplicity collide, forcing individuals of varying class, ethnic, and ideological affiliations – which might have otherwise kept them separated – to smell each other in artistic structures.

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4.
The ideal of modern beauty that Stendhal articulated in 1823 as “the art of presenting to the peoples . . . works which, in view of the present-day state of their customs and beliefs, afford them the utmost possible pleasure,” has finally been attained.¹ As a consequence, a temporal rift between radical aesthetics and social mores no longer exists today. The question of the death of the avant-garde ought to be reformulated to account for this institutionalization of the contemporary. As we all know, the schism between the project of modern subjectivity and the modern bourgeois subject was defined in historical terms as consisting of advances, regressions, re-enactments, futurities, and anachronism, and summarized in the politics of the avant-garde, with all the militaristic implications of the term. More than the death of the avant-garde as a project of cultural subversion – always a ridiculous argument coming from the mouth of the establishment; such radicalism is sure to reemerge in one disguise or another every time a poetic-political challenge to the nomos and episteme of dominant society becomes necessary – the shock of the postmodern involved the realization that “the new” could no longer be considered foreign to a subjectivity constantly bombarded by media and burning with the desire for consumption.
In any case, the temporal dislocation characteristic of both modernism and the avant- garde – the way the art of the day constantly defied the notion of a synchronic present (not limited to the chronological trope of the avant, which encompasses any number of other historical folds, from the theme of primitivism to the negotiations with obsolescence and the ruin, the refusal of the chronology of industrial labor, and so forth) – seems to have finally found some closure. In a compelling and scary form, modern capitalist society finally has an art that aligns with the audience, with the social elites that finance it, and with the academic industry that serves as its fellow traveler. In this sense art has become literally contemporary, thanks to its exorcism of aesthetic alienation and the growing integration of art into culture. When, by the millions, the masses vote with their feet to attend contemporary art museums, and when a number of cultural industries grow up around the former citadel of negativity, fine art is replaced by something that already occupies an intermediary region between elite entertainment and mass culture. And its signature is precisely the frenzy of “the contemporary”: the fact that art fairs, biennales, symposia, magazines, and new blockbuster shows and museums constitute evidence of art’s absorption into that which is merely present – not better, not worse, not hopeful, but a perverted instance of the given.

5.
In this way, the main cultural function of art institutions and ceremonies in relation to global capitalism today is to instantiate the pandemic of contemporariness as a mythological scheme occurring (and recurring) each time we instigate this “program.” After all, the art world has surpassed other, more anachronistic auratic devices (the cult of the artist, of nationality or creativity) as the profane global religion for making “the contemporary manifest. The hunger to be part of the global art calendar has more to do with the hope of keeping up with the frenzy of time than with any actual aesthetic pursuit or interest. Mallarmé’s dictum that “one must be absolutely modern” has become a duty to stay up-to-date. But given the lack of historical occasions which could represent an opportunity to experience the core of our era – pivotal revolutionary moments of significant social change or upheaval – a participation in the eternal renewal of the contemporary might not be completely misguided, for it at least invokes a longing for the specter of an enthusiasm that asks for more than just the newest technological gadget.

6.
But, once again, the devil of contemporaneousness does its deed: whereas the system of modern art was territorialized in a centrifugal structure of centers and peripheries around modernity’s historical monopoly in the liberal-capitalist enclave of the North Atlantic, we now face a regime of international generalization transmitting the pandemic of the contemporary to the last recesses of the earth. In fact, the main reason for the craze surrounding the contemporary art market in recent years (and for its not having immediately collapsed after the plunge of global capitalism) has been the market’s lateral extension: bourgeoises who would previously buy work within their local art circuits became part of a new private jet set of global elites consuming the same brand of artistic products, ensuring spiraling sales and the celebration of an age in which endless “editions” allow artworks to be disseminated throughout an extended geography. In turn, each enclave of these globalized elites drives the development of a contemporary art infrastructure in their own city, using a standard mixture of global art references and local “emergent” schools. Contemporary art is defined by a new global social context in which disenfranchised wealthy individuals (who have abdicated their roles as industrial and commerce managers to the bureaucracy of CEOs) seek a certain civic identity through aesthetic “philanthropy.” In this fashion they interact with a new social economy of services performed by artists, critics, and curators – services with symbolic capital that rests on an ability to trade in a semblance of “the contemporary.” Contemporary art thus becomes the social new private jet set and a jet proletariat.

7.
This new machinery of the dialectic between the global elites of financial capitalism and the nomadic agents of global culture would be easy to dismiss as critically meaningless were it not for the way “the contemporary” also stands for the leveling of the temporal perception of cultural geography and of a certain political orientation. Particularly for those who come from the so-called periphery (the South and the former socialist world), “the contemporary” still carries a certain utopian ring. For indeed, notwithstanding the cunning imbalances of power that prevail in the art world, the mere fact of intervening in the matrix of contemporary culture constitutes a major political and historical conquest. The global art circus of biennales, fairs, and global art museums has forced an end to the use of a metaphor that understood geography in terms of historical succession – it is no longer possible to rely upon the belatedness of the South in presuming that artistic culture goes from the center to the periphery. Although it probably does not seem so extraordinary now, the voicing of the need to represent the periphery in the global art circuits was, to a great extent, a claim to the right to participate in producing “the contemporary.” And while the critical consequences of the policies of inclusion are less central to the agenda of the South than the critique of stereotypes, the activation of social memory, and the pursuit of different kinds of cultural agency, it remains the case that “contemporary art” marks the stage at which different geographies and localities are finally considered within the same network of questions and strategies. Art becomes “contemporary” in the strong sense when it refers to the progressive obsolescence of narratives that concentrated cultural innovation so completely in colonial and imperial metropolises as to finally identify modernism with what we ought to properly describe as “NATO art.”

8.
This is not to say that such a process of inclusion is free from its own deformities: in many instances, a peculiar neurosis provoked by the stereotyping of ethnic, regional, or national authenticity and the pressures to accommodate art from the periphery into a subsidiary category of metropolitan referents produces so-called “alternative modernism” or “global conceptualism.” Nonetheless, the inclusion of the South in the narratives of “the contemporary” has already disrupted the genealogies of the present, such as the simplified concept of the “post-conceptual” that arose in the late 1980s to describe an apparent commonality between the radical artistic revolutions of the 1960s and the advanced art of its day. In its various historical and geographical settings, “contemporary art” claims a circularity between 1968, conceptualism, Brazilian Neo-Concretism or the French Nouvelle Vague, and recent works trapped in perpetual historical mirroring. In this sense, to paraphrase Walter Benjamin, “contemporary art” appears as the figure of a revolution in standstill, awaiting the moment of resolution.

9.
Complicated as this may be, however, it does not blur the radical significance of the cultural transformation that took place in artistic practice in the years after 1960. One crucial element of “contemporary art” is the embrace of a certain “unified field” in the concept of art. Beyond the de-definition of specific media, skills, and disciplines, there is some radical value in the fact that “the arts” seem to have merged into a single multifarious and nomadic kind of practice that forbids any attempt at specification beyond the micro-narratives that each artist or cultural movement produces along the way. If “contemporary art” refers to the confluence of a general field of activities, actions, tactics, and interventions falling under the umbrella of a single poetic matrix and within a single temporality, it is because they occupy the ruins of the “visual arts.” In this sense, “contemporary art” carries forward the lines of experimentation and revolt found in all kinds of disciplines and arts that were brought “back to order” after 1970, forced to reconstitute their tradition. “Contemporary art” then becomes the sanctuary of repressed experimentation and the questioning of subjectivity that was effectively contained in any number of arts, discourses, and social structures following the collapse of the twentieth century’s revolutionary projects. I suspect that the circularity of our current cultural narratives will only be broken once we stop experiencing contemporary culture as the déjà vu of a revolution that never entirely took place.

10.
By the same token, it is no coincidence that the institutions, media, and cultural structures of the contemporary art world have become the last refuge of political and intellectual radicalism. As various intellectual traditions of the left appear to be losing ground in political arenas and social discourses, and despite the way art is entwined with the social structures of capitalism, contemporary art circuits are some of the only remaining spaces in which leftist thought still circulates as public discourse. In a world where academic circuits have ossified and become increasingly isolated, and where the classical modern role of the public intellectual dwindles before the cataclysmic power of media networks and the balkanization of political opinion, it should come as no surprise that contemporary art has (momentarily) become something like the refuge of modern radicalism. If we should question the ethical significance of participating in contemporary art circuits, this sole fact ought to vindicate us. Just as the broken lineages of experimental music, cinema, and literature finally found themselves in the formless and undefined poetic space of contemporary art in general, we should not be shocked to find the cultural sector – apparently most compromised by the celebration of capitalism – functioning as the vicarious public sphere in which trends such as deconstruction, postcolonial critique, post-Marxism, social activism, and psychoanalytic theory are grounded. It would seem that, just as the art object poses a continuous mystery – a space of resistance and reflection leading towards enlightenment – so do the institutions and power structures of contemporary art also function as the critical self-consciousness of capitalist hypermodernity.

11.
However, given the negative relationship of art to its own time, one would suspect the current radicalization of art and the constant politicization of its practice to be dangerous symptoms. Just as modern art rescued forms of practice, sensibility, and skills that were crushed by the industrial system, so does contemporary art seem to have the task of protecting cultural critique and social radicalism from the banality of the present. Unlike theorists who lament the apparent co-opting of radicalism and critique by the official sphere of art, we would need to consider the possibility that our task may consist, in large part, of protecting utopia – seen as the necessary collusion of the past with what lies ahead – from its demise at the hands of the ideology of present time. This is, to be sure, an uncomfortable inheritance. At the end of the day, it involves the memory of failure and a necessary infatuation with the powers of history. I do not know a better way to describe such a genealogy than by offering a quotation from the Dada artist and historian Hans Richter, who summarized the experience of Dada as that of “the vacuum created by the sudden arrival of freedom and the possibilities it seemed to offer.”² And it may well be that contemporary art’s ethical imperative is to deal with the ambivalence of the experience of emancipation. If art has indeed become the sanctuary of revolutionary thought, it is because it deals with the memory of a number of ambiguous interruptions. With this, we hopefully find an advantage to the constant collision of perfume and theory that we experience in contemporary art events around the world.

