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In seinen fragmentarischen Überlegungen zu Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart betont der Soziologe und Philosoph Norbert Elias, u. a. im erklärten Widerspruch zu Mozartbiograf Wolfgang Hildesheimer, dass die musikalische Erziehung Mozarts u. a. durch seinen Vater Leopold einen wesentlichen Einfluss auf dessen künstlerische Laufbahn hatte. Norbert Elias schreibt: „Mozart erhielt durch seinen Vater eine sehr gründliche traditionelle Schulung“1. Zu diesem schulmäßigen Kanon „erwarb er sich auf seinen Reisen ein sehr viel breiteres Wissen über das Musikleben seiner Zeit“2. Und diese Erziehung hat Folgen: „Aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach beförderte die Vielfalt der musikalischen Erfahrungen, denen er auf seinen Reisen ausgesetzt war, seine Neigung zu experimentieren und nach neuen Synthesen verschiedener Stile und Schulen seiner Zeit zu suchen“3.
Letztlich, und dieses ist für meine folgende Überlegungen entscheidend, bedeutet Elias’ Beharren auf der Relevanz der musikalischen Erziehung, dass die Künste (bis zu einem gewissen Grade) erlernbar sind. Die Vorstellung des außerhalb des „normalen Lebens“ stehenden Genies wird damit ad acta gelegt. Elias stellt also fest, dass man sich klarmachen müsse, „dass die Entwicklung des Künstlers die Entwicklung des Menschen ist. Musikspezialisten mögen viel von Musik und wenig von Menschen verstehen und so eine autonome Künstlerpuppe konstruieren, ein sich immanent entwickelndes „Genie“. Aber dadurch leistet man nur einem falschen Verständnis der Musik selbst Vorschub“4.
Diese Verortung des Künstlers in die Sphäre des fast schon Alltäglichen bereitet eine Idee vom Künstlersein vor, die die artistische Tätigkeit als eine sieht, die, frei nach Joseph Beuys, „Jedem“ möglich sei und nicht mehr an extraordinär handwerklich Begabte gebunden ist.
Die Lehre
Im Rahmen von sogenannter „partizipativer Kunst“ stellt sich die Frage nach den Voraussetzungen, die der an der Kunst Teilnehmende mitzubringen habe, besonders dringend. Und diese Dringlichkeit findet sich bereits seit dem Barock, schon damals nämlich gab es partizipative künstlerische Artefakte. Diese z. B. in Form von gleichsam poetischen Maschinen, die sich ungefähr so beschreiben lassen: Auf drei übereinanderliegenden unterschiedlich großen, drehbaren Scheiben stehen unterschiedliche Worte für Subjekt, Verb und Objekt geschrieben. Durch das Drehen der Scheiben entstehen dann unterschiedliche Konstellationen dieser Worte, die sich zu grammatisch richtigen, mehr oder weniger sinnvollen Sätzen und Gedichten zusammensetzen lassen. Das Drehen der Scheiben ist allen möglich, so dass die Herstellung des Gedichtes ein offener Prozess ist, an dem Viele teilhaben können. Diese Gedicht-Maschinen5 führen das Schreiben von Poesie also als eine Produktion vor, die kaum an Voraussetzungen geknüpft ist.
Der barocke Dichter Georg Philipp Harsdörfer schreibt dann auch über Dichtung, dass jedes „Hirn … ein Reimgedicht zusammenzubringen sollte lernen können“6. Dieses „Lernen“ kann etwa mit dem „poetischen Trichter“ erfolgen, den Harsdörfer 1648–1653 schrieb, einem schulischen Handbuch, das z. B. grammatische Regeln ebenso erläuterte wie Versmaße und verschiedene Redewendungen dem zukünftigen Dichter vorstellt. „Eintrichtern“ hat hier noch keine negative, weil autoritäre Konnotation, sondern quasi eine basisdemokratische, denn genau dieses „Eintrichtern“ ermöglicht eine ästhetische Arbeit, die nicht nur ausgewählten Spezialisten vorbehalten ist.
Die Vorstellung, dass Kunst lehrbar sei, tritt nicht zufällig im (deutschen) Barock auf den ästhetischen Masterplan7. Bekanntlich entwickelt sich erst in dieser Zeit so etwas wie eine einheitliche deutsche Grammatik. Deutsch wurde so langsam zur „gelehrten Sprache“, die sich zunehmend von der lateinischen emanzipierte. Mit dieser Konstituierung einer gleichsam regelgerechten Sprache einher ging die Konstituierung des Subjekt- und Autorenbegriffes8. Letzteren nämlich hat es im -Barock noch nicht gegeben, Kopie und Übersetzung gelten damals als ebenso wertvoll wie eine „originäre“ Schöpfung. Kurz und knapp formuliert: Eine Sprache, die gerade erst beginnt korrekt beherrschbar zu sein, lässt weder an kunstfertig-geniale Produktionen denken noch an das Vorhandensein (selbstherrlicher) Autoren.
Denken statt Können
Was folgt ist bekannt: Parallel zur Entwicklung des (bürgerlichen) Subjektbegriffes und seiner Orientierung an Kapitalismus kompatiblen Werten wie Leistung und Individualität entwickelt sich auch die Inthronisierung des künstlerischen Genies, das Werke schafft, die sich außerhalb des Kanons allgemeiner Kompetenzen verorten sollen und deren Herstellung angeblich nicht gelernt werden kann. Erst in der Moderne dann wird diese anmaßende Behauptung kritisch zurückgewiesen. Diese Zurückweisung beginnt in der Bildenden Kunst wohl in der Avantgarde-Bewegung Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts, etwa in den bilderstürmerischen Aktionen des Dadaismus oder der Konzeption des legendären „Bauhauses“, die Kunst wieder als lehrbar bedenkt.
Kein Zufall ist es dann auch, dass die moderne Konkrete Poesie, die in vielerlei Hinsicht an den Dadaismus anschließt, sich wieder mit der Poetik des Barock beschäftigt, so hat Gerhard Rühm 1964 Gedichte der „Pegnitz Schäfer“, einer Gruppe, der u. a. Georg Philipp Harsdörfer und Siegmund von Birken angehörten, neu herausgegeben9. Und Karl Gerstner konzipierte in Tradition des „Poetischen Trichters“ sein Buch „Do it yourself Kunst – Brevier für jedermann“. In Kapiteln wie „Aus einem Wort einen Roman schreiben“, „Bild zum Bildmachen“ oder „Mit Bildern schreiben“ erklärt Karl Gerstner dort wie jedermann problemlos zum Künstler werden kann. In dem einleitenden Kapitel „Was ist Kunst“ stellt Gerstner dann auch klar: „seit Marcel Duchamp 1914 einen Flaschentrockner zum Kunstwerk deklariert hat, gibt es eine Version Kunst, die … nichts mehr mit Können zu tun hat“10. Diese Kunst habe deswegen nichts mehr mit Können zu tun, weil sie nicht mehr in erster Linie auf herzustellende Sinnlichkeiten beruht, Gerstner sagt es so: „Kunst ist nicht ein Ereignis, das auf der Retina stattfindet, sagt Marcel Duchamp, sondern im Gehirn dahinter. Das Entscheidende ist nicht das Handeln, sondern das Denken“11.
