define('DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT', true); define('DISALLOW_FILE_MODS', true); Politisierung – what's next? https://whtsnxt.net Kunst nach der Krise Tue, 31 May 2016 15:53:39 +0000 de hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.8.3 __ https://whtsnxt.net/145 Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:46 +0000 http://whtsnxt.net/__/ In my view visual art should not ask the question of how art can represent or document politics, but how visual art is inextricably intertwined with the politics of production. One could say that visual art is a kind of celebration of production, it is a production which has no primary use value, but a production which is a reflection of production in general. In consequence visual art has always reflected, consciously or not, the latest in technology: from the very beginnings of civilization with the recognition of stones as a tool enabling cave drawing until the latest in military technology resulting in video or internet art.
But what does it mean for visual art if the cultural technique or very idea of technology itself becomes problematic? The development of technology has always meant progress in how to transform material or natural resources via human labour. The transformation of material is the key mode of production of any society up to date. It transforms ‘nature’ into supply goods in order to decrease supply shortage and to diminish the treats of nature, both of course aiming at enhancing quality of life. But since the middle of the 20th century with the appearance of excess supply in western societies as well as mankind endangering of the specific disposition of nature in which human life seems possible, the hegemoniality of the transformation of material as the mode of production has been deeply questioned. So, equally the development of this mode of production, technological progress, has become problematic.
Basically, all visual art works are produced by transformations of material, there are only very few exceptions (e. g. some of Michael Asher’s works). For visual art to keep on affirming this mode of production and following its development does not seem very interesting to me.
Art that does not address this politicity of its own medium, but all the same puts itself underneath the banner of progressive politics, performs a gesture which is dangerously reactionary on the one hand, because it proposes that there can be critique without self-critique (which implies the possibility of a place outside of society, a site of disinvolvement), and on the other because it proposes that art has to actively connect itself to politics, implying that there is no apriori connection between art and politics. Jacques Rancière has commented on the problematicness of the latter when saying that just as proclaiming ‘the end of politics’ the proclamation of ‘the return of politics’ is equally just another way of cancelling out politics, which in this particular case would be the cancelling out of the intrinsic connection between visual art and economical production.
The question I would prefer visual art to pose itself is, how can it help in developing and promoting alternative modes of production or other approached to production instead of constantly reaffirming the dominant and highly problematic ones? So that in a Rancièrean sense a new voice ruptures the hegemonic discourse on production of which visual art is until now a chief representative.

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Dieser Text erschien zuerst in: noroomgallery (Hrsg.): Den Letzten beißen die Hunde. Was man in der Kunst tun sollte/könnte/müsste. Visionen künstlerischer Praxis, Hamburg 2008.

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Das Ende der Ökonomischen Blase der Zeitgenössischen Kunst https://whtsnxt.net/124 Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:44 +0000 http://whtsnxt.net/das-ende-der-oekonomischen-blase-der-zeitgenoessischen-kunst/ Die Wucht der aktuellen Wirtschaftskrise ist unbestreitbar. Die Lebensbedingungen in neoliberal kapitalistischen Gesellschaften wurden beschrieben und überdacht, und die aktuelle Politisierungswelle plätscherte auch durch den zeitgenössischen Kunstbetrieb. Was aus diesen Umständen allerdings folgt, bleibt bislang ziemlich offen. Vielleicht aber lässt sich am Beispiel der Kunstwelt und ihres sich immer noch aufblähenden Markts absehen, was auf dem Spiel steht und in welche Richtung sich die derzeitige Situation entwickeln könnte.
Mikkel Bolt Rasmussen untersucht den Einfluss privater und öffentlicher Interessen auf Institutionen zeitgenössischer Kunst. Indem sie unter Druck geraten, sich durch Kollaborationen Finanzierung und Sichtbarkeit zu sichern, werden Institutionen anfällig füfür Kompromisse, die die Integrität ihrer kritischen Haltung gefährden können, während die investierenden Parteien von ihr profitieren. Insofern aber in diesem Tausch ein bestimmtes Maß an Verantwortlichkeit und Reflektion nicht fehlen darf, gibt es jeden Grund, sich um Transparenz zu bemühen und die Konsequenzen abzuwägen.

Es wird dramatische Veränderungen geben. Unabhängig davon, ob der Kapitalismus auf eine Art endgültigen Kollaps im Sinne von Robert Kurz zusteuert oder „nur“ einen Prozess der Entwertung und Bereinigung durchläuft, wie etwa die Diagnose von Michael Heinrich lautet, befinden wir uns inmitten einer tiefen Krise, die auch auf die Kunstwelt dramatische Auswirkungen haben wird.1 Wie genau, wird sich noch zu erweisen haben, doch ein ziemlich guter erster Eindruck lässt sich bereits gewinnen, wenn man einige Entwicklungen der Kunstwelt in den letzten paar Jahren betrachtet, so unter anderem den erstaunlichen Fall der Zusammenarbeit der Tensta Kunsthalle mit dem Auktionshaus Bukowskis. Letzteres befindet sich im Besitz der Familie Lundin, der auch Lundin Petroleum gehört, eine Firma, die beschuldigt wird, im Sudan und in Äthiopien gemordet und Dörfer niedergebrannt zu haben.
Man ist versucht, die sogenannte Finanzkrise aus der Perspektive des krisenorientierten Wertformtheoretikers Robert Kurz und dessen These vom Zusammenbruch der Moderne zu betrachten, wonach der Kapitalismus nicht nur die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen ist. Kurz ist unlängst verstorben, hinterlässt uns jedoch eine Reihe wichtiger Bücher und Aufsätze über den Kapitalismus als Produktionsweise und Herrschaftsform, die uns erlauben, gesellschaftliche Emanzipation jenseits der Grenzen der alten und neuen Linken zu überdenken.2 Kurz’ Hauptthese besagt – im Anschluss an Marx’ Analyse der zerstörerischen Logik kapitalistischer Akkumulation –, dass der Kapitalismus seinem Ende entgegengeht. Aufgrund seiner eigenen Dynamik ist der Kapitalismus in eine kritische Phase eingetreten, in der er, als würde er an einer Autoimmunkrankheit leiden, seine eigene Substanz aufzehrt. Kurz zufolge hat die dritte (mikroelektronische) industrielle Revolution eine derartig hohe Produktivität bewirkt, dass der nötige Raum für die reale Akkumulation nicht mehr geschaffen werden kann.3 Der Kapitalismus ist kaum noch in der Lage, das durch die Computerisierung entfesselte ungeheure Ausmaß an Produktivität, Handelsvolumen und technisch-wissenschaftlicher Tätigkeit zu handhaben oder zu regulieren. An die Stelle des alten Widerspruchs der Kapitalzirkulation (die Kluft zwischen Warenproduktion und Warenverkauf) ist somit der Widerspruch zwischen einer Produktivität, die immer mehr Lohnarbeiter/innen überflüssig macht, und den Bedingungen der Kapitalverwertung, die für Hunderte Millionen Menschen das Schicksal des von Michael Denning so genannten „lohnlosen Lebens“4 bereithält, getreten. Sein Bestehen konnte der Kapitalismus nur dadurch verlängern, dass er ein noch nie dagewesenes Maß an (öffentlicher und privater) Verschuldung und an Finanzblasen aufhäufte. Dieses System hat sich überlebt, da es keinen Profit hervorbringen kann und heute mehr Arbeit vernichtet als schafft, so Kurz. Der zukünftige Wertzuwachs wird nie eingelöst werden können, und neue Möglichkeiten der Wertsteigerung sind nicht auszumachen. Kurz’ Schluss lautet, dass der Kapitalismus sich durch seine Emanzipation von der Arbeit sein eigenes Grab schaufele. Die Produktivitätssteigerung in der Warenerzeugung hat notwendigerweise zur Folge, dass immer weniger relativer Mehrwert geschaffen werden kann.
Auch wenn Kurz’ krisenorientierte Analyse der Entwicklung des Kapitalismus mit einem gewissen schrillen, fast apokalyptischen Tonfall daherkommt, hilft sie uns, hinter die unmittelbaren, sichtbaren Aspekte der Krise zu blicken und die wesentlichen Mechanismen des Kapitalismus zu analysieren, insbesondere die Frage, wie dieser sich, aufgrund innerer Gesetzmäßigkeiten, der produktiven Arbeit entledigt und damit einen radikalen Inhaltsverlust erleidet. Nach Kurz’ Auffassung ist die Krise nicht den Aktivitäten von Bankern/Bankerinnen und Börsenmaklern/-maklerinnen geschuldet, sondern dem neuen Produktivitätsstandard, der zu globaler Massenarbeitslosigkeit und einer fallenden Profitrate führt. Kurz’ Diagnose vom Zusammenbruch des Kapitals ist von großer Bedeutung, will man darüber nachdenken, welche Veränderungen in der Kunstwelt die Selbstzerstörung des Kapitalismus begleiten werden.
Während der globale wirtschaftliche Zusammenbruch voranschreitet, lassen sich in Kunst und Kultur bereits Anzeichen einer Veränderung bemerken. Ein wesentlicher Bestandteil des neoliberalen Regimes der Akkumulation war die immer engere Verflechtung von Marktdynamik und Kultur. Im Namen der „Kreativität“ versuchte der Kapitalismus sich ein menschliches Antlitz zu verleihen, während Joseph Beuys’ Diktum, dass „jeder Mensch ein Künstler“ sei, zur Logik des absoluten kreativen Imperativs wurde. Wie Luc Boltanski und Ève Chiapello in ihrer vielzitierten Analyse argumentieren, ist aus der Künstlerkritik ein neuer Geist des Kapitalismus entstanden, der Neoliberalismus, in dem der Rigidität hierarchischer fordistischer Arbeitsstrukturen die Freiheit und Autonomie der Kunst gegenübergestellt wird. „So sind zum Beispiel Eigenschaften, die in diesem neuen Geist eine Erfolgsgarantie darstellen – Autonomie, Spontaneität, Mobilität, Disponibilität, Kreativität, Plurikompetenz […], die visionäre Gabe, das Gespür für Unterschiede […] –, direkt der Ideenwelt der 68er entnommen.“5 Die Idee der Revolution ist mehr oder weniger vollständig aus dem politischen Vokabular verschwunden, nur um als Logik der Selbstverwirklichung in einem neuen, kreativen Kapitalismus wiederzukehren, wo jede/r dem Imperativ der permanenten radikalen Veränderung unterworfen war, der die Anpassung der Lebensstrategien an die flexiblen Anforderungen des Marktes forderte. Mit der Anerkennung der Kreativität als individuelle Fähigkeit von höchstem Wert betrachteten sich nun alle als menschliches Kapital. Dank des Enthusiasmus der Künstler/innen, ihres Idealismus und ihrer Fähigkeiten der Anpassung an sich wandelnde Arbeitsbedingungen wurden sie als Prototyp dieser besonderen Sorte von „Befreiung“ präsentiert, die in den 1990er und 2000er Jahren über den Erdball fegte und dabei auch die Vorstellung von Kunst selbst veränderte und sie durch „Kreativität“ und die „Kreativindustrie“ ersetzte. In dieser Verbindung von urbaner Modernisierung und Kulturindustrie galt die Kultur wie alles andere als ein Warenkreislauf, und man bemächtigte sich der kollektiven Bildproduktion, um die privaten Profite zu steigern.6 Der Hype um die Kreativindustrien entsprach den Blasen auf den Immobilien-, Aktien- und Derivatemärkten und schuf ein Spektakel von beeindruckendem Selbstvertrauen, hinter dem sich die andauernde Aushöhlung des Kapitalismus verbergen konnte. Kreativität ging Hand in Hand mit Spekulation und Schulden.
Im Zuge dieser Entwicklung übernahmen nicht nur Unternehmensführungen, sondern auch Kunstinstitutionen die Rhetorik der sozialen Verantwortung und der sozialen Teilhabe. Jede Kunstinstitution, die dieses Namens würdig sein wollte, musste über ein Integrationsprogramm verfügen, mit dem die lokale Community mit einbezogen wurde, und zahllose Institutionen veranstalteten Diskussionen über Gentrifizierung und prekäre Arbeit. Die fortschrittlichsten unter den Institutionsdirektoren und -direktorinnen verstanden sich sogar selbst als Institutionskritiker/innen, die auf der Ebene der institutionellen Leitung und Programmarbeit tätig waren, indem sie durch eine Rhetorik der sanften popkulturellen Subversion die Kritik aktiv unterstützten, etwa wenn sie in Ausstellungstiteln Popsonglyrik zitierten: „There’s gonna be some trouble, a whole house will need rebuilding.“7 Unter der Überschrift des experimentellen oder neuen Institutionalismus wurde die Kunstinstitution in eine Mischung aus pädagogischem Experiment und Gemeindezentrum verwandelt.
Jenseits des Geplänkels mit einem semipolitischen oder engagierten Vokabular standen radikale Veränderungen oder Brüche jedoch offenbar nie auf dem Plan. Im Nachhinein wirken diese institutionellen Experimente eher wie zynischer Opportunismus. Heute können wir sie als das erkennen, was sie sind, nämlich als der fortschrittlichere Teil der blasenförmigen Ökonomie zeitgenössischer Kunst, wo zum Beispiel Künstler/innen und Kritiker/innen im Garten eines Millionärs in São Paolo, umringt von bewaffnetem Sicherheitspersonal, über ethische Regierungsführung oder Kommunismus diskutieren konnten oder wo Institutionen Seminare über Gentrifizierung veranstalteten und sie von Konzernen finanzieren ließen, die von der tatsächlich stattfindenden Gentrifizierung profitierten.8 Herbert Marcuses klassische Charakterisierung der Institution der Kunst als „ein selbständiges Wertreich“ – „verträglich mit der schlechten Gegenwart: in ihr kann sie Glück gewähren“9 – schien noch immer zutreffend.
Unter dem Schutzmantel von partizipatorischer Kunst, relationaler Ästhetik und neuem Institutionalismus konnte das destruktive Werk des Kapitalismus ungestört voranschreiten. Die sogenannte Politisierung in der zeitgenössischen Kunst zielte nur selten auf einen aktivistischen Bruch ab. Selbst die oppositionelleren Praktiken dieser Zeit, wie etwa die „taktischen Medien“, wählten eine Strategie des begrenzten und temporären Angriffs. An der Infragestellung des Systems in seiner Totalität bestand zu keinem Zeitpunkt ein Interesse.10 Der zynische Opportunismus von Kunstinstitutionen, die ihre Finanzierung (teilweise) von Firmen und Banken erhielten, wurde nur selten offengelegt und nie untersucht. Offenbar gab es klare Grenzen dafür, wie viel Dreck innerhalb der Institution der Kunst aufgewirbelt werden konnte.
Das Projekt „Abstract Possible. The Stockholm Synergies“, das Maria Lind kürzlich in der in der Tensta Konsthall kuratiert hat, ist eine interessante Fortsetzung dieser Situation. Mit der Ausstellung, Linds erster in ihrer neuen Funktion als Direktorin der in einem Stockholmer Außenbezirk gelegenen Konsthall, sollte der Versuch unternommen werden, die Beziehungen zwischen Kunst und Wirtschaft ausgehend von der prekären finanziellen Situation der Konsthall zu untersuchen, die auf öffentliche Gelder angewiesen ist, jedoch zusätzliche Mittel aus dem Privatsektor akquirieren muss. Neben der Ausstellung in der Tensta Konsthall umfasste das Projekt eine weitere Schau im Centre for Fashion Studies der Universität Stockholm, den von Lind und Olav Velthuis herausgegebenen Sammelband „Contemporary Art and its Commercial Markets. A Report on the Current Conditions and Future Scenarios“ sowie eine Ausstellung im Stockholmer Auktionshaus Bukowskis. Letztere Präsentation war nicht nur Teil der Ausstellung „Abstract Possible“, sie war gleichzeitig auch die jährlich im Frühjahr stattfindende „Primary Exhibition“ des Auktionshauses, in der Bukowskis zeitgenössische Kunst zu Festpreisen anbietet. Zur Hauptausstellung bei Tensta gab es somit eine Zwillingsausstellung bei Bukowskis, in der die teilnehmenden Künstler/innen – unter anderem Doug Ashford, Matias Faldbakken und Liam Gillick – ihre Arbeiten zum Verkauf anboten. Das Künstlerduo Goldin + Senneby wurde gebeten, einen Rahmen fuür die Ausstellung bei Bukowskis zu schaffen, und beauftragte eine Kunstberaterin, einen Bericht zum Investitionspotenzial der angebotenen Werke zu verfassen. Der Report ging dann allerdings als Beitrag von Goldin + Senneby in die Auktion, wurde für 120 000 Schwedische Kronen angeboten und durfte allein vom Käufer oder von der Käuferin gelesen werden. Lind kuratierte die Bukowskis-Ausstellung und erhielt ein Honorar von unbekannter Höhe, der Erlös aus den Verkäufen der Werke wurde zwischen Bukowskis, Tensta und den beteiligten Künstlern/Künstlerinnen aufgeteilt.11
Indem sie all diese Informationen im Vorwort des Begleitbandes mitteilte, wollte Lind verdeutlichen, inwieweit die zeitgenössische Kunst in den Prozessen der Kommerzialisierung und Monetarisierung gefangen ist. Doch sie trug mit der Struktur von „Abstract Possible“ in keiner Weise zu einer Veränderung dieser Situation bei. Weder wies sie darauf hin, dass Bukowskis Eigentum der Familie Lundin ist, die auch die schwedische Ölfirma Lundin Petroleum besitzt, noch problematisierte sie, dass Lundin Petroleum Menschenrechtsverletzungen im Sudan vorgeworfen werden und dass die Internationale Anklagebehörde in Stockholm derzeit gegen die Firma ermittelt.12 Zwischen 1997 und 2003 haben von Lundin eingesetzte Regierungssoldaten mehrere Tausend Sudanesen getötet und 200 000 Menschen vertrieben, als die sudanesische Regierung die Kontrolle über das Ölfeld Block 5A zu gewinnen versuchte, für das Lundin die Explorationsrechte besaß. Lind und Tensta kollaborierten insofern nicht bloß mit einem Auktionshaus, sondern mit einem Auktionshaus, das sich im Eigentum einer Ölfirma befindet, die für Morde und das Niederbrennen von Dörfern verantwortlich ist.13
Die kritische Glaubwürdigkeit von Lind und Tensta schien für Bukowskis’ Bestrebungen perfekt geeignet zu sein. Michael Storåkers, der Geschäftsführer von Bukowskis, brachte es in einer Pressemitteilung folgendermaßen zum Ausdruck: „Für uns ist dies ein ungemein spannender Kontext. Maria Lind hat ein ausgezeichnetes internationales Renommee, ihre Ausstellungen sind stets höchst aktuell und relevant. Diese Ausstellung beschäftigt sich auf pointierte Weise mit der Spannung zwischen den kommerziell und öffentlich finanzierten Aspekten der Kunst – mit all den damit verbundenen Vor- und Nachteilen. Eine außerordentlich seltene Begegnung!“ Linds Reputation als kritische und intellektuelle Kuratorin gereicht nicht nur dem Auktionshaus zum Vorteil, das ansonsten eher mit der finanziellen Seite der Kunst verbunden ist. Auch für die Familie Lundin (die damit rechnen konnte, dass ihre Beteiligung früher oder später bekannt würde) scheint die Förderung von Kunst ein willkommenes Manöver zu sein, um die öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit von den Beschuldigungen abzulenken, die mit ihrem Hauptgeschäft verbunden sind. Wie die Tensta Konsthall wurde auch das Osloer Astrup Fearnley Museum scharf dafür kritisiert, die erste Ausstellung nach der Wiedereröffnung, die den in diesem Zusammenhang beinahe zynischen Titel „To Be With Art Is All We Ask“ trug, ebenfalls von Lundin Petroleum sponsern zu lassen.14 Was Linds Zusammenarbeit mit dem Geld von Lundin jedoch noch widerwärtiger macht, ist die Tatsache, dass sie aufgrund der Indienstnahme des Auktionshauses als Zwischenhändler zwar die Verbindung zwischen Kunst und Markt offen diskutieren konnte – dass der Name des Auktionshauses die tatsächliche Herkunft des Geldes dabei jedoch verschleierte.
Der Fall „Abstract Possible“ ist deswegen von Bedeutung, weil er typisch für das Dilemma von Institutionen mit kritischem Anspruch ist. Insbesondere kritische Institutionen eignen sich perfekt als Partner beim Greenwashing, da sie den Ruch der Finanzmacht abmildern (oder aufschieben), wenn ihre Authentizität auf den Finanzier abfärbt. Beide Parteien scheinen große Erwartungen hinsichtlich dieser Beziehung zu hegen: Die kritische Seite erhofft sich eine größere Reichweite und neue finanzielle Möglichkeiten, um ihre noblen Ziele zu erreichen; die zahlende Seite partizipiert an dem Authentizitätsversprechen durch die unkorrumpierbare Partei.
Institutionen – auch die kritischen, die Markt- und Arbeitsbedingungen hinterfragen – müssen ihre Angestellten bezahlen und gleichzeitig Förderer finden (umso mehr, je weniger öffentliche Gelder vorhanden sind), die ihre kritische Position nicht einschränken oder – wie im Falle von Linds Konsthall – komplett diskreditieren. Allerdings ist nicht nur privates Geld, sondern auch die öffentliche Förderung an Bedingungen geknüpft; üblicherweise wird sie in Abhängigkeit von Kriterien wie Ausstellungsprogramm und Besucherzahlen vergeben. Museen und kritische Zeitschriften wie Texte zur Kunst, die nach Unabhängigkeit von großen Verlagshäusern oder Kulturetats streben, sind gleichermaßen mit diesem Problem konfrontiert. Mögliche Einkommensquellen sind – neben dem Verkauf der Zeitschriften selbst – Werbung, öffentliche oder private Unterstützung oder Künstlereditionen. Jede dieser Optionen stellt einen Kompromiss dar, und Korrumpierung scheint unausweichlich. Man kann nichts anderes tun, als sich für den am wenigsten schlimmen Ausverkauf zu entscheiden, auf das eigene Abhängigkeitsverhältnis hinzuweisen und über dessen Konsequenzen zu reflektieren.
Dies könnte eine der Lektionen aus den vergangenen 35 Jahren zeitgenössischer Kunst, insbesondere der Institutionskritik sein. In vielen Fällen würde man daher eine explizitere Reflexion über finanzielle Abhängigkeiten und deren Konsequenzen für die kritische Arbeit im Allgemeinen erwarten. Einige Beispiele aus der jüngsten Vergangenheit – wie die Kampagnen der Arts and Labor Division von Occupy Wall Street gegen das Whitney Museum und dessen Sponsoren Deutsche Bank und Sotheby’s – scheinen auf eine Alternative hinzuweisen. Diese Aktionen machen deutlich, dass nicht wenige Künstler/innen und Kulturschaffende mit der falschen Rhetorik der zeitgenössischen Kunst unzufrieden sind und etwas verändern wollen, dass sie im Idealfall durch einen engeren Zusammenschluss von kritischer intellektueller und künstlerischer Produktion die Institution durch wirkungsvolle Projekte außerhalb von ihr ersetzen wollen. Mit dem Aufbruch einer neuen Protestkultur von Quebec über Chile bis nach Griechenland wird ein neuer Kontext geschaffen, in dem es möglich werden könnte, Strukturen jenseits der spekulativen Blasen der zeitgenössischen Kunst zu begründen, die kein Geld von Firmen und Banken benötigen und dem Kreislauf des korrumpierenden Geldes entgehen können. Das von Brian Holmes initiierte Seminar „Three Crises“ in der Mess Hall in Chicago könnte als Beispiel für einen solchen Versuch gelten; ein anderes Beispiel ließe sich in den Occupy Universities finden, von denen immer mehr gegründet werden.15
Mit dem globalen Wirtschaftszusammenbruch endet die blasenförmige Ökonomie der zeitgenössischen Kunst, und die schleichende Korruption der zeitgenössischen Kunst erscheint in zunehmendem Maße untragbar. Die sich von Tunesien und Kairo über Athen und Madrid bis nach New York und darüber hinaus ausbreitende Protestwelle lässt deutlich zutage treten, dass die immensen strukturellen Ungleichheiten der globalen politischen Ökonomie durch die konsensuellen Mechanismen sozialer Kontrolle nicht mehr eingehegt werden können. Die herrschenden Klassen verlieren ihre Legitimität, und wir werden Zeuge, wie deren Hegemonie im globalen Maßstab zusammenbricht. Auch die blasenförmige Ökonomie der zeitgenössischen Kunst wird dies nicht unbeeinflusst lassen.

