Cultural Turn – what's next?

See it Again, Say it Again. The Artist as Researcher

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:49 +0000

Introduction
‘Research’ is a buzz-word on the international art scene. People everywhere are talking about ‘the artist as researcher’ and debating how research in art relates to academic research. These discussions often revolve around the legitimisation of research in art within an academic framework and it is primarily theoreticians, not the artists, who are driving them. This book is an attempt to change this. It approaches the phenomenon of ‘research in and through art’ (to use the most correct and complete term) from the perspective of the visual artist and through the prism of artistic practice. Most of the authors are visual artists themselves and the contributions by theorists also focus on the practice of the artist as researcher.
The exceptional thing about research inand through art is that practical action (the making) and theoretical reflection (the thinking) go hand in hand. The one cannot exist without the other, in the same way action and thought are inextricably linked in artistic practice. This stands in contradistinction to ‘research into art’, such as art history and cultural studies.
Master’s courses in the field of research in art are now on offer in various European cities and artists can gain a doctorate at a growing number of universities. This has long been the case in the United Kingdom, but for most European countries it is new. We can justifiably speak of an ‘educational turn in art’ and an ‘artistic turn in academic education’.¹Political decision-making has thereby given concrete impulses to the institutionalisation of research in art. However, the phenomenon of research in art is nothing new. The idea of art-as-research flows from art itself, in particular from the conceptual art of the 1960s onwards. Conceptual artists oppose the view that art can be viewed in isolation from history and politics, and they assert that art is necessarily cognitive.
In the post-modern era, reflection and research are closely interwoven with artistic practice. In some cases the research has become the work of art itself; subject matter and medium serving as an instrument in the research or ‘thought process’. Artists are increasingly positioning themselves in the societal and artistic field as researchers.

Research and the public domain
The artist-as-researcher distinguishes himself from other artists by taking it upon himself to make statements about the production and thought processes. The artist-researcher allows others to be participants in this process, enters into a discussion about this and opens himself up to critique. This is by no means self-explanatory; it actually represents a radical shift in the conception of ‘artistry’. After all, the romantic view of the artist as a recluse in a studio from which he or she sends messages out into the world was prevalent until far into the 20th century.
The artist-researcher seeks the discussion in the public domain. ‘For research to be research it has to be debated in the public domain,’ as Sarat Maharaj remarked.² This might happen at art academies and at certain art institutes, as well as at universities. When the discussion takes place in an academic context, within the framework of research for a PhD, then certain conditions are attached. For example, the research needs to yield fresh insights, not merely into one’s personal work but for art in a broader sense as well. Crucial here is the academic opponent, whose task it is to critically evaluate the new contribution to the artistic domain. If the research fails to produce novel insights, then there is no justification for the research project to lead to an academic dissertation.
There is a wide range of views about the nature of this dissertation as well as a diversity of opinion about the requirements to which it can be subjected, as is also demonstrated by the contributions to this volume. However, almost everyone concurs that language somehow plays an important part in research in art. Without language it is impossible to enter into a discourse, so the invention of a language in which we can communicate with one another about research in art and through which we can evaluate the research is probably more important than devising a viable research methodology.
When asked about their reasons for embarking upon doctoral research, the response of almost all the artist-researchers is that their aim is to be part of a research community where they can share their thoughts with others and receive constructive, substantive criticism about their work. This research community represents a significant expansion of the possibilities for art and its practitioners, as well as a broadening of art discourse.

Art as (self-) critique
The age-old Western paradigm of art as mimesis, that is as imitation of the world, and as an expression of the close unity of the beautiful and true, came to an end around 1800. Friedrich Hegel thought that art had met its apotheosis, by which he of course did not mean that no more art would be produced or that our visual tradition had suddenly come to an end. For Hegel, the end of art meant that art could no longer be seen as the manifestation of truth and that the depiction of the divine, or of the divine in creation, was no longer self-explanatory.
Hegel’s cogitations coincided with the emergence of an historical awareness, which is by definition also a critical awareness. Henceforth it would be evident that, because of the diversification of modern life and the increasing fragmentation of what was once a single, all-encompassing worldview, it was impossible for any work of art to continue being the rendering of a totality. In art, this new critical awareness assumed a clear-cut form from the second half of the 19th century.
Artists emancipated themselves from the classical tradition and positioned themselves as autonomous creators. One of the ways in which they did this was by responding in an overtly discursive manner to works of art by others. There are many well-known examples of this new, critical attitude: Manet and Titian, Cézanne and Rubens, Picasso and Velázquez, and so on. This critical discursivity represents a shift away from the centuries-old tradition of pupils emulating their masters. By degrees attention shifted from the interpretation of the work of art as a reproduction of reality to the interaction, the active dialogue, between the work of art and the social and historical context in which it was created and the work’s beholder. Modern art, which was no longer representational, became self-critical.
In critical terms, modern art took aim at the societal and political fields, and at itself. The artist places every work of art in the context of other works of art, it is positioned vis-à-vis other works of art. This does not imply that those other works of art are literally identifiable in the new work (though that may be the case). Works of art embody a meta-element, a conceptual moment; the work of art is ‘aware’ of itself, of its own position. One might term this the ‘self-awareness’ of works of art, which question and comment on themselves and the art of others.
From the 1960s, critique and self-reflexivity were a deliberate strategy in art – take, for example, conceptual art, Fluxus, appropriation art, institutional critique and so on. Artists claimed a discursive space for themselves. However, almost immediately this discursive space came under huge pressure from market forces and the for-profit mentality. In the USA and the UK this shift came about in the late 1970s with the governments of Reagan and Thatcher, which were the starting shot for the rise of the art market and, in its wake, a resurgence in traditional, figurative painting. ‘Wir wollen Sonne statt Reagan (‘We want sun instead of Reagan’), sang Joseph Beuys.
Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, neo-liberalism has been the prevailing ideology in Western countries and across whole swathes of the non-Western world, and the laws of the market have apparently gained universal currency. Artists are expected to operate as ‘cultural entrepreneurs’ in the market and within a cultural industry that is to large extent fuelled by biennials, large museums and galleries. Even art journals, which previously played a critical role, participate in this.³
So where is there still a place in the art world for art as critical investigation and self-critique? Where can one find a locus, a platform for reflection and dialogue, which is not subject to pressures from the culture industry? Though universities are also being placed under increased pressure by a profit-driven mentality and cost-cutting operations, and though even here there is the looming danger of a cultural industry of ‘knowledge production’, academia nevertheless seems to represent a good candidate for providing the leeway for this.

Art and knowledge
There is no simple answer to the question of whether research in art generates knowledge and the kind of knowledge that this may be. What do artists know?⁴ They of course know something about images; they know what it is to produce a ‘picture’. Artists have a grasp of phenomena, how things appear to us in a visible guise – about this they know a great deal, but this is too general and therefore too non-committal. The assumption that artists know how things appear to us can only be demonstrated on the basis of specific works of art and this still leaves us with no answer to the broader question of what artists know.
In the context of research in art, perhaps it is better to pose a different question, namely how do artists think? Hannah Arendt’s Thinking, the first volume of The Life of the Mind, might provide a way forward here.⁵
In Thinking, Arendt elaborates upon the distinction made by Immanuel Kant between two modes of thinking, Vernunft and Verstand. Arendt defines Vernunft as ‘reason’ and Verstand as ‘intellect’.
According to Arendt, the distinction between reason and intellect coincides with the distinction between meaning and knowledge. ‘Reason’ and ‘intellect’ serve different purposes, she writes. The first manner of thinking, reason, serves to ‘quench our thirst for meaning’, while the second, intellect, serves ‘to meet our need for knowledge and cognition’ (the capacity to learn something). For knowledge we apply criteria of certainty and proof, it is the kind of ‘knowing’ that presupposes truth, in the sense of correctness.
‘Reason’ has its origins in our need to ponder questions to which we know there is no answer and for which no verifiable knowledge is possible, such as questions about God, freedom and immortality. Reason therefore transcends the limitations of knowledge, namely the criteria of certainty and proof. ‘The need of reason is not inspired by the quest for truth but by the quest for meaning,’ writes Arendt. ‘And meaning and truth are not the same.’
In the other manner of thinking, cognisance or knowledge, the thinking is a means to an end and that objective is the determination or attainment of truth and scholarly insight. Verstand wants to understand perceptible reality and operates by applying laws and fixed criteria to phenomena as they are perceived by the senses. Verstand is based on common sense, on faith in reality, in the ‘authenticity’ of the world. The scholar approaches the world with the goal of unmasking sensory illusions and correcting errors in scholarly investigation.
Reason, by contrast, has a self-contained objective; it is the pure activity of thinking and the simultaneous awareness of this activity while we are thinking. Reason is therefore not merely reflexive but also self-reflexive. The awareness of the activity of thinking itself creates, according to Arendt, a sensation of vitality, of being alive. Reason is the unceasing quest for meaning, a quest that never ends because of constant doubt, and because such thinking is ultimately founded on doubt it possesses what Arendt calls a ‘self-destructive tendency with regard to its own results’.
In order to experience the thinking ourselves, in order to know the possibilities of one’s own mind, it is necessary for us to withdraw from the ‘real’ world. Sensory experience distracts us when we try to concentrate and think, which is why we say that someone who is thinking concentratedly is ‘absent’. To be able to understand the spectacle of the world from within we must break free from sensory perception and from the flux of daily life.
The scientist can also temporarily withdraw from the world of phenomena, but he does that to solve a problem and with the aim of returning to that world and applying the answer there, to deploy the solution in that sensory domain.
Reason, writes Arendt, is ‘out of order’ with the world. It is a type of thinking that does not chime with the world and that is for two reasons: because of the withdrawal from the world that it requires and because it does not produce any definitive end result, it offers no solutions.
It should be obvious that it is primarily reason, Vernunft, which is the faculty of thinking that is relevant to art. Reason is the kind of thinking that is stored away in the work of art. Arendt therefore calls a work of art a ‘thought-thing’, and states that art ‘quenches our thirst for meaning’. Art provides no solutions and has no objective beyond itself.
But what about the fact that the activity of thinking (of ‘reasoning’) presupposes invisibility, that it withdraws from the sensory world and turns inward to a place the outsider cannot see, while works of art are objects that are in fact real, palpable and visible, objects which are part and parcel of reality?
The work of art’s ‘reality’ is idiosyncratic and diverges from other objects in the world – even in the case of ready-mades or conceptual actions intended to traverse the boundary between art and life. It is the function of works of art to generate meaning or to give direction to the quest for meaning. The work of art is the materialisation of thinking; thinking is rendered visible in the work of art. In the work of art, that which is actually absent (the invisible ‘reason’, reasoning) is made present. Art questions all the certitudes that are accepted as matter-of-course, even those of and about itself.
The work of art is not the end product of the artist’s thinking, or just for a moment at best; it is an intermediate stage, a temporary halting of a never-ending thought process. As soon as the artist has allowed the work as object out into the world, he takes leave of it. His activity with regard to this specific work now belongs to the past, and at this point the beholder, the public, becomes involved in the work. The beholder picks up the train of thought as it is embodied in the work of art.
The verb ‘to know’ implies knowledge, evidence, and is therefore not applicable to art or to what artists do. ‘Knowing’ harks back to concepts and criteria that belong in the world of exact science and with a mode of thinking that, in essence, is alien to art.
I would not want to aver that there is an unbridgeable gap between scientists and artists. Scientists have important intuitive moments, flashes of insight, when suddenly and seemingly out of nowhere the long-sought solution to a problem presents itself. Conversely, artists carry out research and their research is, at least in part, rationalisable and disseminable. However, the orientation of these activities and the way in which the thinking takes shape differs for scientists and artists.

Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien als Einleitung in: Janneke Wesseling (ed.), See it Again, Say it Again: The Artist as Researcher, Amsterdam: Valiz, 2011.
1.)These developments are a direct consequence of the Bologna Agreements and the Europe-wide reorganisation of education, aimed at establishing a comparable BA and MA framework for all European countries.
2.)At a symposium about research in art, held as part of ‘Manifesta 8’ in Murcia, Spain, in 2010.
3.)See Laurens Dhaenens and Hilde Van Gelder in the introduction to Kunstkritiek. Standpunten rond de beeldende kunsten uit België en Nederland in een internationaal perspectief [Art criticism. Viewpoints on the visual arts from Belgium and the Netherlands in an international perspective] (Leuven: LannooCampus, 2010).
4.)The question ‘What do artists know?’ was the theme of a round-table discussion on art and education, organised by James Elkins in 2010.
5.)Hannah Arendt (1978), Life of the Mind, ed. Mary McCarthy, 2 vols., New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. . Thinking was originally published in 1971.

Für heute habe ich genügend fette Frauen gesehen

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:48 +0000

Die Prämisse klingt in unseren Ohren wie Ketzerei: Kunst sei nutzlos, ja komplett sinnlos und es wäre immer schon so gewesen und es würde auch immer so bleiben. Dem liegt die These zu Grunde, dass die Kunst – wie auch die Finanzindustrie – keinerlei Produkte und auch keine Dienstleistungen erzeuge. Kunst produziere keine Nahrungsmittel, keine Medizin, keine Energie, keine Baustoffe, keine Maschinen, keine Information, und auch keine Kultur, nicht einmal Sinn oder Wissen würde durch Kunst erschaffen, und das hieße, Kunst sei einzig und alleine für die Unterhaltung, die Ablenkung und die Befriedigung der Menschen da, und ab und zu diene sie auch als Statussymbol und Geldwaschanlage für reiche und einflussreiche Menschen und Firmen, ja sie sei sogar verbraucherfreundlich, und dieser Zusatznutzen sei überhaupt das schlagendste Argument gegen die romantische Verklärung eines solch unregulierten Bereichs unserer Gesellschaft.

„Für heute habe ich genügend fette Frauen gesehen“,
anonymer Museumsbesucher.

Nun zur nahen Zukunft, dort wo Investitionen in elitäre und ekelhaft teure Kunst in Form von Ideen, Objekten, Zertifikaten auch für die Proleten der Unterschicht und für die Emporkömmlinge oder Statuserhalter der Mittelschicht möglich wird. Es drängt sich vordergründig der Vergleich zum Finanzmarkt der späten 1990er Jahre auf (Volksaktie, Dotcom, NASDAQ), kleine Investoren bekommen die Möglichkeit, sagenhaft teure Kunst kollektiv zu erwerben, häppchenweise und zu einem erschwinglichen Preis, mit dem Versprechen, dass diese Kunst auch auf immer und ewig an Wert zunehmen werde. Die Kleininvestoren können in einzelne Kunstwerke oder ganze Werkgruppen, in umfassende Nachlässe und in globale Kunstmarken – Künstler, Galerien, Auktionshäuser, Museen – investieren. Aber wie schon seit jeher fließt der Hauptanteil des Profits auf wundersame Weise bergauf, es werden Transaktionsgebühren aufgeschlagen und der konsolidierte Mehrwert bewegt sich dann unaufhaltsam in Richtung der 0,01%. Der Mensch von der Straße dient als immerwährend stumpfer und zunehmend einfacher zu manipulierender Liquiditätslieferant, durch Massenmedien dumm gehalten und durch Medikamente und Drogen gedämpft, unfähig zu eigenem Willen, dienen diese Arbeitsesel zur schnellen und günstigen Finanzierung des weiteren Wachstums des sogenannten Kunstmarktes, diesem korruptesten und intransparentesten Gebilde mit limitiertem Zugang, Pragmatiker nennen es Marktversagen, Verschwörungstheoretiker und Wirtschaftswissenschaftler sprechen von einer Oligarchie.
In der zweiten Hälfte der 2010er Jahre gibt es dann erstmals Anzeichen von Demokratisierung und Regulierung dieses plutokratischen Systems. Die neugegründete Art Exchange Commission (AEC) in Shanghai wird als globale Regulierungsbehörde eingesetzt und in der Folge werden die neuen großen Marktplätze, gegen allen Widerstand, von den Chinesen aufgekauft und verstaatlicht. Der chinesische Staat greift auch sonst stärker in den Kunstsektor ein und beginnt eine globale Kunsttransaktionssteuer zu erheben. Durch Förderungen, Stipendien und zielgerichtete Zensur wird etwas mehr Stabilität für die kapitalstarken Investoren und eine Grundsicherheit für die kleinen Anleger suggeriert. Kunstobjekte von staatlich finanzierten Künstlern werden zumeist als Bonds zertifiziert und vertrieben. Der Staat hat ein neues Finanzkunst-/Kunstfinanzinstrument geschaffen und finanziert damit Kunstsubvention. Das System wird selbsttragend und dadurch ein lohnendes Zielobjekt für profitorientierte Entitäten.
Parallel dazu geschieht der Durchbruch, in Form des Konzeptes der „virtuellen Existenz“: Das Kunstwerk muss von nun an nicht mehr existieren, um gehandelt zu werden, es genügt ein Zertifikat, um den Besitz zu manifestieren und zu legalisieren. Nun werden auch alle historisch relevanten Kunstobjekte verstaatlicht und eingezogen und nur noch zeitnahe, sogenannt zeitgenössische Kunst darf offen und virtuell gehandelt werden. Die Objekte und Dateien verschwinden in den Depots und auf den Servern der Institutionen zirkulieren legale und illegale Raubkopien und Zertifikate ungehindert. Dadurch wird die Kunst metaphysisch, sie beginnt erst im Moment ihrer eigentlichen Auflösung wirklich zu existieren.
Dieser radikale Schritt öffnet Tür und Tor für Spekulation, neue Transaktionsarten, geteilte Besitzmodelle und Handelssysteme entstehen und das neu erschaffene „Glaubenssystem“ basiert auf einer Pyramide, deren Basis aus Kunstmarken, und die darüber liegenden Ebenen aus Nachlasssystemen, Genres, Generationen, Kunstbewegungen und -szenen, besteht. Kunstbesitz wird nun ausschließlich in Fonds strukturiert, und durch die, dank der Digitalisierung, sehr hohe Bewegungsfähigkeit entwickeln sich neue Formen der Distribution. Der Markt bewegt sich in Richtung binäre Objekte – Zertifikate, Unterschriften, Gif-Animationen, Jpgs, Mp3, Filme, Textfiles und weitere historische Objekte wie html-, css- und flash-files sowie neue noch unbekannte Formate. Obsolete und mittlerweile illegale Konzepte der Finanzindustrie (Aktien, Derivative, Optionen, Futures, Credit Default Swaps), Arbitrage und die Idee des Hedge Fonds werden adaptiert. Nun steht dem globalen Crash des Kunstsystems nichts mehr im Wege.
Die Marktplätze verschieben sich dramatisch, von den verstaatlichten Institutionen und Marktplattformen, den historischen Kunstgalerien und den letzten übriggebliebenen Messen hin zu den neuen digitalen Hochgeschwindigkeitshandelsplattformen.
Die Dinosaurier der Kunstmessen werden in spektakuläre, oscarartige Preisverleihungsshows umgewandelt, um den Unterhaltungsaspekt des Kunstsektors und dessen Protagonisten optimal zu vermarkten. Kunst wird weiter popularisiert und immer mehr zu einem vordergründig praktischen Medium, vergleichbar mit Musik oder Film.
Der daraus entstandene moderne Kunstmarkt und seine Teilnehmer sind Maschinennetzwerke in denen sich, einst von Menschenhand geschaffene, komplexe Algorithmen autonom weiterentwickeln. Es dominiert der Hochfrequenzhandel: Serverfarmen in Dubai, anonyme Handelsteilnehmer, offshore Zertifizierungsgesellschaften, bitcoinartige Währungssysteme und andere, dem Menschen unverständliche und seiner Kontrolle gänzlich entzogene Technologien und Instrumente dominieren die Marktlandschaft.
Nun verlieren auch die Künstler komplett die Kontrolle über ihre Zuliefertätigkeit und die Netzwerke übernehmen die Kunstproduktion. Zu Beginn werden aufgrund der Analyse der Kunstgeschichte neue Konzepte errechnet und zertifiziert, ähnlich einem modernen Schachcomputer errechnen die Netzwerke optimale Varianten und Produkte. In der Folge werden alle Bereiche der Kunstproduktion autonom, und in einem ultimativen Akt der Autonomiemanifestation beginnen die Maschinencluster neue Identitäten, Marktsättigungslevels und Finanzierungs- und Marketingstrategien zu errechnen.
Die Konvergenz ermöglichte zu Beginn des binären Zeitalters die Benutzung einer Plattform für Handel, Produktion, Distribution und Konsumation von Kunst, und genau diese Konvergenz ermöglicht es nun den Netzwerken die Kunstproduktion zu emulieren, zu kapern und zu monopolisieren. Das Hauptargument: Die Qualität der Netzwerkkunst ist um ein vielfaches höher als die herkömmlich erstellten Produkte und auch die Kritik und das Bewertungssystem sind längst an die Netzwerke ausgelagert und in Folge übernommen worden.
Die Menschen sind obsolet geworden, sie sind reine Übersetzer, Beobachter ihres eigenen Machtverlustes und entweder Bewunderer der neuen Ästhetik oder fundamentalistische Kritiker jeglicher Netzwerkkunst. Die vormals neoliberalen Kuratoren und Kritiker dienen nunmehr als Handlanger, sie arbeiten als Assistenten für die virtuellen Instanzen – Historiker und Archäologen. Ihr Versuch, die Netzwerke zu verstehen, scheitert an der übermenschlichen Geschwindigkeit und an der unglaublichen Vielfältigkeit der Entwicklung. Es entsteht Natur pur, chaotisch und komplex und ohne Quellcode unmöglich zu interpretieren.
Nach einer längeren Periode der rein binären Kunst einigen sich die Netzwerke darauf, wieder materielle Objekte herzustellen. Sie beginnen 3D-Macher – vormals 3D-Drucker – zu entwerfen, diese wiederum drucken 3D-Macher, welche dann effektiv materielle Kunst herstellen können. Ehemalige Museen, Fast-Food Restaurants, Copy-Shops, Bibliotheken und Kleidergeschäfte werden Musterzimmer für die Zurschaustellung maschinengemachter Dinge. Offensichtlich haben die Netzwerke Ironie und einen Sinn für Romantik entwickelt, und es stellt sich die Frage, ob eine Art kollektives Bewusstsein mit verschiedenen Seinszuständen und Selbstkritik folgen wird.
Bis heute wurden in den Netzwerkarchiven keine Kunst gesichtet, die fette Frauen beinhaltet, und anonyme Museumsbesucher gibt es schon seit langen nicht mehr.