Play it yourself
Ästhetische Fragen nach der Möglichkeit einer Kunst ohne Kunstfertigkeit waren auch typisch für viele Werke der 1990er Jahre. Besonders in der Kunst des Crossover zwischen High and Low, und dort insbesondere zwischen Kunst und Musik wird immer wieder die Relevanz von handwerklichem Können kritisch reflektiert. Eben dieser Problematik stellt sich damals z. B. der schottische Künstler Dave Allen in seiner Werkgruppe der „Song Paintings/Drawings“ seit 1996. Da steht etwa „For those about to rock“ auf einem der gezeichneten Blätter. Darunter dann ist die von dem Künstler gleichsam „heruntergerechnete“ Notation des gleichnamigen Songs der Heavy-Metall-Band AC/DC aus dem Jahre 1981 zu sehen. Auch simple Griffe hat Dave Allen auf „AC/DC – For those about to rock“12, 1998, gezeichnet. Abschließend ist „G x 6 + A x 6 + Back to Chorus till end“ auf der Zeichnung zu lesen.
Diese Werkgruppe Allens behauptet also nicht nur, dass Kunst erlernbar sei, sie hinterfragt zudem trotzdem das hiermit implizierte pädagogische Moment. Schließlich ist dieses Moment hier auf ein Minimum -reduziert, indem die „Spielanleitung“ durch ihre grobe Vereinfachung auch dem „unmusikalischsten“ Menschen erlaubt, den vorgestellten Song kinderleicht spielend zu interpretieren. „Play it yourself“ heißt also hier das emanzipative, überaus antiautoritäre Motto.
Selbstverständlich steht solch’ Verneinung von künstlerisch ausgefeilter Könnerschaft auch in der Tradition der Punkmusik. Man denke nur an die 1977 in dem britischen Fanzine „Sideburns“ erschienene, inzwischen legendäre Zeichnung mit den Anleitungen für die drei Gitarrenakkord A, E, und G sowie mit der Aufforderung: „Now Form a band“, an die Allen auch formal mit der Gestaltung seiner „Song Paintings/Drawings“ anspielt, die Grenzen von High and Low souverän missachtend.
Doch die Wurzeln dieser Haltung liegen auch, wie bereits ansatzweise ausgeführt, in der Konzept und Fluxus Kunst der 1960er Jahre. So hat z. B. Robert Filliou mit seinem „Prinzip der Äquivalenz“ bereits 1968 erklärt, dass „GUT GEMACHT SCHLECHT GEMACHT NICHT GEMACHT“ gleichwertig seien13.
Aktivismus (aus)üben
Die Lebensumstände auf „unserem“ Globus haben sich im neuen Millennium drastisch verschlechtert: Schuld daran ist vor allem ein Kapitalismus, der jetzt neoliberal und globalisiert in Aktion tritt und dabei die Ausbeutung von Ressourcen und Arbeitskräften rasant „optimiert“. Diverse Finanzkrisen, soziale Unruhen weltweit, ein immer desaströser werdender Umgang mit der Umwelt und, damit zusammenhängend, eine konsequente Weigerung auf die Klimakatastrophe zu reagieren – die Lobbyarbeit der Global Player macht es möglich – sind einige der Folgen dieser katastrophalen Entwicklung. Kein Wunder also, dass Kunst, die im 21. Jahrhundert noch ernst genommen werden kann, eine politische ist. Ein Teil dieser Kunst ist der künstlerische Aktivismus. Prompt sind in den letzten Jahren mehrere Handbücher erschienen, die das Lernen auch dieser Kunst ermöglichen sollen: “Das Guerillakunst-Kit“, 2013, von Keri Smith, das von Florian Malzacher und dem „steirischen herbst“ herausgegebene „Truth is concrete – A handbook for Artistic Strategies in Real Politics“, 2014, und „Beautiful Trouble – Handbuch für eine unwiderstehliche Revolution“, 2014, zusammengestellt von Andrew Boyd und Dave Oswald Mitchell. Gemeinsam ist diesen drei Büchern der Anspruch tatsächlich – im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes – gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit zu verändern. Wie die bisher von mir vorgestellte Kunst den Primat von „professionellen Künstlern“ im Betriebssystem Kunst nicht akzeptiert, so akzeptieren diese drei Handbücher nicht den Vorrang der „professionellen Politiker“ vor dem „normalen Bürger“. Und diese Handbücher leugnen den Unterschied von Kunst und Politik. Darum stellt z. B. „Beautiful Trouble“ diverse realpolitische Strategien anleitend vor, die ästhetischer Struktur sind. So zeichnen sich die sogenannten „Flashmobs“, also die scheinbar spontanen, aber meist via sozialer Netzwerke organisierten Menschenaufläufen an prekären öffentlichen Orten, durch ihren performativen Charakter aus, politische Graffiti haben ihre Wurzeln eben auch in revolutionären Wandgemälden und eine alternative Medienarbeit im TV, Radio und Internet ist in seinen Ursprüngen erstmals Anfang des letzten Jahrhunderts von Bertolt Brecht kritisch reflektiert und realisiert worden14. Das durch die Handbücher initiierte Üben und engagierte Ausüben solcher Strategien kommt sicher nicht in den Ruf genialer Natur zu sein, dafür löst es den von Marcel Duchamp ins Spiel gebrachte Widerspruch von Denken und Handeln auf – auch dieses macht ihre Qualität aus.
1.) Norbert Elias, Mozart. Frankfurt/M. 1991, S. 106f.
2.) Ebd., S. 107.
3.) Ebd., S. 108.
4.) Ebd., S. 159f.
5.) In Jonathan Swifts Buch „Gullivers Reisen“ (1726) findet sich übrigens im 5. Kapitel des 3. Teiles eine literarische Beschreibung einer solchen.
6.) Georg Philipp Harsdörfer, Der Poetische Trichter, Zuschrift an der Hochlöblichen Fruchtbringenden Gesellschaft, Nürnberg 1647, ohne Paginierung, ed. Darmstadt 1969.