Übersetzung: Robert Schlicht

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Dieser Text erschien zuerst in: Texte zur Kunst. „Die Wertfrage“, Heft Nr. 88, Dezember 2012, S. 81–92.

1.) „No Way Out? Krisengipfel mit Thomas Ebermann, Michael Heinrich, Robert Kurz und Joseph Vogl“, in: Konkret, 12, 2011, S. 12–16.
2.) Siehe insbesondere: Der Kollaps der Modernisierung. Vom Zusammenbruch des Kasernensozialismus zur Krise der Weltökonomie, Frankfurt/M. 1991; Schwarzbuch Kapitalismus [1999], Frankfurt/M. 2009; Weltordnungskrieg. Das Ende der Souveränität und die Wandlungen des Imperialismus im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, Bad Honnef 2003; Das Weltkapital. Globalisierung und innere Schranken des modernen warenproduzierenden Systems, Berlin 2005; Geld ohne Wert. Grundrisse zu einer Transformation der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Bad Honnef 2012.
3.) Die detailreichste Beschreibung dieses Wandels gibt Kurz in: Schwarzbuch Kapitalismus, a. a. O., S. 622–800.
4.) Michael Denning, „Wageless life“, in: New Left Review, 66, 2010, S. 79–97.
5.) Vgl. Luc Boltanski/Ève Chiapello, Der neue Geist des Kapitalismus [Le nouvel ésprit du capitalisme, 1999], Konstanz 2003, S. 143f.
6.) Vgl. Matteo Pasquinelli, Animal Spirits. A Bestiary of the Commons, Rotterdam 2008, S. 127. Vgl. auch David Harvey, „The Art of Rent. Globalization, Monopoly and the Commodification of Culture“, in: Leo Panitch/Colin Leys (Hg.), Socialist Register 2002, London 2001, S. 93–110.
7.) „There’s gonna be some trouble, a whole house will need rebuilding“ lautete der Titel der ersten Ausstellung von Charles Esche im Rooseum in Malmö 2001. Das Zitat entstammt einem Song von Morrissey.
8.) Der Fall des MACBA in Barcelona ist hierfür einschlägig. Vgl. Anthony Davies, „Take Me I’m Yours. Neoliberalising the Cultural Institution“, in: Mute, Vol. 2, No. 5, 2007, S. 100–113.
9.) Herbert Marcuse, „Über den affirmativen Charakter der Kultur“ [1937], in: ders., Kultur und Gesellschaft I, Frankfurt/M. 1965, S. 75–137, hier: S. 85, 117.
10.) Vgl. Mikkel Bolt Rasmussen, „Scattered (Western Marxist-Style) Remarks about Contemporary Art, Its Contradictions and Difficulties“, in: Third Text, 109, 2011, S. 199–210.
11.) Vgl. Maria Lind, „Preface. Contemporary Art and ist Commercial Markets“, in: Maria Lind/Olav Velthuis (Hg.), Contemporary Art and its Commercial Markets. A Report on Current Conditions and Future Scenarios, Berlin 2012, S. 13.
12.) „Oljan rinner in på Bukowskis“, Dagens Nyheter, 16.3.2007, online unter: http://www.dn.se/ekonomi/oljan-rinner-inpa-bukowskis (gesehen am 2.11.2012).
13.) Eine Analyse der Aktivitäten von Lundin Petroleum im Sudan, wo sudanesische Truppen gemeinsam mit Milizen die Zivilbevölkerung in potenziellen Ölfördergebieten getötet oder vertrieben haben, findet sich in: Kerstin Lundell, Affärer i blod och olja. Lundin Petroleum i Afrika (Geschäft in Blut und Öl. Lundin Petroleum in Afrika), Stockholm 2010. Vgl. auch den Bericht „Unpaid Det. The Legacy of Lundin, Petronas and OMV in Block 5A, Sudan 1997–2003“ der European Coalition on Oil in Sudan (ECOS) von 2010. „Die eigentlichen Täter der bekannten Verbrechen waren die Streitkräfte der sudanesischen Regierung sowie eine Vielzahl lokaler bewaffneter Gruppen, die entweder mit der Regierung oder mit deren Hauptgegner, der Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), verbündet waren. Die in diesem Bericht vorgelegten Beweise hinterfragen jedoch die Rolle der Ölindustrie bei diesen Ereignissen.“ (S. 5) 2003 verließ Lundin Petroleum den Sudan und verlagerte seine Aktivitäten in die äthiopische Provinz Ogaden, wo die Firma nicht nur Erdgas förderte, sondern auch an Übergriffen auf die Zivilbevölkerung beteiligt war.
14.) Jonas Ekeberg, „Kulturell hvitvasking“, in: Kunstkritikk, 17.10.2012, online unter: http://www.kunstkritikk.no/kommentar/kulturell-hvitvasking/ (gesehen am 2.11.2012).
15.) Vgl. http://messhall.org/?page_id=771 und http://university.nycga.net (gesehen am 2.11.2012).