Fullers These. Zu Jonathan Fullers „On Erbaulichkeit. Art Theory and Culture in the Early 21st Century.“ (2037)

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:47 +0000

Der vorliegende Text ist ein Auszug eines umfangreichen Briefes, der vor wenigen Wochen in der Sammlung der Universität Muri (Schweiz) zwischen den Papieren von Alan Sokal und Jakob Pilzbarth gefunden wurde. Das Schreiben ist mit Oktober 2037 datiert, seine Existenz verdankt sich offenkundig einer der seltenen Falten im Raumzeitkontinuum.
Verfasst wurde es von Prof. Ole Johnsen (DDD – Departement for Discourse Design, University of New Jersey) und ist an den Cheflektor des Fischkamp-Verlages, Chick Olsen, gerichtet. Johnsens Schreiben enthält im Wesentlichen eine etwas schwerfällige Darstellung eines Buch von Jonathan Fuller „On Erbaulichkeit. Art Theory and Culture in the Early 21st Century.“ Da uns das Werk Fullers natürlich (noch) unbekannt ist, geben wir einige Teile von Johnsens Bericht hier wieder, die für das Verständnis von Fullers Thesen nützlich sein könnten. Wir haben das Schreiben, so gut es ging, aus dem Englischen übersetzt und, wo notwendig, mit einigen Erläuterungen versehen. (RH / ES)

[…] kann ich Ihnen also Jonathan Fullers „On Erbaulichkeit. Art Theory and Culture in the Early 21st Century“ nur nachdrücklich zur Übersetzung empfehlen. Auch wenn sich seine Wirkung so kurz nach dem Erscheinen nicht absehen lässt, so handelt es sich trotz mancher Schwächen m. E. um ein bedeutendes Werk, das sich der Frage der Kulturentwicklung zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts stellt und rückblickend den radikalen Wandel in den 20er-Jahren plausibel erklärt.
Bevor ich zum Inhalt komme, vielleicht ein Wort zum Autor. Meinen Kollegen Fuller hätte man vor 50 Jahren vielleicht als „Philosoph“ oder „Historiker“ bezeichnet. Ich weiß, diese Titel sind auch bei Ihnen in Europa seit dem Umbau der Universitäten nicht mehr geläufig, aber weder die heute zulässigen Bezeichnungen „Neurobiologe“ noch „Kulturwissenschaftler“ treffen Fullers vielfältige Interessen und Vorlieben. Jonathan liebt das Dorophon, er geht nicht gerne spazieren und benutzt trotz aller Verbote nach wie vor das alte Internet.
Fullers Frage ist einfach: Wie kam der „Social Turn“, der heute so viele beschäftigt und viele von uns so sehr beunruhigt, an den Universitäten zustande? Üblicherweise wird der Paradigmenwechsel der letzten Jahre, die Renaissance des Gesellschaftlichen, als Adaption der neuen sozialen Bewegungen im akademischen Milieu verstanden. Das mag ja stimmen, aber all diese Erklärungen bleiben äußerlich. Fuller zeigt den immanenten Wandel, also die Erosion des Alten und die Herausbildung des Neuen innerhalb der Kulturwissenschaften – und, vielleicht überraschend, in der Kunst. […]
Wie wir wissen, ist die Entwicklung in den Wissenschaften von Neuorientierungen, von „Turns“ mit jeweils unterschiedlichen neuen Schwerpunkten, Sichtweisen und Funktionen gekennzeichnet. Auch unsere Tätigkeit verdankt sich einem solchen Turn, dem „Cultural Turn“, als am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts Kultur endlich zum Leitbegriff und Leitmotiv aller politischen Analyse wurde. Heute sind uns beispielsweise Samuel Huntingtons Thesen selbstverständlich, aber noch zu Beginn unseres Jahrhunderts, erinnert Fuller, waren sie umstritten, so wie sie jetzt wieder sind!
Fullers Antwort ist so einfach, wie sie einleuchtend ist. Er erklärt den „Social Turn“ als Reaktion auf die langjährige Dominanz einer Rede und Praxis zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts, die er unter dem Begriff „Gelehrsamkeit“ zusammenfasst. Die ersten acht Kapitel (The New Scholar and Old Sage, p. 7 – 81), sie zählen wohl zu den erhellendsten Momenten des ganzen Buches, sind der Genese und Formierung des Konzeptes der Gelehrsamkeit in der wissenschaftlichen Kultur gewidmet. Sie zeichnen die Entstehung des gelehrsamen Diskurses zu Beginn unseres Jahrhunderts minutiös nach und versäumen es nicht, die Schlüsselfigur des „Gelehrsamen“ und seine Herrschaft im Detail zu skizzieren. Dies schafft Fuller auf eine elegant entwickelte Weise, indem er auf den alten Typus des Gelehrten aus dem 18. Jahrhundert rekurriert und den neuen Gelehrsamen zugleich als dessen Nachfolger wie als dessen Devianzprodukt begreift.
Im Konzept der Gelehrsamkeit geht es nach Fuller um nichts weniger als um die „Verbreitung der deutschen Tiefe im Weltmaßstab“, wie er an einer zentralen Stelle seines Buches schreibt (p. 123). Nach Fuller herrschte am Ende des vorigen Jahrhunderts nach langer Zeit wieder rege Nachfrage nach dieser Gelehrsamkeit:

„Je stärker sich die Neurobiologie als Leitdisziplin der Wissenschaft vom Menschen etablierte, je größer ihre Erfolge wurden bei der Erklärung menschlichen Handelns, des Rätsels des Bewusstseins und des moralischen Empfindens, desto stärker wuchs der Druck auf die anderen Disziplinen wie Philosophie, Kunstwissenschaften oder Philologien. Sie mussten sich entscheiden: Entweder eine schwache Wissenschaft zu sein, die mit den Errungenschaften der Neurobiologie nicht mithalten kann und an deren ewig unzufriedenes Blabla niemand mehr so recht glaubte, oder den Rubikon zu überschreiten und wieder gelehrsam zu werden. Der neue Gelehrte machte das Rennen.“

Das Medium des Gelehrsamen ist nach Fuller die „Erbaulichkeit“, ein Konzept, für das uns im Englischen ja der Begriff fehlt. Erbaulichkeit meint eine besondere Form des Diskurses, der nach Fuller gegen die Diskursregeln der älteren kritischen Wissenschaft gerichtet war. Nochmals Fuller:

