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Seit dem 18. Jahrhundert zeigt sich der Wandel als Entwicklung zu einer immer stärker funktional aus-differenzierten Gesellschaft, deren Teilsysteme zur Trennung von der Umwelt, aber im Austausch mit ihr Grenzen bilden. Diese Grenzen werden dadurch bestimmt, dass sich im System Handelnde darüber -verständigen und entsprechende Handlungsrollen -kultivieren. Bei steigender Komplexität kam es im -Bereich des wissenschaftlichen Forschens zur Ausdifferenzierung von Teildisziplinen mit spezifischen Me-thoden. Die gleichzeitige Ausbildung von Fachsprachen führte zur Abkoppelung von der Alltagskommunikation sowie zur weitgehenden Ausklammerung des -Subjekts mit seiner Lebenswelt. Das gilt unabhängig davon, dass sich alle Einzelmenschen täglich in unterschiedlichen gesellschaftlichen Teilsystemen bewegen. Wenn es heute ein gesellschaftliches Teilsystem gibt, in dem das sonst nur partiell beanspruchte Individuum im Mittelpunkt steht, ist es die Kunst. Hier gilt, dass künstlerischer Ausdruck als Prozess und Ergebnis nicht nach praktischer Nützlichkeit zu beurteilen ist. Diese Errungenschaft der Moderne meint die Freiheit, die Welt, die Gesellschaft, das Ich anders denken und darstellen zu dürfen als es Tradition, Staat und Konvention vorschreiben – um den Preis, dass anderenorts für die materielle, rechtliche und politische Aufrechterhaltung der Gesellschaft gesorgt werden muss. Das Kunstsystem ist nicht außerhalb von Gesellschaft autonom, sondern in einer Gesellschaft selbstbestimmt, aber nicht beziehungslos. Freiheit und Verantwortung gehören zusammen. Innerhalb des Kunstsystems wird entschieden, was ungeachtet divergierender Richtungen, Formen und Experimente als Kunst zu gelten hat. Der Streit darüber bleibt ein Dauerstreit. Er wird zwischen Menschen ausgetragen, die auf unterschiedliche Weise der Produktion, Rezeption, Distribution und Verarbeitung von Kunst verbunden sind und diese Handlungsrollen auch wechseln können. Im Blick auf spezifische Handlungen, die untereinander verbunden sind und sich gegenseitig modellieren, wird es möglich, Kunst über eine Organisationsform für Handlungen und Kommunikationen zu bestimmen. Meine Vision der Kunsthochschule, die als wissenschaftlich-künstlerische Institution in staatliche Aufgaben ein-ge-bun-den ist, braucht diesen operationalen Konsens und die permanente Arbeit daran. Wenn man Kunst nicht voreilig domestizieren und amputieren will, ist auf die -besondere Kompetenz, die Intelligenz und Kreativität des Interpreten nicht zu verzichten. Kunst durfte es vor allem dann geben und weiter geben, wenn über sie gesprochen wird. Im Reden und Schreiben darüber werden bereits produzierte Kunstwerke existent gehalten und neue ermöglicht. Dabei steht auch der Sprachgebrauch auf dem Prüfstand. Es macht einen erheblichen Unterschied, ob man für Bilder (und Texte) schlichte Gefäß-Metaphern benutzt oder sich entscheidet, Metaphern im Umkreis von Impuls, Anlass, Anregung und Möglichkeit zu verwenden. Erst die zweite Entscheidung räumt dem einzelnen Betrachter jene Aktivität ein, die sonst nur zu schnell dem Werk selbst zugeschrieben wird. Zwischen Kunst und Schule macht es Sinn, sich im Gebrauch der ersten Person Singular zu üben und damit ein Stück Machtverlust zu riskieren. Die eigene Interpretation von Kunst rechnet mit der Interpretation von anderen, statt die Kunst als Abstraktion quasi stellvertretend und selbstverständlich handeln zu lassen.
Kunst, Medien und Design als Handlungsfelder einer Hochschule, die Lehren und Lernen mit Forschung und Entwicklung verbindet, sind ohne interdisziplinäre Bemühungen nicht mehr zu bewältigen. Das hat etwas mit Disziplin zu tun, mehr noch mit Kommunikation. Gedanken an eine Rettung der Welt durch die freie Kunst erscheinen grandios, bewegen sich jedoch schnell zwischen Fahrlässigkeit und Ideologie. Elitäre Absonderung steht dem grenzüberschreitenden Diskurs im Wege. Produktive Arbeit unter institutionellen Bedingungen setzt ein Selbstverständnis voraus, das eine Entfernung von der eigenen Ich-Bezogenheit in Kauf nimmt oder wenigstens auf Zeit simulieren kann. Wo bereits Aversionen herrschen und Empathie fehlt, ist dem Auseinanderdriften durchaus unterschiedlicher Studiengänge kaum zu begegnen, bleibt das Anregungspotential für die jeweils eigene Arbeit ungenutzt. Zum interdisziplinären Diskurs gibt es keine tragfähige Alternative, auch wenn er nur schwer gelingt und immer wieder zusammenbricht. Sisyphos-Arbeit ist gefragt, hier wie im Umgang mit Studierenden.