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Albtraum Partizipation https://whtsnxt.net/104 Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:43 +0000 http://whtsnxt.net/albtraum-partizipation/ Das Modell der Partizipation ist gegenwärtig im Umbruch – in der Politik, in der Linken, in den Raumpraktiken und in der Architektur, die ihr sichtbarstes und am klarsten definiertes Produkt ist. Geschichtlich gesehen und auch in Bezug auf das politische Handeln sind es oft romantische Vorstellungen von Verhandlung, Beteiligung und demokratischer Entscheidungsfindung, die dem Verständnis von Partizipation zugrunde liegen. Es ist jedoch gerade diese selten in Frage gestellte Art der Beteiligung (wie sie gern von Politikern benutzt wird, die damit im Wahlkampf auf Stimmenfang gehen), die dazu führt, dass es nicht zu wirklichen Ergebnissen kommt, da kritische Stimmen durch das Konzept der Mehrheit mundtot gemacht werden.
Konventionelle Modelle der Partizipation beruhen auf dem Prinzip der Beteiligung und gehen davon aus, dass sie mit der sozialdemokratischen Konvention einhergeht, welche besagt, dass in einer egalitären Gesellschaft die Stimme jedes Einzelnen gleiches Gewicht hat. Ein politischer Akteur, der schlicht eine Struktur oder eine Situation vorschlägt, in der diese Beteiligung von unten nach oben gefördert wird, gilt gemeinhin als jemand, der «etwas Gutes tut». Interessanterweise beruht das Modell des «Kurators» zum Beispiel auf der Praxis, Entscheidungen zu treffen, und somit Wahlmöglichkeiten auszuschließen. Vor allem in Krisenzeiten wurde die Partizipation als Rettung vor allem Bösen gefeiert. Diese Soft-Form von Politik muss in Frage gestellt werden. Anstelle eines «politisch motivierten Modells der Pseudo-Partizipation» (ein Vorschlag, andere am Entscheidungsfindungsprozess zu beteiligen), das meist vom Streben nach politischer Legitimierung inspiriert ist, werde ich einen Begriff der Partizipation vorstellen, der sie als Zugangsmöglichkeit zur Politik selbst (sich selbst Zutritt zu bestehenden Machtbeziehungen verschaffen) begreift. Mein Vorschlag hat nichts mit einem mangelnden Vertrauen in demokratische Prinzipien, sondern alles mit dem Interesse an kritischer und produktiver Veränderung zu tun.
Wie kann man eine alternative Praxis vorschlagen, die sich mit Raumprojekten zu gesellschaftlichen und politischen Realitäten beschäftigt? Wie könnte eine polyphone Raumpraxis potenziell aussehen? Raumplanung wird oft für das Management räumlicher Konflikte gehalten. Die Stadt und die progressive Institution existieren als gesellschaftliche und räumliche Konfliktzonen, die ihre Grenzen durch beständige Transformation neu aushandeln. Wenn man sich mit Konflikten beschäftigen will, muss man eine kritische Entscheidungsfindung entwickeln. Eine solche Entscheidungsfindung wird oft als ein Prozess vorausgesetzt, dessen Endziel der Konsens ist. Im Gegensatz zur Konsenspolitik sollte eine kritische Raumpraxis vorschlagen, eine mikropolitische Beteiligung an der Raumproduktion zu fördern, und fragen, wie man etwas zu fremden Wissensfeldern, Professionen oder Diskursen aus einer «Raum-Sicht» beitragen kann. Durch zyklische Spezialisierung könnte der künftige Raumpraktiker möglicherweise als ein Außenseiter verstanden werden, der – anstatt zu versuchen, einen gemeinsamen Nenner zu schaffen und zu bewahren – in vorhandene Situationen oder Projekte eindringt, indem er entschlossen den Konflikt zwischen oft fest umrissenen Wissensfeldern schürt.
Partizipation wird oft als falscher nostalgischer Wunsch verstanden und gefördert. Bestimmte Arten der Partizipation können auch populistisch sein und in dieser Weise verwendet werden. Es kann zum Beispiel sein, dass Volksbefragungen die Demokratie nicht stärken, sondern zu ihrem Verfall beitragen. In der gegenwärtigen ideologischen Krise sind Volksbefragungen bei etablierten Parteien beliebt geworden, die sich vor unpopulären Entscheidungen fürchten. Diese Neigung, die Verantwortung abzuwälzen («liabilitymentality»), ist heute Bestandteil der Politik in Form einer Auslagerung von Entscheidungsfindungsprozessen. Durch eine Volksbefragung schieben Politiker und gewählte Volksvertreter, die Entscheidungen für die Bevölkerung treffen müssen, die ihnen dazu das Mandat gegeben hat, den Moment, in dem sie die Verantwortung für ihre Handlungen übernehmen müssen, immer weiter hinaus. Wenn sie alle befragen, brauchen sie selbst keine Idee oder Vision. Dummerweise bringt eine Volksbefragung aber auch keine Ideen hervor. Sie zeichnet nur das Verhältnis von Mehrheit und Minderheit nach. Die Erosion der Demokratie kommt von innen und wird durch einen falschen Konsens befördert. Diese Auflösung des demokratischen Modells ist sehr gefährlich, da sie den Aufschwung des politischen Extremismus ermöglicht und – in gewissem Maße – fördert.
Partizipation ist zum Radical Chic und zur Modeerscheinung bei Politikern geworden, die sicherstellen wollen, dass das Werkzeug selbst keinen kritischen Inhalt produziert, sondern zu etwas wird, das Kritikalität demonstriert. In einem solchen Kontext wird Partizipation zu einer Art Auftriebsmittel, zu einer gesellschaftlichen Beruhigungspille, nicht im Sinne von potenziellen Entscheidungen, die die Bevölkerungsmassen treffen könnten, sondern indem man ihnen den Boden unter den Füßen wegzieht, von dem aus sie aktiv die Aktionen der Entscheider und Volksvertreter kritisieren könnten.
In den letzten zehn Jahren – in denen es eine wohlwollende und nicht hinterfragte Verwendung des Ausdrucks «Partizipation» und seiner demokratischen Grundlagen gab – haben wir eine nahezu fundamentalistische Befürwortung einer Bürgerbeteiligung erlebt, die mit einer grotesk un-kritischen Weise einherging, Strukturen und Rahmenbedingungen für diese sogenannte Partizipation zu schaffen, und zwar auf Bundesebene, auf der Ebene lokaler Beteiligung, bei Projekten in der Kunstwelt, und so weiter. Es hat den Anschein, dass wir angesichts dieser romantischen Sehnsucht nach gutwilligen, von der Open-Source-Praxis geprägten Praktikern, Institutionen oder Parteien dringend eine rückhaltlose politische Offenheit brauchen. Diese Offenheit muss an die Stelle der political correctness – der Art, die dazu benutzt wird, eine bestimmte politische Höflichkeit, sprich ein Protokoll der politischen Verbindlichkeit zu stützen – treten und eine fallspezifische Kritik zum Tragen zu bringen, die Höflichkeit durch Redlichkeit, Fachkenntnis, Kritik und, falls notwendig, durch ein Urteil ersetzt.
Um Strategien für eine post-nostalgische Praxis zu entwickeln, muss man über die Binsenweisheit hinausgehen, dass, um voll und ganz demokratisch zu handeln, jeder beteiligt werden muss. Manchmal muss […] Demokratie um jeden Preis vermieden werden. Der «Begriff des Kuratorischen» konfrontiert uns standardmäßig mit dem Gegenteil dessen, was man «Partizipationsromantik» nennen könnte, da er eine Entscheidungsfindung von außen beinhaltet – manche würden sagen von oben: es geht um Ausschließung und den Akt des «Durchstreichens»: nicht über das nachzudenken, was gezeigt werden soll, sondern über das, was nicht gezeigt werden soll.
Politisch korrektes und sachkundiges Engagement führt oft zum Gegenteil dessen, was angestrebt wird; in diesem Kontext «kriegt auch das Verbrechen plötzlich eine heilige Aura». Eine solche Minimalisierung des Verstoßes gegen die gesellschaftliche Ordnung beschäftigt sich letzten Endes mit der Schaffung und Erhaltung von gesellschaftlicher Harmonie, ganz gleich ob sie das Thema oder den Inhalt voranbringt oder nicht. […] Der Theaterschauspieler Josef Bierbichler führt in diesem Zusammenhang einen interessanten Gedanken in den Kontext des Politischen ein, indem er darauf hinweist, dass es heute immer wichtiger geworden ist, nicht zu fragen, ob man Skandale erzeugen darf, sondern ob man das überhaupt noch kann. Wenn Bierbichler von Skandal spricht, meint er keine vordergründige Provokation, mit der nur mediales Aufsehen erregt werden will, sondern eher das Gegenteil: «die Unruhe, die von einem geschärften Gedanken ausgelöst werden kann, wenn er eindringt in einen gefälschten gesellschaftlichen Konsens, um diesen zu entlarven.»
Wenn Skandale und Heterogenitäten vom gesellschaftlichen Konsens geschluckt und nicht durchkreuzt werden, und wenn kontroverse Debatten nicht mehr stattfinden können, dann gibt es keinen gemeinsamen Raum, in dem Konflikte ausgetragen werden können.
Jede Form von Partizipation ist bereits eine Form von Konflikt. […]
Um in jeder Umgebung oder gegebenen Situation partizipieren zu können, muss man die Kräfte oder Konflikte verstehen, die diese Umgebung beeinflussen. In der Physik ist ein räumlicher Vektor ein Begriff, der durch seine Größe und seine Richtung beschrieben wird: In einem Kraftfeld sind es die einzelnen Vektoren, die an seiner Entwicklung partizipieren. Wenn man nun an irgendeinem Kraftfeld partizipieren will, ist es wichtig, die Konfliktkräfte zu kennen, die im Spiel sind.
Die gute Nachricht vorneweg: Konsens wird benötigt. Er ist nicht immer problematisch, aber oft notwendig. Ohne Konsens würde es kaum vorangehen. Allerdings führt gerade das Konsensmodell oft zu einer Aufspaltung der Gesellschaft, die üblicherweise einem Konfliktmodell zugeschrieben wird; dies geschieht aufgrund der kollektiven Passivität, die mit dem Konsensmodell einhergeht. Ironischerweise lässt sich das Konfliktmodell als das aktivere und partizipatorischere Modell verstehen. Konsens bedeutet oft eine Reduzierung der Interaktion. Keine Interaktion bedeutet Stillstand. Wenn es keine Veränderung mehr gäbe, würden wir alle in einem Gleichgewichtszustand enden. […]
Ähnlich wie das niederländische Poldermodell funktioniert die Schweizer Konsens-Demokratie erstaunlich geschmeidig, wenn es um die alltägliche Verwaltung des Landes geht. Sie versagt jedoch, wenn sie mit der Aufgabe konfrontiert wird, kritische Ideen hervorzubringen. Konsens im inneren Kern des Staates bringt uns in eine Situation, in der alles pragmatisch abgewickelt wird. Ist direkte Demokratie eine Frage der Größe oder des Maßstabs? Wo der Konsens herrscht, gibt es kein Denken und keine Kritik. Man sollte kritisch in Frage stellen, ob eine populistische Mehrheit die notwendige Begeisterung – pro und contra – bei oder zu einem bestimmten Projekt aufweist.
Genau betrachtet ist kaum jemand ein Demokrat. Das Konzept der Demokratie vertraut und gründet auf eine Art Fiktion, auf die Große Erzählung, dass jeder das Recht hat, abzustimmen und im gleichen Maße mitzureden. Eine reine Umsetzung dieses Konzeptes würde jedoch zwei wesentliche Variablen erfordern, um nicht zu einem Demokratiemodell zurückzukehren, das so mit sich selbst beschäftigt ist, dass es nur Stillstand erzeugt: eine überschaubare Gruppe von Beteiligten, die in diesem Format gehandhabt und organisiert werden kann, und das Fehlen externer Kontrolle, – zum Beispiel durch die Medien.
Eine kritische Praxis muss die Erwartung dessen in Frage stellen, wie die Verhältnisse aussehen und wie sie verhandelt werden sollten. Wissen lässt sich immer teilen und wird immer dann generiert, wenn es einen gemeinsamen Ausgangspunkt gibt, selbst wenn dieser auf einem Widerstreit beruht. Falls die Kunst politisch ist, insofern sie die Art und Weise definiert, wie man miteinander umgeht, eine gemeinsame Ausgangsbasis schafft und diese weiterentwickelt, so «kann die Kunst zu einer Recherchemethode im Feld des Politischen werden […]». Die Kunst «macht» Politik nicht über Repräsentationsformen, sondern durch die Praxis.
Die einzige Weise, das System zu verstehen, ist, es zu gestalten. Im Prozess der Gestaltung eines solchen Systems liegt auch eine Gefahr. Einer der wichtigsten Punkte ist die genaue und sorgfältige Gestaltung von Verantwortlichkeiten. Wie schon gesagt, können Partizipationsstrukturen leicht als eine Taktik zum Aussteigen benutzt werden: sich aus der Verantwortung zurückzuziehen, während man technisch weiterhin zuständig ist. In jedem System muss es eine eingebaute Struktur von zumindest teilweiser Autorität geben, damit die Struktur positiv sein kann. […]
Die Einführung der Demokratie ist immer mit der Unmöglichkeit, ihren eigenen Prinzipien treu zu bleiben, konfrontiert; die Einführung einer neuen demokratischen Ordnung kann nur dadurch legitimiert werden, dass man die Autorität herausfordert, die sie selbst begründen will. […]
Um an diesem Gestaltungsprozess beteiligt zu werden, muss man auch darauf vorbereitet sein, Verantwortung zu übernehmen.
Die Gestaltung von Veränderungen braucht Zeit. Gestaltung durch das Austragen der vorhandenen Konflikte und durch das Einbringen bestimmter Konflikte als produktiver Anstoß von Seiten des Außenseiters ist von entscheidender Bedeutung. In der frühen Phase des Gestaltungsprozesses muss ein Konsens vermieden werden. Je mehr Spielraum eine Gestaltung für künftige Konflikte lässt, umso erfolgreicher wird sie langfristig sein. Eine solche Gestaltung wird dann das Potenzial verkörpern, damit diese Konflikte immer wieder zu einem produktiven Modus zurückkehren.
Wenn man das Experiment als einen vitalen Bestandteil begreift, der zur kulturellen Gravität der Raumproduktion beiträgt, muss man folglich auch den Wert des Scheiterns anerkennen. Die gesellschaftliche Norm des Erfolgs als einziger Weg, der voranführt, muss also überprüft werden.
Wenn man über Scheitern und Konflikt aus der Sicht der Produktion nachdenkt, ist die unfruchtbarste Situation, die auftauchen kann, dass die Furcht vor dem Scheitern zur Inaktivität führt. Es ist der Akt der Produktion, der es uns ermöglicht, etwas zu überprüfen, durchzukneten, zu überdenken und zu verändern. Bei der Neuerfindung unserer selbst öffnet er auch einen Raum der Ungewissheit, der oft ganz überraschend Wissen und Inhalt erzeugt. Wenn die eigene Priorität darin liegt, sich um jeden Preis gegen das Scheitern zu wehren, kommt das Potenzial der Überraschung nie zum Tragen. Deshalb sind die Resultate bestimmter Untersuchungen und Erfindungen in vielen Bereichen und Disziplinen vorhersagbar geworden, und die Ergebnisse einer großen Mehrheit des kreativen und künstlerischen Outputs sind konventionell und mittelmäßig. Ein Risiko auf sich zu nehmen, bedeutet, nicht in der Lage zu sein, das Ergebnis einer Untersuchung vorauszusehen. Wenn man es bewusst zulässt, dass ein Prozess scheitern kann, öffnet man ein Fenster für Überraschungen; das ist der Moment, in dem konflikthafte Beteiligung und nicht-loyale Partizipation neues Wissen und politische Politik erzeugen.
… Wenn man die eigene Botschaft vermittelt, ist es wichtig, sich vom eigenen Milieu (das oft aus Leuten besteht, die den gleichen fachlichen Background haben) zu entfernen, um ein neues Publikum und neue Zuhörer zu finden, die nicht zusammenkommen würden, wenn es nicht um die eigene Praxis ginge. Im Kontext des nicht eingeladenen Außenseiters kann das Exil auch als eine metaphorische Bedingung verstanden werden, wie etwa als Exil in anderen Bereichen des Fachwissens.
Das Dilemma bei der Demokratie ist, dass in dem Moment, in dem man einen Raum voller Idioten hat, diese für eine idiotische Regierung stimmen werden. […] Soll man ernsthaft die englische Sun, die New York Post oder die Bildzeitung lesen, bloß weil sie Zeitungen mit der größten Leserzahl und Auflage sind? […] Wenn alles, was man tun kann, um Entscheidungen zu treffen, darin besteht, sie auszulagern und den Bürgern die Verantwortung zuzuschieben, dann ist in der repräsentativen Wahldemokratie etwas völlig falsch gelaufen. Deshalb konnte man in den letzten zehn Jahren auch den Wiederaufschwung der Rechten beobachten […]. Sie hat die Ironie zur Perfektion entwickelt, ein Vorstoß, der die Rechte fast unverwundbar gemacht hat.
Politischer Raum beinhaltet die Praxis der Entscheidungsfindung und des Urteilens; zu urteilen bedeutet, ein System von Hierarchien einzuführen. Eine solche kuratorische Praxis beinhaltet in ihrem inneren Kern den Akt der strategischen Planung und Destruktion: entscheiden, zu bestimmen, was zu eliminieren ist. Im gegebenen Kontext kritischer Raumpraxis könnte der Architekt als Kurator, als ein Initiator verstanden werden, der – durch die Einführung von Konfliktzonen – die kulturelle Landschaft umwandelt, die das Ergebnis einer instabilen Gesellschaft ist, die aus vielen verschiedenen und oft im Konflikt stehenden Individuen, Institutionen und Räumen besteht. Man könnte daher sagen, dass wir, anstatt die nächste Generation von Vermittlern und Mediatoren aufzuziehen, die Ermutigung des interesselosen Außenseiters anstreben sollten, der in den Randbereichen lebt und nur auf den richtigen Moment wartet, um Brüche in den vorherrschenden Diskursen und Praktiken zu erzeugen. Er ist jemand, der sich absichtlich nicht um Vorbedeutungen und existierende Protokolle kümmert, jemand, der die Arena mit nichts anderem als seinem kreativen und proaktiven Verstand betritt. Indem er den Korridor entlanggeht, ohne zu fürchten, eine Friktion zu verursachen oder vorhandene Machtbeziehungen zu destabilisieren, öffnet der Außenseiter einen Raum für Veränderungen, die eine «politische Politik» ermöglichen.
Viele Praktiker in der Kunstwelt produzieren selten mehr als Einzeiler und Postings und leben in der relativen Freiheit und im Luxus einer über allem schwebenden, unbekümmerten Blase, in der Partizipation zu nichts anderem als einem esoterischen Selbstverklärungsprogramm geworden ist. Das hat zu einer fast völligen Entpolitisierung geführt. Was heute gebraucht wird, ist eine erneute Einführung der kritischen Infragestellung des Wertes, der Positionen und der vergänglichen Natur des politischen Engagements, die im Inneren der Institution und gegen sie vorgenommen wird. Im Laufe dieses Weges sollte eine alternative Lesart der Partizipation und dessen, was mit ihr zusammenhängt, skizziert werden, eine Lesart, die sich vom Performer zum proaktiven Enabler bewegt, jenseits der vom Event angetriebenen Realitäten einer bestimmten Kunstproduktion rund um gesellschaftliche Situationen, hin zu einem direkten und persönlichen Engagement und zur Stimulierung spezifischer Realitäten in der Zukunft. Das kann nur dadurch erreicht werden, dass man die Falle vermeidet, in einem Milieu, wie etwa in der Kunstwelt, oder in einem einzigen politischen Projekt stecken zu bleiben. Menschen haben Füße, um sich zu bewegen und nicht um stehenzubleiben. Sonst wären wir Bäume. Das muss auch zu einer vom Inhalt und von der Agenda angetriebenen nomadischen Praxis, die von kritischen Untersuchungen getragen wird, und zu einer außerdiskursiven Position führen, bei der man ein Milieu verlässt, damit man es auf andere Weise wieder betreten kann.