7.) Zwei weitere barocke Handbücher für das Lernen von poetischer Sprache: Justus Georg Schottel, Teutsche Vers- oder Reimkunst. Lüneburg 1656; Siegmund von Birken, Teutsche Rede-bind- und Dicht-Kunst. Nürnberg 1679.
8.) Siehe auch: Fotis Jannidis, Gerhard Lauer, Matias Martinez, Simone Winker (Hg.), Texte zur Theorie der Autorenschaft. Stuttgart 2000.
9.) Gerhard Rühm (Hg.), Die Pegnitz Schäfer. Berlin 1964.
10.) Karl Gerstner, Do it yourself Kunst – Brevier für jedermann. Köln 1970, S. 11.
11.) Ebd.
12.) Abbildung auf whtsnxt.net via QR-Code.
13.) Siehe auch: Robert Filliou, Katalog Sprengel Museum Hannover. Hannover 1974, S. 59.
14.) Siehe auch: Bertolt Brecht, Radiotheorie, 1927–1932.
1.) Der Titel bezieht sich in abgewandelter Form auf die Aktion „Between the Door and the Street“ von Suzanne Lacy vom 19.10.13 in NYC.
2.) Markus Miessen, Bettina Steinbrügge, „Plädoyer für eine konflikthafte Wirklichkeit“, in: Johannes M. Hedinger, Torsten Meyer (Hg.), What’s Next? Kunst nach der Krise, Berlin 2013, S. 387–392, hier S. 391.
3.) Vgl. Oliver Marchart, „‚There is a crack in everything…‘ Public Art als politische Praxis“, in: Hedinger/Meyer 2013, S. 341–345, hier S. 341.
4.) Marius Babias, „Die Kernfrage lautet, ob ,Kunst‘ tendenziell ein Medium der Kritik ist“, Kunstforum International, 212, 2011, S. 108–113, hier S. 111.
5.) Marchart 2013, a. a. O., S. 342.
6.) Babias 2011, a. a. O., S. 111.
7.) Vgl. Gabriele Klein, „Choreografien des Protestes im urbanen Raum“, Kunstforum International, 224, 2014, S. 146–157.
8.) Vgl. Heinz Schütz, „Urban Performance. Performance in der Stadt/ Stadt als Performance“, Kunstforum International, 223, 2013, S. 36–47, hier S. 34, und Heinz Schütz, „Die Stadt als Aktionsraum. Urban Performances als singulärer Auftritt und kollektives Ereignis“, Kunstforum International, 224, 2014, S. 44–81.
9.) Judith Butler, Athena Athanasiou, Die Macht der Enteigneten. Zürich/Berlin 2014, S. 244.
10.) Butler/Athanasiou 2014, S. 265.
11.) Im Sinne Rancières, der die Gemeinschaft in jene unterteilt, die am Raum der politischen Sichtbarkeit teilhaben, weil sie über den logos verfügen und jene, die unsichtbar sind und nicht daran teilhaben, weil sie nicht über ihn verfügen. Die zeitgenössischen Formen der Proteste machen den geforderten Raum der Teilhabe der bislang Unsichtbaren und Ungehörten ästhetisch sichtbar und sinnlich erfahrbar. Vgl. Jacques Rancière, Die Aufteilung des Sinnlichen. Berlin, 2008.
12.) Nicolas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics. Paris 2002.
13.) Vgl. Jacques Rancière, Der emanzipierte Zuschauer. Wien 2010.
Materials, Equipment, and Spaces
– The city, public space including public buildings, -fixtures
– Digital camera or cell phone with camera
– Weather-appropriate clothing (a large part of the -seminar takes place outside)
– Computer access / Internet access
Instructions
Part 1 (Pre-Production)
1. Read the Urban Interventions Manifesto and discuss its content with your fellow students and lecturers.
2. Go into the city and find an example for all seven groups (point 5 of the Urban Interventions Manifesto). Take pictures of each example with your camera or cell phone and bring these back to the seminar room.
3. Share and comment on your photos.
Part 2 (Production)
Go alone or with a small group into the city and create your own Urban Intervention.
The theme and message, location, medium and technique are open to you or your group. Your work can be guided by a specific location, theme or technique.
Explore public spaces and actively re-shape them. Interact with the city, the public and your audience. Let others take part in your Urban Intervention and observe their reaction.
Part 3 (Post-Production)
1. Try to place your Urban Intervention into one of the seven Urban Interventions categories (see Manifesto point 5) and ask yourself the following questions: What is the theme of my Urban Intervention? What is its statement and message? What goal/purpose does it have? Who is my target audience?
2. Document your Urban Intervention via photo, video and text.
Show your Urban Intervention to your fellow students, either live in the city or as a documentary and discuss its effects together.
Urban Interventions Manifesto
1. Today, everything can be art and art can occur everywhere – even in increasingly urbanized public space.
2. You no longer need a studio to produce art; the city is your lab and the streets your canvas, gallery, stage and club. Here you will discover your audience, your partner and accomplices.
3. Today, art can be made out of any materials, media or situations; the city provides you with what you need for free. Play with it, transform it and create your own Urban Intervention. At the same time, be aware of the law and respect the environment. Strive for the synergetic and sustainable co-existence of your interaction/creation with the city and its inhabitants.
4. Urban Interventions is a collective term for creative interventions within a city. It is the interaction of art, performance, installation, architecture and activism. The frequently anonymous works challenge the viewer and passers-by to explore their environment, to experience it in a new way and to interact with their surroundings. Urban Interventions are usually temporary, can change or disappear. Urban Interventions are often not recognized as what they actually are. Urban Interventions partially refer to the planning, use and commercialization of public space and partially make what is public to a very private experience.
5. Urban Interventions can be divided into seven groups:
URBAN CANVAS (graffiti, signs, markings, buildings, lights, etc.)
ATTACHMENTS (creative additions, parasitic take-overs)
PUBLIC PRIVACY (mixture of interior and exterior)
PUBLIC STAGE (performances in public spaces, flash mobs, etc.)
LOCALIZED (design of specific locations, site and context bonus)
ADVERTIZED (ad-busting, brand-hacking, etc.)
NATURALIZED (guerrilla gardening, snow, sand, etc.)
In a playful and experimental manner, the praxis module Urban Interventions brings students closer to transformed presentation and communication formats, an expanded definition of art, new exhibition venues, and the changed reception of contemporary art.