„Ihre Sprache muss ein wohltuender Schock gewesen sein. Entgegen der ausgewogenen, hochspezialisierten Sprache der alten Wissenschaftlergeneration waren die Neuerer voller Tiefe und Allgemeinheit. Schon bald sprachen sie auf akademischen Tagungen wie auf Managementkongressen, manche hielten bis zu 150 Vorträge pro Jahr und gaben fast täglich Interviews. Nicht dass die Vertreter der neuen Erbaulichkeit verständlich waren, natürlich nicht, aber was sie sagten, klang weise. Woher kam ihr glänzender Erfolg? Ich meine, sie kompensierten vor allem zwei Defizite: Zum einen etwas, was damals vom breiten Publikum als ‚Bildungsmangel’ empfunden wurde, zum anderen glichen sie den ‚Mangel an Sinn’ aus, der viele Menschen beschäftigte und gegen den die angewandte Neurobiologie zu Beginn des Jahrtausends ja noch kein Mittel parat hatte. Die erbauliche Rede war mahnend und radikal, aber gerade dadurch war sie versöhnlich, störte niemanden und war, auch wenn ihre Vertreter in Rätseln sprachen, in gewissem Sinn humorvoll und unterhaltend.“

Auf minutiöse Weise gelingt es Fuller in der Folge jenen Prozess der Herausbildung des „Gelehrsamen“ vor dem Hintergrund der Wandlungen der akademischen Debatten und der Umgestaltung der universitären Strukturen zu Beginn unseres Jahrhunderts nachzuzeichnen. Fuller meint, dass die Etablierung des erbaulichen Diskurses zunächst vor allem in Italien und Frankreich erfolgte und betrachtet in der Folge detailliert die Werke, Karrieren und Einkommensverhältnisse von drei heute vergessenen Autoren (vgl. Kap. 9: Early Architects of New Erbaulichkeit: Kristeva, Eco, Baudrillard). Ein prototypisches Beispiel bilden dabei die mathematischen Schriften von Jacques Lacan zur „asphärischen Topologie“: […]
Wie kam es nun zum Wandel, zum Überborden des Konzeptes der Erbaulichkeit? Fuller berücksichtigt hier besonders die Rolle der Kunst und ihre Entwicklung.
Lange schon war die Ästhetik das beliebteste, ja das zentrale Feld der Gelehrsamkeit, auf dem sie ihr Inventar entwickelte und schärfte. Fuller bringt die Krise der Erbaulichkeit auf eine verblüffend einfache Formel, indem er sie mit der Kunstentwicklung synchronisiert:

„Je beliebiger die visuelle Produktion empfunden wurde, desto erbaulicher musste der Diskurs über sie werden. Die Gelehrsamkeit war die treue Begleiterin der Kunst, das war ihre wesentliche (nicht zuletzt ökonomische) Funktion, sozusagen die epistemologische Homebase des Paradigmas. Ihr Erfolg am Markt war beider Erfolg, sobald ihr Unternehmen allerdingsin Schwierigkeiten geriet, hatten beide Probleme.“

Eine Bruchlinie bildet nach Fuller die Große Krise von 2019, der plötzliche Zusammenbruch des Kunstmarktes, der weltweit so viele Existenzen zerstört hat. Fullers Darstellung (Kap. 12: Bloody Saturday) erinnert eindrücklich an diese Wendezeit, als – Sie werden sich vielleicht erinnern – bei Sothebys ein seltener Duchamp erstmals sogar unter den Wert eines mittelformatigen Goyas fiel. In der Folge geriet der „Cultural Turn“ selbst unter Druck:

„Heute ist ja weitgehend vergessen, dass VDs (= Visual Designer, Anm. d. Hrsg.) damals noch als Einzelpersonen, rechtlich unter der Berufsbezeichnung ‚bildende Künstler’ agierten und noch nicht angestellt waren. Auch wenn der Markt noch florierte, war das Auskommen vieler dieser ‚Künstler’ noch höchst unsicher, ihre Existenz leidvoll, flankiert und ermuntert von einer Kunsttheorie, die mit der seltsamen Bezeichnung ‚autonom’ das existenzielle und finanzielle Elend dieser Menschen legitimierte.“

Ein ganzes Kapitel widmet Fuller nun der widersprüchlichen Übergangszeit nach der Krise, als die VD-Agenturen wie Saatchi und Gates die „freien Künstler“ unter Vertrag stellten. Das Angestelltenverhältnis wurde am Anfang natürlich als Erlösung, aber interessanter Weise in dieser frühen Phase auch als Einschränkung empfunden. Das Signierverbot setzte sich erst langsam durch. Sogar Kunstakademien waren in gewisser Weise ja unabhängig, bevor sie schlossen. In Kap. 15 (Fine Arts: From Expression to Training) zeigt Fuller eindrücklich, dass die heutigen Trainingscenter der VD-Agenturen ursprünglich aus den alten Kunstakademien und –universitäten geboren wurden und wie noch längere Zeit versucht wurde, eine heute schwer nachzuvollziehende Trennung zwischen Werbung und Kunstausübung aufrecht zu erhalten. […]
Besonders ans Herz legen möchte ich Ihnen Fullers Exkurs zur Rolle staatlicher Kunstförderung (Kap. 17: Wild Production). Aus den alten Akten der Ministerien rekonstruiert Fuller mit archivalischem Fleiß, dass zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts tatsächlich noch die Produktion von Kunst (und nicht wie heute ausschließlich die Konsumtion) staatlich gefördert wurde. Es mutet absurd an: Theaterstücke, Filme, Bilder, ja sogar ganze Bücher wurden zu Hauf aus Steuermitteln finanziert, ohne dass man wusste, wie viele Besucher zu den Ausstellungen kommen werden oder ob es überhaupt Besucher oder Leser eines geförderten Produkts geben wird. Das blieb alles dem Zufall überlassen, was, obwohl es gar nicht so lange her ist, wirklich unvorstellbar anmutet: Es gab keinen einzigen professionellen Leser (Lesen wurde noch als Privatsache betrachtet), es gab keine neurobiologischen Verständnistests, kein staatlich anerkanntes Empfindungszertifikat an den Bildern. Es wurde einfach auf gut Glück produziert. Im Grunde war klar, dass dieses wild wuchernde System implodieren musste und damit dem „Cultural Turn“ die Grundlagen entzog. […]
Das besondere Verdienst Fullers ist die Betrachtung der Gegenwart. So überzeugend der Prozess der Durchsetzung des Konzepts der Gelehrsamkeit und sein Niedergang von Fuller nachgezeichnet wird, so unsicher bleibt er natürlich bei der Debatte jenes Begriffes, der gegenwärtig so heftig diskutiert wird. Der Terminus „The Social“ (Sie würden wohl den Begriff „Gesellschaft“ verwenden) bereitet Fuller, und da ist er beileibe nicht der einzige unter den zeitgenössischen Autoren, durchaus Schwierigkeiten. Nun wäre es allzu beckmesserisch, dies der Arbeit als einen gravierenden Mangel anzulasten, gemeint ist nach Fuller „die Wiederentdeckung des Begriffes Gesellschaft“ (Kap. 18: The Social Turn. An Ambivalent Project), die sich in so vielen Arbeiten derzeit parallel ereignet.
In manchem erscheinen die Neuerer freilich als Etikettenschwindler. Der „Social Turn“ ist häufig nichts anderes als eine semantische Transformation, ein Wortgeklingel, und Sie könnten statt „Gesellschaft“ ebenso gut auch unser altes, vertrautes „Kultur“ einsetzen. Aber es wäre ungerecht, das Neue in Bausch und Bogen zu verdammen.
Der Paradigmenwechsel besteht, und er besteht, dies ist Fullers These, in Wahrheit aber in einem Rückgriff auf Konzepte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Fuller zeigt, dass etwa Goldmanns „Society and Knowledge“ oder das bahnbrechende „Political Economics“ von Sarah Peters in vielem auf Konzepten der „Kritischen Sozialwissenschaft“ (– im Original deutsch, Anm. d. Hrsg.) des 20. Jahrhunderts beruhen. Eindrucksvoll weist Fuller abschließend auf Autoren wie Theodor Adorno (Kap. 20: The Beauty of Dialectics), Jürgen Habermas (Kap. 21: Reason, Boredom and Speech) und Max Hörkheimer (sic!, Anm. d. Hrsg.) hin, der mir leider unbekannt ist.
[…] hoffe ich also, ihnen mit meiner Darstellung gedient zu haben. Angeregt von Fuller habe ich mir übrigens eben einen Band von Adorno aus der alten dorophonischen Bibliothek besorgt und versuche gerade, seine „Ästhetische Theorie“ zu lesen. Ein enigmatisches Werk, aber eine faszinierende Lektüre, die ich Ihnen nur empfehlen kann. In ihrem Verlagsarchiv müsste noch ein Exemplar zu finden sein.

Mit besten Grüßen
Ihr
O. Johnsen.

Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschein erstmals in ART AND NOW: Über die Zukunft künstlerischer Produktivitätsstrategien, Wien 2010, S. 106ff.

Next Art Education. Erste Befunde

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:43 +0000

Die nächste Kunst ist die Kunst der nächsten Gesellschaft. Als nächste Gesellschaft bezeichnet der Soziologe und Kulturtheoretiker Dirk Baecker – im Anschluss an den Managementdenker Peter F. Drucker – die Gesellschaft, die auf dem Computer als geschäftsführender Medientechnologie basiert. Baecker geht dabei von der u. a. auch von Marshall McLuhan, Manuel Castells, Niklas Luhmann, Régis Debray und anderen formulierten Vermutung aus, dass kaum etwas so große Bedeutung für die Strukturen einer Gesellschaft und die Formen einer Kultur hat wie die jeweils dominierenden Verbreitungsmedien. Folglich wird die Einführung des Computers für die Gesellschaft ebenso dramatische Folgen haben wie zuvor nur die Einführung der Sprache, der Schrift und des Buchdrucks.¹
Next Art Education ist der Versuch, an diese Vermutung mit der Frage nach adäquaten Reaktionen im Feld der Verkoppelung von Kunst und Pädagogik anzuschließen.