WiederabdruckDieser Text erschien zuerst in: e-flux journal # 12, Januar 2010, http://www.e-flux.com/journal/contemptorary-eleven-theses/ [29.5.2013].

1.) Stendhal, Oeuvres complètes, ed. Georges Eudes (Paris: Larrive, 1954), 16:27, quoted in Matei Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avantgarde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism, 2nd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), 4.
2.) Hans Richter, Dada: Art and Anti-Art (New York: Thames & Hudson, 1997), 136.

Towards a Futurology of the Present: Notes on Writing, Movement, and Time1

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:38 +0000

‘Tomorrow never happens, man’ – Janis Joplin²

Has there ever been a revolution without its musicians, artists, and writers? Could we imagine the Zapatista movement, for example, without its poetry and lyricism? At this moment, I am writing from the specific location of the west coast of Australia, on land known to Aboriginal Australians as Beeliar Boodjar. Across the Indian Ocean, remarkable things are happening in North Africa. I listen on the internet to the songs of freedom being sung in Tahrir Square, as well as to the young hip-hop artists who provided the soundtrack to the revolution in Tunisia. But their YouTube videos are not the only things going viral. Significantly, their mutant desires, of which their music is an expression, are also beginning to ripple outwards. I feel it here at my kitchen table as I type, as viscerally as the caffeine flowing through my body. I also see it on the evening news in Spain and Greece. Perhaps the alterglobalisation movement never died, but was simply laying in wait. Perhaps we are only at the beginning. And perhaps there is little real difference in our movements between making music and making change; between the creation of art and the creation of new social relations through our activisms. Our common art is the crafting of new ways of being, of seeing, of valuing; in short, the cultivation of new forms of life, despite and beyond the deadening, ossified structures all around us.
What I would like to focus on most especially in this piece is the art of writing; more specifically, on the relationship between nonfiction writing and social movements. Movement produces writing which produces movement which produces writing, and so the loop turns; a constant feedback loop between action and reflection, experience and expression. To the relationship between writing and movement, I would like to introduce the added factor of time. Until very recently, radical writing practices have tended to operate in accordance with, and uncritically reproduce, some very particular ideas about time. One such idea is that it is compartmentalised into discrete units. Another is that it is linear and moves only in one direction. These understandings are part and parcel of Gottfried Hegel’s dialectical logic³, which, via Karl Marx, has become the unthinking, taken-for-granted folk theory of generations of activists. They are also part of Enlightenment, or modernist, rationality more broadly – that particular way of knowing that has predominated across the world for the past few centuries. Linear, compartmentalised time has meant that we have come to see past, present, and future as three separate things – a division that lies at the root of the means-ends distinction in traditional leftist politics. It is only when present and future are treated as mutually exclusive entities that means and ends can be regarded likewise. Furthermore, for Hegel and Marx, one must always negate in order to create; that is, the present must firstly be negated before the future is ever able to come into being.⁴ Revolutionary politics is therefore conceived of in purely negative terms, and the job of building a new world deferred until after the revolution. Social movements become equivalent to war rather than creation. When the ends justify the means, the present effectively becomes sacrificed at the altar of The Future – and this for the sake of utopian designs fabricated in the minds of a self-appointed few.
The kind of temporal sensibility outlined above lies at the heart of the manifesto genre.⁵ It seems today, however, that people have grown tired of manifestos. The same is true for any such exhortation from above of what people should or should not be doing. My argument is that the present context of postmodernity⁶ demands of radical writers a fundamental rethinking of their (our) modus operandi. I will, in this article, present a critique not just of the manifesto, but also of the jeremiad – another one of the literary forms most commonly produced by radical writers. Where the manifesto is concerned with the future, the jeremiad centres on the present. The intention of the latter, however, is usually only to serve as a diagnostic description upon which a prescription must be founded; an ‘is’ that must be followed by an ‘ought’. In this way, we are hence led back into the domain of the manifesto. But what happens to radical writing once we reject those dichotomies upon which the jeremiad-manifesto distinction is predicated – namely, those of is-ought, means-ends, and present-future? What happens when the writer treats the present and future not as two separate things, but as conjoined in an indivisible flow within which means and ends are consonant? What I would like to propose, then, is a new writerly practice; one which I have chosen to call the futurology of the present.
Such a practice would involve an unearthing of the many living futures constantly coming into being in the present. Unlike the jeremiad, it does not solely describe what is, but also what is becoming. In other words, it entails not simply ‘a negation of what exists, but also an affirmation of what springs forth’⁷. And it does not prescribe a single path forward, as with the manifesto, but tries instead to reveal the multifarious pathways fanning outwards from any given moment. It starts with the novel innovations and creative insurgencies happening everywhere in our midst, and from there works to build affinities between them. In this endeavour, I find inspiration in Rebecca Solnit’s assertion that ‘the revolution exists in little bits everywhere, but not much has been done to connect its dots. We need to say that there are alternatives being realized all around us and theorize the underlying ideals and possibilities’⁸. This is, of course, an endeavour that necessarily requires a heightened sensitivity toward those ‘moments when things do not yet have a name’; in short, toward newness. The new here is not meant to mean the same thing as ‘fashionable’, but rather refers to those becomings that are constitutive of alternative realities.¹⁰ This kind of sensibility has become especially important of late, given that ours is an era of accelerated social change, pregnant with germinal, as-yet-unnamed phenomena. One cannot continue imposing anachronistic grids upon our ever-complexifying present without exacting an extremely violent and myopic reductionism. Instead, as Félix Guattari writes, the upheavals that define our current conditions of existence call for a method attuned ‘towards the future and the emergence of new social and aesthetic practices’¹¹. My proposal for a futurology of the present is one attempt to concretely think through what such a method might look like. I have certainly not been alone in these efforts. Besides Solnit, other fellow travellers include the members of Colectivo Situaciones whose practice of ‘militant research’ they characterise as the search for ‘emerging traces of a new sociability’¹². Consider too the mode of ethnographic practice proposed by the anarchist anthropologist, David Graeber. One role ‘for a radical intellectual’, he writes, might be ‘to look at those who are creating viable alternatives, try to figure out what might be the larger implications of what they are (already) doing, and then offer those ideas back, not as prescriptions, but as contributions, possibilities – as gifts’¹³.
As has already been hinted at, the articulation of these ideas will necessarily require a confrontation with Hegelian dialectics and ‘the damage it has caused, and continues to cause in political movements’¹⁴. One of the principle reasons for this is that, to really understand the future appearing in the present, it is necessary to strip away the sedimented habits of thought under which becomings are subsumed or rendered invisible. As will be seen over the course of this essay, Hegel’s method could be considered as precisely one of these habits (certainly, capitalism an issue here too, but I take it for granted that my readers are already convinced of this). My contention is that even those who do not consider themselves as having anything to do with Marx or Hegel still unwittingly reproduce many of their assumptions. Indeed, as far as traditional forms of radical politics are concerned, the Hegelian-Marxist dialectical schema has become the Sun around which all the other heavenly bodies orbit. For 150 years, we believed this Sun would give us clarity and deliver us from darkness to light. It turns out, however, that it has only served to obscure more than it has revealed. All those other stars, old and new, that have been shielded from view by the blinding, sun-soaked sky are today beginning to demand our attention and sparkle anew. This essay seeks to assist in this efflorescence, since, as Hardt suggests, we cannot hope to achieve any kind of liberation unless we first liberate ourselves from Hegel.¹⁵ One thing must be made clear, though, and that is that I confront Hegel’s legacy not purely by way of negation, which would only mean a perverse reproduction of his dialectical straightjacket, but by proposing and affirming an escape route. My goal is a re-imagining of radical politics and a re-tooling of radical writerly practice.
Having thus far skimmed the surface of my argument, what I would like to do now is go deeper. I will start out by introducing the concept of the ‘perpetual present’ – the temporality within which the futurology of the present is situated. From this basis, I will proceed to elucidate the ways in which such a practice overcomes the limitations of previous modes of radical writing; namely, those premised on compartmentalised, linear time. In the second half of the article, I will link the futurology of the present to a politics of hope, before concluding with some thoughts on the nexus between activist and artistic practices – the very note on which I began.