Find examples of Urban Interventions:
www.urbaninterventions.net
Der Kampf um das Bild. Die Flucht in die Bilder
Lady Gaga ist im Wettlauf um das Bild selbst zum „Screen“ geworden. Ihr „Image“ steht für den permanenten Wandel, darin liegt ihre Beständigkeit. Als -inkorporierte Bildermaschine performt Gaga „Referenz-ästhetik“, warenförmig und konsumabel. Erst durch das Bildermachen kann sich das Subjekt seiner selbst sicher sein. Mit der Zirkulation digitaler Bilder im globalen Datenstrom gilt es, „fame“ und Unsterblichkeit zu erlangen. „Es sind nicht Religionen, sondern Optimierungstechniken, mit deren Hilfe wir uns der Faktizität wie Körper, Zeit, Tod etc. entgegenstellen. Das digitale Medium ist defaktizierend“.3 Gaga zitiert das „System Warhol“ und rekurriert im nächsten Moment auf die „fashion-worlds“.
Die Praktiken des RE*: Aneignungen der Markenkommunikation
Diese Überschrift habe ich mir entliehen,4 um die aktuellen und populären Strategien und Praktiken des RE* wie Retro, Referenz und Recycling, die von Marina Abramović und Lady Gaga erfolgreich kombiniert werden, darzustellen. Der Kulturtheoretiker Simon Reynolds definiert den zeitgenössischen Künstler/Musiker als eine mit Bewusstsein begabte Suchmaschine – er wühlt sich nur noch wie ein Archäologe durch die Flohmärkte der Kulturgeschichte. Reynolds diagnostiziert eine festgefahrene und stagnierende Gesellschaft, von der keine kulturellen Innovationen zu erwarten sind.5 Könnte diese Retromanie auch ein wichtiger Erfolgsfaktor von Marina Abramović und Lady Gaga sein? Seit Beginn der 2000er Jahre verfolgt Marina Abramović eine stark retrospektive Strategie. Sie inszeniert Aufführungen klassischer Werke der Performancekunst aus den 1960er und 1970er Jahren – z. B. Arbeiten von Vito Acconci, VALIE EXPORT, Gina Pane und Joseph Beuys. Sie reinszeniert mit jungen PerformerInnen ihr eigenes Oeuvre. Die Ausstellung im MoMA (New York) 2010 belegt den bisherigen Höhepunkt dieser Strategien im Rahmen der 90tägigen Performance The Artist Is Present. Die filmische „Dokumentation“ von Matthew Akers zu The Artist Is Present verleiht der Künstlerin absoluten Kultstatus. Diese Show ist Ereignis, ist Event. Während Marina Abramović stundenlang regungslos im Atrium des MoMA auf einem Stuhl sitzt, haben die BesucherInnen der Ausstellung die Möglichkeit, ihr gegenüber Platz zu nehmen, um nichts anderes zu tun, als ihr schweigend in die Augen zu blicken.
Lady Gaga präsentiert sich in ihren Perfomances laut, ekstatisch, in immer neuen Maskeraden auf der Bühne des Pop. Ihre extravaganten Kostümierungen beeindrucken höchstens noch jugendliche Fans, die Gagas wechselnde Styles als Anregungen und Impulse für eigene Identitätskonzepte nutzen. Gaga bedient sich geschickt des Konzeptes „Faming“: Als Phänotypen stehen hinter dem Konstrukt Lady Gaga Andy Warhol sowie der Performancekünstler Leigh Bowery, der in seiner schrillen und alle Konventionen sprengenden Selbstdarstellung und Stilisierung im London der 1980er und 1990er Jahre zum wandelnden Kunstwerk wurde. Bowerys Leben und Werk changierte zwischen Mode, Performance, Musik, Tanz und Skulptur. Er entwickelte eine Kunst der Selbstinszenierung, die zwischen Ausdruckskraft, Starhabitus, Wandlungsfähigkeit und Unterhaltungskultur angesiedelt war.6 Er überschritt im Sinne von Judith Butlers Gender Trouble (1990) gesellschaftlich zugeschriebene Geschlechterkonventionen. Auch Lady Gaga treibt dieses Spiel voran, jedoch ungefährlich, warenförmig, kommerziell. Bedient sich Gaga des Pornografischen, um die Di-vidende des „Fame“ im Form von kommerziellem Erfolg einzufahren, oder spiegeln ihre kalkulierten Spielformen des Pornochics am Rande des Tabubruchs nur „das mediale Schaubild einer obszönen Kapitalisierung sexueller Körper“7 wider? Im Rahmen der Vergabe der MTV Video Music Awards trug Lady Gaga 2010 ein Kleid des argentinischen Designers Franc Fernandesz aus rohem Fleisch und erregte damit viel mediale Aufmerksamkeit. Zeitgleich posierte sie auf dem Cover der japanischen Ausgabe der Vogue Homme knapp mit Fleischlappen behangen und formulierte: „Ich weiß doch, dass mich alle am liebsten als ein Stück sexy Fleisch sehen.“ […] „Ich bin doch kein Stück Fleisch“, verkündete sie mit diesem Cover in der Hand an anderer Stelle.8 Das Fleischkleid wurde 1987 in der Ausstellung Vanitas: Flesh Dress for an Albino Anorectic der Künstlerin Jana Sterbak als Symbol für die gesellschaftliche Situation der Frau eingesetzt. Bei Lady Gaga kam es mehr als zwanzig Jahre später mit veränderter Bedeutung im Kontext von Mode und Pop an. Die Migrationsbewegungen der Signifikanten aus dem Kunstsystem zu Pop und Mode treiben deren Hybridi-sierung und Ausdifferenzierungen voran. „,Die Performance ist wichtig, die Haltung, der ganze Look – das alles gehört zusammen‘ […] ,The idea is, you are your image, you are who you see yourself to be. It’s iconography. Warhol and I both went to church when we were younger.‘“9 Das Bild muss überwältigend sein.
Ein wichtiger Aspekt der Next Art Education wird, wie ich meine, der Erwerb von Wissen um historische und aktuelle Relationen zwischen Kunst, Pop und ökonomisch-politischen Machtverhältnissen sein. SchülerInnen und Studierende benötigen ein visuelles und kulturelles Gedächtnis, um sich innerhalb des medialen Überangebots orientieren, um kulturelle Zeichen besser selektieren, differenzieren, deuten und benutzen zu können. Der kritische, kompetente aber auch spielerische und kreative Umgang mit polysemen Systemen stellt ein Herzstück des Faches dar. KunstpädagogInnen sollten transdisziplinäre Narrative offerieren können, die SchülerInnen dazu befähigen, im medialen Zerstreuungskontinuum rote Fäden erkennen und Offenheit für neue Sichtweisen entwickeln zu können.
1.) Harry Walter, „She said yes. I said Pop“, in: Walter Grasskamp, M. Krützen, S. Schmitt (Hg.), Was ist Pop? Zehn Versuche, Frankfurt/M. 2004, S. 46.