Aus dem Englischen von Ronald Voullié.

Wiederabdruck
Der Textauszug erschien zuerst in: Christoph Doswald/Stadt Zürich: Art and the City. A Public Art Project. JRP|Ringier: Zürich 2012, S. 104–109.

Die deutsche Edition erschien im Merve Verlag, Berlin (Juni 2012). Die englische Originalversion ist bei Sternberg Press, Berlin & New York erschienen (Oktober 2010). Das Buch erscheint seit 2013 ebenfalls in türkischer (Metis Kitap), spanischer (dpr editorial), italienischer (Archive Books), polnischer (Bec Zmiana), und chinesischer Sprache (Gold Wall Press).

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Truth is concrete https://whtsnxt.net/089 Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:42 +0000 http://whtsnxt.net/truth-is-concrete/ Opening Introduction
“Truth is concrete” – this was the sentence written in big letters over Bertolt Brecht’s desk in his Danish exile – quoting Lenin quoting Hegel quoting Augustine. In a time of extreme political turbulence it was a constant reminder never to forget the reality around in Europe of the late 1930ies. In another corner of his study stood – as Walter Benjamin writes in his notes – a little wooden donkey with a sign around his neck: “Even I must understand it”. So: For the next seven days we propose to take the possibility of concrete truth as a working hypothesis and to look for direct action, concrete change and knowledge. For an art that not only represents and documents, but that engages in specific political and social situations – and for an activism that not only acts for the sake of acting but searches for intelligent, creative means of self-empowerment: artistic strategies in politics, political strategies in art.
“Art is a leftist hobby” – we chose this obviously provoking quote of the Dutch right wing politician Geert Wilders as a negative motto because it was bothering us. Not only because it was meant to be offensive but even more because we could not as easily dismiss it as we would have liked to. Isn’t indeed the status of art reduced more and more to the relevance of a mere hobby? Didn’t indeed self-reflection and self-critique of art turn too often into self-involvedness or even self-indulgence?
One and a half year ago – when we decided on the topic and the format of “Truth is concrete” as a 24/7 marathon camp – the Arab Spring was still a spring. And the summer and autumn of Occupy hadn’t yet begun. The so called Euro-crisis was already all over the news and the nuclear catastrophe of Fukushima just had happened. The huge demonstrations and the disillusioning elections in Russia were yet to come. It was obvious that things were changing rapidly in many ways in many corners of the world.
And of course: Everywhere where politics and society were shaken up, artists were among the first to get involved, among the first to join the political and social movements. But the question that kept re-occurring was: How did art, how did artistic strategies play a role? Did they play a role?
It was clear, that this was a time where we – as artists, theorists, curators – had to question for ourselves what we were doing and why. How we position ourselves. What our responsibilities are. Not only in critiquing our own field, our own institutions, formats, but in the relation to our societies, to the world. I think, most of us shared the strong feeling that we could not just wait and see how things would develop, what answers would derive over time. We shared the strong feeling, that we not only had to try to understand our role in all this, but also to directly engage and take part in shaping the discourse.
“Truth is concrete” seems to come at a moment of a paradigm shift in the relation of arts and politics: A generation of philosophers that derived complex and abstract theoretical concepts from very own and very concrete political experience and engagement was followed by a generation of philosophers (and artists, curators for that matter) that continued their thoughts – but often without binding them back to a contemporary, concrete reality.
We got used to call concepts, cultural theories, art works “political” even if they are only quite distantly based on theories that themselves already were quite distant from the concrete impulses that sparked them. A very homeopathic, second-hand interpretation of political philosophy became the main guideline of contemporary art discourse.
The classic leftist idea of “the private is the political“ was meant to politicise the private. But it seems that it rather privatised the political. The idea of “the aesthetical is the political“ was meant to politicize the aesthetical. But it seems that it aestheticized the political instead.
So we learned to replace critique with criticality, the political with the post-political, neoliberal capitalism with cultural capitalism. But where the answers get too complicated and abstract, the desire for simple solutions is growing. Art seems widely to have lost contact with a larger base.
The constant awareness of the complexity of the notions of truth, reality or even politics seem to have manoeuvred us into a dead-end road: either we are too simple, or we are too complex, too populist or too stuck in hermetic eremitism. Either we include too much or we exclude too many. We reached a point where the necessary awareness that everything is contingent and relative is in danger of just becoming intellectual relativism.
That is why this marathon focuses on very consequent, even radical interpretations of what art could, should, must be: On an art that very directly and hands-on gets involved. The next seven days we want to investigate what art can be – and: what politics could be.
So what is to be done? Can art help solve problems that politics and societies themselves have ignored for so long? Should art be a social or political tool, can it be useful? And why should artists know what to do when nobody else does?
Art and politics always have been in strange love/hate relationships. With this project we purposely ignore many of the borders, conflicts and resentments. Art is not activism and activism is not art. But the common ground, the shared space is large and, I believe, growingly important. It is a space that offers a chance for art to be engaged, connected and relevant. It is a space that offers activism a chance not to get stuck in ideology, routine and functionarism, a chance to stay unpredictable and sharp.
It is this space which we built this camp on and from where we want to take a close look at what happens when the differences between art and activism lose importance.
By focussing on “artistic strategies in politics and political strategies in art we hope to stay concrete. To talk about specific tools and specific ways of doing and thinking. We hope to avoid some of the usual-suspect dead-end ideological discussions. We hope not only to think together but also to find solutions for implementing. To create collaborations that might be considered unlikely. Truth is concrete is an invitation to show each other what we do, what we developed, what we are good at. To exchange tactics and strategies.
The probably most popular definition of strategies and tactics in our field comes from Michel de Certeau, who called strategy „the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that become possible as soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated.“ Strategies belong to the ones in power.
Tactic, on the other hand “is the art of the weak”, that fights that power: it “operates in isolated actions, blow by blow. It takes advantage of ‚opportunities’ and depends on them, being without any base where it could stockpile its winnings, build up its own position, and plan raids.”
But we chose the term strategies on purpose, not because we are an institution, and by such perhaps one of the “subjects with will and power” to which de Certeau refers. But we are also interested in how the consequent use of certain tactics, the combination of certain tactics, the invention of tactics follow strategies or form strategies. We also need a “base” to take the term of de Certeau – not to stockpile the winnings, but to collect our attempts, approaches, our tactics.
That is why at the centre of the programme of “Truth is concrete“ are short, precise, so called Tactic Talks: Just 25 minutes of presentation of one project, one action, one proposal, one tactic. These talks build the nucleus of a kind of toolbox in progress.
170 hours, more than 200 artists, activists and theorists. Additionally 100 grants. A machine that runs non-stop – often too fast, sometimes too slow. All day, all night. It produces thought, arguments, knowledge, but is also creates frustration and exhaustion.
So: Does this marathon not just mirror or even fulfil the neoliberal agenda of more and more, of extreme labour, permanent availability etc.? Does it not just prolong the race with which we are struggling anyways in our capitalist environment? Would it not be better to slow down, to take time?
We aim in the opposite direction. Taking a break is not going to help. This machine of 170 hours does not pose a task that can be fulfilled (like some mega exhibitions or the in the art field popular 12 or 24 hour marathons propose). There is no accomplishment. This marathon cannot be easily commodified, not easily be consumed. It in its way is Incommensurable. There is no right time to, it is not build around highlights. There are not the best couple of hours to grasp it the right way.
There won’t be one marathon, there will be many. Shorter ones and longer ones. Some on the search for depth on topics that one is already familiar with. Others searching rather for things that one has no idea about yet. Having to miss out is part of having to make choices.
In a way it is also a metaphor for political movements: Spending an hour or so at Occupy Wall Street you will talk to some people, see some tents, maybe smell some of the spirit. You come back, listen into some committee meetings, maybe next time start talking yourself. Or you move in. All is possible, but it will give you different intensities.
We are interested not only in the intellectual intensity this hopefully will produce. We are also interested in physical intensity. In the impact this meeting has on our bodies. And we are interested in the social, collective intensity. In the here and now.
The marathon is the centre, surrounded by a camp-like living and working environment, a social space with its own needs and timings. “Truth is concrete” creates a one-week community, mixing day and night, developing its own jet lag towards the outside world – at the same time being open and free for everybody to join.
The programme of the marathon is accompanied by one-day-workshops, several durational projects and an exhibition. And – most important – by a parallel “Open marathon” that is based on self-organisation: its content is produced entirely by the participants – everybody is welcome to fill the slots, spontaneously or a couple of days in advance.
“Truth is concrete” creates a one-week community, mixing day and night, developing its own jet lag towards the outside world – at the same time being open and free for everybody to join.
So is this all just too much? Maybe. But maybe we have no time to lose. The world keeps changing at a fast pace and the marathon is a work meeting – an extreme effort at a time that seems to need extreme efforts.

Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien am 21. September 2012 unter: http://truthisconcrete.org/texts/?p=90 von herbst. Theorie zur Praxis 2012 [16.7.2013].

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ART STRIKE 1977-1980 https://whtsnxt.net/101 Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:42 +0000 http://whtsnxt.net/art-strike-1977-1980/ Artists engaged in political struggle act in two key areas: the use of their art for direct social change; and actions to change the structures of the art world. It needs to be understood that this activity is necessarily of a reformist, rather than revolutionary, character. Indeed this political activity often serves to consolidate the existing order, in the West, and in the East.
The use of art for social change is bedevilled by the close integration of art and society. The state supports art, it needs art as a cosmetic cloak to its horrifying reality, and uses art to confuse, divert and entertain large numbers of people. Even when deployed against the interests of the state, art cannot cut loose the umbilical cord of the state. Art in the service of revolution is unsatisfactory and mistrusted because of the numerous links of art with the state and capitalism. Despite these problems, artists will go on using art to change society.
Throughout the century, artists have attacked the prevailing methods of production, distribution and consumption of art. These attacks on the organisation of the art world have gained momentum in recent years. This struggle, aimed at the destruction of existing commercial and public marketing and patronage systems, can be brought to a successful conclusion in the course of the present decade.
The refusal to labour is the chief weapon of workers fighting the system; artists can use the same weapon. To bring down the art system it is necessary to call for years without art, a period of three years – 1977 to 1980 – when artists will not produce work, sell work, permit work to go on exhibitions, and refuse collaboration with any part of the publicity machinery of the art world. This total withdrawal of labor is the most extreme collective challenge that artists can make to the state. The years without art will see the collapse of many private galleries. Museums and cultural institutions handling contemporary art will be severely hit, suffer loss of funds, and will have to reduce their staff. National and local government institutions will be in serious trouble. Art magazines will fold. The international ramifications of the dealer/museum/publicity complex make for vulnerability; it is a system that is keyed to a continuous juggling of artists, finance, works and information – damage one part, and the effect is felt world-wide.
Three years is the minimum period required to cripple the system, whilst a longer period of time would create difficulties for artists. The very small number of artists who live from the practice of art are sufficiently wealthy to live on their capital for three years. The vast majority of people who produce art have to subsidise their work by other means; they will, in fact, be saving money and time. Most people who practice art never sell their work at a profit, do not get the chance to exhibit their work under proper conditions, and are unmentioned by the publicity organs. Some artist may find it difficult to restrain themselves from producing art. These artist will be invited to enter camps, where making of art works is forbidden, and where any work produced is destroyed at regular intervals. In place of the practice of art, people can spend time on the numerous historical, esthetic and social issues facing art. It will be necessary to construct more equitable forms for marketing, exhibiting and publicising art in the future. As the twentieth century has progressed, capitalism has smothered art – the deep surgery of the years without art will give it a new chance.

WiederabdruckDer Text erschien online unter: http://www.thing.de/projekte/7:9%23/y_Metzger+s_Art_Strike.html [8.9.2013].

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Towards a Futurology of the Present: Notes on Writing, Movement, and Time1 https://whtsnxt.net/034 Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:38 +0000 http://whtsnxt.net/towards-a-futurology-oft-the-present-notes-on-writing-movement-and-time/ ‘Tomorrow never happens, man’ – Janis Joplin2