Das Projekt Kunsthochschule wird im Überschneidungsbereich von Bildung, Kunst und Wissenschaft konkret. Bildung braucht Bilder. Sie braucht aber auch die intensive Auseinandersetzung mit dem Bild selbst. Wer sich ein Bild machen will von der Welt oder Teilen von ihr, wer wissen und wahrnehmen will, wie das alles zusammenhängt, muss sich auf die Bilder von anderen einlassen und selbst Bilder entwerfen. Lehre in diesem Bereich ist nur aufgrund hartnäckiger Klischeevorstellungen unmöglich, allerdings auch kaum wie eine Alphabetisierungskampagne zu betreiben. Bilder können dabei helfen, zu erkennen, dass die vorherrschende Wirklichkeit nur eine der möglichen Beschreibungen ist. Mit wissenschaftlichen Argumenten lässt sich geltend machen, dass ein Bild erst dann zu verstehen ist, wenn erfasst wird, wie es zeigt und was nicht zu sehen ist. Die Rede von der Benutzeroberfläche mag nicht in allen Aspekten angemessen sein – sie erinnert aber daran, dass das Entscheidende davor und dahinter -passiert, vor allem aber in und zwischen Menschen.
Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien zuerst in: Michael Schwarz, Marina Abramović (Hg.): „Beschreiben“, zum Beispiel eine Kunsthochschule. Hochschule für Bildende Künste Braunschweig. Jahrbuch 3. Köln 1999, S. 45–48.
Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien zuerst in: e-flux journal # 29, November 2011, http://www.e-f lux.com/journal/art-withoutwork/ [3.4.2013].
1.)Lawrence Weiner, Declaration of Intent (1968):
1. The artist may construct the piece.
2. The piece may be fabricated.
3. The piece need not be built.Each being equal and consistent with the intent of the artist the decision as to condition rests with the receiver upon the occasion of receivership.
2.)Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 7.
3.)Karl Marx, The German Ideology (1845) (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998), 53: For as soon as the division of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; whereas in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic. This fixation of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into material power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now.
1. Die heutige Avantgarde, die nicht geltende Mystifikationen wiederholt, ist gesellschaftlich unterdrückt. Die Bewegung, die von der Gesellschaft erwünscht ist, kann von ihr aufgekauft werden: das ist die Pseudoavantgarde.
2. Wer neue Werte schafft, dem erscheint das heutige Leben als Illusion und Fragment. Wenn die Avantgarde die Frage nach der Bedeutung des Lebens stellt, aber unzufrieden damit, ihre Folgerungen verwirklichen will, sieht sie sich von allen Möglichkeiten abgeschnitten und von der Gesellschaft abgekapselt.
3. Die ästhetischen Abfälle der Avantgarde wie Bilder, Filme, Gedichte usw. sind bereits erwünscht und wirkungslos; unerwünscht ist das Programm der völligen Neugestaltung der Lebensbedingungen, das die Gesellschaft in ihren Grundlagen verändert.
4. Nachdem man die Produkte der Avantgarde ästhetisch neutralisiert auf den Markt gebracht hat, will man nun Ihre Forderungen, die nach wie vor auf eine Verwirklichung im gesamten Bereich des Lebens abzielen, aufteilen, zerreden und auf tote Gleise abschieben. Im Namen der früheren und jetzigen Avantgarde und aller vereinzelten, unzufriedenen Künstler protestieren wir gegen diese kulturelle Leichenfledderei und rufen alle schöpferischen Kräfte zum Boykott solcher Diskussionen auf.
5. Die moderne Kultur ist substanzlos, sie besitzt keinerlei Kraft, die sich den Beschlüssen der Avantgarde wirklich wiedersetzen könnte.
6. Wir, die neue Werte schaffen, werden von den Hütern der Kultur nicht mehr lauthals bekämpft, sondern auf spezialisierte Bereiche festgelegt, und unsere Forderungen werden lächerlich gemacht.
7. Darin sollen die Künstler die Rolle der früheren Hofnarren übernehmen, von der Gesellschaft bezahlt, ihr eine bestimmte kulturelle Freiheit vorzuspiegeln.
8. Der gesellschaftliche Dünkel will der Avantgarde ein Niveau vorschreiben, das sie nicht verlassen darf, wenn sie gesellschaftsfähig bleiben will.
9. Die Existenz des Künstlers ist das Ferment zur Metamorphose unserer absterbenden europäischen Kultur, einem Prozess, der nicht aufzuhalten, sondern zu beschleunigen ist.
10. Die europäische Kultur ist ein krankes, altes, schwangeres Weib, das sterben wird. Sollen wir den absolut aussichtslosen Versuch unternehmen, die Mutter zu retten – oder soll das Kind leben? – Die Restaurativen wollen noch die Mutter retten – und töten damit auch das Kind. Die Avantgarde hat sich entschieden: die Mutter muss sterben, damit das Kind leben kann.
11. Die Avantgarde von gestern ist comme il faut. Die künstlerische Linksfront ist heute ein Wahrheitsproblem: „Eine Wahrheit wird nur 10 Jahre alt.“ (Ibsen)
12. Künstler und Intellektuelle: unterstützt die situationistische Bewegung, denn sie jagt keinen Utopien nach, sondern ist die einzige Bewegung, die den gegenwärtigen kulturellen Zustand aufhebt.
13. Die Aufgabe der Avantgarde besteht einzig und allein darin, ihre Anerkennung zu erzwingen, ehe Ihre Disziplin und ihr Programm verwässert worden sind. Das ist es, was die Situationistische Internationale zu tun gedenkt.
München, Januar 1961
Herausgegeben von der GRUPPE SPUR als Deutsche Sektion der SITUATIONISTISCHEN INTERNATIONALE
Sturm • Prem • Fischer • Kunzelmann • Zimmer
der Skandinavischen Sektion: Steffan • Larsson • Asger Jorn • Jörgen Nash • Katia Lindell
und der Belgischen Sektion: Maurice Wyckaert
1.