The Perpetual Present
In today’s social movements, there is an increasing call for a harmonisation between means and ends, now widely understood by way of the notion of ‘prefigurative politics’¹⁶. Such a sensibility cannot but imply a radically different, even ‘amodern’¹⁷, temporal schema. Present and future cease to be treated as two distinct entities (the former but an instrument for the realisation of the latter), but instead become rendered as simply two linguistic signs referring to a common, indivisible flow. Such is also the case with the past. Drawing on Guattari, we could well say that both past and future inhere together in the ‘perpetual present’¹⁸, an enduring liquid moment containing both memory and potentiality; traces of what has been, but also intimations of what could be, each indissolubly connected to the other. With this perspective in mind, there can no longer be said to be a revolutionary before, during, and after. Instead of activist strategy being determined by a stark delineation between discrete stages, means and ends become consonant within a permanent revolutionary process; a continual freeing up of life, desire and the imagination wherever they happen to be imprisoned. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri write: ‘We must think of [pre-revolutionary] resistance, [revolutionary] insurrection and [post-revolutionary] constituent power as an indivisible process, in which these three are melded into a full counter-power and ultimately a new, alternative formation of society’.¹⁹
It has occurred to me that the Roman god, Janus, could be taken as figurative of the perpetual present. He had one face looking forward towards the future and one face looking backward towards the past, and yet both belonged to a single head. The term ‘Janus-faced’ has, in modern times, become a synonym for ‘two-faced’ or ‘duplicitous’, carrying with it negative connotations, and yet, for the ancient Romans, Janus had an altogether different meaning. He was the god of thresholds; ‘an important Roman god who protected doorways and gateways’, primarily symbolising change and transition.²⁰ The perpetual present is always a threshold between that which is ceasing to be and that which is coming into being; at once the repository of memories and the font of potentialities; a record of the past and a map to the future. Friedrich Nietzsche is of critical import here: ‘I am of today and of the has-been’, he writes, ‘but there is something in me that is of tomorrow and of the day-after-tomorrow and of the shall-be’.²¹ This may well have been uttered by Janus himself.
A word on Michel Foucault is apposite here as well, particularly regarding his notion of the ‘history of the present’, which was how he described his genealogical method.²² Despite first appearances, the history and futurology of the present are not at all in conflict. Both, in fact, are immanent within the perpetual present. The multifarious routes by which the present is constructed are simultaneously one and the same with those processes by which alternative futures continually come into being. Hence, the history and futurology of the present are not unlike the two faces of Janus. One casts its gaze upstream towards the tributaries and the other downstream towards the delta, but both belong to a common body bobbing upon a single river. While the history of the present challenges linear history and its obsession with the origin, the futurology of the present does likewise with respect to linear futurology and its drive toward the projected end-point of history, or telos. There is no Future with a capital ‘F’; only the delta, opening out onto the infinite expanse of the ocean.
At this point, it must also be made clear that the perpetual present has nothing at all to do with the kind of endless present postulated by neoliberal ideologues. Where the former is the font of infinite alternative futures, of a variable creativity that continually issues forth from the free play of difference, the latter is a present condemned to futurelessness, to an endless reproduction of the status quo. It was in this context that, in response to Margaret Thatcher’s infamous doctrine that ‘There is No Alternative’, the World Social Forum first proposed its counter-slogan of ‘Another World is Possible’. Alterglobalisation activists have since been vindicated in this idea, with the global financial crash of 2008 serving to irreparably discredit the neoliberal experiment. The state bail-out of banks to the tune of trillions revealed the neoliberal discourse (particularly its insistence on minimal state intervention in the economy) to have been fallacious all along. Capital needs the state and has always needed it, not least of all in its policing of unruly citizens. Neoliberalism was never really realised as a system, but functioned only as a legitimating discourse that, in practice, never aligned with what it professed in theory. Following these embarrassing revelations, global elites are increasingly eschewing the concept of neoliberalism, and find themselves conflicted about the way forward. As such, we have now entered into a brand new historical moment; one in which the futurology of the present arguably becomes more important than ever. With neoliberalism staggering along ‘zombie-like’ and ‘ideologically dead’²³, the space has now become wide open for the assertion and enactment of alternatives.
Tying together some of the points I have made thus far, the perpetual present is forever the site of ‘unconsciouses that protest’²⁴, of insubordinate creativity and disobedient desire, of emergent values and practices that lead outwards onto alternative horizons, beyond the mirages conjured up by capitalism, the state, the traditional Left, and all similar such boring and life-denying institutions. It is the work of the futurologist of the present to tease these out from the tangle of everyday life, help increase their visibility, and thereby participate in their propagation. Below, I will seek to expand on these ideas and to further articulate their implications for radical scholarship and writing practices. In so doing, I will focus, first of all, on the challenges that the futurology of the present poses to compartmentalised time (and those modes of writing premised on such a temporality), before proceeding to do likewise with respect to linear time.

Beyond Compartmentalised Time
As touched upon earlier, my contention is that the past-present-future schema of time has been at the root of a profound disarticulation between means and ends in traditional revolutionary politics. Means and ends have only come to be regarded as mutually exclusive entities because present and future have been treated likewise. There has, as such, been a failure to recognise the necessary correspondence between the two; that is, between how we act in the present and the kind of world we wish to see in the future. It is for this reason that we have ended up with such abominations as the Leninist vanguard party, whereby dictatorial practices are supposed to somehow lead to a democratic society.²⁵
Owing to the fact that the idea of compartmentalised time has been little reflected upon in the past, radical nonfiction has tended to take three principle forms; namely, historical treatises, jeremiads, and manifestos, each mapping with its own discrete domain within the past-present-future trinary. The notion of the historical treatise needs little introduction, and the other two have already been briefly discussed. What I would like to do here, however, is to zoom in a little more closely on the jeremiad form. Diagnostic jeremiads like Marx’s three-volume Das Kapital²⁶ are meant to function only as a set of ‘is’ claims upon which prescriptive ‘oughts’ can be based. Marx’s jeremiad- and manifesto-style writings therefore go hand-in-hand. Had David Hume been alive in Marx’s time, he no doubt would have critiqued Marx for assuming that it is even possible to make valid ‘ought’ statements on the basis of descriptive ‘is’ claims.²⁷ For Hume, all such prescriptions are dubious at best. And yet, the assumption that an ‘is’ must necessarily precede an ethical ‘ought’ is still rife amongst radical scholars. There is an unthinking assumption that a complete and ‘objective’ understanding of the present is a necessary prerequisite for effective political action.²⁸ Some jeremiad writers in fact become so consumed with this task, that they fail to even try to imagine alternative possible futures. What matters to them is to first negate the present; to limit themselves to mere resistance, in other words.
Hence, aside from those jeremiads which function within the is-ought framework, there are also those based on ‘is’ descriptions alone; pure lamentations of, or fulminations against, the present configuration of things.²⁹ For the most part, the intention of the lamentative jeremiad is to raise consciousness about this or that issue, such that the reader might somehow, magically, be spurred into action, as if a detailed knowledge of the evils of society was all that was required for this to happen. Precisely how to act on this knowledge is left up to the reader. Often, however, these works have the unintended and reverse effect of leaving the reader feeling overwhelmed and helpless, even despite their politicisation or conscientisation. The futurology of the present, in contrast, aims not to be merely descriptive or prescriptive, but rather, demonstrative. By this I mean that its concern is with fostering inspiration and hope through the demonstration of alternatives. So many contemporary writers and scholar-activists dedicate their lives, as Marx did, to writing about what is wrong with the world, but far fewer have cared to write about what people are already doing to change the world or to bring to light the many living, breathing examples all around us of how things can always be otherwise. Indeed, Harry Cleaver’s observation that Marx’s ‘historical analysis provided much more detail on capitalist domination than on working class subjectivity’³⁰ is an understatement to say the least. This is one reason that radicals so often end up with a perverse fascination for the ‘creativity’ and ‘dynamism’ of capitalism, thereby reifying that which they claim to oppose. One of the ironies here is that capitalists do not create; they simply orchestrate and marshal the creativity of the commons for their own ends.³¹
In contrast to the jeremiad, the futurology of the present starts not with capitalism (or any other kind of domination), but with the ideas and practices of those challenging it. That is not to say, however, that it fails to offer a critique of the various apparatuses of domination. On the contrary, it offers a critique of a radically different kind – one that operates via the presentation of alternatives, of ‘yeses’ that already carry within them a ‘no’. Every innovation, every ‘yes’, embodies a proposal for a different kind of world, but one that is defined, from the outset, against the world that it is leaving behind. The point is to commence with the affirmative, rather than defer it until after the negative. It is in this way that the futurology of the present becomes a project of fomenting hope. It destabilises the taken-for-grantedness of the present, albeit not in a way which disowns it, as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels do when they celebrate the communist movement as that ‘which abolishes the present state of things’³². Disavowing oneself of the present in this manner could be seen to be part and parcel of the disastrous disconnect between means and ends, as discussed earlier. Unlike the jeremiad form, the futurology of the present centres not on the negation of the present-day so much as on its continual reinvention. It necessarily remains within the temporality of the perpetual present. It aligns itself, as such, with the radical challenge that Nietzsche poses to Hegelian thought. In Hegel, negation invariably precedes creation, but in the work of Nietzsche, we are presented with the alternative possibility of creation itself as a means of negation.³³ One creates in order to negate, and not vice versa. In prefigurative politics, we prefigure the world we wish to create through our actions in the present, while simultaneously rendering redundant that which we leave behind. And in our futurologies of the living present, we offer an exposition of these other worlds already in construction without having to first negate. Such texts, furthermore, are themselves self-conscious creations. They are not just about the world, but are also added to it, thereby becoming a part of its workings. The creative act – whether on the streets or on the page – is already subversive. To practice creative subversion is not to overthrow, as with mere resistance, but to undercut and displace. Most importantly of all, it is to cultivate alternative futures in the living present and therefore to affirm life despite capitalism.