Has there ever been a revolution without its musicians, artists, and writers? Could we imagine the Zapatista movement, for example, without its poetry and lyricism? At this moment, I am writing from the specific location of the west coast of Australia, on land known to Aboriginal Australians as Beeliar Boodjar. Across the Indian Ocean, remarkable things are happening in North Africa. I listen on the internet to the songs of freedom being sung in Tahrir Square, as well as to the young hip-hop artists who provided the soundtrack to the revolution in Tunisia. But their YouTube videos are not the only things going viral. Significantly, their mutant desires, of which their music is an expression, are also beginning to ripple outwards. I feel it here at my kitchen table as I type, as viscerally as the caffeine flowing through my body. I also see it on the evening news in Spain and Greece. Perhaps the alterglobalisation movement never died, but was simply laying in wait. Perhaps we are only at the beginning. And perhaps there is little real difference in our movements between making music and making change; between the creation of art and the creation of new social relations through our activisms. Our common art is the crafting of new ways of being, of seeing, of valuing; in short, the cultivation of new forms of life, despite and beyond the deadening, ossified structures all around us.
What I would like to focus on most especially in this piece is the art of writing; more specifically, on the relationship between nonfiction writing and social movements. Movement produces writing which produces movement which produces writing, and so the loop turns; a constant feedback loop between action and reflection, experience and expression. To the relationship between writing and movement, I would like to introduce the added factor of time. Until very recently, radical writing practices have tended to operate in accordance with, and uncritically reproduce, some very particular ideas about time. One such idea is that it is compartmentalised into discrete units. Another is that it is linear and moves only in one direction. These understandings are part and parcel of Gottfried Hegel’s dialectical logic3, which, via Karl Marx, has become the unthinking, taken-for-granted folk theory of generations of activists. They are also part of Enlightenment, or modernist, rationality more broadly – that particular way of knowing that has predominated across the world for the past few centuries. Linear, compartmentalised time has meant that we have come to see past, present, and future as three separate things – a division that lies at the root of the means-ends distinction in traditional leftist politics. It is only when present and future are treated as mutually exclusive entities that means and ends can be regarded likewise. Furthermore, for Hegel and Marx, one must always negate in order to create; that is, the present must firstly be negated before the future is ever able to come into being.4 Revolutionary politics is therefore conceived of in purely negative terms, and the job of building a new world deferred until after the revolution. Social movements become equivalent to war rather than creation. When the ends justify the means, the present effectively becomes sacrificed at the altar of The Future – and this for the sake of utopian designs fabricated in the minds of a self-appointed few.
The kind of temporal sensibility outlined above lies at the heart of the manifesto genre.5 It seems today, however, that people have grown tired of manifestos. The same is true for any such exhortation from above of what people should or should not be doing. My argument is that the present context of postmodernity6 demands of radical writers a fundamental rethinking of their (our) modus operandi. I will, in this article, present a critique not just of the manifesto, but also of the jeremiad – another one of the literary forms most commonly produced by radical writers. Where the manifesto is concerned with the future, the jeremiad centres on the present. The intention of the latter, however, is usually only to serve as a diagnostic description upon which a prescription must be founded; an ‘is’ that must be followed by an ‘ought’. In this way, we are hence led back into the domain of the manifesto. But what happens to radical writing once we reject those dichotomies upon which the jeremiad-manifesto distinction is predicated – namely, those of is-ought, means-ends, and present-future? What happens when the writer treats the present and future not as two separate things, but as conjoined in an indivisible flow within which means and ends are consonant? What I would like to propose, then, is a new writerly practice; one which I have chosen to call the futurology of the present.
Such a practice would involve an unearthing of the many living futures constantly coming into being in the present. Unlike the jeremiad, it does not solely describe what is, but also what is becoming. In other words, it entails not simply ‘a negation of what exists, but also an affirmation of what springs forth’7. And it does not prescribe a single path forward, as with the manifesto, but tries instead to reveal the multifarious pathways fanning outwards from any given moment. It starts with the novel innovations and creative insurgencies happening everywhere in our midst, and from there works to build affinities between them. In this endeavour, I find inspiration in Rebecca Solnit’s assertion that ‘the revolution exists in little bits everywhere, but not much has been done to connect its dots. We need to say that there are alternatives being realized all around us and theorize the underlying ideals and possibilities’8. This is, of course, an endeavour that necessarily requires a heightened sensitivity toward those ‘moments when things do not yet have a name’; in short, toward newness. The new here is not meant to mean the same thing as ‘fashionable’, but rather refers to those becomings that are constitutive of alternative realities.10 This kind of sensibility has become especially important of late, given that ours is an era of accelerated social change, pregnant with germinal, as-yet-unnamed phenomena. One cannot continue imposing anachronistic grids upon our ever-complexifying present without exacting an extremely violent and myopic reductionism. Instead, as Félix Guattari writes, the upheavals that define our current conditions of existence call for a method attuned ‘towards the future and the emergence of new social and aesthetic practices’11. My proposal for a futurology of the present is one attempt to concretely think through what such a method might look like. I have certainly not been alone in these efforts. Besides Solnit, other fellow travellers include the members of Colectivo Situaciones whose practice of ‘militant research’ they characterise as the search for ‘emerging traces of a new sociability’12. Consider too the mode of ethnographic practice proposed by the anarchist anthropologist, David Graeber. One role ‘for a radical intellectual’, he writes, might be ‘to look at those who are creating viable alternatives, try to figure out what might be the larger implications of what they are (already) doing, and then offer those ideas back, not as prescriptions, but as contributions, possibilities – as gifts’13.
As has already been hinted at, the articulation of these ideas will necessarily require a confrontation with Hegelian dialectics and ‘the damage it has caused, and continues to cause in political movements’14. One of the principle reasons for this is that, to really understand the future appearing in the present, it is necessary to strip away the sedimented habits of thought under which becomings are subsumed or rendered invisible. As will be seen over the course of this essay, Hegel’s method could be considered as precisely one of these habits (certainly, capitalism an issue here too, but I take it for granted that my readers are already convinced of this). My contention is that even those who do not consider themselves as having anything to do with Marx or Hegel still unwittingly reproduce many of their assumptions. Indeed, as far as traditional forms of radical politics are concerned, the Hegelian-Marxist dialectical schema has become the Sun around which all the other heavenly bodies orbit. For 150 years, we believed this Sun would give us clarity and deliver us from darkness to light. It turns out, however, that it has only served to obscure more than it has revealed. All those other stars, old and new, that have been shielded from view by the blinding, sun-soaked sky are today beginning to demand our attention and sparkle anew. This essay seeks to assist in this efflorescence, since, as Hardt suggests, we cannot hope to achieve any kind of liberation unless we first liberate ourselves from Hegel.15 One thing must be made clear, though, and that is that I confront Hegel’s legacy not purely by way of negation, which would only mean a perverse reproduction of his dialectical straightjacket, but by proposing and affirming an escape route. My goal is a re-imagining of radical politics and a re-tooling of radical writerly practice.
Having thus far skimmed the surface of my argument, what I would like to do now is go deeper. I will start out by introducing the concept of the ‘perpetual present’ – the temporality within which the futurology of the present is situated. From this basis, I will proceed to elucidate the ways in which such a practice overcomes the limitations of previous modes of radical writing; namely, those premised on compartmentalised, linear time. In the second half of the article, I will link the futurology of the present to a politics of hope, before concluding with some thoughts on the nexus between activist and artistic practices – the very note on which I began.

The Perpetual Present
In today’s social movements, there is an increasing call for a harmonisation between means and ends, now widely understood by way of the notion of ‘prefigurative politics’16. Such a sensibility cannot but imply a radically different, even ‘amodern’17, temporal schema. Present and future cease to be treated as two distinct entities (the former but an instrument for the realisation of the latter), but instead become rendered as simply two linguistic signs referring to a common, indivisible flow. Such is also the case with the past. Drawing on Guattari, we could well say that both past and future inhere together in the ‘perpetual present’18, an enduring liquid moment containing both memory and potentiality; traces of what has been, but also intimations of what could be, each indissolubly connected to the other. With this perspective in mind, there can no longer be said to be a revolutionary before, during, and after. Instead of activist strategy being determined by a stark delineation between discrete stages, means and ends become consonant within a permanent revolutionary process; a continual freeing up of life, desire and the imagination wherever they happen to be imprisoned. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri write: ‘We must think of [pre-revolutionary] resistance, [revolutionary] insurrection and [post-revolutionary] constituent power as an indivisible process, in which these three are melded into a full counter-power and ultimately a new, alternative formation of society’.19
It has occurred to me that the Roman god, Janus, could be taken as figurative of the perpetual present. He had one face looking forward towards the future and one face looking backward towards the past, and yet both belonged to a single head. The term ‘Janus-faced’ has, in modern times, become a synonym for ‘two-faced’ or ‘duplicitous’, carrying with it negative connotations, and yet, for the ancient Romans, Janus had an altogether different meaning. He was the god of thresholds; ‘an important Roman god who protected doorways and gateways’, primarily symbolising change and transition.20 The perpetual present is always a threshold between that which is ceasing to be and that which is coming into being; at once the repository of memories and the font of potentialities; a record of the past and a map to the future. Friedrich Nietzsche is of critical import here: ‘I am of today and of the has-been’, he writes, ‘but there is something in me that is of tomorrow and of the day-after-tomorrow and of the shall-be’.21 This may well have been uttered by Janus himself.
A word on Michel Foucault is apposite here as well, particularly regarding his notion of the ‘history of the present’, which was how he described his genealogical method.22 Despite first appearances, the history and futurology of the present are not at all in conflict. Both, in fact, are immanent within the perpetual present. The multifarious routes by which the present is constructed are simultaneously one and the same with those processes by which alternative futures continually come into being. Hence, the history and futurology of the present are not unlike the two faces of Janus. One casts its gaze upstream towards the tributaries and the other downstream towards the delta, but both belong to a common body bobbing upon a single river. While the history of the present challenges linear history and its obsession with the origin, the futurology of the present does likewise with respect to linear futurology and its drive toward the projected end-point of history, or telos. There is no Future with a capital ‘F’; only the delta, opening out onto the infinite expanse of the ocean.
At this point, it must also be made clear that the perpetual present has nothing at all to do with the kind of endless present postulated by neoliberal ideologues. Where the former is the font of infinite alternative futures, of a variable creativity that continually issues forth from the free play of difference, the latter is a present condemned to futurelessness, to an endless reproduction of the status quo. It was in this context that, in response to Margaret Thatcher’s infamous doctrine that ‘There is No Alternative’, the World Social Forum first proposed its counter-slogan of ‘Another World is Possible’. Alterglobalisation activists have since been vindicated in this idea, with the global financial crash of 2008 serving to irreparably discredit the neoliberal experiment. The state bail-out of banks to the tune of trillions revealed the neoliberal discourse (particularly its insistence on minimal state intervention in the economy) to have been fallacious all along. Capital needs the state and has always needed it, not least of all in its policing of unruly citizens. Neoliberalism was never really realised as a system, but functioned only as a legitimating discourse that, in practice, never aligned with what it professed in theory. Following these embarrassing revelations, global elites are increasingly eschewing the concept of neoliberalism, and find themselves conflicted about the way forward. As such, we have now entered into a brand new historical moment; one in which the futurology of the present arguably becomes more important than ever. With neoliberalism staggering along ‘zombie-like’ and ‘ideologically dead’23, the space has now become wide open for the assertion and enactment of alternatives.
Tying together some of the points I have made thus far, the perpetual present is forever the site of ‘unconsciouses that protest’24, of insubordinate creativity and disobedient desire, of emergent values and practices that lead outwards onto alternative horizons, beyond the mirages conjured up by capitalism, the state, the traditional Left, and all similar such boring and life-denying institutions. It is the work of the futurologist of the present to tease these out from the tangle of everyday life, help increase their visibility, and thereby participate in their propagation. Below, I will seek to expand on these ideas and to further articulate their implications for radical scholarship and writing practices. In so doing, I will focus, first of all, on the challenges that the futurology of the present poses to compartmentalised time (and those modes of writing premised on such a temporality), before proceeding to do likewise with respect to linear time.

Beyond Compartmentalised Time
As touched upon earlier, my contention is that the past-present-future schema of time has been at the root of a profound disarticulation between means and ends in traditional revolutionary politics. Means and ends have only come to be regarded as mutually exclusive entities because present and future have been treated likewise. There has, as such, been a failure to recognise the necessary correspondence between the two; that is, between how we act in the present and the kind of world we wish to see in the future. It is for this reason that we have ended up with such abominations as the Leninist vanguard party, whereby dictatorial practices are supposed to somehow lead to a democratic society.25
Owing to the fact that the idea of compartmentalised time has been little reflected upon in the past, radical nonfiction has tended to take three principle forms; namely, historical treatises, jeremiads, and manifestos, each mapping with its own discrete domain within the past-present-future trinary. The notion of the historical treatise needs little introduction, and the other two have already been briefly discussed. What I would like to do here, however, is to zoom in a little more closely on the jeremiad form. Diagnostic jeremiads like Marx’s three-volume Das Kapital26 are meant to function only as a set of ‘is’ claims upon which prescriptive ‘oughts’ can be based. Marx’s jeremiad- and manifesto-style writings therefore go hand-in-hand. Had David Hume been alive in Marx’s time, he no doubt would have critiqued Marx for assuming that it is even possible to make valid ‘ought’ statements on the basis of descriptive ‘is’ claims.27 For Hume, all such prescriptions are dubious at best. And yet, the assumption that an ‘is’ must necessarily precede an ethical ‘ought’ is still rife amongst radical scholars. There is an unthinking assumption that a complete and ‘objective’ understanding of the present is a necessary prerequisite for effective political action.28 Some jeremiad writers in fact become so consumed with this task, that they fail to even try to imagine alternative possible futures. What matters to them is to first negate the present; to limit themselves to mere resistance, in other words.
Hence, aside from those jeremiads which function within the is-ought framework, there are also those based on ‘is’ descriptions alone; pure lamentations of, or fulminations against, the present configuration of things.29 For the most part, the intention of the lamentative jeremiad is to raise consciousness about this or that issue, such that the reader might somehow, magically, be spurred into action, as if a detailed knowledge of the evils of society was all that was required for this to happen. Precisely how to act on this knowledge is left up to the reader. Often, however, these works have the unintended and reverse effect of leaving the reader feeling overwhelmed and helpless, even despite their politicisation or conscientisation. The futurology of the present, in contrast, aims not to be merely descriptive or prescriptive, but rather, demonstrative. By this I mean that its concern is with fostering inspiration and hope through the demonstration of alternatives. So many contemporary writers and scholar-activists dedicate their lives, as Marx did, to writing about what is wrong with the world, but far fewer have cared to write about what people are already doing to change the world or to bring to light the many living, breathing examples all around us of how things can always be otherwise. Indeed, Harry Cleaver’s observation that Marx’s ‘historical analysis provided much more detail on capitalist domination than on working class subjectivity’30 is an understatement to say the least. This is one reason that radicals so often end up with a perverse fascination for the ‘creativity’ and ‘dynamism’ of capitalism, thereby reifying that which they claim to oppose. One of the ironies here is that capitalists do not create; they simply orchestrate and marshal the creativity of the commons for their own ends.31
In contrast to the jeremiad, the futurology of the present starts not with capitalism (or any other kind of domination), but with the ideas and practices of those challenging it. That is not to say, however, that it fails to offer a critique of the various apparatuses of domination. On the contrary, it offers a critique of a radically different kind – one that operates via the presentation of alternatives, of ‘yeses’ that already carry within them a ‘no’. Every innovation, every ‘yes’, embodies a proposal for a different kind of world, but one that is defined, from the outset, against the world that it is leaving behind. The point is to commence with the affirmative, rather than defer it until after the negative. It is in this way that the futurology of the present becomes a project of fomenting hope. It destabilises the taken-for-grantedness of the present, albeit not in a way which disowns it, as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels do when they celebrate the communist movement as that ‘which abolishes the present state of things’32. Disavowing oneself of the present in this manner could be seen to be part and parcel of the disastrous disconnect between means and ends, as discussed earlier. Unlike the jeremiad form, the futurology of the present centres not on the negation of the present-day so much as on its continual reinvention. It necessarily remains within the temporality of the perpetual present. It aligns itself, as such, with the radical challenge that Nietzsche poses to Hegelian thought. In Hegel, negation invariably precedes creation, but in the work of Nietzsche, we are presented with the alternative possibility of creation itself as a means of negation.33 One creates in order to negate, and not vice versa. In prefigurative politics, we prefigure the world we wish to create through our actions in the present, while simultaneously rendering redundant that which we leave behind. And in our futurologies of the living present, we offer an exposition of these other worlds already in construction without having to first negate. Such texts, furthermore, are themselves self-conscious creations. They are not just about the world, but are also added to it, thereby becoming a part of its workings. The creative act – whether on the streets or on the page – is already subversive. To practice creative subversion is not to overthrow, as with mere resistance, but to undercut and displace. Most importantly of all, it is to cultivate alternative futures in the living present and therefore to affirm life despite capitalism.