Der Remodernismus nimmt die ursprünglichen Prinzipien des Modernismus und bringt sie wieder zur Anwendung. Das Hauptaugenmerk liegt auf Vision anstelle von Formalismus.
2.
Der Remodernismus schließt eher ein als aus. Er heißt Künstler willkommen, die sich selbst erkennen und finden wollen mithilfe künstlerischer Prozesse, welche danach streben zu verbinden und einzuschließen, anstatt sich zu entfremden und auszuschließen. Der Remodernismus erhält die spirituelle Vision der Gründerväter des Modernismus aufrecht und respektiert den Mut und die Integrität, mit der sie sich den Leiden der menschlichen Seele gestellt haben und diese mit einer neuen Kunst zum Ausdruck gebracht haben, einer Kunst, die keinem religiösen oder politischen Dogma mehr unterlag und die danach strebte, dem ganzen Spektrum der menschlichen Psyche Ausdruck zu verleihen.
3.
Der Remodernismus verwirft und ersetzt den Post-Modernismus, da dieser weder in der Lage war, sich mit den elementaren Fragen nach der Bedeutung des Menschseins auseinanderzusetzten, noch Antworten auf diese zu geben.
4.
Der Remodernismus verkörpert spirituelle Tiefe und Bedeutung und beendet ein Zeitalter bestehend aus wissenschaftlichem Materialismus, Nihilismus und spirituellem Bankrott.
5.
Wir brauchen nicht noch mehr dämliche, langweilige, hirnlose Zerstörung der Konvention, wir brauchen nichts Neues sondern Beständiges. Wir brauchen eine Kunst, die Körper und Seele mit einbezieht, die die Prinzipien anerkennt, mithilfe derer Weisheit und Einsicht im Laufe der Geschichte der Menschheit am Leben erhalten wurden. Dies ist die wahre Aufgabe der Tradition.
6.
Der Modernismus hat sein Potential nie erfüllt. Es ist sinnlos ‚post-‘ irgendetwas zu sein, wenn man noch nicht einmal ‚etwas‘ gewesen ist.
7.
Spiritualität ist die Reise der Seele auf Erden. Ihr allererstes Prinzip ist eine Absichtserklärung der Wahrheit ins Gesicht zu sehen. Die Wahrheit ist wie sie ist, unabhängig davon, wie wir sie gerne hätten.
Ein spiritueller Künstler zu sein bedeutet, sich ohne wenn und aber unseren Projektionen zu stellen, den guten und den schlechten, den ansprechenden und den grotesken, unseren Stärken und unseren Schwächen, um uns selbst und dadurch unsere wahre Beziehung zu Anderen und unsere Verbindung zum Göttlichen zu erkennen.
8.
Bei spiritueller Kunst geht es nicht um ein Märchenland. Es geht darum, die raue Oberflächenstruktur des Lebens zu greifen. Es geht darum, sich den Schatten zu stellen und sich mit wilden Hunden anzufreunden. Spiritualität ist die Erkenntnis, dass alles im Leben einem höheren Zweck dient.
9.
Spirituelle Kunst ist keine Religion. Spiritualität ist das Streben der Menschheit, sich selbst zu verstehen und durch die Klarheit und Integrität ihrer Künstler zu Ihrer Symbolik zu gelangen.
10.
Das Erschaffen von wahrer Kunst ist das Verlangen des Menschen, mit sich selbst, seinen Mitmenschen und seinem Gott zu kommunizieren. Kunst, die diese Themen außer Acht lässt, ist keine Kunst.
11.
Es sollte angemerkt werden, dass die künstlerische Technik von der Vision des Künstlers diktiert wird. Sie ist nur in dem Maße notwendig, wie sie dieser entspricht.
12.
Die Aufgabe der Remodernisten ist es, Gott zurück in die Kunst zu bringen, aber nicht so, wie Gott vorher war. Der Remodernismus ist keine Religion, aber wir erachten es als unerlässlich, den Enthusiasmus wiederzuerlangen (vom griechischen en theos, von Gott besessen sein).
13.
Wahre Kunst ist sichtbare Manifestation, Beweis und Wegbegleiter der Reise der Seele. Spirituelle Kunst bedeutet nicht, Madonnas oder Buddhas zu malen. Spirituelle Kunst ist das Malen von Dingen, die die Seele des Künstlers berühren. Spirituelle Kunst schaut oft nicht sehr spirituell aus, sie sieht so aus wie alles andere, weil in der Spiritualität alles andere enthalten ist.
14.
Wieso brauchen wir eine neue Spiritualität in der Kunst? Weil mit anderen auf bedeutsame Art und Weise in Verbindung zu treten die Menschen glücklich macht. Verstanden zu werden und sich gegenseitig zu verstehen macht das Leben lebenswert.
Zusammenfassung:
Jedem, der sich in einer ungestörten mentalen Verfassung befindet, ist klar, dass das, was heute ziemlich ernsthaft von der regierenden Elite als Kunst herausgegeben wird, den Beweis erbringt, dass die scheinbar rationale Entwicklung eines Ideengerüsts gänzlich danebengegangen ist. Der Modernismus basiert auf gültigen Prinzipien, aber die jetzt aus ihm gezogenen Schlussfolgerungen sind absurd.
Wir machen auf dieses Fehlen von Bedeutung aufmerksam, damit eine kohärente Kunst erreicht und dieses Ungleichgewicht ausgeglichen werden kann.
Es gibt keinen Zweifel, dass es eine spirituelle Renaissance in der Kunst geben wird, da es für die Kunst keinen anderen Weg geben kann. Es ist die Aufgabe des Stuckismus diese spirituelle Renaissance jetzt einzuleiten.