Beyond Linear Time
Aside from the compartmentalisation of time, we have also inherited from Hegel the idea that time moves in a straight line from an identifiable origin toward an ultimate end-point. Where the historical treatise usually draws a rigid straight line between the origin and the present, the manifesto does likewise between the present and the projected telos. The origin and the telos alike are both employed in the construction of linear timelines in which the progressions from past to present and from present to future are cast as somehow natural and inevitable. The way in which Marx adapted these ideas is by now the stuff of undergraduate textbooks: Guided by the invisible hand of History with a capital ‘H’, we pass through certain inevitable stages, one of which is our capitalist present, in order to eventually arrive at communism. Hence, even as Marxists angrily denounce capitalism, they ironically naturalise the social injustices that it produces as necessary by-products of the inexorable forward impetus of time. This became ludicrously apparent to me in a recent Facebook debate in which one Marxist tried to reason with me that ‘slavery was a necessary stage in human history’. The history and futurology of the present, as mentioned earlier, each seek to disrupt this kind of linearity in their own ways. The former cares not for the single origin, but for the multiple tributaries which have converged upon the present. The latter, meanwhile, concerns itself not with the single telos, but with the deltaic openings spilling out on to oceanic infinity. In each case, past, present and future – and the pathways between them – are denaturalised and rendered contingent. Here, I will focus most especially on the movement between present and future. Hence, while in the previous section, I sought primarily to problematise the jeremiad, I will now endeavour to do likewise with respect to the manifesto.
The manifesto could be thought of as akin to a children’s colouring book. When we are issued a colouring book with all of the designs already pre-determined, all that remains for us to do is to colour them in. Exactly such an idea was expressed by Marx himself when he wrote: ‘It is not enough that thought strive to actualize itself; actuality must itself strive toward thought’³⁴. What he meant by this was that the telos of history was already known in thought and all that was required was for reality to catch up; that is, for the proletariat to fulfill its historic mission. This is a temporality in which the future, paradoxically enough, actually precedes the present, since the telos is always given a priori. As the French-Russian Hegelian philosopher, Alexandre Kojève, puts it, ‘the historical movement arises from the Future and passes through the Past in order to realize itself in the Present’.³⁵ The present is thus held in tow by someone or other’s personal utopia, usually cast as universal. As such, it might well be argued that the manifesto form is inherently authoritarian. Martin Luther King had a dream, but so did Mao Tse-Tung. The difference in the latter case was that the dream had rigidified into a nightmarish Plan. The telos upon which such plans are predicated becomes a transcendental ideal; a mirage on the horizon dictating a single path we are to follow if ever we are to reach it. The question is: Who decides upon such ideals and who is enslaved by them? Do those enslaved by other people’s ideals not have dreams of their own? How might we avoid these dreams being steamrolled in the rationalist march of History?
The tyranny of linear time, according to Rosi Braidotti, is that it ‘functions like a black hole into which possible futures implode and disappear’³⁶. To reject this conception of time is therefore to make ‘an ethical choice in favour of the richness of the possible’³⁷. It means to move from the World Social Forum slogan of ‘Another World is Possible’ to the more open idea that many worlds are possible. In addition to the image of the delta invoked earlier, let us also consider Jorge Luis Borges’ evocation of the ‘garden of forking paths’; a garden in which ‘time forks perpetually toward innumerable futures’³⁸. Change at any given point in time occurs through the aleatory and contingent actualisation of any one of these countless possible futures, not through any kind of rational progression. To proceed in this garden is not to progress, since the paths lead not so much forward, but outward. Contra Hegel and Marx, then, history does not consist of a series of logical stages, nor does it move in only one direction. There is only perpetual movement; a processual and protean creativity that wells unceasingly out of the perpetual present. The kind of writing appropriate to this movement is precisely that which I have been calling the futurology of the present. When revolution no longer has anything to do with linear timelines or the realisation of a pre-ordained telos, those self-proclaimed prophets of the hidden god of History cease to have any relevance. The futurology of the present, as such, could well represent a possible new form of non-vanguardist writerly practice. There are no experts or professional revolutionaries diagnosing the present or prescribing the future, as with the jeremiad and manifesto forms respectively. Rather, the writer takes her lead from the autonomous and creative participation of people in the making of their worlds, in social movements and countercultures of all kinds; ‘those crucibles of human sociability and creativity out of which the radically new emerges’³⁹.
Here, it will be worth lingering for a moment with the question of the new. In the introduction to this piece, I emphasised the point that the futurology of the present necessarily requires a special sensitivity toward newness. This stands in stark contrast to past modes of radical writing, which usually subordinated the new to the ostensibly eternal. In the linear temporal schema of the manifesto, there is no such thing as novelty, since the work of activists is not conceptualised as the creation of new forms of life so much as the gradual fulfilment of an essential humanness, or ‘species-being’⁴⁰. This set of essences is deemed to have always been there, hidden beneath the veil of false consciousness.⁴¹ It is the difference between drawing and simply colouring-in. My contention is that the production of novelty needs to be understood on its own terms. As Maurizio Lazzarato puts forth, ‘the conjunctions and disjunctions between things are each time contingent, specific and particular and do not refer back to an essence, substance or deep structure upon which they would be founded’⁴². Once radical writing is able to successfully dissociate itself from any kind of hidden god or pre-ordained telos, it can become instead a valuable means with which to bring to light the open-ended and indeterministic ways that everyday actors at the grassroots creatively negotiate and construct their worlds. The value of this sensibility towards newness lies in the fact that it charges the imagination with an enriched sense of possibilities and demonstrates how the world is forever open to reinvention. This is an antidote, not just to the sense of historical duty preached by the vanguardists and manifesto writers, but also to the pervasive sense of hopelessness peddled by those whose interests lie with the present configuration of things.