Beyond Linear Time
Aside from the compartmentalisation of time, we have also inherited from Hegel the idea that time moves in a straight line from an identifiable origin toward an ultimate end-point. Where the historical treatise usually draws a rigid straight line between the origin and the present, the manifesto does likewise between the present and the projected telos. The origin and the telos alike are both employed in the construction of linear timelines in which the progressions from past to present and from present to future are cast as somehow natural and inevitable. The way in which Marx adapted these ideas is by now the stuff of undergraduate textbooks: Guided by the invisible hand of History with a capital ‘H’, we pass through certain inevitable stages, one of which is our capitalist present, in order to eventually arrive at communism. Hence, even as Marxists angrily denounce capitalism, they ironically naturalise the social injustices that it produces as necessary by-products of the inexorable forward impetus of time. This became ludicrously apparent to me in a recent Facebook debate in which one Marxist tried to reason with me that ‘slavery was a necessary stage in human history’. The history and futurology of the present, as mentioned earlier, each seek to disrupt this kind of linearity in their own ways. The former cares not for the single origin, but for the multiple tributaries which have converged upon the present. The latter, meanwhile, concerns itself not with the single telos, but with the deltaic openings spilling out on to oceanic infinity. In each case, past, present and future – and the pathways between them – are denaturalised and rendered contingent. Here, I will focus most especially on the movement between present and future. Hence, while in the previous section, I sought primarily to problematise the jeremiad, I will now endeavour to do likewise with respect to the manifesto.
The manifesto could be thought of as akin to a children’s colouring book. When we are issued a colouring book with all of the designs already pre-determined, all that remains for us to do is to colour them in. Exactly such an idea was expressed by Marx himself when he wrote: ‘It is not enough that thought strive to actualize itself; actuality must itself strive toward thought’34. What he meant by this was that the telos of history was already known in thought and all that was required was for reality to catch up; that is, for the proletariat to fulfill its historic mission. This is a temporality in which the future, paradoxically enough, actually precedes the present, since the telos is always given a priori. As the French-Russian Hegelian philosopher, Alexandre Kojève, puts it, ‘the historical movement arises from the Future and passes through the Past in order to realize itself in the Present’.35 The present is thus held in tow by someone or other’s personal utopia, usually cast as universal. As such, it might well be argued that the manifesto form is inherently authoritarian. Martin Luther King had a dream, but so did Mao Tse-Tung. The difference in the latter case was that the dream had rigidified into a nightmarish Plan. The telos upon which such plans are predicated becomes a transcendental ideal; a mirage on the horizon dictating a single path we are to follow if ever we are to reach it. The question is: Who decides upon such ideals and who is enslaved by them? Do those enslaved by other people’s ideals not have dreams of their own? How might we avoid these dreams being steamrolled in the rationalist march of History?
The tyranny of linear time, according to Rosi Braidotti, is that it ‘functions like a black hole into which possible futures implode and disappear’36. To reject this conception of time is therefore to make ‘an ethical choice in favour of the richness of the possible’37. It means to move from the World Social Forum slogan of ‘Another World is Possible’ to the more open idea that many worlds are possible. In addition to the image of the delta invoked earlier, let us also consider Jorge Luis Borges’ evocation of the ‘garden of forking paths’; a garden in which ‘time forks perpetually toward innumerable futures’38. Change at any given point in time occurs through the aleatory and contingent actualisation of any one of these countless possible futures, not through any kind of rational progression. To proceed in this garden is not to progress, since the paths lead not so much forward, but outward. Contra Hegel and Marx, then, history does not consist of a series of logical stages, nor does it move in only one direction. There is only perpetual movement; a processual and protean creativity that wells unceasingly out of the perpetual present. The kind of writing appropriate to this movement is precisely that which I have been calling the futurology of the present. When revolution no longer has anything to do with linear timelines or the realisation of a pre-ordained telos, those self-proclaimed prophets of the hidden god of History cease to have any relevance. The futurology of the present, as such, could well represent a possible new form of non-vanguardist writerly practice. There are no experts or professional revolutionaries diagnosing the present or prescribing the future, as with the jeremiad and manifesto forms respectively. Rather, the writer takes her lead from the autonomous and creative participation of people in the making of their worlds, in social movements and countercultures of all kinds; ‘those crucibles of human sociability and creativity out of which the radically new emerges’39.
Here, it will be worth lingering for a moment with the question of the new. In the introduction to this piece, I emphasised the point that the futurology of the present necessarily requires a special sensitivity toward newness. This stands in stark contrast to past modes of radical writing, which usually subordinated the new to the ostensibly eternal. In the linear temporal schema of the manifesto, there is no such thing as novelty, since the work of activists is not conceptualised as the creation of new forms of life so much as the gradual fulfilment of an essential humanness, or ‘species-being’40. This set of essences is deemed to have always been there, hidden beneath the veil of false consciousness.41 It is the difference between drawing and simply colouring-in. My contention is that the production of novelty needs to be understood on its own terms. As Maurizio Lazzarato puts forth, ‘the conjunctions and disjunctions between things are each time contingent, specific and particular and do not refer back to an essence, substance or deep structure upon which they would be founded’42. Once radical writing is able to successfully dissociate itself from any kind of hidden god or pre-ordained telos, it can become instead a valuable means with which to bring to light the open-ended and indeterministic ways that everyday actors at the grassroots creatively negotiate and construct their worlds. The value of this sensibility towards newness lies in the fact that it charges the imagination with an enriched sense of possibilities and demonstrates how the world is forever open to reinvention. This is an antidote, not just to the sense of historical duty preached by the vanguardists and manifesto writers, but also to the pervasive sense of hopelessness peddled by those whose interests lie with the present configuration of things.

A Note on Hope
In the context of this discussion, hope is that intangible but very real feeling that our struggles remain worthwhile; that it is still worth resisting assimilation into the soul-crushing tedium of the system and persisting in our efforts to prefigure alternative futures. However, it is in the interests of the political and economic elite to maintain and reproduce the status quo from which they benefit – and a huge part of this is the effort to ‘destroy any sense of possible alternative futures’; to stamp out any initiatives which hint to how the world might be otherwise or at least ‘to ensure that no one knows about them’43 As such, the capitalists, politicians, police, media, and so on could even be said to constitute ‘a vast bureaucratic apparatus for the creation and maintenance of hopelessness’44. As Graeber succinctly puts it, ‘hopelessness isn’t natural. It needs to be produced’45.
I would like to argue, though, that capitalism has not been alone in producing hopelessness.
Revolutionaries too have been just as culpable. From the perspective of the traditional Left, the story of the twentieth century is one of dashed hopes and unfulfilled dreams. It is not that the prophets of History overlooked the importance of hope to our movements, but rather that they propagated endless false hopes in a tomorrow which never comes. Reality was never really able to live up to their manifestos. The prophets will usually fault reality for failing to fulfill their version of utopia, but it is instead their utopia that must be faulted for failing to correspond to reality. It was situated in the distant future, completely cut off from the living present. It was thought, furthermore, that it could be achieved only by means of negation. In practice, negating the present also meant negating oneself. Sacrifice and discipline were what was commanded. Revolutionaries came to conceive of their practice as war, rather than creation, and their creative desires were endlessly deferred until after the revolution. The point I am getting at is that if people today are mired in cynicism and feel helpless to change the world, it is not only because the elites have perfected their bureaucratic apparatus for the production of hopelessness, but also because the traditional Left offers absolutely no alternative. Many people have grown wary of the vanguardists and self-appointed prophets, whose faith in the inevitability of historical progress now seems more misguided than ever, but at the same time have yet to be convinced that alternative revolutionary practices are viable, worthwhile, or even possible. The result is apathy, but an apathy that could very well be political46 – a sensibility, perhaps, of profound antipathy towards the authoritarianism of both capitalism and the traditional Left, but one that lacks sufficient hope to be able to be enacted in alternatives.
Many writers who wish to avoid the authoritarianism of the manifesto tradition might very well feel that their solution is to offer simple critiques, sans prescriptions. I would like to argue here, however, that failing to offer any hope at all is no alternative to offering false hope. Even Foucault, whom earlier I identified as an ally, oftentimes falls into this trap. A detailed knowledge about the workings of various forms of power, most notably ‘discipline’47, can only take us so far. What then? What about counterpower? Foucault tends to give the impression that the reach of power is total. His concept of the ‘carceral continuum’48 means that we are forever on the backfoot, only ever able to resist in a scattered and piecemeal way. But there are some profound ironies here. The first is that, despite Foucault’s philosophical emphasis on contingency, his writings often leave the reader (well, at least this reader) with the impression that relations of force are an inevitable aspect of social life. The second irony is as follows: Foucault knew as much as anyone that our discourses do not simply emerge from the world, but also serve to produce it. Therefore, if we do not allow enough discursive space in our work for resistance, subversion, and counterpower, we only end up reproducing the very conditions of our own incarceration. What is perhaps needed, then, is to make a subtle, yet profound inversion: that it is power on the backfoot, forever in an attempt to contain our uncontainable vitality.49 Where things do cohere together and take on the character of something resembling an insurmountable power structure, we would do well to remind ourselves that the longevity of such social formations is, historically-speaking, much more exceptional than the event of their break-up and dissolution – not vice versa. Certainly, it is of paramount importance to understand the world and the systems of oppression and exploitation that we are up against, but if our writing stops there and avoids giving due attention to what people are doing to undo the status quo, then there is the risk that we will only end up leaving our readers feeling disempowered – armed with knowledge, but starved of the hope necessary to act on this knowledge. An example drawn from personal experience – even despite it being in the context of teaching, rather than writing – will illustrate well the point I am attempting to make here.
A few years ago, I was helping to teach an undergraduate course entitled ‘Environmental Issues in Asia’ – one of my earliest experiences as a university educator. In the last class of the semester, I asked each student, as we went around the room, to share one thing that they would be taking away with them from the course. The response that most stood out to me was that of a young Asian Australian man, the gist being more or less as follows:
Well, I came into this really interested in the environment; interested in learning more about the issues and exploring how I could get involved to make a difference. But I’m left feeling really overwhelmed. The issues are just so big and the scale of the challenges so great that I’ve almost lost hope. We’re all doomed. Indeed, there seems these days to be more and more of an apocalyptic zeitgeist about the place, especially when it comes to the environment and issues around climate change. What I realised from this feedback was that, as educators, myself and my colleagues had given too little thought to mitigating against this kind of counter-productive, fatalistic resignation. The course content covered things like dam construction in China, the effects of glacier melt and rising sea levels in Bangladesh, deforestation and oil palm monocultures in Malaysian Borneo, and so on, but gave scant attention to what can be done about such issues (including what we in Australia can do, especially considering the record of some Australian companies in the Asia-Pacific region), or how indigenous peoples and others are already fighting back. On this last point, local peoples have rarely been treated as agents acting on the stage of world history, only as helpless victims. This, however, must change. I realised through this experience how mistaken I had been in thinking that it was enough to simply convey content about the issues, without also conveying hope – not a false hope premised on some transcendental future utopia, but an immanent hope, grounded in real-life, real-world futures already in construction in the present. I hence resolved from then on that, in both my teaching and writing, I would not limit myself to trying to conscientise people simply by pointing out what is wrong with the world. Equally important would be showing what can be done – indeed what already is being done – about injustices everywhere; that relations of force are never total or inevitable and that new worlds are always in construction. Hope (in the very specific sense in which I have been using the term here) is what makes the difference between empowerment and mere conscientisation. And the propagation of such hope, through the exposition of alternative futures already in construction, is one very important role that both radical educators and writers can play.
The futurology of the present, then, might fruitfully be characterised as a practice of hope. It is not simply about the transfer of knowledge, but more significantly of ‘affect’50. It is animated by revolutionary desire, while at the same time acting as a relay for this desire to spread. It does not speak about movements, but with them. It thinks with them, moves with them, and tries to inspire movement in turn. This is exactly what happened with a recent article by the North American-based CrimethInc Collective on the Really Really Free Market (RRFM)51 – an anarchist initiative best described as a kind of celebratory potlatch in which nothing is bartered or sold and everything is free. The idea is that people bring food, clothes, books, art, music, skills, services, or whatever else to share, and the rest takes care of itself. This is a perfect example of prefigurative politics in that it embodies, in the here and now, what an alternative commons-based society would look like. There is no question of having to wait until after the revolution to begin building a new world. And it demonstrates that we do not have to choose between Josef Stalin and Milton Friedman, but rather, can opt for an alternative politics of liberating the commons from both the state and the market. Indeed, the RRFM (along with other such cooperativist initiatives) acquires a new poignancy in light of the Crash of 2008 – its very name being an irreverent poke at neoliberal free market ideology. Soon after the appearance of the CrimethInc article in print and online, RRFMs began popping up across North America, Australia, Indonesia, and elsewhere. The latest I have heard is that Philippine anarchists are now beginning to organise such events as well, of course adapting them to local conditions. As the idea parachutes into a new context, it immediately enters into a new set of relations and necessarily emerges transformed in the process. It is a becoming and not a matter of simple repetition (unless, however, we are talking about a McDonalds franchise). I should also add here that it is never a matter of initiatives flowing in a one-way direction from the ‘West’ to the ‘Rest’, since there is also considerable cultural traffic in the opposite direction. Consider, for instance, the sheer global influence of the Zapatista movement or of the World Social Forum initiative originating from Brazil. A more recent example might be the affective vector that traversed the Mediterranean from Tahrir Square, Cairo, to Puerta del Sol Square, Madrid, from there emanating throughout the rest of Spain and beyond.
In each of the above cases, the role of the writer in acting as a relay for hope and inspiration cannot be discounted or underestimated. To foment affect in this way is especially revolutionary considering the ‘veritable obsession on the part of the rulers of the world with ensuring that social movements cannot be seen to grow, to flourish, to propose alternatives’52. To actively help in circulating, amplifying and making visible the alternatives being realised all around us is to shatter any sense of inevitability. And by this, I am really referring to two things: firstly, to the inevitability of the present promoted by the political-economic elite, and secondly, to the inevitability of the future posited by the traditional Hegelian-Marxist Left. The former would say that there is no alternative to the present; the latter that there is no alternative to their prescribed future. The futurology of the present, in contrast, emphasises that there are always alternatives. It offers examples of creative subversion, while at the same time refusing to channel movement in a particular direction, as with the manifesto form. To participate in the cultivation and propagation of new liberatory potentials – the ‘production of production’53, in short – is enough. What matters is that creativity, desire and the imagination remain free to flourish, rather than be shut down, domesticated, canalised, or stultified.
In addition to the aforementioned CrimethInc article, another work that I would consider as exemplary of the futurology of the present is The Take54, a documentary by Avi Lewis and Naomi Klein on the workers’ rebellion in Argentina that followed the financial meltdown of 2001. Here, I depart from my focus on writing for a moment, since the futurologist of the present need not necessarily be bound by the written word. The Take’s activist filmmakers aimed to mobilise their audience not solely by rousing in them an indignation against the local elites and International Monetary Fund, but more importantly by highlighting the real alternatives to capitalist social relations that Argentinian workers are already building in the present. Through their appropriation and collective self-management of abandoned factories, these workers are setting about the task of building a new and different kind of economy without having to first take state power. The bosses are not overthrown, but simply made redundant – completely surplus to the needs of society. This is another instance, like the RRFM, of creative subversion. In demonstrating real alternatives and emergent futures, The Take stands in stark contrast to the long tradition of documentary realism amongst radical filmmakers, the goal of which is simply to raise consciousness and bear witness to a given situation of injustice, in much the same vein as the jeremiad. In this style of documentary, the creative autonomy of people on the ground in responding to their situation is submerged or rendered irrelevant – perhaps because it is deemed a priori that local people are incapable of self-organisation and hence that solutions need to come from elsewhere and be imposed from the outside. It is the self-legitimating discourse of vanguardists and professional revolutionaries. The Take, however, partakes of no such nonsense, nor does it limit itself to merely communicating information about what is wrong with the world. Rather, it offers an inspiring, concrete example of how the world can be, and already is becoming, otherwise. In conveying an immanent hope, it too is exemplary of that which I have been calling the futurology of the present.
Graeber’s Direct Action is also worth mentioning.55 Graeber, who sometimes likes to refer to himself as a ‘professional optimist’, describes in his book the proposals for a new society embodied in the practices of North American activists in the alterglobalisation movement. His work takes the form of an ethnography, albeit one that centres not on some supposedly static culture (as with traditional ethnographies), but on culture-in-motion. It strikes me that ethnography in the latter mode seems particularly well-suited to the futurology of the present. This is because embodied participation in people’s social worlds arguably allows us to grasp newness in its very contexts of production and at the very moments of its inception. The ethnographer starts with small things in small places and, from there, learns to appreciate their wider significance and connect the dots between them. The small, therefore, is never to be confused with the insignificant or trifling, since, arguably, it is only ‘through attention to detail that we can find different kinds of collectivity in formation’56. Social theorists of the more conventional, desk-bound kind have typically overlooked the small details on the ground in favour of abstract theory, but in so doing, they have often also overlooked those formative processes by which newness enters the world.
Without wishing to indulge too much, my own research project at present is one which combines an ethnographic and futurological sensibility. In short, my work is concerned with the fate of national liberation movements under conditions of globalisation, focussing, most importantly, on the tentative green shoots that are beginning to emerge from their ashes.57 My primary case study is that of the Philippines, which, although having been granted formal independence from the United States (US) in 1946, is still considered by many Filipin@s58 to be under the thumb of US imperialist control – and with good reason. As such, the Maoist insurgency against the US-backed Marcos dictatorship in the 1970s and early 1980s – led by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and their armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA) – was imagined as a war of national liberation, in much the same vein as those which arose in Nicaragua and El Salvador during the same period. Despite having mobilised hundreds of thousands of people on countless fronts for almost two decades, the CPP-NPA was ironically absent in the developments which finally brought down the Marcos regime in February 1986. What toppled the dictator in the end was a military mutiny, accompanied by a popular though bloodless uprising. This dramatic turn of events became known as the People Power Revolution. In adherence with Maoist orthodoxy, the CPP-NPA’s focus was guerrilla war in the countryside, and yet the popular uprising that had swept Marcos from power had taken place in urban Manila. Long accustomed to proclaiming themselves as the vanguard of the movement, these developments came as a severe shock to many. The CPP-NPA’s absence in the midst of an insurrection meant that what replaced Marcos was not the long-prophesised communist seizure of state power, but the restoration, at least nominally, of liberal democracy. These events plunged the entire Philippine Left (in which the Maoist CPP had for so long been hegemonic) into a full-blown crisis. This was only further compounded by the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and Soviet Union in the years between 1989 and 1991, therefore dovetailing with the generalised Crisis of the Left that had, by that point, become a global phenomenon. By that time, too, the national liberation movements that had won political independence had proven themselves utterly incapable of improving the lot of the populations they now presided over. One set of bureaucrats was simply replaced by another. The same old problems associated with statism persisted, and imperialist logics were indigenised and perpetuated in the form of exclusionary nationalisms.
In 1993, the CPP-NPA imploded, with two-thirds of its members choosing to defect en masse, rejecting not only its increasingly authoritarian leadership, but also Maoist ideology as a whole. Although many of the defectors still find themselves shackled by old habits, their response to the crisis of the Left, for the most part, is not the rectification and reconsolidation of old orthodoxies (as is the case with those who remained loyal to the Party), but an effort to invent new subjectivities more in consonance with the times. Indeed, in my ethnographic fieldwork in both the Philippines and Filipin@ diaspora, these two contrasting responses to the Crisis of the Left – rectification and reinvention – were what I found to constitute the most significant fault-line in Philippine radical politics today. The flipside to the Crisis of the Left, then, has been a vibrant regeneration of radical political culture. With the Marcos dictatorship gone and the Maoists a spent force, there occurred a veritable flowering of new ideas and practices throughout the 1990s, continuing through to the present day. The disintegration of the CPP-NPA in 1993 in fact coincided with the beginning of a boom period for the environmentalist, feminist, and anarchist movements in the Philippines. Today, the Philippine social movement landscape is home to a diverse array of nascent subjectivities, constitutive of efforts to re-found transformative politics on new grounds. During my fieldwork, I sought out those former CPP activists who had broken with Maoism; those who were rethinking all of the old certainties and endeavouring to enact new modes of activism in tune with contemporary realities. I also sought out the younger generation of Filipin@ activists in order to get a sense of both the continuities and discontinuities between their ideas and those of the older generation. In each of these cases, what I paid special attention to was the new; that is, to intimations of alternative futures arising in the present, which I took to be the same thing. These intimations included all manner of emergent, even insurgent, subjectivities – new political tendencies and ways of seeing, innovations in practices and methods, new modes of cultural identification, alternative values, and so on. It is important to point out, though, that these were most often elemental or larval in form – small becomings that did not necessarily add up to fully-baked ideas or practices, nor to formal theory that was written down or codified into political programmes. This did not mean, however, that they were any less significant. On the contrary, these larval subjectivities turned out to be of paramount importance in my work, since it was at the micropolitical level of identity and desire that some of my most significant insights were gleaned. In addition, the concept of hope that I detailed earlier remained, at all times, extremely pertinent, since the novel imaginings, identities, values, practices, and experiments that I picked up on already point the way beyond the impasse within which many activists have floundered in recent decades. From the ruins of the traditional Left, a new radical politics for the twenty-first century is in the process of being born.
Although having presented a number of examples of the kinds of things that the futurology of the present concerns itself with, each in relation to the idea of immanent hope, I do wish to leave a degree of openness in my formulation so that readers can remain free to take up the practice and carry it in their own directions. Social movements, often the hotbeds of cultural innovation, have been my main focus in this article, but they certainly need not constitute the entirety of what the futurologist of the present looks at. Glimpses and intimations of other worlds in the making are indeed all around us. There is, in all spheres of life, an ‘unceasing creation’ and ‘uninterrupted upsurge of novelty’59. Anywhere where there is an autonomous cultural production taking place, outside of the habituated channels by which the status quo reproduces itself, is a potential site for the futurologist of the present to involve herself in and draw inspiration from. Wherever there is disobedience, insubordination, creative maladjustment, play, experimentation, or creation, no matter whether at the micro or macro scale, there is something happening which deserves our attention.