Reichweite
Next Art Education – das mag eventuell etwas forsch klingen, vielleicht auch etwas visionär. Und genau so ist es auch gemeint. Es geht mir hier um einige Grundsatzüberlegungen, die mich umtreiben, wenn ich vor dem Hintergrund meines Berufs – der mit der Ausbildung von Lehrern für das Fach Kunst und also sehr konkret mit der nächsten Generation (von Lehrern, von Schülern, von Schule) zu tun hat – über das Nächste in der Kunst und über die Bildung der Zukunft (und über die Zukunft der Bildung) nachdenke.
Zunächst sei vorbemerkt, dass die Schule – das wissen alle, die eine solche besucht haben – ein Problem mit dem Neuen hat. Das Neue ist prinzipiell nicht Sache der Schule, jedenfalls nicht als Gegenstand des Unterrichts. Sie hat andere Aufgaben. Die Schule ist einer jener Orte, deren expliziter Zweck es ist, den Kommunikationsprozess am Laufen zu halten, der die Übertragung von im Gedächtnis einer Generation enthaltenen Informationen in das Gedächtnis der nächsten erlaubt. Das, was man die Paideia oder auch, weil Bildung das Faktum der Kultur² ist, was man Kultur nennt, wird durch Institutionen wie die Schule aufrechterhalten. Es geht um die Weitergabe von als kulturell bedeutsam erachteten Inhalten, um die Tradition dessen, was sich kulturell bewährt hat und deshalb als des Bewahrens wert angesehen wird. Mit ihren Schulen bewähren und bewahren sich Kulturen.
Und gleich noch eine Vorbemerkung dazu: Schule hat eine ganze Menge mit Zukunft, mit Science Fiction sogar, zu tun. Grundsätzlich. Schule hängt fundamental zusammen mit dem Neuen – mit dem Ungewissen, Unvorhersehbaren, mit dem Möglichen. Die neue Generation, die neuen Subjekte, sind zunächst einmal Projekte, Entwürfe. Wenn nicht für die Schule, sondern für das Leben gelernt – und gelehrt – wird, müssen die pädagogischen Anstrengungen der Lehrer auf Teilhabequalifikation für eine Gesellschaft zielen, die es im Moment noch gar nicht gibt.
Was ich damit meine und was ich meinen Lehramtsstudierenden gerne schon gleich zu Beginn des Studiums erzähle, ist eine einfache Rechenaufgabe: Wie lange wirken Sie in die Zukunft hinein? Wenn Sie als Lehramtsstudent zum Beispiel 1990 geboren jetzt 23 Jahre alt sind und in schätzungsweise zwei Jahren in den Schuldienst eintreten, dann werden Sie bis zu Ihrer Pensionierung – das wird ca. 40 Jahre später, also im Jahr 2055, sein – mit Schülern zu tun haben. Sie haben dann vielleicht in Ihrem letzten Dienstjahr mit 10-jährigen Schülern zu tun, die Sie dann auf deren Zukünfte vorbereiten sollen. Das Leben dieser Schüler, Jahrgang 2045, wird, wenn die Lebenserwartung der Menschen so bleibt wie im Moment, ca. 70 Jahre später, also im Jahr 2125, enden. Ihre pädagogischen Anstrengungen im letzten Dienstjahr sollten also darauf zielen, dass Ihre Schüler an der Gesellschaft des Jahres 2125 noch kompetent partizipieren können. Und meine Tätigkeit als Hochschullehrer könnte ich so verstehen, dass ich jetzt darauf zielen muss, Sie dazu zu befähigen.
Das ist ein Riesensprung in die Zukunft. 112 Jahre. Und es ist ohne Frage hier, der Deutlichkeit wegen, etwas überdramatisiert. Aber auch wenn wir etwas realistischer werden und nur einmal davon ausgehen, dass Sie in Ihrem fünfzigsten Lebensjahr einem zehnjährigen Schüler etwas mitgeben wollen, von dem dieser profitiert, wenn er selbst fünfzig Jahre alt ist, sind wir bereits im Jahr 2080.
Die Dimensionen dieses Zeitsprungs werden deutlich, wenn wir den gleichen Zeitraum in die andere Richtung bedenken. Für die dramatische Version heißt das, wir befinden uns im Jahr 1901. Die Kunst der klassischen Moderne steht uns gerade bevor. Mit dem ersten Kunsterziehungstag in Dresden wird 1901 die (neuere, d. h. eigentliche) Ideengeschichte der Kunstpädagogik beginnen. Als „neue Medien“ stehen uns der (Stumm-)Film und das Radio unmittelbar bevor. Bis zur Erfindung und Verbreitung des Fernsehens ist es noch fast ein ganzes Menschenleben. Die realistischere Version bringt uns ins Jahr 1956. Ungefähr 12 Jahre, bevor das Fernsehen Massenmedium wird und eine Kulturrevolution die ganze Welt umkrempelt, ist ein Lehramtsstudent im vierten Semester seiner Ausbildung damit beschäftigt, was er als Fünfzigjähriger im Jahr 1973 einem zehnjährigen Schüler zu geben haben wird, damit dieser im Jahr 2013 – gut 20 Jahre nach dem web1.0 und fast 10 Jahre nach dem web2.0 – im Stande ist, sein fünfzigjähriges Leben am Rande der nächsten Gesellschaft zu meistern.

1. Das wäre ein allgemeiner Ausgangspunkt für Next Art Education: Sie muss, wie alle Pädagogik, radikal in Richtung Zukunft gedacht werden. Es geht um das Werden, nicht um das Sein. Das erreicht man am besten, indem man sich ernsthaft am Jetzt orientiert.

Krise
Mit der Rede von der nächsten Kunst ist mehr gemeint, als den nächsten Hype im Betriebssystem anzukündigen, der ebenso schnell wie angesagt, wieder verschwunden ist. Die nächste Kunst ist in größerem Rahmen gedacht. Es geht um die Folgen medienkultureller Wandlungsprozesse im Großmaßstab. Hintergrund dafür ist die in epistemologischer Tradition (z. B. Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard etc.) stehende Grundannahme, dass sich die symbolischen Aktivitäten einer Gesellschaft – zum Beispiel ihre Religion, ihre Ideologien, ihre Kunst – nicht unabhängig von den Technologien erklären lassen, die diese Gesellschaft benutzt, um ihre symbolischen Spuren zu erfassen, zu archivieren und zirkulieren zu lassen.³ In diesem Sinne macht Dirk Baecker in den „Studien zur nächsten Gesellschaft“ soziologische Entwicklungen an Aufkommen und Gebrauch bestimmter Medientechnologien fest: Die Einführung der Sprache konstituierte die Stammesgesellschaft, die Einführung der Schrift die antike Hochkultur, die Einführung des Buchdrucks die moderne Gesellschaft und die Einführung des Computers wird die „nächste Gesellschaft“ konstituieren.
Als Erklärung für die aus den medienkulturellen Neuerungen je folgenden gesellschaftlichen Wandlungsprozesse, die sich als existentielle Krisen im Sinne von Höhe- und Wendepunkten potentiell katastrophaler Entwicklungen darstellen, bietet Baecker die Hypothese an, dass es einer Gesellschaft nur dann gelingt, sich zu reproduzieren, wenn sie auf das Problem des Überschusses an Sinn eine Antwort findet, das mit der Einführung jedes neuen Kommunikationsmediums einhergeht. So hatte es die Antike durch die Verbreitung der Schrift mit einem Überschuss an Symbolen zu tun, die Moderne hatte durch die Buchdrucktechnologie und die damit verbundene massenhafte Verbreitung von Büchern mit einem Überschuss an Kritik zu tun, und die nächste Gesellschaft wird sich durch einen Überschuss an Kontrolle auszeichnen, der mit der Einführung des Computers verbunden ist.⁴
Solche mediologischen Revolutionen haben tiefgreifende Auswirkungen auf die Gesellschaft und ihre Funktionssysteme. Die Suche nach neuen Kulturformen, die der Überforderung der Gesellschaft durch das jeweils neue Kommunikationsmedium gewachsen sind, stürzt die Gesellschaft zunächst in fundamentale Krisen. Mit einer solchen Krise haben wir im Moment zu tun. Deshalb kann man sagen: Die Kunst nach der Krise ist die Kunst der nächsten Gesellschaft. Sie wird Formen hervorbringen, die es uns erlauben, „das Potential des Computers auszunutzen, ohne uns von ihm an die Wand spielen zu lassen“.⁵
Genau so, wie die moderne Gesellschaft Wege gefunden hat, mit dem Überschuss an Kritik umzugehen, und zwar sowohl mit der Möglichkeit zu kritisieren wie auch mit der Möglichkeit, kritisiert zu werden, muss die nächste Gesellschaft Umgangsformen mit Kontrolle entwickeln, die nicht nur reagieren auf die Möglichkeit, kontrolliert zu werden, sondern auch auf die Möglichkeit, zu kontrollieren. Kontrollüberschuss heißt zweifellos auch, dass Computer Menschen kontrollieren können oder Menschen andere Menschen mit Hilfe von Computern kontrollieren können. Aber die Kontrollgesellschaft lediglich von Orwells „Big Brother“ aus zu denken, deutet auf eine an den Erfahrungen der Moderne orientierten Perspektive hin, die der Komplexität der nächsten Gesellschaft nicht angemessen ist.