A Note on Hope
In the context of this discussion, hope is that intangible but very real feeling that our struggles remain worthwhile; that it is still worth resisting assimilation into the soul-crushing tedium of the system and persisting in our efforts to prefigure alternative futures. However, it is in the interests of the political and economic elite to maintain and reproduce the status quo from which they benefit – and a huge part of this is the effort to ‘destroy any sense of possible alternative futures’; to stamp out any initiatives which hint to how the world might be otherwise or at least ‘to ensure that no one knows about them’⁴³ As such, the capitalists, politicians, police, media, and so on could even be said to constitute ‘a vast bureaucratic apparatus for the creation and maintenance of hopelessness’⁴⁴. As Graeber succinctly puts it, ‘hopelessness isn’t natural. It needs to be produced’⁴⁵.
I would like to argue, though, that capitalism has not been alone in producing hopelessness.
Revolutionaries too have been just as culpable. From the perspective of the traditional Left, the story of the twentieth century is one of dashed hopes and unfulfilled dreams. It is not that the prophets of History overlooked the importance of hope to our movements, but rather that they propagated endless false hopes in a tomorrow which never comes. Reality was never really able to live up to their manifestos. The prophets will usually fault reality for failing to fulfill their version of utopia, but it is instead their utopia that must be faulted for failing to correspond to reality. It was situated in the distant future, completely cut off from the living present. It was thought, furthermore, that it could be achieved only by means of negation. In practice, negating the present also meant negating oneself. Sacrifice and discipline were what was commanded. Revolutionaries came to conceive of their practice as war, rather than creation, and their creative desires were endlessly deferred until after the revolution. The point I am getting at is that if people today are mired in cynicism and feel helpless to change the world, it is not only because the elites have perfected their bureaucratic apparatus for the production of hopelessness, but also because the traditional Left offers absolutely no alternative. Many people have grown wary of the vanguardists and self-appointed prophets, whose faith in the inevitability of historical progress now seems more misguided than ever, but at the same time have yet to be convinced that alternative revolutionary practices are viable, worthwhile, or even possible. The result is apathy, but an apathy that could very well be political⁴⁶ – a sensibility, perhaps, of profound antipathy towards the authoritarianism of both capitalism and the traditional Left, but one that lacks sufficient hope to be able to be enacted in alternatives.
Many writers who wish to avoid the authoritarianism of the manifesto tradition might very well feel that their solution is to offer simple critiques, sans prescriptions. I would like to argue here, however, that failing to offer any hope at all is no alternative to offering false hope. Even Foucault, whom earlier I identified as an ally, oftentimes falls into this trap. A detailed knowledge about the workings of various forms of power, most notably ‘discipline’⁴⁷, can only take us so far. What then? What about counterpower? Foucault tends to give the impression that the reach of power is total. His concept of the ‘carceral continuum’⁴⁸ means that we are forever on the backfoot, only ever able to resist in a scattered and piecemeal way. But there are some profound ironies here. The first is that, despite Foucault’s philosophical emphasis on contingency, his writings often leave the reader (well, at least this reader) with the impression that relations of force are an inevitable aspect of social life. The second irony is as follows: Foucault knew as much as anyone that our discourses do not simply emerge from the world, but also serve to produce it. Therefore, if we do not allow enough discursive space in our work for resistance, subversion, and counterpower, we only end up reproducing the very conditions of our own incarceration. What is perhaps needed, then, is to make a subtle, yet profound inversion: that it is power on the backfoot, forever in an attempt to contain our uncontainable vitality.⁴⁹ Where things do cohere together and take on the character of something resembling an insurmountable power structure, we would do well to remind ourselves that the longevity of such social formations is, historically-speaking, much more exceptional than the event of their break-up and dissolution – not vice versa. Certainly, it is of paramount importance to understand the world and the systems of oppression and exploitation that we are up against, but if our writing stops there and avoids giving due attention to what people are doing to undo the status quo, then there is the risk that we will only end up leaving our readers feeling disempowered – armed with knowledge, but starved of the hope necessary to act on this knowledge. An example drawn from personal experience – even despite it being in the context of teaching, rather than writing – will illustrate well the point I am attempting to make here.
A few years ago, I was helping to teach an undergraduate course entitled ‘Environmental Issues in Asia’ – one of my earliest experiences as a university educator. In the last class of the semester, I asked each student, as we went around the room, to share one thing that they would be taking away with them from the course. The response that most stood out to me was that of a young Asian Australian man, the gist being more or less as follows:
Well, I came into this really interested in the environment; interested in learning more about the issues and exploring how I could get involved to make a difference. But I’m left feeling really overwhelmed. The issues are just so big and the scale of the challenges so great that I’ve almost lost hope. We’re all doomed. Indeed, there seems these days to be more and more of an apocalyptic zeitgeist about the place, especially when it comes to the environment and issues around climate change. What I realised from this feedback was that, as educators, myself and my colleagues had given too little thought to mitigating against this kind of counter-productive, fatalistic resignation. The course content covered things like dam construction in China, the effects of glacier melt and rising sea levels in Bangladesh, deforestation and oil palm monocultures in Malaysian Borneo, and so on, but gave scant attention to what can be done about such issues (including what we in Australia can do, especially considering the record of some Australian companies in the Asia-Pacific region), or how indigenous peoples and others are already fighting back. On this last point, local peoples have rarely been treated as agents acting on the stage of world history, only as helpless victims. This, however, must change. I realised through this experience how mistaken I had been in thinking that it was enough to simply convey content about the issues, without also conveying hope – not a false hope premised on some transcendental future utopia, but an immanent hope, grounded in real-life, real-world futures already in construction in the present. I hence resolved from then on that, in both my teaching and writing, I would not limit myself to trying to conscientise people simply by pointing out what is wrong with the world. Equally important would be showing what can be done – indeed what already is being done – about injustices everywhere; that relations of force are never total or inevitable and that new worlds are always in construction. Hope (in the very specific sense in which I have been using the term here) is what makes the difference between empowerment and mere conscientisation. And the propagation of such hope, through the exposition of alternative futures already in construction, is one very important role that both radical educators and writers can play.
The futurology of the present, then, might fruitfully be characterised as a practice of hope. It is not simply about the transfer of knowledge, but more significantly of ‘affect’⁵⁰. It is animated by revolutionary desire, while at the same time acting as a relay for this desire to spread. It does not speak about movements, but with them. It thinks with them, moves with them, and tries to inspire movement in turn. This is exactly what happened with a recent article by the North American-based CrimethInc Collective on the Really Really Free Market (RRFM)⁵¹ – an anarchist initiative best described as a kind of celebratory potlatch in which nothing is bartered or sold and everything is free. The idea is that people bring food, clothes, books, art, music, skills, services, or whatever else to share, and the rest takes care of itself. This is a perfect example of prefigurative politics in that it embodies, in the here and now, what an alternative commons-based society would look like. There is no question of having to wait until after the revolution to begin building a new world. And it demonstrates that we do not have to choose between Josef Stalin and Milton Friedman, but rather, can opt for an alternative politics of liberating the commons from both the state and the market. Indeed, the RRFM (along with other such cooperativist initiatives) acquires a new poignancy in light of the Crash of 2008 – its very name being an irreverent poke at neoliberal free market ideology. Soon after the appearance of the CrimethInc article in print and online, RRFMs began popping up across North America, Australia, Indonesia, and elsewhere. The latest I have heard is that Philippine anarchists are now beginning to organise such events as well, of course adapting them to local conditions. As the idea parachutes into a new context, it immediately enters into a new set of relations and necessarily emerges transformed in the process. It is a becoming and not a matter of simple repetition (unless, however, we are talking about a McDonalds franchise). I should also add here that it is never a matter of initiatives flowing in a one-way direction from the ‘West’ to the ‘Rest’, since there is also considerable cultural traffic in the opposite direction. Consider, for instance, the sheer global influence of the Zapatista movement or of the World Social Forum initiative originating from Brazil. A more recent example might be the affective vector that traversed the Mediterranean from Tahrir Square, Cairo, to Puerta del Sol Square, Madrid, from there emanating throughout the rest of Spain and beyond.
In each of the above cases, the role of the writer in acting as a relay for hope and inspiration cannot be discounted or underestimated. To foment affect in this way is especially revolutionary considering the ‘veritable obsession on the part of the rulers of the world with ensuring that social movements cannot be seen to grow, to flourish, to propose alternatives’⁵². To actively help in circulating, amplifying and making visible the alternatives being realised all around us is to shatter any sense of inevitability. And by this, I am really referring to two things: firstly, to the inevitability of the present promoted by the political-economic elite, and secondly, to the inevitability of the future posited by the traditional Hegelian-Marxist Left. The former would say that there is no alternative to the present; the latter that there is no alternative to their prescribed future. The futurology of the present, in contrast, emphasises that there are always alternatives. It offers examples of creative subversion, while at the same time refusing to channel movement in a particular direction, as with the manifesto form. To participate in the cultivation and propagation of new liberatory potentials – the ‘production of production’⁵³, in short – is enough. What matters is that creativity, desire and the imagination remain free to flourish, rather than be shut down, domesticated, canalised, or stultified.
In addition to the aforementioned CrimethInc article, another work that I would consider as exemplary of the futurology of the present is The Take⁵⁴, a documentary by Avi Lewis and Naomi Klein on the workers’ rebellion in Argentina that followed the financial meltdown of 2001. Here, I depart from my focus on writing for a moment, since the futurologist of the present need not necessarily be bound by the written word. The Take’s activist filmmakers aimed to mobilise their audience not solely by rousing in them an indignation against the local elites and International Monetary Fund, but more importantly by highlighting the real alternatives to capitalist social relations that Argentinian workers are already building in the present. Through their appropriation and collective self-management of abandoned factories, these workers are setting about the task of building a new and different kind of economy without having to first take state power. The bosses are not overthrown, but simply made redundant – completely surplus to the needs of society. This is another instance, like the RRFM, of creative subversion. In demonstrating real alternatives and emergent futures, The Take stands in stark contrast to the long tradition of documentary realism amongst radical filmmakers, the goal of which is simply to raise consciousness and bear witness to a given situation of injustice, in much the same vein as the jeremiad. In this style of documentary, the creative autonomy of people on the ground in responding to their situation is submerged or rendered irrelevant – perhaps because it is deemed a priori that local people are incapable of self-organisation and hence that solutions need to come from elsewhere and be imposed from the outside. It is the self-legitimating discourse of vanguardists and professional revolutionaries. The Take, however, partakes of no such nonsense, nor does it limit itself to merely communicating information about what is wrong with the world. Rather, it offers an inspiring, concrete example of how the world can be, and already is becoming, otherwise. In conveying an immanent hope, it too is exemplary of that which I have been calling the futurology of the present.
Graeber’s Direct Action is also worth mentioning.⁵⁵ Graeber, who sometimes likes to refer to himself as a ‘professional optimist’, describes in his book the proposals for a new society embodied in the practices of North American activists in the alterglobalisation movement. His work takes the form of an ethnography, albeit one that centres not on some supposedly static culture (as with traditional ethnographies), but on culture-in-motion. It strikes me that ethnography in the latter mode seems particularly well-suited to the futurology of the present. This is because embodied participation in people’s social worlds arguably allows us to grasp newness in its very contexts of production and at the very moments of its inception. The ethnographer starts with small things in small places and, from there, learns to appreciate their wider significance and connect the dots between them. The small, therefore, is never to be confused with the insignificant or trifling, since, arguably, it is only ‘through attention to detail that we can find different kinds of collectivity in formation’⁵⁶. Social theorists of the more conventional, desk-bound kind have typically overlooked the small details on the ground in favour of abstract theory, but in so doing, they have often also overlooked those formative processes by which newness enters the world.
Without wishing to indulge too much, my own research project at present is one which combines an ethnographic and futurological sensibility. In short, my work is concerned with the fate of national liberation movements under conditions of globalisation, focussing, most importantly, on the tentative green shoots that are beginning to emerge from their ashes.⁵⁷ My primary case study is that of the Philippines, which, although having been granted formal independence from the United States (US) in 1946, is still considered by many Filipin@s⁵⁸ to be under the thumb of US imperialist control – and with good reason. As such, the Maoist insurgency against the US-backed Marcos dictatorship in the 1970s and early 1980s – led by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and their armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA) – was imagined as a war of national liberation, in much the same vein as those which arose in Nicaragua and El Salvador during the same period. Despite having mobilised hundreds of thousands of people on countless fronts for almost two decades, the CPP-NPA was ironically absent in the developments which finally brought down the Marcos regime in February 1986. What toppled the dictator in the end was a military mutiny, accompanied by a popular though bloodless uprising. This dramatic turn of events became known as the People Power Revolution. In adherence with Maoist orthodoxy, the CPP-NPA’s focus was guerrilla war in the countryside, and yet the popular uprising that had swept Marcos from power had taken place in urban Manila. Long accustomed to proclaiming themselves as the vanguard of the movement, these developments came as a severe shock to many. The CPP-NPA’s absence in the midst of an insurrection meant that what replaced Marcos was not the long-prophesised communist seizure of state power, but the restoration, at least nominally, of liberal democracy. These events plunged the entire Philippine Left (in which the Maoist CPP had for so long been hegemonic) into a full-blown crisis. This was only further compounded by the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and Soviet Union in the years between 1989 and 1991, therefore dovetailing with the generalised Crisis of the Left that had, by that point, become a global phenomenon. By that time, too, the national liberation movements that had won political independence had proven themselves utterly incapable of improving the lot of the populations they now presided over. One set of bureaucrats was simply replaced by another. The same old problems associated with statism persisted, and imperialist logics were indigenised and perpetuated in the form of exclusionary nationalisms.
In 1993, the CPP-NPA imploded, with two-thirds of its members choosing to defect en masse, rejecting not only its increasingly authoritarian leadership, but also Maoist ideology as a whole. Although many of the defectors still find themselves shackled by old habits, their response to the crisis of the Left, for the most part, is not the rectification and reconsolidation of old orthodoxies (as is the case with those who remained loyal to the Party), but an effort to invent new subjectivities more in consonance with the times. Indeed, in my ethnographic fieldwork in both the Philippines and Filipin@ diaspora, these two contrasting responses to the Crisis of the Left – rectification and reinvention – were what I found to constitute the most significant fault-line in Philippine radical politics today. The flipside to the Crisis of the Left, then, has been a vibrant regeneration of radical political culture. With the Marcos dictatorship gone and the Maoists a spent force, there occurred a veritable flowering of new ideas and practices throughout the 1990s, continuing through to the present day. The disintegration of the CPP-NPA in 1993 in fact coincided with the beginning of a boom period for the environmentalist, feminist, and anarchist movements in the Philippines. Today, the Philippine social movement landscape is home to a diverse array of nascent subjectivities, constitutive of efforts to re-found transformative politics on new grounds. During my fieldwork, I sought out those former CPP activists who had broken with Maoism; those who were rethinking all of the old certainties and endeavouring to enact new modes of activism in tune with contemporary realities. I also sought out the younger generation of Filipin@ activists in order to get a sense of both the continuities and discontinuities between their ideas and those of the older generation. In each of these cases, what I paid special attention to was the new; that is, to intimations of alternative futures arising in the present, which I took to be the same thing. These intimations included all manner of emergent, even insurgent, subjectivities – new political tendencies and ways of seeing, innovations in practices and methods, new modes of cultural identification, alternative values, and so on. It is important to point out, though, that these were most often elemental or larval in form – small becomings that did not necessarily add up to fully-baked ideas or practices, nor to formal theory that was written down or codified into political programmes. This did not mean, however, that they were any less significant. On the contrary, these larval subjectivities turned out to be of paramount importance in my work, since it was at the micropolitical level of identity and desire that some of my most significant insights were gleaned. In addition, the concept of hope that I detailed earlier remained, at all times, extremely pertinent, since the novel imaginings, identities, values, practices, and experiments that I picked up on already point the way beyond the impasse within which many activists have floundered in recent decades. From the ruins of the traditional Left, a new radical politics for the twenty-first century is in the process of being born.
Although having presented a number of examples of the kinds of things that the futurology of the present concerns itself with, each in relation to the idea of immanent hope, I do wish to leave a degree of openness in my formulation so that readers can remain free to take up the practice and carry it in their own directions. Social movements, often the hotbeds of cultural innovation, have been my main focus in this article, but they certainly need not constitute the entirety of what the futurologist of the present looks at. Glimpses and intimations of other worlds in the making are indeed all around us. There is, in all spheres of life, an ‘unceasing creation’ and ‘uninterrupted upsurge of novelty’⁵⁹. Anywhere where there is an autonomous cultural production taking place, outside of the habituated channels by which the status quo reproduces itself, is a potential site for the futurologist of the present to involve herself in and draw inspiration from. Wherever there is disobedience, insubordination, creative maladjustment, play, experimentation, or creation, no matter whether at the micro or macro scale, there is something happening which deserves our attention.