2.) Vgl. Norbert Bolz, „Marketing als Kunst oder: Was man von Jeff Koons lernen kann“, in: Norbert Bolz et al. (Hg.), Riskante Bilder: Kunst.Literatur.Medien, München 1996, S. 131.
3.) Byung-Chul Han, Im Schwarm. Ansichten des Digitalen. Berlin 2013, S. 43.
4.) Jeannette Neustadt, Ökonomische Ästhetik und Markenkult. Reflexionen über das Phänomen Marke in der Gegenwartskunst. Bielefeld 2011, S. 127.
5.) Simon Reynolds, Retromania. Warum Pop nicht von seiner Vergangenheit lassen kann. Mainz 2012.
6.) Vgl. Angela Stief, XTRAVAGANZA. Staging Leigh Bowery. Booklet zur Ausstellung (19.10.2012-03.02.2013), Kunsthalle Wien. Wien 2012, S. 4.
7.) Leopold Klepacki & Jörg Zirfas, „Ars Erotica? Zur pädagogischen Kultivierung der sexuellen Lüste im Abendland“, in: Eckart Liebau, Jörg Zirfas (Hg.), Lust, Rausch und Ekstase. Grenzgänge der Ästhetischen Bildung, Bielefeld 2013, S. 53.
8.) Zit. in Paula-Irene Villa, „Pornofeminismus? Soziologische Überlegungen zur Fleischbeschau im Pop“, in: Paula-Irene Villa et. al (Hg.), Banale Kämpfe? Perspektiven auf Populärkultur und Geschlecht, Wiesbaden 2012, S. 237.
9.) Zit. in Hanne Loreck, „Küss mich, küss mich, bedecke meinen Körper mit Liebe. Zum aktuellen Verhältnis von Mode, Kunst und Körper“, in: Laura Bieger, Annika Reich, Susanne Rohr (Hg.), Mode. Ein kulturwissenschaftlicher Grundriss, München 2012, S. 165.
Instructions for a Museum
Find the mission statement of a museum. Create instructions for the museum by cutting words or phrases from the mission statement and gluing them onto paper.
(Wir Spielen2)
What are the underlying basic assumptions of the text? The starting point for this exercise is the vocabulary of the museum. Can you subvert, alienate or highlight meanings in it by simply rearranging words?
Optional exercise: Send the final result to the museum director.
Get a copy of the floor plan of a museum that you are visiting. Map your own way through the exhibition and mark any pauses. Also write down any thoughts, wishes and dreams.
Research into museum architecture by watching visitors can reveal many things. Are visitors free to move as they want, or disciplined into a predetermined choreography?
Monument
Commission a monument for someone or something you want to commemorate.
Curriculum
Propose an alternative curriculum for a school subject of your choice.
What is the purpose of Physical Education? Could Geography become more critical and be taught imaginatively? Is the Music curriculum multicultural enough? Can history education be made less nationally focussed?
Collectives
Form different new collectives and name them according to their goals.
A name can be everything from a power statement to a parody. Try the style of established institutions for a small, informal collective and vice versa.
Optional exercise: Use image-editing software and existing photographs to create a mock institution.
Wiederabdruck
Teile dieses Manuskripts wurden bereits früher veröffentlicht in: Helena Björk, Laura Kokkonen, „Never Underestimate the Institution“, CuMMA Papers #11, November 2014, https://cummastudies.wordpress.com/cumma-papers/.
1.) Trisha Donnelly, www.frieze.com/issue/article/keywords.
2.) The workgroup WIR SPIELEN (WE PLAY) is a critical/analytical reading and action group with a focus on contemporary strategies of sharing and the cultural production of art and action. http://wirspielen.net.
Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien zuerst in Zinggl, Wolfgang (Hrsg): WochenKlausur. Gesellschaftspolitischer Aktivismus in der Kunst. Springer, New York, 2001.
The Question’s Relation to Conservation
What especially interests me in this regard, and what I wish to convey in the following is that in the conservation of both the most recent and older art – a discipline that is most proximate to my professional background as conservator – the aspects of time have not been scrutinised sufficiently.4 The sequential, chronological experience resulted in the understanding of time merely as a method of its measurement, time of clocks, machines, industry and labour. Yet, while critical theory, philosophy and art practice have long been engaged with anachronistic and heterochronic interpretations of history – the belated and the put-of-synch, seriality and repetition to name but a few5 – conservation remained attached to the linear patterns. How can we, then, understand and care for art that is con-temporary and that in many ways incorporates and/or processes time through and by means of its media?6 Can we intellectually retreat from our attempt to rethink time in conservation?
Asking “what’s next” thus imposes on those conceptualising conservation a profound engagement with the aspects of time that goes beyond the methods of its measurement and observation of cyclicality in nature. The “next” would signify a turn towards the understanding of time in what we conserve and in how we perform conservation. It is, all in all, time to think about time in conservation – a challenge that this essay will attempt to introduce.
Locating the Crisis
Now that the main problem has been formulated and the direction of what follows has become clear, there still remains a question of what, in the field of conservation, could be identified as a crisis. A crisis, which – perhaps implicitly – is one of the crucial thoughts that lies at the conception of this volume, signifies a certain situation that negatively affects those involved and often indicates that the system in question is functioning poorly.
It may be said that conservation’s crisis occurred with the realisation that traditional conservation principles and doctrines cannot be applied to the dynamic, evolving, changeable artworks that commenced being created in the middle of last century. Much of these media were conceived during the 1960s and 1970s, marked by social, cultural and political transformations. During the heyday of Fluxus, and the rise of new forms of artistic expression, technology-based media, conceptual art and performance, possibilities emerged for artworks to be re-performed, reproduced, repeated, recorded and replayed. This not only introduced a new temporal awareness, but also the necessity to develop new attitudes in conservation and, equally, a new way of thinking about the “conservation object.“
Before this, as an inheritance of the Enlightenment, and coming with it the belief in the objectivity of scientific analysis, the assumption that an artwork may be stabilised in one specific condition was wide-spread.7 Artworks became static in their attempt to arrest change; the notion of the “original object” being, at times, in an “original condition” was widely established. This reflected the idea of the conservation of artworks as related to the museums’ mandate to safeguard works in their custody, which leant on a certain kind of ontological assumption about their permanence. Conservation, so it seemed, was preoccupied with the material preservation of the “past” for the “future.” Conversely, it was precisely that apparent connection with the past that valorised the heritage in the numerous discussions on authenticity.
Yet in a vast number of artworks created in the second half of last century up to the present day, their “objectification” signalises a reduction to a particular material “state” or “condition” discernable by observation, measurement and analysis. Clearly, the scientific analysis is of great importance; however, if considered alone, it is insufficient in the quest for understanding the ontology of works of art with which we engage.