Übersetzung: Frank Christopher Schröder
Billy Childish, Charles Thomson
1. March 2000
Wiederabdruck:
Das Manifest erschien unter http://www.stuckism.com/Manifestos/RemodernismGerman.html [29.4.2013].
Wiederabdruck
17 May 1960
reprinted in Internationale Situationniste #4 (June 1960)
Wiederabdruck
Serpentine Gallery Manifesto Marathon, 2008.
Weiterführende Informationen/Bilder/Materialien whtsnxt.net/108
]]>Publiziert von Boris Lurie als Flyer für die Ausstellung „KUNST UND POLITIK“, Karlsruher Kunstverein 1970.
Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien unter: http://www.no-art.info/_statements/de.html [12.7.2013].
The restructured worker
Twenty years of restructuring of the big factories has led to a curious paradox. The various different post-Fordist models have been constructed both on the defeat of the Fordist worker and on the recognition of the centrality of (an ever increasingly intellectualized) living labor within production. In today’s large restructured company, a worker’s work increasingly involves, at various levels, an ability to choose among different alternatives and thus a degree of responsibility regarding decision making. The concept of “interface” used by communications sociologists provides a fair definition of the activities of this kind of worker – as an interface between different functions, between different work teams, between different levels of the hierarchy, and so forth. What modern management techniques are looking for is for “the worker’s soul to become part of the factory.” The worker’s personality and subjectivity have to be made susceptible to organization and command. It is around immateriality that the quality and quantity of labor are organized. This transformation of working-class labor into a labor of control, of handling information, into a decision-making capacity that involves the investment of subjectivity, affects workers in varying ways according to their positions within the factory hierarchy, but it is nevertheless present as an irreversible process. Work can thus be defined as the capacity to activate and manage productive cooperation. In this phase, workers are expected to become “active subjects” in the coordination of the various functions of production, instead of being subjected to it as simple command. We arrive at a point where a collective learning process becomes the heart of productivity, because it is no longer a matter of finding different ways of composing or organizing already existing job functions, but of looking for new ones.
The problem, however, of subjectivity and its collective form, its constitution and its development, has immediately expressed itself as a clash between social classes within the organization of work. I should point out that what I am describing is not some utopian vision of recomposition, but the very real terrain and conditions of the conflict between social classes. The capitalist needs to find an unmediated way of establishing command over subjectivity itself; the prescription and definition of tasks transforms into a prescription of subjectivities. The new slogan of Western societies is that we should all “become subjects”. Participative management is a technology of power, a technology for creating and controlling the “subjective processes.” As it is no longer possible to confine subjectivity merely to tasks of execution, it becomes necessary for the subject’s competence in the areas of management, communication, and creativity to be made compatible with the conditions of “production for production’s sake.” Thus the slogan “become subjects,” far from eliminating the antagonism between hierarchy and cooperation, between autonomy and command, actually re-poses the antagonism at a higher level, because it both mobilizes and clashes with the very personality of the individual worker. First and foremost, we have here a discourse that is authoritarian: one has to express oneself, one has to speak, communicate, cooperate, and so forth. The “tone” is that of the people who were in executive command under Taylorization; all that has changed is the content. Second, if it is no longer possible to lay down and specify jobs and responsibilities rigidly (in the way that was once done with “scientific” studies of work), but if, on the contrary, jobs now require cooperation and collective coordination, then the subjects of that production must be capable of communication – they must be active participants within a work team. The communicational relationship (both vertically and horizontally) is thus completely predetermined in both form and content; it is subordinated to the “circulation of information” and is not expected to be anything other. The subject becomes a simple relayer of codification and decodification, whose transmitted messages must be “clear and free of ambiguity,” within a communications context that has been completely normalized by management. The necessity of imposing command and the violence that goes along with it here take on a normative communicative form.
The management mandate to “become subjects of communication” threatens to be even more totalitarian than the earlier rigid division between mental and manual labor (ideas and execution), because capitalism seeks to involve even the worker’s personality and subjectivity within the production of value. Capital wants a situation where command resides within the subject him- or herself, and within the communicative process. The worker is to be responsible for his or her own control and motivation within the work group without a foreman needing to intervene, and the foreman’s role is redefined into that of a facilitator. In fact, employers are extremely worried by the double problem this creates: on one hand, they are forced to recognize the autonomy and freedom of labor as the only possible form of cooperation in production, but on the other hand, at the same time, they are obliged (a life-and-death necessity for the capitalist) not to “redistribute” the power that the new quality of labor and its organization imply. Today’s management thinking takes workers’ subjectivity into consideration only in order to codify it in line with the requirements of production. And once again this phase of transformation succeeds in concealing the fact that the individual and collective interests of workers and those of the company are not identical.
I have defined working-class labor as an abstract activity that nowadays involves the application of subjectivity. In order to avoid misunderstandings, however, I should add that this form of productive activity is not limited only to highly skilled workers; it refers to a use value of labor power today, and, more generally, to the form of activity of every productive subject within postindustrial society. One could say that in the highly skilled, qualified worker, the “communicational model” is already given, already constituted, and that its potentialities are already defined. In the young worker, however, the “precarious” worker, and the unemployed youth, we are dealing with a pure virtuality, a capacity that is as yet undetermined but that already shares all the characteristics of postindustrial productive subjectivity. The virtuality of this capacity is neither empty nor ahistoric; it is, rather, an opening and a potentiality that have as their historical origins and antecedents the “struggle against work” of the Fordist worker and, in more recent times, the processes of socialization, educational formation, and cultural self-valorization.