Revisiting the Art-Activism Nexus
Apart from hope, another point that has resurfaced throughout this article is the vital place of creativity. This idea, however, will now need to be unpacked and expanded upon. It turns out that the ways in which I have been using the terms ‘creation’ and ‘creativity’ have really been operating on three distinct levels. There is, first of all, the ontological creativity of the ‘chaosmos’⁶⁰ – a point alluded to upon my introduction of the concept of the perpetual present. Secondly, there is the creativity of activists and countercultural deviants. Thirdly, there is the creativity of artists and writers in their production and relaying of affect. Although each of these forms of creativity are able to be distinguished from one another, it is the relationships between them, and not the categorical divisions, which are of paramount importance here. To begin with, activist practice aligns with creativity in the first sense in that to forge new forms of life outside of prevailing apparatuses of domination is to allow ontological processes of creation to continue flourishing without blockage or curtailment. From the moment there is an imposition of relations of force, or a reduction of life to either state or market logics, there is creative subversion. ‘Life revolts against everything that confines it’⁶¹, as Suely Rolnik felicitously puts it. The same could certainly be said of creativity in the artistic sense.
Activists and artists alike converge in the figure of the creator – that inventor of new values of the kind celebrated by Nietzsche⁶² as well as by autonomist theorists of ‘self-valorization’⁶³ – in that they self-consciously endeavour to bring newness into the world. Each intervenes into the material-semiotic realm that we have become accustomed to calling ‘culture’ and there, works to shake up and reinvent conventional ways of seeing, thinking, feeling, valuing, doing. Hence, to revisit a point I made in the beginning of this article, perhaps there is little real difference between making art and making change. Perhaps the production of new forms of life by activists is itself an art – not art that simply represents life, but art that is utterly indistinguishable from it.⁶⁴ As such, the futurologist of the present does not simply observe and describe at a distance the alternative futures arising in social movements and countercultural milieux, but rather, participates politically in their production and propagation. In other words, to write of countercultural practice, broadly conceived, need not take the form of a detached reportage, but can alternately become a countercultural practice in its own right. Before there was ever such a thing as viral YouTube videos, there were contagions of revolutionary desire of the kind that spread with lightning speed in 1848, 1968, 1989–1991, and 1999–2001, not to mention the Arab Spring currently underway. The principle, though, is the same. One important role that the radical writer can play, as I have suggested, is to act as a relay through which such contagions can spread – not as a spokesperson or representative of a given initiative or movement, but as a participant; an element amongst others, animated only by the winds of collective desire that fill her sails.
At this point, yet further unpacking of the concept of creativity will be required. Implicit in this article to date has been an idea of creativity defined in opposition to two separate, albeit related, aspects of Hegelian dialectics. The first is the primacy that Hegel accords to negation, which relates to the past-present-future trinary of compartmentalised time. The second, meanwhile, is Hegel’s faith in an ultimate telos, inextricably related to the notion of linear time. I will discuss each of these in turn, zooming in first of all on creation beyond negation, before then turning my attention to creation beyond teleology.
It is only owing to the dialectical schema imported into radical politics by Marx that we have come to conceptualise movement practice as war rather than as creation. Had radical politics been based upon an alternative set of premises, the history of the recent past might have looked very different. From today’s standpoint, Tristan Tzara’s quip in the early twentieth century that ‘dialectics kills’⁶⁵ seems strangely prescient of what was to ensue. ‘It lives by producing corpses, which lie strewn across an empty field where the wind has ceased to blow’, he continued.⁶⁶ Tzara was a key figure in the Dada movement, and what set the Dadaists apart from other avant-garde groups was precisely their staunch anti-Hegelianism. In fact, the Dada Manifesto of 1918 was not really a manifesto at all.⁶⁷ Instead, what Tzara produced was a parody of the very manifesto form, mocking his contemporaries for the Hegelian sense of historical self-importance which they accorded themselves.
Tzara’s distaste for Hegel was likely to have been inherited from Nietzsche, a well-known influence on Dada. The idea that dialectics kills has echoes of Nietzsche all through it, perhaps no better illustrated than when he affirmed: ‘We have art in order not to die of the truth’⁶⁸. For Hegel, truth meant dialectics and the law of negation, to which Nietzsche counterposed an affirmative philosophy of creation. He upheld creativity and the artistic sensibility as alternatives to those modes of thought which attempt to reduce reality to a stable set of laws, axioms, and equations. For Marx and Hegel, creation is always suspended until after the moment of negation, but Nietzsche’s radical contribution was to free creativity from the negative, while at the same time freeing temporality from the past-present-future trinary. Jeremiad writers and documentary realists are amongst those who continue to enslave their creative sensibilities to the negative, their practice bound by an unthinking adherence to Hegelian folk theories. Their overarching imperative of needing to first negate the present means that they fail to appreciate the creativity happening all around them. Blinded by the Sun of Hegel, they lose sight all those other stars out there; those ideas, practices, and intimations of alternative futures continually coming into being in our midst. Once we are able to regain our vision, our actions in the present cease to be rendered simply as means to an end, but instead become ‘means without end’⁶⁹ – a protean creativity and endless becoming that knows no discrete temporal stages, no telos, no hidden god. When means and ends become discordant, we forget that both are in fact immanent within the perpetual present. Creativity needs to be able to flourish, and to do so it must be liberated from negation. This is the place of means without end, of prefigurative politics, of the futurology of the present, and of all art that ceases to become abstracted from life and instead becomes life itself.
Having just discussed the possibility of creation beyond negation, I will now direct my critical gaze to creation beyond teleology. To free temporality from the telos of linear time is to do away with the idea that there is any kind of intrinsic point to history. Earlier, I recounted a Facebook debate I had with one particular Marxist who insisted that slavery was a necessary stage in human history. In this case, the African peoples brought to the Americas were quite literally the slaves of someone else’s future. This trans-Atlantic trade in human lives, however, was a contingent and non-inevitable event, not a progression along a linear timeline toward some ultimate telos – no matter whether the telos of colonial masters or Marxist historiographers. For the prophets of the hidden god of History to naturalise the entire past as inevitable only makes them the strange bedfellows of the slave-masters. And their naturalisation of the future only makes all of us slaves, condemned to playing catch-up with their version of what the future should look like.
In this schema, there can never be anything new, since everything is already given a priori. The future is foreordained and simply awaits realisation. Only when we can unmoor ourselves from hidden gods, illusory tomorrows, and other such stultifying ideas, can we really embrace creativity and appreciate the production of novelty on its own terms. From the instant that the god of History is dethroned by Janus, infinite horizons fan out in all directions. And our creativity suddenly becomes creativity per se, not the mere fulfilment of a telos. This is an idea I characterised earlier in terms of drawing, rather than merely colouring-in. The blank sketchbook knows no a priori designs; only the a posteriori marks that we leave behind as we move. In the realm of activism, this sensibility is embodied in the practice of prefigurative politics – a break not only from the cult of negation, but also from the idea that revolution has to mean fulfilling some programme handed down from on high. As Graeber writes, ‘we’re all already revolutionaries when we make something genuinely new’⁷⁰. What this means for radical writing, meanwhile, is to do away with manifestos and instead tune our attention into the profound creativity everywhere in our midst. Unlike in the manifesto tradition, the futurology of the present does not prescribe a single monolithic future, but tries instead to articulate the many alternative futures continually emerging in the perpetual present. The goal of such an endeavour is to make visible the living, breathing alternatives all around us, while at the same time fomenting an immanent hope that can spread virally and be enacted in other places elsewhere.
To sacrifice today in the name of an illusory tomorrow is just not the point anymore. It is for this reason that I chose to open with those extraordinary words from Janis Joplin – tomorrow never happens. The point is to draw, not simply to colour-in or fulfill some pre-ordained utopian future. It is to continually re-invent reality from within reality, rather than from some external, transcendental standpoint such as that mystical realm where invisible hands and hidden gods reside. As an aside, it has occurred to me, as I sit here at my kitchen table punching out these final words, what a happy coincidence it is that the names Janis and Janus bear such a striking resemblance to one another. If I was a visual artist (not just a writer-cum-artist manqué), I would no doubt enjoy experimenting with ways to combine the two in some sort of installation – perhaps a stone bust of Janus, singing in the unmistakably raw and passionate voice of one of the legends of the hippie movement. But it matters not that I am no artist in any formal sense, since each of us are already artists of the present in our own ways. ‘One creates new modalities of subjectivity in the same way that an artist creates new forms from the palette’, writes Guattari.⁷¹ The parallel he draws between art and social transformation is not to be taken as mere metaphor, however. What he calls for is a merging of art with life, his contention being that global warming and the other great issues of our times cannot be adequately addressed ‘without a mutation of mentality, without promoting a new art of living in society’⁷². To the ends of forging a more habitable and convivial present, the cross-fertilisations between artistic and activist practices need to continue proliferating, and creativity in general must remain free to flourish. Just as the economic crisis in Argentina in 2001 was quickly and creatively responded to by way of a slew of liberatory initiatives at the grassroots (including the occupied factory movement discussed earlier), the same is now happening in response to the current economic crisis, albeit at a global scale. In these conditions, the futurology of the present is needed now more than ever. The question becomes whether to resign ourselves to the life-denying ossification of creativity under capitalism and the traditional Left alike, or, to liberate life wherever it is imprisoned and to participate passionately and deliberately in the production of the new.