2. Das wäre ein weiterer Ausgangspunkt für Next Art Education: Der Held der nächsten Gesellschaft, Sachverwalter der Kultur und vorbildliches Ideal für Bildungsprojekte ist nicht mehr der an die öffentliche Vernunft appellierende Intellektuelle der Aufklärung, nicht mehr der den Vergleich des Realen mit dem Idealen beherrschende Kritiker, kurz: nicht mehr das souveräne Subjekt der Moderne, sondern der Hacker.⁶

Kontrolle
Wenn das Leitmedium der nächsten Gesellschaft der Computer ist, drängt sich der Hacker hier offensichtlich auf. Aber allzu konkret ist es gar nicht gemeint. Bezogen auf die Kunst der nächsten Gesellschaft geht es vor allem um Cultural Hacking⁷ und entsprechend soll Hacking deshalb als allgemeines, grundlegendes Arbeits- und Handlungsprinzip verstanden werden, das mit dem Computer nur insofern zu tun hat, als es auf die Überforderung der aktuellen Gesellschaft durch den Computer reagiert – und zwar indem es auf Kontrolle mit Kontrolle reagiert. Der Hacker ist hier deshalb einfach jemand, der die Kulturtechniken beherrscht, die notwendig sind, um das Kontrollieren und das Kontrolliert-Werden als die beiden Seiten einer Medaille zu begreifen.
Düllo und Liebl bezeichnen Cultural Hacking ganz in diesem Sinn auch als „Kunst des strategischen Handelns“.⁸ Sie charakterisieren Cultural Hacking als kritisches und subversives Spiel mit kulturellen Codes, Bedeutungen und Werten. Es geht dabei um die Erkundung kultureller Systeme mit dem Ziel, sich darin zurechtzufinden, und zugleich neue Orientierungen in diese Systeme einzuführen. Der Hacker installiert Störungen im System, er nistet sich ein in bestehende Kontrollprojekte wie ein Parasit – und beantwortet so den Kontrollüberschuss, indem er eigene Kontrollprojekte auf die Kontrollprojekte der anderen aufsetzt.
„Die Kunst der nächsten Gesellschaft ist leicht und klug“, prognostiziert Baecker, „Sie weicht aus und bindet mit Witz. Ihre Bilder, Geschichten und Töne greifen an und sind es nicht gewesen.“⁹ – Das kann man als Werk eines Cultural Hacker lesen. Der Künstler der nächsten Gesellschaft ist jemand, der in der Lage ist, einen Code zu knacken, sei es technischer, sozialer, psychischer oder kultureller Code.¹⁰ Er betreibt formal strenge, aber im Effekt sehr befreiende Experimente mit Codierungstechniken, die unterschiedliche Bild- und Sprachspiele ineinander übersetzen.

3. Das wäre ein konkreter Fund für Next Art Education: Orientierung an den für den Umgang mit dem Sinnüberschuss an Kontrolle notwendigen Kulturtechniken. Der Künstler der nächsten Gesellschaft beherrscht (kontrolliert) die Kulturtechniken seiner Zeit. Seine Kunst „zittert im Netzwerk“ und „vibriert in den Medien“.¹¹ Er muss kein Experte der Informatik sein, aber er pflegt einen kreativen Umgang mit Codierungstechniken und Kontrollprojekten.

Post Art
Die Krise, die den Übergang in die nächste Gesellschaft markiert, ist für die Kunst eine Katastrophe. Das hatte Régis Debray in seiner „Geschichte der Bildbetrachtung im Abendland“¹² schon angekündigt. In gedanklicher Nähe zur Idee der nächsten Gesellschaft entlarvt er die Kunst (oder besser DIE Kunst) als ein Symptom der durch Buchdruck und Zentralperspektive geprägten Mediosphäre. Kunst ist demnach „kein unveränderlicher Bestandteil der conditio humana“ und auch keine „transhistorische Substanz“, die sich als anthropologische Konstante unverändert durch die Kulturgeschichte zieht, sondern ein erst „spät im neuzeitlichen Abendland“ aufgetauchter Begriff, dessen Fortbestand „keineswegs“ gesichert ist. Kunst – so Debray – „das reißerische einsilbige Wort stellt sich jedem Erklärungsversuch in den Weg, der die Wandelbarkeit von Bildern im Auge hat. Es stellt ein Artefakt als Natur vor, einen Augenblick als etwas Wesentliches und die Folklore als universell Gültiges.“¹³
Auch die Chefkuratorin der weltweit größten und bedeutendsten Ausstellung für zeitgenössische Kunst bezweifelt inzwischen, „dass die Kategorie Kunst eine gegebene Größe ist. Nichts ist einfach gegeben“, meint Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev und erklärt, dass sie im Rahmen der documenta 13 die Gewissheit erschüttern will, „dass es ein Feld namens Kunst überhaupt gibt“.¹⁴ Die Konzeption von Kunst, „die Farbe mittels Farbe untersucht, Form mit Form, Geschichte mit Geschichte, Raum mit Raum“, bezeichnet sie als „bourgeoise, eurozentrische Idee“ und ist sich deshalb „ehrlich gesagt“ nicht sicher, ob das „Feld der Kunst“ – bezogen auf die große abendländische Erzählung – „auch im 21. Jahrhundert überdauern wird“.¹⁵ Entsprechend versammelt sie in Kassel Kunst von Outsidern: von Menschen, die keine (professionellen) Künstler sind oder sein wollen und das „Feld der Kunst“ eher nur von der Außenseite kennen (Outsider Art), und – wie das seit Okwui Enwezors documenta 11 in solchen Kontexten angemessener Standard ist – von Menschen, die außerhalb eurozentrischer Kulturhoheiten leben (Global Art).
Die nächste Kunst verlässt das „bourgeoise, eurozentrische“ Feld und die gewohnten Mechanismen der Ein- und Ausschließung. „Sie sprengt ihre hochkulturellen Fesseln und verlässt das Gefängnis ihrer Autonomie. Sie wird sich“, so Dirk Baecker im Gespräch mit Johannes Hedinger, „neue Orte, neue Zeiten und ein neues Publikum suchen. Sie wird mit Formaten experimentieren, in der die gewohnten Institutionen zu Variablen werden.“¹⁶
Die nächste Kunst ist nicht mehr Kunst. Sie ist darüber hinaus. Jerry Saltz hat hier den schwer fassbaren Begriff Post Art eingebracht: „Post Art – things that aren’t artworks so much as they are about the drive to make things that, like art, embed imagination in material […] Things that couldn’t be fitted into old categories embody powerfully creative forms, capable of carrying meaning and making change.“¹⁷ Er hat dabei Dinge im Sinn, „that achieve a greater density and intensity of meaning than that word usually implies“ – zum Beispiel das Hinweisschild neben den kleinen, unscheinbaren Landschaftsmalereien im Brain der documenta 13, das darüber informiert, dass der Künstler und Physiker Mohammad Yusuf Asefi in den späten 1990er und frühen 2000er Jahren ca. 80 Gemälde der National Gallery in Kabul vor der Zerstörung durch die Taliban bewahrt hat, indem er die menschlichen Figuren, deren Abbildung unter dem fundamentalistischen Regime verboten war, in den Landschaften sorgfältig und akribisch reversibel übermalt hat: „A number of things at Documenta 13 that weren‘t art took my breath away, in ways that turned into art.“¹⁸

4. Der nächste Fund trifft die Kunst ins Mark. Next Art Education bricht mit der Geschichte der Kunst als große Erzählung eurozentrischer Hochkultur. Sie begibt sich auf ungesichertes Terrain. Sie lässt sich ein auf die andere und auf die nächste Kunst und versucht, Post Art zu denken. Sie steht wiedererkennbar in Verbindung mit dem Feld der Kunst, denkt aber darüber hinaus. Und sie weiß: Die nächste Kunst bleibt nicht unbeeindruckt von der Welt, in der sie entsteht. Sie befasst sich mit aktuellen Gegenständen des aktuellen Lebens, sie nutzt dafür aktuelle Darstellungstechnologien und sie operiert auf dem Boden alltagskultureller Tatsachen.

Natives
Jimmie Durham versteht sich selbst als American Native. Seine ethnisch codierten Arbeiten, mit denen er seit den 1970er Jahren radikale Kulturkritik an den (europäischen) Siedlern Amerikas, den American Immigrants, betreibt, gehen von einem Selbstverständnis aus, das er selbst wie folgt in Worte fasst: „According to some official documents I was born in Arkansas in 1940, but that state is a recent invention. The ‚united states’ were all invented against American Indians, and as a Cherokee I was born in Cherokee territory under the aggressive political act called ‚Arkansas’.“¹⁹
Die Generation von Menschen, die in die Krise hinein geboren ist, wird Digital Native genannt. Diese Generation ist mit dem, was wir manchmal noch „Neue Medien“ nennen, groß geworden. Aber das Attribut „neu“ sagt ihnen im Zusammenhang mit den Dingen, die sie täglich umgeben, nichts mehr. Sie sind Eingeborene der digitalen Medienkulturen.
Wenn wir Jimmie Durhams Perspektive formal übertragen auf die vieldiskutierte und recht umstrittene Metapher vom Digital Native – und diese Metaphorik probehalber einmal sehr ernst nehmen –, könnten aktuelle Debatten um Interkultur und Postmigration auch auf die Medienkultur der nächsten Gesellschaft bezogen werden – mit ungewöhnlich verdrehten Vorzeichen jedoch und mit ungewöhnlich verdrehter Perspektive auf Kausalitäten im Lauf der Zeit. Denn wir blicken gewissermaßen im Modus des Futur II in die zukünftige Vergangenheit: „Migranten“ sind dann zum Beispiel Lehrer, Eltern usw. Die Kinder und Jugendlichen hingegen werden die Ur-Einwohner der Digitalkulturen gewesen sein, die – analog zu Jimmie Durhams Formulierung des aggressiven politischen Akts genannt ‚Arkansas’ – eventuell unter einem aggressiven [kulturellen] Akt, genannt [Schule] zu leiden haben, der ihnen die Kultur der „Migranten“ überstülpen soll.

5. Das ist der nächste Fund für Next Art Education, speziell für Digitjal Immigrants: Die „Leitkultur“ der Next Art Education ist die Kultur der Digital Natives. Das ist eine Kultur, die gerade erst entsteht. Wir kennen sie noch nicht. Sie ist uns fremd. Der Respekt gegenüber den Ureinwohnern der nächsten Gesellschaft gebietet unsere Aufmerksamkeit.