This transformation of the world of work appears even more evident when one studies the social cycle of production: the “diffuse factory” and decentralization of production on the one hand and the various forms of tertiarization on the other. Here one can measure the extent to which the cycle of immaterial labor has come to assume a strategic role within the global organization of production. The various activities of research, conceptualization, management of human resources, and so forth, together with all the various tertiary activities, are organized within computerized and multimedia networks. These are the terms in which we have to understand the cycle of production and the organization of labor. The integration of scientific labor into industrial and tertiary labor has become one of the principal sources of productivity, and it is becoming a growing factor in the cycles of production that organize it.
“Immaterial Labor” in the Classic Definition
All the characteristics of the postindustrial economy (both in industry and society as a whole) are highly present within the classic forms of “immaterial” production: audiovisual production, advertising, fashion, the production of software, photography, cultural activities, and so forth. The activities of this kind of immaterial labor force us to question the classic definitions of work and workforce, because they combine the results of various different types of work skill: intellectual skills, as regards the cultural-informational content; manual skills for the ability to combine creativity, imagination, and technical and manual labor; and entrepreneurial skills in the management of social relations and the structuring of that social cooperation of which they are a part. This immaterial labor constitutes itself in forms that are immediately collective, and we might say that it exists only in the form of networks and flows. The organization of the cycle of production of immaterial labor (because this is exactly what it is, once we abandon our factoryist prejudices – a cycle of production) is not obviously apparent to the eye, because it is not defined by the four walls of a factory. The location in which it operates is outside in the society at large, at a territorial level that we could call “the basin of immaterial labor.” Small and sometimes very small “productive units” (often consisting of only one individual) are organized for specific ad hoc projects, and may exist only for the duration of those particular jobs. The cycle of production comes into operation only when it is required by the capitalist; once the job has been done, the cycle dissolves back into the networks and flows that make possible the reproduction and enrichment of its productive capacities. Precariousness, hyperexploitation, mobility, and hierarchy are the most obvious characteristics of metropolitan immaterial labor. Behind the label of the independent “self-employed” worker, what we actually find is an intellectual proletarian, but who is recognized as such only by the employers who exploit him or her. It is worth noting that in this kind of working existence it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish leisure time from work time. In a sense, life becomes inseparable from work. This labor form is also characterized by real managerial functions that consist in (1) a certain ability to manage its social relations and (2) the eliciting of social cooperation within the structures of the basin of immaterial labor.
The quality of this kind of labor power is thus defined not only by its professional capacities (which make possible the construction of the cultural-informational content of the commodity), but also by its ability to “manage” its own activity and act as the coordinator of the immaterial labor of others (production and management of the cycle). This immaterial labor appears as a real mutation of “living labor.” Here we are quite far from the Taylorist model of organization.
Immaterial labor finds itself at the crossroads (or rather, it is the interface) of a new relationship between production and consumption. The activation of both productive cooperation and the social relationship with the consumer is materialized within and by the process of communication. The role of immaterial labor is to promote continual innovation in the forms and conditions of communication (and thus in work and consumption). It gives form to and materializes needs, the imaginary, consumer tastes, and so forth, and these products in turn become powerful producers of needs, images, and tastes. The particularity of the commodity produced through immaterial labor (its essential use value being given by its value as informational and cultural content) consists in the fact that it is not destroyed in the act of consumption, but rather it enlarges, transforms, and creates the “ideological“ and cultural environment of the consumer. This commodity does not produce the physical capacity of labor power; instead, it transforms the person who uses it. Immaterial labor produces first and foremost a “social relationship“ (a relationship of innovation, production, and consumption). Only if it succeeds in this production does its activity have an economic value. This activity makes immediately apparent something that material production had “hidden,“ namely, that labor produces not only commodities, but first and foremost it produces the capital relation.
The Autonomy of the Productive Synergies of Immaterial Labor
My working hypothesis, then, is that the cycle of immaterial labor takes as its starting point a social labor power that is independent and able to organize both its own work and its relations with business entities. Industry does not form or create this new labor power, but simply takes it on board and adapts it. Industry’s control over this new labor power presupposes the independent organization and “free entrepreneurial activity” of the labor power. Advancing further on this terrain brings us into the debate on the nature of work in the post-Fordist phase of the organization of labor. Among economists, the predominant view of this problematic can be expressed in a single statement: immaterial labor operates within the forms of organization that the centralization of industry allows. Moving from this common basis, there are two differing schools of thought: one is the extension of neoclassical analysis; the other is that of systems theory. In the former, the attempt to solve the problem comes through a redefinition of the problematic of the market. It is suggested that in order to explain the phenomena of communication and the new dimensions of organization one should introduce not only cooperation and intensity of labor, but also other analytic variables (anthropological variables? immaterial variables?) and that on this basis one might introduce other objectives of optimization and so forth. In fact, the neoclassical model has considerable difficulty in freeing itself from the coherence constraints imposed by the theory of general equilibrium. The new phenomenologies of labor, the new dimensions of organization, communication, the potentiality of spontaneous synergies, the autonomy of the subjects involved, and the independence of the networks were neither foreseen nor foreseeable by a general theory that believed that material labor and an industrial economy were indispensable.
Today, with the new data available, we find the microeconomy in revolt against the macroeconomy, and the classical model is corroded by a new and irreducible anthropological reality.