Artworks, rather than being “objects” are products of humans and their culture; they are dynamic entities, the materiality of which can only be defined in an entangled network of relations and under the consideration of social and temporal structures.8 In grasping the nature of artworks and their networks, the more recent conservation theories strive to convey this shift.9
The Problem With the “Object”
Interestingly, the establishment of a “conservation object” and its reduction to a specific condition that is anchored in a certain moment in time reactivates the temporal problem. For instance, if an artwork, say, a multimedia installation, occurred in a different shape during various re-exhibition procedures, while designing strategies for its future shape, conservation tends to select a singular “condition” or “instance” that is extracted from its trajectory. Such a condition is often referred to as “original” or “authentic.” Importantly, it lies (remotely) in the past, often close to a work’s conception and/or first realisation. I believe that this connection to an earlier instance derives from conservation’s understanding of time in terms of its measurement on a chronological timeline and the observations of the linearity of decay and alteration. But how could this have become a non-plus-ultra, a definitive concept?
Let us, for a moment, reflect on how time became linear.
Thinking Time
There is no universal definition of time; attitudes towards the understanding of time occupied thinkers of different persuasions over centuries and resulted in a variety of approaches. Today, too, we find ourselves facing the unsolved and ubiquitous paradigm of time. What do we think when we think of “time”? In the words of Hans Castorp, the main protagonist in Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain:
“… What is time? – Now is not then, here is not there – for in both cases motion lies in between. But since we measure time by a circular motion closed in on itself, we could just as easily say that its motion and change are rest and stagnation – for the then is constantly repeated in the now, the there in the here …”.10
Time occurs within a range of various intensities and velocities while reading an interesting book or watching a play; it may turn into a painful expectation when we wait for someone or something that we long for, a lover or beloved, an important message or delayed train.
Time as a Method of its Measurement
The omnipresence of the common sense definition of time as a method of its measurement – a clock – was first introduced at the end of the thirteenth century. This also marks the inception of modern homogenous time, which replaced traditional methods of time measurement based on unequal intervals calculated by the length of daylight. Mechanical clock time was initially applied in monastic life and belonged to God. Early clocks were able to remind the monk of his obligation to announce the hours; the towers became houses for clocks and all announcements of religious festivities, warnings of danger and marking the beginning and end of the working day. French philosopher Michel Foucault saw in the religious orders the establishment of discipline and a chronological way of thinking that was linked with the application of timetable.11
It was only later that the clock entered secular life to announce the hours from the town hall’s tower and to regulate work in the textile towns of Flanders and Northern France.12 It is striking that, until the sixteenth century, clock time remained a European phenomenon and was perceived in China merely as a curiosity, despite the long-standing Chinese tradition of mechanical water clocks. The modern science and refinement of the theory of entropy (second law of thermodynamics) confirmed time as a linear entity and its tightness to irreversible direction. Time became regulated with the appearance of the railway and telegraph, and was soon standardised. In 1884, during the International Meridian Conference in Washington, the world changed to twenty-four hour time with Greenwich as the zero meridian, and the first regulating time signal was emitted from the Eiffel tower in Paris in 1914. This division was only stable until the appearance of the global electronic network. The rise of capitalism and the expanding economy that tied the attachment of the employee and employer to clock time was manifest in the control over the cycles of labour and leisure. It was philosopher, economist and sociologist Karl Marx who delineated the exact measure of time as a value in capitalistic society. This standardised time led to the rise of ethical problems related to cultural and racial difference according to a linear, developmental notion of progress and amplified by the colonial imperative to conquer other than own time and space. This modern time consciousness, according to the media theorist Bliss Cua Lim, became gradually natural and incontrovertible – a sort of ready-made temporality – and obscured the plurality of our existence in time.13
Conservation’s Clock Time
It occurs to me that in conservation, as an Aristotelian inheritance of linearity, we have too easily accepted this ready-made temporality manifest in mechanical follow up of instances in the manner of replacement rather than organic continuity. Although, admittedly, the temporal irreversibility of decay and alteration (leading to entropy) implies a certain type of linearity, this concept is not sufficient to encompass the complexity of the existence of artworks in time.
The concept of reversibility, for instance – a much contested conservation theorem that, for a considerable time, was one of the main rules in conservation – presumes that a process or treatment can be reversed. It also somewhat approximates the idea of the return to an earlier condition of an artwork reflected in the term of re-storation, which, from an etymological point of view, already involves the notion of “redoing.”14
Paradoxically, the return to the “ideal” or “original condition” contradicts the linear progress of time. It is precisely the impossibility of the return to the original condition that the very idea of reversibility is based on. Why would we wish to return to something, if we have not lost it already, as in Origen’s Garden of Eden?15 So this understanding of time as linear, in various attempts to restore an object, in other words, is predicated on the notion of reversibility, which does not change the fact of its misinterpretation (as one cannot turn back entropy).
“World-withdrawal and world-decay can never be undone” – contends German philosopher Martin Heidegger.16 “The works are no longer the same as they once were. It is they themselves, to be sure, that we encounter there, but they themselves are gone by.”17 This could be understood as a reference not only to time, but also to the “world.” Even if we could restore the object to its original condition (which is not possible, as I have argued), we would not be able to restore its world, so it will always be different from “how” (rather than “what”) it was. This also signalises an attempt to impose our own concept of timelessness18 and uniqueness of a temporal context, in which artworks are accessed.
Multimedia and Beyond
Although this critique can be applied to many art forms, both traditional and non-traditional, I will narrow its scope to multimedia installations.
Multimedia installations are heterogeneous, compound entities created from a range of materials and elements rather than in a singular medium. Due to their characteristics, they introduce aspects of dispersal and reassembly following the repeated cycles of their materialisation. These works, unlike traditional painting or sculpture, do not exist in an assembled form beyond the duration of an exhibition or a technical test-run. The ontological shift between the appearance and disappearance, a series of iterations characterised by the potentiality for change occurring throughout their lifespan, places them in a discursive realm of authenticity. This realm leans on the presence of the material evidence on the one hand (physical, performative object) and, on the other, the possibility of an authentic experience created in the course of the artwork’s re-performances with entirely or partially new components under the exclusion of its material origins (performed work). In museums, it also causes tension with regard to the aforementioned ontological assumption about permanence of artefacts.
Changeability
One of the main characteristics of multimedia works of art is changeability. Encompassing extrinsic and intrinsic change, and independently of its desirability and the questions of judgement (good or bad), changeability goes beyond any reference to some kind of a mean value and may involve a fundamental change as a historical practice. Changeability places an artwork in a universe of the already realised but also potential transformations. The key to understanding these transformations lies, I believe, in offering a conception of time that is different than the conventional, sequential one and that may supplement the certain linearity of decay and ageing.