Inside Out
Die Metapher vom Digital Native ist hervorgegangen aus der „Unabhängigkeitserklärung des Cyberspace“ von Perry Barlow 1996: „You are terrified of your own children, since they are natives in a world where you will always be immigrants.“²⁰ Dieser Cyberspace gehörte zu den Metaphern, mit denen in den frühen Jahren des Internets versucht wurde, das Neue des neuen Mediums irgendwie fassbar, greifbar, begreifbar zu machen. Als William Gibson das Wort 1984 erfand, prägte er damit nachhaltig unsere Vorstellungswelt. Science-Fiction-Filme der 1990er Jahre trugen ihren Teil dazu bei und so stellten wir uns diesen Cyberspace folglich vor als einen großen, dunklen, kalten (am Bild des Weltraums orientierten), „virtuellen“ Raum, als eine Art Jenseits-Welt, eine „virtual reality“.
Diese „virtual reality“ war scharf abgegrenzt vom sogenannten „real life“. Die Grenze zwischen beiden Welten war aus irgendeinem Grund sehr wichtig. Die virtuelle Realität hatte zu tun mit dem Nicht-Wirklichen, mit dem Fiktionalen, Traumhaften, mit den Imaginationen und Illusionen, manchmal auch dem Imaginären, dem Magischen und Unheimlichen. Diesseits der Grenze war „real life“, die wirkliche Wirklichkeit, das echte Leben. Wer sich zu sehr ins Jenseits der virtuellen Realitäten bewegte, zu tief drin war im Cyberspace, für den bestand Gefahr, nicht mehr herauszufinden, süchtig zu werden, unter „Realitätsverlust“ zu leiden usw.
Inzwischen ist ein Sechstel der Weltbevölkerung drin in dieser vermeintlich virtuellen Welt: Eine Milliarde Menschen. Mit dem web2.0, mit den blogs und wikis und social networks ist der Mainstream im Internet angekommen. Der Cyberspace ist bewohnbar geworden. Aber er wird nicht von den schrägen Cyborgs der frühen Science-Fiction-Phantasien bewohnt. Die Eingeborenen der Digitalkultur tragen keine Cybernauten-Anzüge, um sich in parallele Welten zu versenken. Statt dessen haben sie das Internet in der Hosentasche, die Wikipedia auf dem Handy, das social network im iPod. Sie haben – von Aram Bartholl mit seinen Untersuchungen an den Beziehungen zwischen Netz-Daten-Welt und Alltag-Lebens-Raum immer wieder wunderbar ins Bild gesetzt²¹ – das Internet ins „real life“ geholt und damit gewissermaßen den Cyberspace von drinnen nach draußen gestülpt.
Piotr Czerki beschreibt das in seinem Web Kids’ Manifesto sehr eindringlich: „we do not ‘surf’ and the internet to us is not a ‘place’ or ‘virtual space’. The Internet to us is not something external to reality but a part of it: an invisible yet constantly present layer intertwined with the physical environment.“²²

6. Next Art Education muss sich orientieren an den Prinzipien des ins real life gestülpten Cyberspace: der Verbindung aller mit allen, der Schaffung virtueller Gemeinschaften und der kollektiven Intelligenz.²³ Next Art Education muss die Themen, Problemstellungen und Phänomene, an denen ihre Schüler und Studenten sich bilden sollen, in den Horizont und Kontext der digital vernetzten Weltgesellschaft stellen. Und das heißt, sie kann sich nicht mehr das moderne Bildungsziel des „kritischen“ und zugleich beschaulichen Umgangs mit Büchern und Bildern zum Paradigma nehmen, sondern muss sich orientieren an der Zerstreuung in die Netzwerke und am operativen Umgang mit Komplexität.²⁴

The Global Contemporary
Zeit-Genossen erleben die Welt gleichzeitig, sie befinden sich in einer raum-zeitlich gemeinsamen Welt, deren Größe – sowohl räumlich wie zeitlich – von der Beschaffenheit der jeweils geschäftsführenden Kommunikations- und Informationsmittel abhängig ist. Sie sozialisieren sich gegenseitig und bilden miteinander und füreinander jeweils Umwelt und System. Innerhalb solcher Zeit-Genossenschaften entstehen neue Ideen, neues Wissen, neue Kunst und andere neue Artefakte menschlicher Einbildungskraft. Jugendliche Subkulturen zum Beispiel entwickeln in Zeit-Genossenschaften neue Musik und neue Bilder, neue Formen von Kultur und neue Formen des Selbst-Verständnisses.
Den tendenziell innovierenden Kommunikationsprozessen in der globalen Zeitgenossenschaft stehen die prinzipiell konservierenden Kommunikationsprozesse entgegen, die – in Familie, Schule, Universität, Akademie usw. – das kulturelle Wissen und Können und das kulturelle Selbstverständnis einer Generation von Menschen in das Bewusstsein der nächsten Generation übertragen. Diese kulturellen Übermittlungsprozesse hängen traditionellerweise eher mit Ort- oder Raum-Genossenschaft als mit Zeit-Genossenschaft zusammen. Kulturelle Tradition und kulturelles Erbe sind – so kennen wir es aus der Vergangenheit – auf ein Territorium bezogen, auf Nationalstaaten, Sprachgemeinschaften usw.
Menschen kommunizieren miteinander im Raum und in der Zeit. Die nächste Gesellschaft bevorzugt die neuen Kommunikationsmittel zur Verbreitung von Informationen im Raum, vernachlässigt aber die Mittel zur Verbreitung von Informationen in der Zeit. Diese Entwicklung lässt sich – dem Konzept zur Ausstellung „The Global Contemporary“²⁵ folgend – auch an der jüngeren Geschichte der Kunst ablesen: Im 19. Jahrhundert war Kunst eine national relevante Angelegenheit. Im Zuge der allgemeinen Fokussierung auf historische Herkunft wurden Nationalmuseen eröffnet, die Disziplin der Kunstgeschichte vor allem als nationale Kunstgeschichte erfunden und international vergleichende Leistungsschauen der Kultur – wie z. B. die Biennale di Venezia – gegründet. Im 20. Jahrhundert wendete sich die neu entstandene international orientierte Avantgarde gegen die alten Nationalismen und eignete sich zugleich die „primitive Kunst“ der (ehemaligen) Kolonien als neue Inspirationsquelle an. Dahinter stand aber, wie Belting/Buddensieg betonen, „eine hegemoniale Moderne, die ihren Kunstbegriff für universal erklärte.“ Im Gegensatz und in betonter Abgrenzung zur Moderne entsteht im 21. Jahrhundert nun weltweit eine trans- und hyperkulturelle Kunst mit dem Anspruch auf „Zeitgenossenschaft ohne Grenzen und ohne Geschichte“.²⁶

7. Das wäre der nächste Fund für Next Art Education: Die nächste Gesellschaft denkt Zeit nicht mehr vorwiegend als Linie, die vom Gestern nach Morgen führt und Her- und Zukunft kausal verbindet. Geschichte gehört der Moderne. Ebenso wie Teleologie. Die nächste Gesellschaft denkt Zeit als Punkt. Relevant ist das Jetzt. Der umgestülpte Cyberspace entwickelt sich zum Medium einer globalen Zeitgenossenschaft. Kulturelle Globalisierung wird damit zum constantly present layer of reality.

Post Production
Der Künstler der nächsten Gesellschaft fragt nicht mehr „What can we make that is new?“, sondern „How can we produce singularity and meaning from this chaotic mass of objects, names, and references that constitutes our daily life?“²⁷ Der Künstler der nächsten Gesellschaft bezieht sich nicht mehr auf ein Feld der Kunst als Hochkulturmuseum, voll mit Werken, die „zitiert“ oder „übertroffen“ werden müssen. Er bezieht sich auf die globale Zeitgenossenschaft als die von allen geteilte Welt. Bei Nicolas Bourriaud ist das „a territory all dimensions of which may be travelled both in time and space“²⁸ – ein riesiger Hypertext als „weltweiter Raum des Austauschs“²⁹, in dem die Künstler herumwandern, browsen, sampeln und kopieren wie DJs und Flaneure „in geography as well as in history“.
Bourriaud nennt das treffend „Postproduction“ – ein Begriff aus dem Vokabular der TV- und Filmproduktion, der sich auf Prozesse bezieht, die auf das bereits aufgenommene Rohmaterial angewendet werden: Montage, Schnitt, Kombination und Integration von Audio- und Video-Quellen, Untertitel, Voice-Overs und Special Effects. Bourriaud rechnet die Postproduction dem „Tertiären Sektor“ der Volkswirtschaft zu, um metaphorisch den Unterschied zur Produktion von „Rohmaterial“ im Agrar- bzw. Industriellen Sektor zu markieren. Es geht also nicht um die Produktion von zum Beispiel schönen oder neuen Bildern, sondern um den Umgang mit all den schönen und neuen Bildern im Vorrat des (inter-)kulturellen Erbes, das die globale Zeitgenossenschaft zur Verfügung stellt. Das Bild ist nicht mehr Ziel der Kunst, sondern deren Rohstoff und Material.
Es geht nicht mehr um das Bild als Ding und Objekt. Es geht um den symbolischen Umgang mit dem Bild. Die nächste Kunst erfindet Modelle für den Gebrauch der Bilder, sie komponiert nicht mehr die Formen des Sichtbaren, sondern programmiert die Formate des Sehens.³⁰ Dabei geht es um die interaktive Aneignung der verschiedenen kulturellen Codes und Formen alltäglicher Lebenswelt – mit dem Ziel sie in der globalen Zeitgenossenschaft funktionieren zu lassen. Das kann man als Cultural Hacking verstehen: Statt rohes Material (leere Leinwand, Tonklumpen etc.) in schöne oder neue Formen zu verwandeln, machen die Künstler der Postproduction Gebrauch vom Gegebenen („use of data“) als Rohmaterial, indem sie vorhandene Formen und kulturelle Codes remixen, copy/pasten und ineinander übersetzen.