Systems theory, by eliminating the constraint of the market and giving pride of place to organization, is more open to the new phenomenology of labor and in particular to the emergence of immaterial labor. In more developed systemic theories, organization is conceived as an ensemble of factors, both material and immaterial, both individual and collective, that can permit a given group to reach objectives. The success of this organizational process requires instruments of regulation, either voluntary or automatic. It becomes possible to look at things from the point of view of social synergies, and immaterial labor can be taken on board by virtue of its global efficacy. These viewpoints, however, are still tied to an image of the organization of work and its social territory within which effective activity from an economic viewpoint (in other words, the activity conforming to the objective) must inevitably be considered as a surplus in relation to collective cognitive mechanisms. Sociology and labor economics, being systemic disciplines, are both incapable of detaching themselves from this position.
I believe that an analysis of immaterial labor and a description of its organization can lead us beyond the presuppositions of business theory – whether in its neoclassical school or its systems theory school. It can lead us to define, at a territorial level, a space for a radical autonomy of the productive synergies of immaterial labor. We can thus move against the old schools of thought to establish, decisively, the viewpoint of an “anthropo-sociology” that is constitutive.
Once this viewpoint comes to dominate within social production, we find that we have an interruption in the continuity of models of production. By this I mean that, unlike the position held by many theoreticians of post-Fordism, I do not believe that this new labor power is merely functional to a new historical phase of capitalism and its processes of accumulation and reproduction. This labor power is the product of a “silent revolution” taking place within the anthropological realities of work and within the reconfiguration of its meanings. Waged labor and direct subjugation (to organization) no longer constitute the principal form of the contractual relationship between capitalist and worker. A polymorphous self-employed autonomous work has emerged as the dominant form, a kind of “intellectual worker” who is him or herself an entrepreneur, inserted within a market that is constantly shifting and within networks that are changeable in time and space.
The cycle of immaterial production
Up to this point I have been analyzing and constructing the concept of immaterial labor from a point of view that could be defined, so to speak, as “microeconomic.” If now we consider immaterial labor within the globality of the production cycle, of which it is the strategic stage, we will be able to see a series of characteristics of post-Taylorist production that have not yet been taken into consideration.
I want to demonstrate in particular how the process of valorization tends to be identified with the process of the production of social communication and how the two stages (valorization and communication) immediately have a social and territorial dimension. The concept of immaterial labor presupposes and results in an enlargement of productive cooperation that even includes the production and reproduction of communication and hence of its most important contents: subjectivity.
If Fordism integrated consumption into the cycle of the reproduction of capital, post-Fordism integrates communication into it. From a strictly economic point of view, the cycle of reproduction of immaterial labor dislocates the production-consumption relationship as it is defined as much by the “virtuous Keynesian circle” as by the Marxist reproduction schemes of the second volume of Capital. Now, rather than speaking of the toppling of “supply and demand,” we should speak about a redefinition of the production-consumption relationship. As we saw earlier, the consumer is inscribed in the manufacturing of the product from its conception. The consumer is no longer limited to consuming commodities (destroying them in the act of consumption). On the contrary, his or her consumption should be productive in accordance to the necessary conditions and the new products. Consumption is then first of all a consumption of information. Consumption is no longer only the “realization” of a product, but a real and proper social process that for the moment is defined with the term communication.
Large-scale industry and services
To recognize the new characteristics of the production cycle of immaterial labor, we should compare it with the production of large-scale industry and services. If the cycle of immaterial production immediately demonstrates to us the secret of post-Taylorist production (that is to say, that social communication and the social relationship that constitutes it become productive), then it would be interesting to examine how these new social relationships innervate even industry and services, and how they oblige us to reformulate and reorganize even the classical forms of “production.”
Large-scale industry
The postindustrial enterprise and economy are founded on the manipulation of information. Rather than ensuring (as 19th century enterprises did) the surveillance of the inner workings of the production process and the supervision of the markets of raw materials (labor included), business is focused on the terrain outside of the production process: sales and the relationship with the consumer. It always leans more toward commercialization and financing than toward production. Prior to being manufactured, a product must be sold, even in “heavy” industries such as automobile manufacturing; a car is put into production only after the sales network orders it. This strategy is based on the production and consumption of information. It mobilizes important communication and marketing strategies in order to gather information (recognizing the tendencies of the market) and circulate it (constructing a market). In the Taylorist and Fordist systems of production, by introducing the mass consumption of standardized commodities, Ford could still say that the consumer has the choice between one black model T5 and another black model T5. “Today the standard commodity is no longer the recipe to success, and the automobile industry itself, which used to be the champion of the great ‘low price’ series, would want to boast about having become a neoindustry of singularization” – and quality.1 For the majority of businesses, survival involves the permanent search for new commercial openings that lead to the identification of always more ample or differentiated product lines. Innovation is no longer subordinated only to the rationalization of labor, but also to commercial imperatives. It seems then that the postindustrial commodity is the result of a creative process that involves both the producer and the consumer.
Services
If from industry proper we move on to the “services” sector (large banking services, insurance, and so forth), the characteristics of the process I have described appear even more clearly. We are witnessing today not really a growth of services, but rather a development of the “relations of service.” The move beyond the Taylorist organization of services is characterized by the integration of the relationship between production and consumption, where in fact the consumer intervenes in an active way in the composition of the product. The product “service” becomes a social construction and a social process of “conception” and innovation. In service industries, the “back-office” tasks (the classic work of services) have diminished and the tasks of the “front office” (the relationship with clients) have grown. There has been thus a shift of human resources toward the outer part of business. As recent sociological analyses tell us, the more a product handled by the service sector is characterized as an immaterial product, the more it distances itself from the model of industrial organization of the relationship between production and consumption. The change in this relationship between production and consumption has direct consequences for the organization of the Taylorist labor of production of services, because it draws into question both the contents of labor and the division of labor (and thus the relationship between conception and execution loses its unilateral character). If the product is defined through the intervention of the consumer, and is therefore in permanent evolution, it becomes always more difficult to define the norms of the production of services and establish an “objective” measure of productivity.