Revisiting the Art-Activism Nexus
Apart from hope, another point that has resurfaced throughout this article is the vital place of creativity. This idea, however, will now need to be unpacked and expanded upon. It turns out that the ways in which I have been using the terms ‘creation’ and ‘creativity’ have really been operating on three distinct levels. There is, first of all, the ontological creativity of the ‘chaosmos’60 – a point alluded to upon my introduction of the concept of the perpetual present. Secondly, there is the creativity of activists and countercultural deviants. Thirdly, there is the creativity of artists and writers in their production and relaying of affect. Although each of these forms of creativity are able to be distinguished from one another, it is the relationships between them, and not the categorical divisions, which are of paramount importance here. To begin with, activist practice aligns with creativity in the first sense in that to forge new forms of life outside of prevailing apparatuses of domination is to allow ontological processes of creation to continue flourishing without blockage or curtailment. From the moment there is an imposition of relations of force, or a reduction of life to either state or market logics, there is creative subversion. ‘Life revolts against everything that confines it’61, as Suely Rolnik felicitously puts it. The same could certainly be said of creativity in the artistic sense.
Activists and artists alike converge in the figure of the creator – that inventor of new values of the kind celebrated by Nietzsche62 as well as by autonomist theorists of ‘self-valorization’63 – in that they self-consciously endeavour to bring newness into the world. Each intervenes into the material-semiotic realm that we have become accustomed to calling ‘culture’ and there, works to shake up and reinvent conventional ways of seeing, thinking, feeling, valuing, doing. Hence, to revisit a point I made in the beginning of this article, perhaps there is little real difference between making art and making change. Perhaps the production of new forms of life by activists is itself an art – not art that simply represents life, but art that is utterly indistinguishable from it.64 As such, the futurologist of the present does not simply observe and describe at a distance the alternative futures arising in social movements and countercultural milieux, but rather, participates politically in their production and propagation. In other words, to write of countercultural practice, broadly conceived, need not take the form of a detached reportage, but can alternately become a countercultural practice in its own right. Before there was ever such a thing as viral YouTube videos, there were contagions of revolutionary desire of the kind that spread with lightning speed in 1848, 1968, 1989–1991, and 1999–2001, not to mention the Arab Spring currently underway. The principle, though, is the same. One important role that the radical writer can play, as I have suggested, is to act as a relay through which such contagions can spread – not as a spokesperson or representative of a given initiative or movement, but as a participant; an element amongst others, animated only by the winds of collective desire that fill her sails.
At this point, yet further unpacking of the concept of creativity will be required. Implicit in this article to date has been an idea of creativity defined in opposition to two separate, albeit related, aspects of Hegelian dialectics. The first is the primacy that Hegel accords to negation, which relates to the past-present-future trinary of compartmentalised time. The second, meanwhile, is Hegel’s faith in an ultimate telos, inextricably related to the notion of linear time. I will discuss each of these in turn, zooming in first of all on creation beyond negation, before then turning my attention to creation beyond teleology.
It is only owing to the dialectical schema imported into radical politics by Marx that we have come to conceptualise movement practice as war rather than as creation. Had radical politics been based upon an alternative set of premises, the history of the recent past might have looked very different. From today’s standpoint, Tristan Tzara’s quip in the early twentieth century that ‘dialectics kills’65 seems strangely prescient of what was to ensue. ‘It lives by producing corpses, which lie strewn across an empty field where the wind has ceased to blow’, he continued.66 Tzara was a key figure in the Dada movement, and what set the Dadaists apart from other avant-garde groups was precisely their staunch anti-Hegelianism. In fact, the Dada Manifesto of 1918 was not really a manifesto at all.67 Instead, what Tzara produced was a parody of the very manifesto form, mocking his contemporaries for the Hegelian sense of historical self-importance which they accorded themselves.
Tzara’s distaste for Hegel was likely to have been inherited from Nietzsche, a well-known influence on Dada. The idea that dialectics kills has echoes of Nietzsche all through it, perhaps no better illustrated than when he affirmed: ‘We have art in order not to die of the truth’68. For Hegel, truth meant dialectics and the law of negation, to which Nietzsche counterposed an affirmative philosophy of creation. He upheld creativity and the artistic sensibility as alternatives to those modes of thought which attempt to reduce reality to a stable set of laws, axioms, and equations. For Marx and Hegel, creation is always suspended until after the moment of negation, but Nietzsche’s radical contribution was to free creativity from the negative, while at the same time freeing temporality from the past-present-future trinary. Jeremiad writers and documentary realists are amongst those who continue to enslave their creative sensibilities to the negative, their practice bound by an unthinking adherence to Hegelian folk theories. Their overarching imperative of needing to first negate the present means that they fail to appreciate the creativity happening all around them. Blinded by the Sun of Hegel, they lose sight all those other stars out there; those ideas, practices, and intimations of alternative futures continually coming into being in our midst. Once we are able to regain our vision, our actions in the present cease to be rendered simply as means to an end, but instead become ‘means without end’69 – a protean creativity and endless becoming that knows no discrete temporal stages, no telos, no hidden god. When means and ends become discordant, we forget that both are in fact immanent within the perpetual present. Creativity needs to be able to flourish, and to do so it must be liberated from negation. This is the place of means without end, of prefigurative politics, of the futurology of the present, and of all art that ceases to become abstracted from life and instead becomes life itself.
Having just discussed the possibility of creation beyond negation, I will now direct my critical gaze to creation beyond teleology. To free temporality from the telos of linear time is to do away with the idea that there is any kind of intrinsic point to history. Earlier, I recounted a Facebook debate I had with one particular Marxist who insisted that slavery was a necessary stage in human history. In this case, the African peoples brought to the Americas were quite literally the slaves of someone else’s future. This trans-Atlantic trade in human lives, however, was a contingent and non-inevitable event, not a progression along a linear timeline toward some ultimate telos – no matter whether the telos of colonial masters or Marxist historiographers. For the prophets of the hidden god of History to naturalise the entire past as inevitable only makes them the strange bedfellows of the slave-masters. And their naturalisation of the future only makes all of us slaves, condemned to playing catch-up with their version of what the future should look like.
In this schema, there can never be anything new, since everything is already given a priori. The future is foreordained and simply awaits realisation. Only when we can unmoor ourselves from hidden gods, illusory tomorrows, and other such stultifying ideas, can we really embrace creativity and appreciate the production of novelty on its own terms. From the instant that the god of History is dethroned by Janus, infinite horizons fan out in all directions. And our creativity suddenly becomes creativity per se, not the mere fulfilment of a telos. This is an idea I characterised earlier in terms of drawing, rather than merely colouring-in. The blank sketchbook knows no a priori designs; only the a posteriori marks that we leave behind as we move. In the realm of activism, this sensibility is embodied in the practice of prefigurative politics – a break not only from the cult of negation, but also from the idea that revolution has to mean fulfilling some programme handed down from on high. As Graeber writes, ‘we’re all already revolutionaries when we make something genuinely new’70. What this means for radical writing, meanwhile, is to do away with manifestos and instead tune our attention into the profound creativity everywhere in our midst. Unlike in the manifesto tradition, the futurology of the present does not prescribe a single monolithic future, but tries instead to articulate the many alternative futures continually emerging in the perpetual present. The goal of such an endeavour is to make visible the living, breathing alternatives all around us, while at the same time fomenting an immanent hope that can spread virally and be enacted in other places elsewhere.
To sacrifice today in the name of an illusory tomorrow is just not the point anymore. It is for this reason that I chose to open with those extraordinary words from Janis Joplin – tomorrow never happens. The point is to draw, not simply to colour-in or fulfill some pre-ordained utopian future. It is to continually re-invent reality from within reality, rather than from some external, transcendental standpoint such as that mystical realm where invisible hands and hidden gods reside. As an aside, it has occurred to me, as I sit here at my kitchen table punching out these final words, what a happy coincidence it is that the names Janis and Janus bear such a striking resemblance to one another. If I was a visual artist (not just a writer-cum-artist manqué), I would no doubt enjoy experimenting with ways to combine the two in some sort of installation – perhaps a stone bust of Janus, singing in the unmistakably raw and passionate voice of one of the legends of the hippie movement. But it matters not that I am no artist in any formal sense, since each of us are already artists of the present in our own ways. ‘One creates new modalities of subjectivity in the same way that an artist creates new forms from the palette’, writes Guattari.71 The parallel he draws between art and social transformation is not to be taken as mere metaphor, however. What he calls for is a merging of art with life, his contention being that global warming and the other great issues of our times cannot be adequately addressed ‘without a mutation of mentality, without promoting a new art of living in society’72. To the ends of forging a more habitable and convivial present, the cross-fertilisations between artistic and activist practices need to continue proliferating, and creativity in general must remain free to flourish. Just as the economic crisis in Argentina in 2001 was quickly and creatively responded to by way of a slew of liberatory initiatives at the grassroots (including the occupied factory movement discussed earlier), the same is now happening in response to the current economic crisis, albeit at a global scale. In these conditions, the futurology of the present is needed now more than ever. The question becomes whether to resign ourselves to the life-denying ossification of creativity under capitalism and the traditional Left alike, or, to liberate life wherever it is imprisoned and to participate passionately and deliberately in the production of the new.