1.) Acknowledgements are due first of all to Anamaine Asinas for all her love, support, and inspiration. Ana – I cannot help but think that the kind of intensely passionate, nurturing and mutually-liberating relationship we share is the very stuff that revolutions are made of. I would also like to extend my warmest thanks to Eric Pido and Marta Celletti, since it was in many a conversation with these dear friends that some of the ideas presented in this article were first formed. Sincere thank yous must also go out to Marc Herbst, Rosi Braidotti, Steven Morgana, Suzanne Passmore, and Elmo Gonzaga, each of whom kindly read various incarnations of this work and provided some very helpful and encouraging feedback. Lastly, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to all of the many activists whom I have worked with over the years, since it is really the collective imagination of our movements that is the true author of this work.
2.) Janis Joplin, ‘Ball and Chain’ in Janis Joplin’s Greatest Hits, CBS Records, 1973.
3.) See Gottfried Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977 [1807].
4.) As the Hegelian philosopher Alexandre Kojève put it: ‘Time in which the Future takes primacy can be realized, can exist, only provided that it negates or annihilates’. See Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Basic Books, New York, 1969, p. 136. Hegel’s ideas on negation are drawn, in no small part, from physics: ‘In modern physical science the opposition, first observed to exist in magnetism as polarity, has come to be regarded as a universal law pervading the whole of nature’ (Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 223). Here he takes the positive-negative opposition found in electrical and magnetic phenomena and adapts it to social relations, elevating it as a mechanical law governing all of history.
5.) See, for example, Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992 [1848]; Michael Albert, Moving Forward: Program for a Participatory Economy, AK Press, San Francisco, 2000; and George Monbiot, Manifesto for a New World Order, New Press, New York, 2004. The manifestos of the twentieth century avant-gardes (Futurist, Surrealist, Situationist, and so on) are perfectly exemplary too – with the exception, perhaps, of the Dada Manifesto of 1918, which was more a parody of the manifesto form.
6.) See, for example, Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992 [1848]; Michael Albert, Moving Forward: Program for a Participatory Economy, AK Press, San Francisco, 2000; and George Monbiot, Manifesto for a New World Order, New Press, New York, 2004. The manifestos of the twentieth century avant-gardes (Futurist, Surrealist, Situationist, and so on) are perfectly exemplary too – with the exception, perhaps, of the Dada Manifesto of 1918, which was more a parody of the manifesto form.
7.) Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, Labor of Dionysus: A critique of the state-form, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1994, p. 6.
8.) Rebecca Solnit, 2009, ‘The Revolution Has Already Occurred’, The Nation, viewed 19 April 2009, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090323/solnit, p. 13.
9.) Dimitris Papadopoulos, Niamh Stephenson & Vassilis Tsianos, Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century, Pluto Press, London, 2008, p. xiii.
10.) Gilles Deleuze, ‘What is a dispositif?’, in T. J. Armstrong (ed), Michel Foucault: Philosopher, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1992, p. 163.
11.) Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1995, p. 12.
12.) Colectivo Situaciones, 2003, ‘On the Researcher-Militant’, European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies, viewed 28 January 2011, http://eipcp.net/transversal/0406/colectivosituaciones/en, p. 3.
13.) David Graeber, Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology, Prickly Paradigm Press, Chicago, 2004, p. 12.
14.) Maurizio Lazzarato, ‘Multiplicity, Totality, Politics’, Parrhesia, iss. 9, 2010, p. 24.
15.) Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1993, pp. ix–xv.
16.) See Uri Gordon, Anarchy Alive!: Anti-Authoritarian Politics from Practice to Theory, Pluto Press, London, 2008; and Jeffrey S. Juris, Networking Futures: The Movements Against Corporate Globalization, Duke University Press, Durham, 2008.
17.) Bruno Latour, ‘Postmodern? No, Simply Amodern!: Steps Towards an Anthropology of Science’, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 21, iss. 1, 1990, pp. 145–171.
18.) Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 92. Here, Guattari draws from the concept of ‘duration’ as found in Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, Dover Publications, Mineola, 1998 [1911].
19.) Cited in Gerald Raunig, Art and Revolution: Transversal Activism in the Long Twentieth Century, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007, p. 47.
20.) Scott Littleton, Gods, Goddesses, and Mythology, Vol. 6, Marshall Cavendish, Tarrytown, 2005, p. 770.
21.) Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Penguin Books, London, 2003 [1885], p. 150.
22.) Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, Penguin, London, 1991 [1977], p. 31; Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, in P. Rabinow (ed), The Foucault Reader, Penguin Books, London, 1984, pp. 76–100.
23.) Free Association, 2010, How to generate a generation, viewed 25 February 2011, http://freelyassociating.org/2010/10/how-to-generate-a-generation/, p. 1.
24.) Gilles Deleuze cited in Félix Guattari & Suely Rolnik, Molecular Revolution in Brazil, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2008 [1986], p. 19.
25.) See Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, What is to be Done?, Oxford University Press, Clarendon, 1963 [1902].
26.) Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1, Penguin Books, London, 1986 [1867]; Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 2, Penguin Books, London, 1985 [1885]; Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 3, Penguin Books, London, 1981 [1894].
27.) See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007 [1740].
28.) An analogy might help to illustrate the problematic I am dealing with here: Imagine that you are a houseguest at the home of a friend and you get up in the middle of the night to use the bathroom. The only problem is that there is an electrical storm outside and the power has failed. All is dark. Would it be necessary to have a complete map of the entire household in your mind in order to be able to reach the bathroom, or might it also be possible to feel your way there through the dark? The futurology of the present is not concerned with the map of the house; only with those feeling their way through the dark. Instances of the latter kind are what Maurice Merleau-Ponty has referred to as ‘absorbed coping’. See Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, Merleau-Ponty and ‘Phenomenology of perception’, Routledge, Abingdon, 2011, pp. 96–97.
29.) Examples include Jean Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact, Berg, Oxford, 2005; Paul Virilio 2005, The Information Bomb, Verso, London; and Annie Le Brun 2008, The Reality Overload: The Modern World’s Assault on the Imaginal Realm, Inner Traditions, Rochester.
30.) Harry Cleaver, 1992, ‘Kropotkin, Self-Valorization and the Crisis of Marxism’, Libcom, viewed 9 March 2010, http://libcom.org/library/kropotkin-self-valorization-crisis-marxism, p. 4.
31.) The commons could be considered as capitalism’s constitutive outside. It is the very lifeblood of capital and yet, even as it is harnessed, it must simultaneously be negated lest it threaten the calcified order necessary for capitalism’s own reproduction. The concept of the ‘constitutive outside’ has been drawn here from Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex“, Routledge, New York, 1993, pp. 3, 8.
32.) Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976 [1847], p. 57.
33.) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. See also Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, Athlone Press, London, 1983 [1962].
34.) Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982 [1844], p. 138.
35.) Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 136.
36.) Rosi Braidotti, Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 167.
37.) Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 29.
38.) Jorge Luis Borges, ‘The Garden of Forking Paths’ in D. Yates & J. Irby (eds), Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings, New Directions, New York, 1964, p. 28.
39.) Richard Day, Gramsci is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements, Pluto Press, London, 2005, p. 183.
40.) Karl Marx, ‘Estranged Labour’ in K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1961 [1844], pp. 67–83.
41.) This is an idea expressed in Gottfried Hegel, ‘The doctrine of essence’ in W. Wallace (ed), The logic of Hegel, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1892 [1817], pp. 207–286. ‘[T]hings really are not what they immediately show themselves … there is a permanent in things, and that permanent is in the first instance their Essence’ (pp. 208–209).
42.) Lazzarato, ‘Multiplicity, Totality, Politics’, p. 24.
43.) David Graeber, 2008, ‘Hope in Common’, The Anarchist Library, viewed 1 July 2011, http://theanarchistlibrary.org/HTML/David_Graeber__Hope_in_Common.html, pp. 1, 4.
44.) Graeber, ‘Hope in Common’, p. 1.
45.) Graeber, ‘Hope in Common’, p. 1
46.) This formulation of a ‘political apathy’ is indebted to the work of Feeltank Chicago. See Jerome Mast Grand, Amber Hasselbring & Corndog Brothers, 2008, ‘Renaming Bush Street’, Journal of Aesthetics and Protest, iss. 6, viewed 5 July 2011, http://www.journalofaestheticsandprotest.org/6/antiwar/renamingbushstreet.html.
47.) Foucault, Discipline and Punish.
48.) Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 293–308.
49.) Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, Empire, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2000.
50.) My thinking on affect is primarily sourced from Brian Massumi, Parables for the virtual: Movement, affect, sensation, Duke University Press, Durham, 2002. In short, affect is the capacity to affect and be affected. It is not a personal feeling, but a pre-personal intensity that exists only in flows between people and things.
51.) CrimethInc., 2008, ‘The Really Really Free Market: Instituting the Gift Economy’, CrimethInc. Ex-Workers’ Collective, viewed 8 July 2011, http://www.crimethinc.com/texts/atoz/reallyreally.php.
52.) Graeber, ‘Hope in Common’, p. 1.
53.) Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, Penguin, New York, 2009 [1972], pp. 4–8.
54.) Avi Lewis & Naomi Klein, The Take, Barna-Alper Productions, New York, 2004.
55.) David Graeber, Direct Action: An Ethnography, AK Press, Oakland, 2009.
56.) Penny Harvey & Soumhya Venkatesan, ‘Faith, Reason and the Ethic of Craftsmanship: Creating Contingently Stable Worlds’, in M. Candea (ed), The Social After Gabriel Tarde: Debates and Assessments, Routledge, Abingdon, p. 130.
57.) The bulk of my research results are still in the process of being written up, although a few preliminary sketches have so far been published. See, for instance, Marco Cuevas-Hewitt, ‘Sketches of an Archipelagic Poetics of Postcolonial Belonging’, Budhi: A Journal of Culture and Ideas, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2007, pp. 239–246; and Marco Cuevas-Hewitt, ‘The Figure of the “Fil-Whatever“: Filipino American Trans-Pacific Social Movements and the Rise of Radical Cosmopolitanism’, World Anthropologies Network E-Journal, no. 5, 2010, pp. 97–127.
58.) I seek to neutralise gender here by synthesising both the feminine and masculine suffixes (‘-a’ and ‘-o’, respectively) into the new suffix of ‘-@’. The reason that I have chosen this form over the standard ‘Filipino’ is that I wish to avoid using a gender-specific descriptor to stand in for all Filipin@s. This is an unfortunate grammatical inheritance from Spanish colonialism, since pre-Hispanic indigenous languages in the Philippine archipelago were, by and large, gender-neutral. I might have chosen to use the alternative suffix of ‘-a/o’ but decided against it, not just because it reads somewhat clumsily, but more importantly because it perpetuates the rigid binary notion of gender by which genderqueer individuals are marginalised.
59.) Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 29.
60.) Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, Continuum, London, 2004 [1987], p. 7.
61.) Cited in Guattari & Rolnik, Molecular Revolution in Brazil, p. 87.
62.) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra; Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1989 [1886].
63.) Harry Cleaver, Reading Capital Politically, Anti/Theses, Leeds, 2000 [1979], p. 18; Antonio Negri, Books for Burning: Between Civil War and Democracy in 1970s Italy, Verso, London, 2005, pp. 198–207, 215–230.
64.) See John Jordan, ‘Deserting the Culture Bunker’, Journal of Aesthetics and Protest, iss. 3, viewed 10 July 2011, http://www.joaap.org/new3/jordan.html.
65.) Cited in Lee Scrivner, ‘How to Write an Avant-Garde Manifesto (A Manifesto)’, London Consortium, viewed 9 July 2011, http://www.londonconsortium.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/scrivneripmessay.pdf, p. 13.
66.) Cited in Scrivner, ‘How to Write an Avant-Garde Manifesto (A Manifesto)’, p. 13.
67.) Tristan Tzara, 2006 [1918], ‘Dada Manifesto’, Wikisource, viewed 4 July 2011, http://www.freemedialibrary.com/index.php/Dada_Manifesto_(1918,_Tristan_Tzara).
68.) Cited in Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, Penguin Books, London, 2005 [1942], p. 90.
69.) Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End: Notes on Politics, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2000.
70.) Graeber, ‘Hope in Common’, p. 4.
71.) Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 7. To interpret Guattari here as saying that the production of novelty is simply a straightforward matter of human intent and free will would be gravely mistaken. Becomings can only occur through ‘heterogenesis’ (pp. 33–57); that is, through a multiplicity of elements in symbiosis. In the case of multiplicities in which human beings play a part, subjectivity is certainly one ingredient in the mix, but it does not assume the role of primary causal determinant. There is always an unpredictability to heterogenesis and we often we end up with entirely different outcomes to what we originally intended. It must furthermore be stressed that human subjectivity does not exist on some separate plane of reality as René Descartes presumed, but must rather be seen to be part of matter.
72.) Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 20.