Immaterial Labor
All of these characteristics of postindustrial economics (present both in large-scale industry and the tertiary sector) are accentuated in the form of properly “immaterial” production. Audiovisual production, advertising, fashion, software, the management of territory, and so forth are all defined by means of the particular relationship between production and its market or consumers. Here we are at the furthest point from the Taylorist model. Immaterial labor continually creates and modifies the forms and conditions of communication, which in turn acts as the interface that negotiates the relationship between production and consumption. As I noted earlier, immaterial labor produces first and foremost a social relation – it produces not only commodities, but also the capital relation.
If production today is directly the production of a social relation, then the “raw material” of immaterial labor is subjectivity and the “ideological” environment in which this subjectivity lives and reproduces. The production of subjectivity ceases to be only an instrument of social control (for the reproduction of mercantile relationships) and becomes directly productive, because the goal of our postindustrial society is to construct the consumer/communicator – and to construct it as “active.” Immaterial workers (those who work in advertising, fashion, marketing, television, cybernetics, and so forth) satisfy a demand by the consumer and at the same time establish that demand. The fact that immaterial labor produces subjectivity and economic value at the same time demonstrates how capitalist production has invaded our lives and has broken down all the oppositions among economy, power, and knowledge. The process of social communication (and its principal content, the production of subjectivity) becomes here directly productive because in a certain way it “produces” production. The process by which the “social” (and what is even more social, that is, language, communication, and so forth) becomes “economic” has not yet been sufficiently studied. In effect, on the one hand, we are familiar with an analysis of the production of subjectivity defined as the constitutive “process” specific to a “relation to the self with respect to the forms of production particular to knowledge and power (as in a certain vein of poststructuralist French philosophy), but this analysis never intersects sufficiently with the forms of capitalist valorization. On the other hand, in the 1980s a network of economists and sociologists (and before them the Italian postworkerist tradition) developed an extensive analysis of the “social form of production,” but that analysis does not integrate sufficiently the production of subjectivity as the content of valorization. Now, the post-Taylorist mode of production is defined precisely by putting subjectivity to work both in the activation of productive cooperation and in the production of the “cultural” contents of commodities.
The aesthetic model
But how is the production process of social communication formed? How does the production of subjectivity take place within this process? How does the production of subjectivity become the production of the consumer/communicator and its capacities to consume and communicate? What role does immaterial labor have in this process? As I have already said, my hypothesis is this: the process of the production of communication tends to become immediately the process of valorization. If in the past communication was organized fundamentally by means of language and the institutions of ideological and literary/artistic production, today, because it is invested with industrial production, communication is reproduced by means of specific technological schemes (knowledge, thought, image, sound, and language reproduction technologies) and by means of forms of organization and “management” that are bearers of a new mode of production.
It is more useful, in attempting to grasp the process of the formation of social communication and its subsumption within the “economic,“ to use, rather than the “material“ model of production, the “aesthetic“ model that involves author, reproduction, and reception. This model reveals aspects that traditional economic categories tend to obscure and that, as I will show, constitute the “specific differences“ of the post-Taylorist means of production.2 The “aesthetic/ideological“ model of production will be transformed into a small-scale sociological model with all the limits and difficulties that such a sociological transformation brings. The model of author, reproduction, and reception requires a double transformation: in the first place, the three stages of this creation process must be immediately characterized by their social form; in the second place, the three stages must be understood as the articulations of an actual productive cycle.3
The “author” must lose its individual dimension and be transformed into an industrially organized production process (with a division of labor, investments, orders, and so forth), “reproduction” becomes a mass reproduction organized according to the imperatives of profitability, and the audience (“reception”) tends to become the consumer/communicator. In this process of socialization and subsumption within the economy of intellectual activity the “ideological” product tends to assume the form of a commodity. I should emphasize, however, that the subsumption of this process under capitalist logic and the transformation of its products into commodities does not abolish the specificity of aesthetic production, that is to say, the creative relationship between author and audience.
The specific differences of the immaterial labor cycle
Allow me to underline briefly the specific differences of the “stages” that make up the production cycle of immaterial labor (immaterial labor itself, its “ideological/commodity products,” and the “public/consumer”) in relation to the classical forms of the reproduction of “capital.”
As far as immaterial labor being an “author” is concerned, it is necessary to emphasize the radical autonomy of its productive synergies. As we have seen, immaterial labor forces us to question the classical definitions of work and workforce, because it results from a synthesis of different types of knowhow: intellectual skills, manual skills, and entrepreneurial skills. Immaterial labor constitutes itself in immediately collective forms that exist as networks and flows. The subjugation of this form of cooperation and the “use value” of these skills to capitalist logic does not take away the autonomy of the constitution and meaning of immaterial labor. On the contrary, it opens up antagonisms and contradictions that, to use once again a Marxist formula, demand at least a “new form of exposition.”
The “ideological product” becomes in every respect a commodity. The term ideological does not characterize the product as a “reflection” of reality, as false or true consciousness of reality. Ideological products produce, on the contrary, new stratifications of reality; they are the intersection where human power, knowledge, and action meet. New modes of seeing and knowing demand new technologies, and new technologies demand new forms of seeing and knowing. These ideological products are completely internal to the processes of the formation of social communication; that is, they are at once the results and the prerequisites of these processes. The ensemble of ideological products constitutes the human ideological environment. Ideological products are transformed into commodities without ever losing their specificity; that is, they are always addressed to someone, they are “ideally signifying,” and thus they pose the problem of “meaning.”