1.) Acknowledgements are due first of all to Anamaine Asinas for all her love, support, and inspiration. Ana – I cannot help but think that the kind of intensely passionate, nurturing and mutually-liberating relationship we share is the very stuff that revolutions are made of. I would also like to extend my warmest thanks to Eric Pido and Marta Celletti, since it was in many a conversation with these dear friends that some of the ideas presented in this article were first formed. Sincere thank yous must also go out to Marc Herbst, Rosi Braidotti, Steven Morgana, Suzanne Passmore, and Elmo Gonzaga, each of whom kindly read various incarnations of this work and provided some very helpful and encouraging feedback. Lastly, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to all of the many activists whom I have worked with over the years, since it is really the collective imagination of our movements that is the true author of this work.
2.) Janis Joplin, ‘Ball and Chain’ in Janis Joplin’s Greatest Hits, CBS Records, 1973.
3.) See Gottfried Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977 [1807].
4.) As the Hegelian philosopher Alexandre Kojève put it: ‘Time in which the Future takes primacy can be realized, can exist, only provided that it negates or annihilates’. See Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Basic Books, New York, 1969, p. 136. Hegel’s ideas on negation are drawn, in no small part, from physics: ‘In modern physical science the opposition, first observed to exist in magnetism as polarity, has come to be regarded as a universal law pervading the whole of nature’ (Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 223). Here he takes the positive-negative opposition found in electrical and magnetic phenomena and adapts it to social relations, elevating it as a mechanical law governing all of history.
5.) See, for example, Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992 [1848]; Michael Albert, Moving Forward: Program for a Participatory Economy, AK Press, San Francisco, 2000; and George Monbiot, Manifesto for a New World Order, New Press, New York, 2004. The manifestos of the twentieth century avant-gardes (Futurist, Surrealist, Situationist, and so on) are perfectly exemplary too – with the exception, perhaps, of the Dada Manifesto of 1918, which was more a parody of the manifesto form.
6.) See, for example, Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992 [1848]; Michael Albert, Moving Forward: Program for a Participatory Economy, AK Press, San Francisco, 2000; and George Monbiot, Manifesto for a New World Order, New Press, New York, 2004. The manifestos of the twentieth century avant-gardes (Futurist, Surrealist, Situationist, and so on) are perfectly exemplary too – with the exception, perhaps, of the Dada Manifesto of 1918, which was more a parody of the manifesto form.
7.) Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, Labor of Dionysus: A critique of the state-form, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1994, p. 6.
8.) Rebecca Solnit, 2009, ‘The Revolution Has Already Occurred’, The Nation, viewed 19 April 2009, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090323/solnit, p. 13.
9.) Dimitris Papadopoulos, Niamh Stephenson & Vassilis Tsianos, Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century, Pluto Press, London, 2008, p. xiii.
10.) Gilles Deleuze, ‘What is a dispositif?’, in T. J. Armstrong (ed), Michel Foucault: Philosopher, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1992, p. 163.
11.) Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1995, p. 12.
12.) Colectivo Situaciones, 2003, ‘On the Researcher-Militant’, European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies, viewed 28 January 2011, http://eipcp.net/transversal/0406/colectivosituaciones/en, p. 3.
13.) David Graeber, Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology, Prickly Paradigm Press, Chicago, 2004, p. 12.
14.) Maurizio Lazzarato, ‘Multiplicity, Totality, Politics’, Parrhesia, iss. 9, 2010, p. 24.
15.) Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1993, pp. ix–xv.
16.) See Uri Gordon, Anarchy Alive!: Anti-Authoritarian Politics from Practice to Theory, Pluto Press, London, 2008; and Jeffrey S. Juris, Networking Futures: The Movements Against Corporate Globalization, Duke University Press, Durham, 2008.
17.) Bruno Latour, ‘Postmodern? No, Simply Amodern!: Steps Towards an Anthropology of Science’, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 21, iss. 1, 1990, pp. 145–171.
18.) Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 92. Here, Guattari draws from the concept of ‘duration’ as found in Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, Dover Publications, Mineola, 1998 [1911].
19.) Cited in Gerald Raunig, Art and Revolution: Transversal Activism in the Long Twentieth Century, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2007, p. 47.
20.) Scott Littleton, Gods, Goddesses, and Mythology, Vol. 6, Marshall Cavendish, Tarrytown, 2005, p. 770.
21.) Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Penguin Books, London, 2003 [1885], p. 150.
22.) Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, Penguin, London, 1991 [1977], p. 31; Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, in P. Rabinow (ed), The Foucault Reader, Penguin Books, London, 1984, pp. 76–100.
23.) Free Association, 2010, How to generate a generation, viewed 25 February 2011, http://freelyassociating.org/2010/10/how-to-generate-a-generation/, p. 1.
24.) Gilles Deleuze cited in Félix Guattari & Suely Rolnik, Molecular Revolution in Brazil, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2008 [1986], p. 19.
25.) See Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, What is to be Done?, Oxford University Press, Clarendon, 1963 [1902].
26.) Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1, Penguin Books, London, 1986 [1867]; Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 2, Penguin Books, London, 1985 [1885]; Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 3, Penguin Books, London, 1981 [1894].
27.) See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007 [1740].
28.) An analogy might help to illustrate the problematic I am dealing with here: Imagine that you are a houseguest at the home of a friend and you get up in the middle of the night to use the bathroom. The only problem is that there is an electrical storm outside and the power has failed. All is dark. Would it be necessary to have a complete map of the entire household in your mind in order to be able to reach the bathroom, or might it also be possible to feel your way there through the dark? The futurology of the present is not concerned with the map of the house; only with those feeling their way through the dark. Instances of the latter kind are what Maurice Merleau-Ponty has referred to as ‘absorbed coping’. See Komarine Romdenh-Romluc, Merleau-Ponty and ‘Phenomenology of perception’, Routledge, Abingdon, 2011, pp. 96–97.
29.) Examples include Jean Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact, Berg, Oxford, 2005; Paul Virilio 2005, The Information Bomb, Verso, London; and Annie Le Brun 2008, The Reality Overload: The Modern World’s Assault on the Imaginal Realm, Inner Traditions, Rochester.
30.) Harry Cleaver, 1992, ‘Kropotkin, Self-Valorization and the Crisis of Marxism’, Libcom, viewed 9 March 2010, http://libcom.org/library/kropotkin-self-valorization-crisis-marxism, p. 4.
31.) The commons could be considered as capitalism’s constitutive outside. It is the very lifeblood of capital and yet, even as it is harnessed, it must simultaneously be negated lest it threaten the calcified order necessary for capitalism’s own reproduction. The concept of the ‘constitutive outside’ has been drawn here from Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex“, Routledge, New York, 1993, pp. 3, 8.
32.) Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976 [1847], p. 57.
33.) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. See also Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, Athlone Press, London, 1983 [1962].
34.) Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982 [1844], p. 138.
35.) Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. 136.
36.) Rosi Braidotti, Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 167.
37.) Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 29.
38.) Jorge Luis Borges, ‘The Garden of Forking Paths’ in D. Yates & J. Irby (eds), Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings, New Directions, New York, 1964, p. 28.
39.) Richard Day, Gramsci is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements, Pluto Press, London, 2005, p. 183.
40.) Karl Marx, ‘Estranged Labour’ in K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1961 [1844], pp. 67–83.
41.) This is an idea expressed in Gottfried Hegel, ‘The doctrine of essence’ in W. Wallace (ed), The logic of Hegel, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1892 [1817], pp. 207–286. ‘[T]hings really are not what they immediately show themselves … there is a permanent in things, and that permanent is in the first instance their Essence’ (pp. 208–209).
42.) Lazzarato, ‘Multiplicity, Totality, Politics’, p. 24.
43.) David Graeber, 2008, ‘Hope in Common’, The Anarchist Library, viewed 1 July 2011, http://theanarchistlibrary.org/HTML/David_Graeber__Hope_in_Common.html, pp. 1, 4.
44.) Graeber, ‘Hope in Common’, p. 1.
45.) Graeber, ‘Hope in Common’, p. 1
46.) This formulation of a ‘political apathy’ is indebted to the work of Feeltank Chicago. See Jerome Mast Grand, Amber Hasselbring & Corndog Brothers, 2008, ‘Renaming Bush Street’, Journal of Aesthetics and Protest, iss. 6, viewed 5 July 2011, http://www.journalofaestheticsandprotest.org/6/antiwar/renamingbushstreet.html.
47.) Foucault, Discipline and Punish.
48.) Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 293–308.
49.) Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, Empire, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2000.
50.) My thinking on affect is primarily sourced from Brian Massumi, Parables for the virtual: Movement, affect, sensation, Duke University Press, Durham, 2002. In short, affect is the capacity to affect and be affected. It is not a personal feeling, but a pre-personal intensity that exists only in flows between people and things.
51.) CrimethInc., 2008, ‘The Really Really Free Market: Instituting the Gift Economy’, CrimethInc. Ex-Workers’ Collective, viewed 8 July 2011, http://www.crimethinc.com/texts/atoz/reallyreally.php.
52.) Graeber, ‘Hope in Common’, p. 1.
53.) Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, Penguin, New York, 2009 [1972], pp. 4–8.
54.) Avi Lewis & Naomi Klein, The Take, Barna-Alper Productions, New York, 2004.
55.) David Graeber, Direct Action: An Ethnography, AK Press, Oakland, 2009.
56.) Penny Harvey & Soumhya Venkatesan, ‘Faith, Reason and the Ethic of Craftsmanship: Creating Contingently Stable Worlds’, in M. Candea (ed), The Social After Gabriel Tarde: Debates and Assessments, Routledge, Abingdon, p. 130.
57.) The bulk of my research results are still in the process of being written up, although a few preliminary sketches have so far been published. See, for instance, Marco Cuevas-Hewitt, ‘Sketches of an Archipelagic Poetics of Postcolonial Belonging’, Budhi: A Journal of Culture and Ideas, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2007, pp. 239–246; and Marco Cuevas-Hewitt, ‘The Figure of the “Fil-Whatever“: Filipino American Trans-Pacific Social Movements and the Rise of Radical Cosmopolitanism’, World Anthropologies Network E-Journal, no. 5, 2010, pp. 97–127.
58.) I seek to neutralise gender here by synthesising both the feminine and masculine suffixes (‘-a’ and ‘-o’, respectively) into the new suffix of ‘-@’. The reason that I have chosen this form over the standard ‘Filipino’ is that I wish to avoid using a gender-specific descriptor to stand in for all Filipin@s. This is an unfortunate grammatical inheritance from Spanish colonialism, since pre-Hispanic indigenous languages in the Philippine archipelago were, by and large, gender-neutral. I might have chosen to use the alternative suffix of ‘-a/o’ but decided against it, not just because it reads somewhat clumsily, but more importantly because it perpetuates the rigid binary notion of gender by which genderqueer individuals are marginalised.
59.) Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 29.
60.) Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, Continuum, London, 2004 [1987], p. 7.
61.) Cited in Guattari & Rolnik, Molecular Revolution in Brazil, p. 87.
62.) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra; Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1989 [1886].
63.) Harry Cleaver, Reading Capital Politically, Anti/Theses, Leeds, 2000 [1979], p. 18; Antonio Negri, Books for Burning: Between Civil War and Democracy in 1970s Italy, Verso, London, 2005, pp. 198–207, 215–230.
64.) See John Jordan, ‘Deserting the Culture Bunker’, Journal of Aesthetics and Protest, iss. 3, viewed 10 July 2011, http://www.joaap.org/new3/jordan.html.
65.) Cited in Lee Scrivner, ‘How to Write an Avant-Garde Manifesto (A Manifesto)’, London Consortium, viewed 9 July 2011, http://www.londonconsortium.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/scrivneripmessay.pdf, p. 13.
66.) Cited in Scrivner, ‘How to Write an Avant-Garde Manifesto (A Manifesto)’, p. 13.
67.) Tristan Tzara, 2006 [1918], ‘Dada Manifesto’, Wikisource, viewed 4 July 2011, http://www.freemedialibrary.com/index.php/Dada_Manifesto_(1918,_Tristan_Tzara).
68.) Cited in Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, Penguin Books, London, 2005 [1942], p. 90.
69.) Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End: Notes on Politics, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2000.
70.) Graeber, ‘Hope in Common’, p. 4.
71.) Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 7. To interpret Guattari here as saying that the production of novelty is simply a straightforward matter of human intent and free will would be gravely mistaken. Becomings can only occur through ‘heterogenesis’ (pp. 33–57); that is, through a multiplicity of elements in symbiosis. In the case of multiplicities in which human beings play a part, subjectivity is certainly one ingredient in the mix, but it does not assume the role of primary causal determinant. There is always an unpredictability to heterogenesis and we often we end up with entirely different outcomes to what we originally intended. It must furthermore be stressed that human subjectivity does not exist on some separate plane of reality as René Descartes presumed, but must rather be seen to be part of matter.
72.) Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 20.

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Dieser Text erschien zuerst unter http://joaap.org/issue8/8toc.htm

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There is no Alternative: The Future is self-organised https://whtsnxt.net/042 Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:38 +0000 http://whtsnxt.net/there-is-no-alternative-the-future-is-self-organised/ Part 1
As workers in the cultural field we offer the following contribution to the debate on the impact of neoliberalism on institutional relations:
– Cultural and educational institutions as they appear today are nothing more than legal and administrative organs of the dominant system. As with all institutions, they live in and through us; we participate in their structures and programmes, internalise their values, transmit their ideologies and act as their audience/public/social body.
– Our view: these institutions may present themselves to us as socially accepted bodies, as somehow representative of the society we live in, but they are nothing more than dysfunctional relics of the bourgeois project. Once upon a time, they were charged with the role of promoting democracy, breathing life into the myth that institutions are built on an exchange between free, equal and committed citizens. Not only have they failed in this task, but within the context of neoliberalism, have become even more obscure, more unreliable and more exclusive.
– The state and its institutional bodies now share aims and objectives so closely intertwined with corporate and neoliberal agendas that they have been rendered indivisible. This intensification and expansion of free market ideology into all aspects of our lives has been accompanied by a systematic dismantling of all forms of social organisation and imagination antithetical to the demands of capitalism.
– As part of this process it’s clear that many institutions and their newly installed managerial elites are now looking for escape routes out of their inevitable demise and that, at this juncture, this moment of crisis, they’re looking at ‘alternative’ structures and what’s left of the Left to model their horizons, sanction their role in society and reanimate their tired relations. Which of course we despise!

In their scramble for survival, cultural and educational institutions have shown how easily they can betray one set of values in favour of another and that’s why our task now is to demand and adhere to the foundational and social principles they have jettisoned, by which we mean: transparency, accountability, equality and open participation.
– By transparency we mean an opening up of the administrative and financial functions/decision making processes to public scrutiny. By accountability we mean that these functions and processes are clearly presented, monitored and that they can in turn, be measured and contested by ‘participants’ at any time. Equality and open participation is exactly what it says – that men and women of all nationalities, race, colour and social status can participate in any of these processes at any time.
– Institutions as they appear today, locked in a confused space between public and private, baying to the demands of neoliberal hype with their new management structures, are not in a position to negotiate the principles of transparency, accountability and equality, let alone implement them. We realise that responding to these demands might extend and/or guarantee institutions’ survival but, thankfully, their deeply ingrained practices prevent them from even entertaining the idea on a serious level.
– In our capacity as workers with a political commitment to self-organisation we feel that any further critical contribution to institutional programmes will further reinforce the relations that keep these obsolete structures in place. We are fully aware that ‘our’ critiques, alternatives and forms of organisation are not just factored into institutional structures but increasingly utilised to legitimise their existence.
– The relationship between corporations, the state and its institutions is now so unbearable that we see no space for negotiation – we offer no contribution, no critique, no pathway to reform, no way in or out. We choose to define ourselves in relation to the social forms that we participate in and not the leaden institutional programmes laid out before us – our deregulation is determined by social, not market relations. There is no need for us to storm the Winter Palace, because most institutions are melting away in the heat of global capital anyway. We will provide no alternative. So let go!

The only question that remains is how to get rid of the carcass and deal with the stench:
– We are not interested in their so-called assets; their personnel, buildings, archives, programmes, shops, clubs, bars, facilities and spaces will all end up at the pawnbroker anyway…
– All we need is their cash in order to pay our way out of capitalism and take this opportunity to make clear our intention to supervise and mediate our own social capital, knowledge and networks.
– As a first step we suggest an immediate redistribution of their funds to already existing, self-organised bodies with a clear commitment to workers’ and immigrants’ rights, social (anti-racist, anti-sexist, anti-homophobic) struggle and representation.
There is no alternative! The future is self-organised.
– In the early 1970s corporate analysts developed a strategy aimed at reducing uncertainty called ‘there is no alternative’ (tina). Somewhat ironically we now find ourselves in agreement, but this time round we’re the scenario planners and executors of our own future though we are, if nothing else, the very embodiment of uncertainty.
– In the absence of clearly stated opposition to the neoliberal system, most forms of collective and collaborative practice can be read as ‘self-enterprise’. By which we mean, groupings or clusters of individuals set up to feed into the corporate controlled markets, take their seats at the table, cater to and promote the dominant ideology.
– Self-organisation should not be confused with self-enterprise or self-help, it is not an alternative or conduit into the market. It isn’t a label, logo, brand or flag under which to sail in the waters of neoliberalism (even as a pirate ship as suggested by mtv)! It has no relationship to entrepreneurship or bogus ‘career collectives’.
– In our view self-organisation is a byword for the productive energy of those who have nothing left to lose. It offers up a space for a radical re-politicisation of social relations – the first tentative steps towards realisable freedoms.

Self-organisation is:
– Something which predates representational institutions. To be more precise: institutions are built on (and often paralyse) the predicates and social forms generated by self-organisation.
– Mutually reinforcing, self-valorising, self-empowering, self-historicising and, as a result, not compatible with fixed institutional structures.
– A social and productive force, a process of becoming which, like capitalism, can be both flexible and opaque – therefore more than agile enough to tackle (or circumvent) it.
– A social process of communication and commonality based on exchange; sharing of similar problems, knowledge and available resources.
– A fluid, temporal set of negotiations and social relations which can be emancipatory – a process of empowerment.
– Something which situates itself in opposition to existing, repressive forms of organisation and concentrations of power.
– Always challenging power both inside the organisation and outside the organisation; this produces a society of resonance and conflict, but not based on fake dualities as at present.
– An organisation of deregulated selves. It is at its core a non-identity.
– A tool that doesn’t require a cohesive identity or voice to enter into negotiation with others. It may reside within social forms but doesn’t need to take on an identifiable social form itself.
– Contagious and inclusive, it disseminates and multiplies.
– The only way to relate to self-organisation is to take part, self-organise, connect with other self-organising initiatives and challenge the legitimacy of institutional representation.

We put a lid on the bourgeois project, the national museums will be stored in their very own archive, the Institutes of Contemporary Art will be handed over to the artists unions, the Universities and Academies will be handed over to the students, Siemens and all the other global players will be handed over to their workers. The state now acts as an administrative unit – just as neoliberalism has suggested it – but with mechanisms of control, transparency accountability and equal rights for all.

END

Disclaimer:
This text can be freely distributed and printed in non-commercial, no-money contexts without the permission of the authors.
It was originally conceived as a pamphlet with the aim of disrupting the so-called critical paths and careers being carved out by those working the base structure of the political-art fields. We’re aware of contradictions, limits and problems with this text and invite all to measure the content in direct relation to the context in which it may appear. In fact, it has come as no surprise to us that its dodgy, legitimising potential has been most keenly exploited by those it originally set out to challenge.
Having let it fly we now invite you, the reader, to consider why it’s in this publication, whose interests it serves and the power relations it helps to maintain.

Stephan Dillemuth in Munich, Anthony Davies in London and Jakob Jakobsen in Copenhagen, 12 June 2005.

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Der Text erschien zuerst in: Will Bradley/Charles Esche (Hg.): Art and Social Change. A Critical Reader. London 2007, S. 378–381.

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