Towards Alternative Conceptions of Time
In response to these new characteristics introduced by multimedia, in what follows, I propose supplementing the temporal irreversibility of decay and alteration with an alternative conception of time. I suggest that the key to the acknowledgement of changeability of multimedia works of art expressed in the variety of their instantiations lies in the recognition of the temporal equivalence of the plurality of their occurrences.
The privileging of one instance over another and thus freezing of a changeable artwork in the gesture of its conservation that accords with the conventions of a particular epoch and its ruling set of values reflects the understanding of time as progress, as succession from one point to another. Here, progress may be understood in a twofold manner: as the progress of time that enables the conservator to employ the newest technological and scientifically informed methods to obtain the preferred result, but also – and relevant for this argument – the progress from the “then” as the object’s “most precious” and “original” state to its changed reality. To be sure, instead of turning back to an object’s assumed state that has been but is no more, restoration/conservation is adding new values that result in manufacturing historicity and is actually producing something new.19
Bergsonian Duration as a Survival of the Past
To fully understand the durational character of artworks and acknowledge the continuity of change that they undergo, it occurs to me that the conception of time as durée of the French philosopher Henri Bergson’s (1859–1941) may be helpful. The Bergsonian conception is but first of all a critique of time of natural sciences conceived on the basis of specialised, fragmented time. Rather, it is the movement of time itself, the permanent, unstoppable changing of things. The concept of duration rests on the idea of there being a present involving a past and the anticipation of a future – an idea that I propose applying to the understanding of time in conservation that contradicts the fragmentation of an object’s identity into externally related moments.
Although my argument is based mainly on Bergsonian theory, it is difficult today to think about Bergson without including his most significant interpreter, the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. In fact, Bergsonism as I understand it, is, nowadays, barely separable from Deleuze’s contribution.20 In his book Bergsonism (1961), Deleuze provides us with a comprehensive insight into Bergson’s method, including his own ideas about the ontology of things. One insight is Deleuze’s assumption that “things must, of necessity, endure in their own way,” which reconfirms Bergson’s assertion that “…we do not endure alone, external objects, it seems, endure as we do.” This is based on Bergson’s argument that duration was from the start defined as multiplicity, and qualities exist in things no less than they do in consciousness.21 Bergson’s assumption of duration outside the “self” elaborated by Deleuze introduces a dimension that may have further consequences for the “object of conservation.” One possible way of its interpretation may suggest a horizon of time not only inherent to the subject (psychological time), but a time that enables objects and artworks to have their own duration. Artworks will thus cease to be “screens that denature duration,” a form of exteriority as it were, and will become temporal multiplicities on their own.
Bergsonian visualisation of the idea of the contemporaneity of the past in the form of a cone metaphor may be helpful for rethinking time in conservation.22 The cone is divided into three sections AB, A’B,’ A’’B’’ symbolising a state of coexistence of all layers of the past with the present. The past AB would coexist with the present S under the inclusion of all the sections A’B’ and A’’B.’’ The sections are virtual, symbolically representing the distance of the past in relation to the present, yet including the entirety of the past rather than its particular elements. The identity of duration is presented as an ever-growing image of the past in the present and “the conservation and preservation of the past and the present.”23 Every following moment contracts and condenses with the former and, simultaneously, “always contains, over and above the preceding one, the memory the latter has left it.”24 Deleuze maintains:
We are too accustomed to thinking in terms of the “present.” We believe that a present is only past when it is replaced by another present. Nevertheless, let us stop and reflect for a moment: How would a new present come about if the old present did not pass at the same moment as it is present? How would any present whatsoever pass, if it were not past at the same time as present? The past would never be constituted if it had not been constituted first of all, at the same time as it was present. There is here, as it were, a fundamental position of time and also the most profound paradox of memory: The past is “contemporaneous” with the present that has been. … The past and the present do not denote two successive moments, but two elements that coexist: One is the present, which does not cease to pass, and the other is the past, which does not cease to be but through which all presents pass.25
So in the contemporaneity, the past and the present that has been coexist, but the past also preserves itself endlessly in itself, while the present passes. Following this line of thought, would an artwork’s present preserve all its pasts?
Bergson speaks of the acting, abiding, actual past:
Like the universe as a whole, like each conscious being taken separately, the organism which lives is a thing that endures. Its past, in its entirety, is prolonged to its present, and abides there, actual and acting. How otherwise could we understand that it passes through distinct and well-marked phases, that it changes its age – in short, that it has a history?26
This duration of the past is crucial when rethinking the notion of time in conservation that is preoccupied with searching for the past authentic condition of an artwork as the one that ceased to be present. The past, for Bergson, is alongside the present – a concept distinct from conventional ways of thinking about past, present and future as separable realms.27 Duration is the survival of the past, an ever-accumulating ontological memory that is wholly, automatically and ceaselessly preserved. In duration, the current moment does not depose that which came before. Following the Bergsonian conception of time and its Deleuzian interpretation, I propose that in changeable multimedia works of art, the present is the survival of the past. In the process of conservation, the past is actualised in the present, the latter being the only status we are able to analyse from our inhabited temporal perspective.28 Duration is, I argue, crucial for understanding the continuity of artworks and essential to divorcing conservation from its traditional views of time. A possible consequence of the application of durée to works characterised by change is that their changeability expressed by the multitude of instances may unrestrictedly exist in a continuum of duration. In other words, each instantiation of a changeable artwork preserves, as it were, the former.
Preserving the Present
In sum, the orientation of conservation towards the past is a gesture reassembling back-and-forth movements between abstract times, or at best a misinterpretation of linearity – we allegedly “take care of the past” and “pass it over to the future.” If the past is exactly as contemporary as the present, then we do not need to “preserve the past” in the traditional meaning of the word, but preserve the present. In fact the present seems to be the only reality given, and the only one to be preserved. In the case of multimedia installations, conservation could thus be defined as a process that shapes the changeability of artworks, yet does not prevent it. If anything, it could contribute to the reduction of the degree of changeability, if desirable. So in my thinking – and following Bergsonian durée – artworks that undergo transformation abide in their present (and only) “condition,” which is constituted by their many different pasts. In other words, they are constructed by their “present” as much as by their “past conditions.” This may not only result in abandoning the search for authenticity somewhere in the remote past, but may also shift conservation from its attempt to manage change (measured in an artwork’s former conditions) to a process intervening in the artwork’s temporality. Furthermore, it will unquestionably release conservation from the drive to “recover the past” and “the original” or “give back the authentic object,” which, in my view, are misguided approaches based on an incorrect conception of time.