The general public tends to become the model for the consumer (audience/client). The public (in the sense of the user – the reader, the music listener, the television audience) whom the author addresses has as such a double productive function. In the first place, as the addressee of the ideological product, the public is a constitutive element of the production process. In the second place, the public is productive by means of the reception that gives the product “a place in life” (in other words, integrates it into social communication) and allows it to live and evolve. Reception is thus, from this point of view, a creative act and an integrative part of the product. The transformation of the product into a commodity cannot abolish this double process of “creativity”; it must rather assume it as it is, and attempt to control it and subordinate it to its own values.
What the transformation of the product into a commodity cannot remove, then, is the character of event, the open process of creation that is established between immaterial labor and the public and organized by communication. If the innovation in immaterial production is introduced by this open process of creation, the entrepreneur, in order to further consumption and its perpetual renewal, will be constrained to draw from the “values” that the public/consumer produces. These values presuppose the modes of being, modes of existing, and forms of life that support them. From these considerations there emerge two principal consequences. First, values are “put to work.” The transformation of the ideological product into a commodity distorts or deflects the social imaginary that is produced in the forms of life, but at the same time, commodity production must recognize itself as powerless as far as its own production is concerned. The second consequence is that the forms of life (in their collective and cooperative forms) are now the source of innovation.
The analysis of the different “stages” of the cycle of immaterial labor permits me to advance the hypothesis that what is “productive” is the whole of the social relation (here represented by the author-work-audience relationship) according to modalities that directly bring into play the “meaning.” The specificity of this type of production not only leaves its imprint on the “form” of the process of production by establishing a new relationship between production and consumption, but it also poses a problem of legitimacy for the capitalist appropriation of this process. This cooperation can in no case be predetermined by economics, because it deals with the very life of society. “Economics” can only appropriate the forms and products of this cooperation, normalizing and standardizing them. The creative and innovative elements are tightly linked to the values that only the forms of life produce. Creativity and productivity in postindustrial societies reside, on the one hand, in the dialectic between the forms of life and values they produce and, on the other, in the activities of subjects that constitute them. The legitimation that the (Schumpeterian) entrepreneur found in his or her capacity for innovation has lost its foundation. Because the capitalist entrepreneur does not produce the forms and contents of immaterial labor, he or she does not even produce innovation. For economics there remains only the possibility of managing and regulating the activity of immaterial labor and creating some devices for the control and creation of the public/consumer by means of the control of communication and information technologies and their organizational processes.
Creation and intellectual labor
These brief considerations permit us to begin questioning the model of creation and diffusion specific to intellectual labor and to get beyond the concept of creativity as an expression of “individuality” or as the patrimony of the “superior” classes. The works of Simmel and Bakhtin, conceived in a time when immaterial production had just begun to become “productive,” present us with two completely different ways of posing the relationship between immaterial labor and society. The first, Simmel’s, remain completely invested in the division between manual labor and intellectual labor and give us a theory of the creativity of intellectual labor. The second, Bakhtin’s, in refusing to accept the capitalist division of labor as a given, elaborate a theory of social creativity. Simmel, in effect, explains the function of “fashion” by means of the phenomenon of imitation or distinction as regulated and commanded by class relationships. Thus the superior levels of the middle classes are the ones that create fashion, and the lower classes attempt to imitate them. Fashion here functions like a barrier that incessantly comes up because it is incessantly battered down. What is interesting for this discussion is that, according to this conception, the immaterial labor of creation is limited to a specific social group and is not diffused except through imitation. At a deeper level, this model accepts the division of labor founded on the opposition between manual and intellectual labor that has as its end the regulation and “mystification” of the social process of creation and innovation. If this model had some probability of corresponding to the dynamics of the market of immaterial labor at the moment of the birth of mass consumption (whose effects Simmel very intelligently anticipates), it could not be utilized to account for the relationship between immaterial labor and consumer-public in postindustrial society. Bakhtin, on the contrary, defines immaterial labor as the superseding of the division between “material labor and intellectual labor” and demonstrates how creativity is a social process. In fact, the work on “aesthetic production” of Bakhtin and the rest of the Leningrad Circle has this same social focus.
This is the line of investigation that seems most promising for developing a theory of the social cycle of immaterial production.
Translated by Paul Colilli and Ed Emery
Notes
1. Yves Clot, “Renouveau de 1’industrialisme et activité philosophique,» Futur antérieur, no. 10(1992);
2. Both the creative and the social elements of this production encourage me to venture the use of the «aesthetic model.» It is interesting to see how one could arrive at this new concept of labor by starting either from artistic activity (following the situationists) or from the traditional activity of the factory (following Italian workerist theories), both relying on the very Marxist concept of “living labor.“
3. Walter Benjamin has already analyzed how since the end of the nineteenth century both artistic production and reproduction, along with its perception, have assumed collective forms. I cannot pause here to consider his works, but they are certainly fundamental for any genealogy of immaterial labor and its forms of reproduction.
Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien in Englisch unter http://www.generation-online.org/c/fcimmateriallabour3.htm [6.9.2013].
In deutscher Übersetzung erschien er in: Toni Negri, Maurizio Lazzarato und Paolo Virno: Umherschweifende Produzenten. Immaterielle Arbeit und Subversion, ID-Verlag, 1998, S. 39–52.
Wiederabdruck:
Vorwort zu „Der Blaue Reiter Almanach“ (1912), zitiert in: 1000 Artists‘ Manifestos. From the Futurists to the Stuckists. Selected by Alex Danchev. Penguin/London 2011, S. 35–37.