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Dieser Text erschien zuerst unter http://joaap.org/issue8/8toc.htm

Der Barbar als Kulturheld

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:37 +0000

III.14

Zwei Wege zum Erfolg: das heitere und das heroische Scheitern.
Von Karl Popper lernten alle Wissenschaftler, durch Scheitern erfolgreich zu arbeiten. Popper nannte dieses bemerkenswerte Verfahren „Falsifikation“: ein Wissenschaftler stellt Hypothesen auf, deren Bedeutungen sich erst herausstellen, wenn es nicht gelingt, sie zu widerlegen. In den Naturwissenschaften sind Experimente der beste Weg zur Falsifizierung von Hypothesen. Wenn das Experiment scheitert, weiß man, daß die Hypothesen unbrauchbar sind. Also arbeitete der Wissenschaftler erfolgreich! Aber um Experimente zu entwerfen, braucht man Hypothesen. Wie können Experimente Hypothesen widerlegen, wenn die Experimente erst durch die besagten Hypothesen möglich werden? Naturwissenschaftler führen Experimente und Hypothesen zusammen im Aufbau einer Logik (zumeist mathematisch formuliert), die es ermöglicht, mit der Diskrepanz zwischen hypothetischen Voraussagen und experimentellen Resultaten zu rechnen. Die Falsifikation läuft also darauf hinaus, Diskrepanzen zu bewerten und zu handhaben. Das Experiment ist gelungen, wenn es scheitert. In den Künsten unseres Jahrhunderts wurde ebenfalls Scheitern als Form des Gelingens zum Thema gemacht: und zwar in mehrfacher Hinsicht. Auffällig ist die Betonung, daß moderne Künstler experimentieren. Die Begriffe „experimentell“, „experimentelle Kunst“ werden stets bemüht, um künstlerische Arbeiten interessant erscheinen zu lassen, wenn sie offensichtlich eine Diskrepanz zwischen der Erwartung an die Künstler und den faktischen Werken zur Erscheinung bringen. Seit hundert Jahren werden solche Diskrepanzen von einem Teil des Kunstpublikums als Entartungen stigmatisiert. Die Kampagnen gegen die entarteten Künste zielten darauf ab, nur solche Werke als gelungen zuzulassen, die mit einem vorgegebenen Kunstverständnis übereinstimmten. Als Künstler fühlte sich derjenige bestätigt, dem andere vorhielten, gescheitert zu sein.
Die Überprüfung dieses Kunstverständnisses wollten die Künstler aber gerade erreichen, indem sie experimentierten. Sie führten Experimente und hypothetische Kunstbegriffe im Aufbau einer Logik zusammen, die es ermöglichen sollte, die Bedeutung des künstlerischen Arbeitens in der Konfrontation mit dem Unbekannten, Inkommensurablen, dem nicht Beherrschbaren, also der Wirklichkeit, zu sehen. Im Scheitern, nach akademischen Regeln ein vorgegebenes Kunstverständnis durch Werke zu verifizieren, sieht der moderne Künstler das Gelingen seiner Arbeit; denn es käme auf ihn als Individuum gar nicht an, wenn er nur eine normative Ästhetik oder Kunsttheorie durch seine Arbeit bestätigen müßte.
Niemand hat in diesem Jahrhundert die peinliche Frage: „Und das soll Kunst sein?“ so radikal gestellt wie die Künstler selber. In der Beschäftigung mit dieser Frage gingen sie so weit zu bezweifeln, daß sie überhaupt Kunst-Werke schaffen. Denn ein planmäßig ausgeführtes Werk wäre nur eine Illustration eines hypothetischen Konstrukts von Kunst, das auch ohne die Werke besteht.
Künstler begründeten die Notwendigkeit zu experimentieren aber nicht nur durch das Ziel, vorherrschende Kunstauffassungen zu falsifizieren. Sie entdeckten, daß offensichtlich eine generelle Diskrepanz zwischen gedanklichem Konstrukt und seiner bildsprachlichen Vergegenständlichung unvermeidbar ist, weil für Menschen Identität zwischen Anschauung und Begriff, Inhalt und Form, Bewußtsein und Kommunikation nicht herstellbar ist (von mathematischer Eindeutigkeit abgesehen). Sie lernten mit der Nichtidentität von Kunstkonzept und Kunstwerk produktiv umzugehen, indem sie die Diskrepanz nutzten, um etwas Neues hervorzubringen, das man sich nicht hypothetisch ausdenken kann. Innovativ zu sein, hieß also, von vornherein auf die erzwungene Identität von normativen Kunstbegriffen und ihrer Entsprechung im Werk zu verzichten. Das Scheitern der Werke wurde zur Voraussetzung dafür, etwas Neues, Unbekanntes zum Thema zu machen. Dieses Verfahren hatte für die Künstler eine existentielle Dimension. Wer sich auf das Neue, auf das Experiment einläßt, ist in der herkömmlichen Rolle als Künstler weder erkennbar noch akzeptierbar. Latente soziale Stigmatisierungen trieben die Künstler immer weiter in die Radikalität des Experimentierens. Sie hatten extreme Lebensbedingungen zu akzeptieren. Um die zu ertragen, neigten sie zu exzessiver Lebensführung. Der Konsum von Drogen aller Art wirkte sich auf die Verfassung der Experimentatoren aus, wodurch sie häufig ein auffälliges Verhalten demonstrierten, das die Öffentlichkeit nicht nur als exzentrisch, sondern auch als psychopathologisch bewertete. Das Scheitern ihrer bürgerlichen Existenz verstanden mehr und mehr Künstler als Voraussetzung für ihre Fähigkeit, radikal zu experimentieren.
In diesem Punkt trafen sie sich mit anderen Abweichungspersönlichkeiten (Terroristen, Kriminellen, Propheten), z. B. mit Hitler. Er legitimierte sich durch die Erfahrung des Scheiterns als Bürger wie als Künstler. Immer wieder betonte er, daß er Hunger, Abweisung, seelische Verwüstung habe durchmachen müssen. Radikal sein zu müssen, ergab sich aus der Erfahrung des Scheiterns. In dieser Radikalität lag sein Heroismus der Tat begründet: die heroische Künstlerattitude, die sich prinzipiell im radikalen Scheitern bewährt. Er falsifizierte mit allem, was er tat, die alte europäische Welt mit ihren religiösen, sozialen, künstlerischen Vorstellungen. Götterdämmerung ist der Name, der seit Wagner für diese Strategie des heroischen Scheiterns verwendet wird. So konnte er am Ende seiner Tage zurecht überzeugt sein, mit seinem Scheitern die Welt radikaler verändert zu haben als alle seine Zeitgenossen.
Heute nennt man den Heroismus des Scheiterns wohl besser ästhetischen Fundamentalismus. Er hat an Faszination nichts verloren. Wagner und Nietzsche, die Protagonisten des heroischen und des heiteren Scheiterns, interessieren inzwischen aber nicht nur Künstler, Politiker, Wissenschaftler und andere Welterretter. Längst haben jugendliche Subkulturen die Glorie des Scheiterns zur eigenen Rechtfertigung genutzt. Eine ganze Generation scheint unter dem Eindruck zu leben, daß sie scheitern wird – wirtschaftlich, ökologisch, sozial. An Radikalität nehmen es die Hooligans, die Ghettobewohner, die Mafiosi mit jedem Wagner und jedem Hitler auf. An das Schaffen von Werken glauben sie nicht mehr. Sie experimentieren total und konfrontieren sich dem unbekannten und unbeherrschbaren Selbstlauf von Natur und Gesellschaft anscheinend ohne jede Angst. Die Attituden von Künstlern und Politikern interessieren sie nicht mehr, weil sie diese Attituden selbst repräsentieren. Mit postmoderner Heiterkeit sind sie heroisch. Der lachende Schrecken, die zynische Wurstigkeit grundiert ihre Alltagserfahrung bei der geradezu wissenschaftlich gerechtfertigten Aufgabe, sich selbst zu falsifizieren. Was einst nur Atom- und Neutronenbombenbauern, heiligen Selbstmördern und starken Nihilisten der Künste vorbehalten war, praktiziert jetzt jedermann. Die Philosophie des Scheiterns als Form der Vollendung wurde total. Welch ein Erfolg – gerade auch als Aufklärung. Denn die Aufklärer wußten, daß sie nur durch eines widerlegt werden würden: durch ihren Erfolg.

Wiederabdruck
Der Textauszug erschien zuerst in: Der Barbar als Kulturheld, Bazon Brock III: Gesammelte Schriften 1991–2002, Ästhetik des Unterlassens, Kritik der Wahrheit – wie man wird, der man nicht ist. DuMont: Köln 2002, S. 310ff.

http://bazonbrock.de/werke/detail/?id=12§id=135&highlight=zwei%20wege%20zum%20erfolg#sect [20.01.2013].