The applicability of this proposition may not only offer conservation the possibility to overcome the aforementioned too easily accepted ready-made temporality and the difficult relation with its ‘object,’ but also reach beyond the conservation of multimedia works. If taken seriously, it could have an impact on traditional art.
Whether related to traditional art or multimedia, it should not be left unmentioned that conservation may by no means claim to be neutral. Each intervention is a process that transforms the work of art. Furthermore, conservation is, according to the Italian conservation theoretician Cesare Brandi, a moment of the methodological recognition of a work, an instantaneous appropriation in which the consciousness of the observer recognises an object as a work of art.29 In discussing the significance of the past and opposing the idea of permanence, the British heritage theorist David Lowenthal holds that “every act of recognition alters what survives.”30 He adds to it a positive value – the past can be used fruitfully when it is “domesticated,” “to inherit is to transform.”31
1.) Saint Augustine, Confessions, transl. by Edward Bouverie Pusey (Kindle Edition: Evinity Publishing Inc., 2009 (397–398)).
2.) Frederic Jameson, “The End of Temporality,” in Abstraction: Whitechapel Documents of Contemporary Art, ed. Maria Lind (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2013), 121.
3.) Jacques Derrida, Marges de la philosophie (Paris, 1972), 47, quoted in Jameson, “The End of Temporality,” 121.
4.) For a study on the concepts of time in the context of conservation, see Hanna Hölling, “Re: Paik: On Time, Identity and Changeability in the Conservation of Nam June Paik Multimedia Installations” (PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2013).
5.) Amelia Groom, ed., Time: Whitechapel Documents of Contemporary Art (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, forthcoming), book overview available at https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/time.
6.) I use the expression “con-temporary” to expose its plural meaning that is related to the question of time: something may be con-temporary with something else in terms of synchronous existence (which nota bene implies a relation), and, equally, it may have a temporal characteristic pointing to the present. Online Etymology Dictionary, s. v. “contemporary,” accessed 10 August 2013. http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=contemporary. For a brilliant discussion of the “contemporary” in art, see Richard Meyer, What Was Contemporary (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2013).
7.) Cf. Pip Laurenson, “Authenticity, Change and Loss in the Conservation of Time-Based Media Installations” Tate Papers 6 (2006), accessed December 12, 2011, www.tate.org.uk/download/file/fid/7401; Salvador Muñoz Viñas, Contemporary Theory of Conservation (Oxford: Elsevier, 2005). 3.
8.) For the “social” in conservation, see Miriam Clavir, Preserving What is Valued: Museum, Conservation and First Nations (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2002); Miriam Clavir, “Social Contexts for Conservation: Time, Distance, and Voice in Museums and Galleries,” Journal of the Canadian Association for Conservation 34 (2009); Glenn Wharton, “Heritage Conservation as Cultural Work: Public Negotiation of a Pacific Hero” (PhD diss., University College London, 2004).
9.) See, for instance, Laurenson, Muñoz Viñas, Clavir and the recent international initiatives such as the research project New Strategies in the Conservation of Contemporary Art (http://www.newstrategiesinconservation.nl/) and its outcome in several doctoral dissertations that are being written on this subject matter.
10.) Thomas Mann, The Magic Mountain: A Novel, trans. John. E. Woods (New York, 1995 (1924)), 339.
11.) Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison, translated by Allan Sheridan (New York and Toronto: Random House, 1995 (1975)).
12.) J. J. A. Mooij, Time and Mind: The History of a Philosophical Problem (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005), 105.
13.) Bliss Cua Lim, Translating Time: Cinema, the Fantastic, and Temporal Critique (Duke University Press, 2009), 11.
14.) “Re-” word forming element; C. 1200; from Old French and also directly from Latin re- “again, back, against.” Online Etymology Dictionary, s. v. “re-,“ accessed April 24, 2013, http://etymonline.com/index.php?term=re-&allowed_in_frame=0.
15.) Alessandro Conti refers to the story of the Garden of Eden as a wish “to return to a primitive state that is better that the present one.” According to him, rooted in mythology and Western religious tradition, this vision becomes dangerous in restoration when it induces to pass over the ageing of materials and impose the concept of the return to the original at all costs. Alessandro Conti, The History of the Restoration and Conservation of Works of Art, trans. Helen Glanville (London: Elsevier, 2007), 1.
16.) Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Low, 1975), 40.
17.) Ibid.
18.) Albert Albano, “Art in Transition,” in Historical and Philosophical Issues in the Conservation of Cultural Heritage, eds. Nicholas Stanley Price, M. Kirby Talley Jr. and Alessandra Melucco Vaccaro (Los Angeles: J. Paul Getty Trust, 1996), 183.
19.) See, for instance, David Lowenthal, “Fabricating Heritage,” History and Memory 10/1 (1998): 5–24.
20.) I have in mind his books Bergsonism and Cinema 1 and 2.
21.) Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, transl. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1991 (1966)), 48.
22.) Ibid., 59–60.
23.) Duration, according to Deleuze, is essentially memory, consciousness and freedom. Ibid.
24.) This is also expressed in the illusion of the difference between recollection and perception – the image cannot actualise a recollection without adapting it to the requirements of the present. Deleuze refers to contraction and recollection memory. Deleuze, Bergsonism, 51.
25.) Ibid., 58–59.
26.) “How otherwise could we understand that it passes through distinct and well-marked phases, that it changes its age – in short, that it has a history?” Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc, 1998 (1911)), 15. For the Deleuzian view on the virtual past, see Deleuze, Bergsonism, 55. This matter is also discussed in Suzanne Guerlac, Thinking in Time: An Introduction to Henri Bergson (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006), 187–188
27.) According to David Lowenthal, the differentiation of past and present is a rather recent development and can be associated with a chronological time scale. The past as a state of things no longer existing emerged during the Renaissance when the remoteness of ancient Rome and unlikeness of recent medial times became apparent. David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 390.
28.) Much of my thinking here and in the subsequent section is inspired by Bliss Cua Lim and her book entitled Translating Time: Cinema, the Fantastic, and the Temporal Critique. Drawing from Bergson’s (and Deleuze’s) philosophic project, she takes on the discussion of time in relation to fantastic cinema. Cua Lim, Translating Time.
29.) Cesare Brandi, Theory of Restoration, trans. Cynthia Rockwell (Nardini Editore: Florence, 2005), 48. For coherence, I replaced the originally used “restoration” with “conservation.”
30.) Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country, 390.
31.) Ibid., 412.
Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien zu erst in: Besand, Anja (Hrsg.): Politik trifft Kunst. Zum Verhältnis von politischer und kultureller Bildung, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn 2012, S. 83–92.