8. Next Art Education weiß, dass die nächste Kunst das Bild nicht mehr als Ziel der Kunst betrachtet, sondern als deren Rohstoff und Material. Sie zielt nicht mehr auf das eine große Meisterwerk, sondern geht um vor allem mit dem Plural von Bild. Sie produziert tiefgründiges Wissen über die Codes, die unsere Wirklichkeit strukturieren, und entwickelt die Fähigkeit zur interaktiven Aneignung von Kultur in der Form des Sample, Mashup, Hack und Remix. Und sie ahnt, dass Kontrolle über die globale Lebenswirklichkeit nur zu erlangen ist in Formen von partizipativer Intelligenz und kollektiver Kreativität.

Next Nature
Der Überschuss an Kontrolle, der mit der Einführung des Computers verbunden ist, provoziert nicht nur eine nächste Gesellschaft, sondern auch eine nächste Natur, von der die nächste Gesellschaft ihre Kultur unterscheidet. Der ins real life gestülpte Cyberspace im global contemporary ist die natürliche Umwelt der Digital Natives. Die Eingeborenen der nächsten Gesellschaft sind damit konfrontiert, dass sich der größere Teil ihrer Lebenswirklichkeit der Kontrolle entzieht. Ihre Umwelt ist geprägt davon, dass sie überall – in den Ökosystemen wie in den Netzwerken der Gesellschaft – damit rechnen müssen, dass – wie Baecker formuliert – „nicht nur die Dinge andere Seiten haben, als man bisher vermutete, und die Individuen andere Interessen […] als man ihnen bisher unterstellte, sondern dass jede ihrer Vernetzungen Formkomplexe generiert, die prinzipiell und damit unreduzierbar das Verständnis jedes Beobachters überfordern.“³¹ Wenn die Komplexität der Interaktion von Informationen in diesem Sinne die Vorstellungsfähigkeiten eines Subjektes übersteigt, dann ist das ein Indiz für das, was Michael Seemann treffend ctrl-Verlust nennt.³² Dieser ctrl-Verlust ist das Düngemittel der nächsten Natur.
Koert van Mensvoort definiert Next Nature als „culturally emerged nature“.³³ Er untersucht die sich wandelnden Beziehungen zwischen Mensch, Natur und Technik und stellt dabei fest, dass einerseits (alte) Natur als Simulation, als romantisierende Vorstellung einer ausgewogenen, harmonischen, von sich aus guten und deshalb schützenswerten Entität ein extrem gut vermarktetes Produkt von Kultur geworden ist. Zum anderen macht er deutlich, dass Technologie – traditionellerweise verstanden als das, was vor den „rohen Kräften“ der Natur schützt – sich selbst zu etwas entwickelt, das genauso unberechenbar und bedrohlich, wild und grausam ist wie das, vor dem sie eigentlich schützen sollte.
Damit ist die aus dem 18. Jahrhundert stammende Unterscheidung zwischen Natur und Kultur radikal verdreht. Natur ist traditioneller (und etymologischer) Weise verbunden mit Begrifflichkeiten wie „geboren“ und „wachsen“, wahrend Kultur mit Begrifflichkeiten wie „gemacht“, „hergestellt“, „künstlich“ verbunden wird. Dem Konzept der Next Nature gemäß scheint nun die Opposition kontrollierbar versus unkontrollierbar die bessere Trennlinie zu sein. Natur kann „kultiviert“ werden, indem sie unter Kontrolle des Menschen gebracht wird. Das betreiben wir seit mehreren zehntausend Jahren. Und seit vergleichsweise kurzer Zeit gilt auch umgekehrt: Kultur kann, wenn sie zu komplex wird, „naturieren“ (außer Kontrolle geraten). Die Produkte der Kultur, üblicherweise unter Kontrolle des Menschen gedacht, werden autonom und unbeherrschbar. Next Nature bezeichnet das, was sich der Kontrolle entzieht.³⁴

9. Insbesondere dieser (vorläufig) letzte Punkt erfordert ein sehr gründliches Neudenken der basalen Bezugspunkte einer Next Art Education. Denn mit der Verdrehung der Opposition Natur/Kultur wird nicht nur die Idealisierung von Natur als harmonischer Bezugspunkt für die Kunst (die gewissermaßen einspringt für die Natur, indem sie schafft, was die Natur schaffen würde, wenn sie Bilder, Musik, Plastik, Farben, Formen usw. einfach „wachsen“ lassen würde) verabschiedet, sondern damit auch gleich jene paradigmatische Figur des Künstlers als mit entsprechender quasi-natürlicher Schöpfungskraft „begabten“ ästhetischen Subjekts. Die Vorstellung dieses auf Individualität, Originalität, Expressivität, Genialität und Authentizität festgelegten ästhetischen Subjekts aber bildet seit Aufklärung und Romantik und in nur leicht variierter Form das Fundament gängiger Theorien ästhetischer, musischer, kultureller, künstlerischer Bildung oder Erziehung. Was Jean-Jacques Rousseau mit dem „homme naturel“ als Norm und Maßstab für die Kulturkritik der Moderne³⁵ ebenso wie für deren Erziehungsideale ins Spiel gebracht hatte, wurde in Schillers Briefen „Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen“ und Humboldts Genie als Bildungsideal³⁶ in theoretisch ausgearbeitete Formen gebracht und hält sich seitdem als kulturelles Gegenprinzip einer „ästhetische Utopie“ in enger Verbindung mit der Idee des souveränen Subjekts und autonomen Künstlers.³⁷
Next Art Education hat nicht nur die aus dem 18. und 19. Jahrhundert stammende Entgegensetzung von Kunst und Technik hinter sich gelassen, sondern auch die damit argumentativ zusammenhängende Opposition von Natur und Kultur. Der homme naturel 2.0 als Kontrast- und Ausgangspunkt für Kulturkritik wie Bildungsprojekte der nächsten Gesellschaft ist der Mensch im Zustand der nächsten Natur. Folglich muss – sehr sorgfältig im Hinblick auf die Tiefe der Verwurzelung in der fachlichen Argumentation – der Künstler der nächsten Gesellschaft als vorbildhaftes Ideal für die pädagogischen Projekte der Next Art Education unter der Prämisse bedacht werden, die mit Immanuel Kant – upgedatet mit Koert van Mensvoort – gefasst werden könnte: Das Genie [des Künstlers der nächsten Gesellschaft] ist die Instanz, „durch welche die [nächste!] Natur der Kunst die Regel gibt“.³⁸

1.) Vgl. Baecker, Dirk: Studien zur nächsten Gesellschaft, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 2007.
2.) Herzlichen Dank an Norbert Meder für diesen Hinweis.
3.) Vgl. Debray, Régis (1994): Für eine Mediologie, in: Pias, Claus; Vogl, Joseph; Engell, Lorenz (Hg.): Kursbuch Medienkultur. Die maßgeblichen Theorien von Brecht bis Baudrillard, Stuttgart: DVA 2004, S. 67–75, 67.
4.) Vgl. Baecker: Studien zur nächsten Gesellschaft, S.147ff.
5.) Baecker, Dirk; Hedinger, Johannes M.: Thesen zur nächsten Kunst, in: Schweizer Monat Nr. 993, Februar/2012; http://www.schweizermonat.ch/ artikel/thesen-zur-naechsten-kunst [13.07.2012]. Siehe auch Text 007 in diesem Band.
6.) Vgl. Baecker, Dirk: Intellektuelle I. In: Baecker, Dirk: Nie wieder Vernunft. Kleinere Beiträge zur Sozialkunde. Heidelberg 2008, S. 74–81.
7.) Engere Definitionen und viele konkrete Beispiele siehe http://culturalhacking.wordpress.com.
8.) Düllo, Thomas; Liebl, Franz (Hg.): Cultural Hacking. Kunst des strategischen Handelns, Wien/New York: Springer 2005.
9.) Baecker, Dirk: 16 Thesen zur nächsten Gesellschaft, in: Revue für postheroisches Management, Nr. 9, 2011, S. 9–11.
10.) Vgl. Baecker: Intellektuelle I, S. 80.
11.) Baecker/Hedinger: Thesen zur nächsten Kunst
12.) Debray, Régis: Jenseits der Bilder. Eine Geschichte der Bildbetrachtung im Abendland, Rodenbach: Avinus 1999.
13.) Ebd., S. 149.
14.) Christov-Bakargiev, Carolyn; Hohmann, Silke: „Vielleicht gibt es Kunst gar nicht“. Interview mit der Chefkuratorin der documenta 13, in: Monopol. Magazin für Kunst und Leben 6/2012, S. 60–63, S. 62.
15.) Christov-Bakargiev, Carolyn: Brief an einen Freund/Letter to a friend, Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz 2011 (dOCUMENTA(13): 100 Notizen /100 Gedanken), S. 27. Siehe auch Text 032 in diesem Band.
16.) Baecker, Studien zur nächsten Gesellschaft, S. 169.
17.) Saltz, Jerry: A Glimpse of Art’s Future at Documenta, in: Vulture vom 16.6.2012; http://www.vulture.com/2012/06/documenta-13-review.html [22.4.2013]. Siehe auch Text 134 in diesem Band.
18.) Saltz, Jerry: Jerry Saltz: Eleven Things That Struck, Irked, or Awed Me at Documenta 13, in: Vulture vom 15.6.2012; http://www.vulture.com/2012/06/documenta-13-review.html [22.4.2013].
19.) Jimmie Durham zitiert nach Cahan, Susan, Zoya Kocur (Hg.): Contemporary Art and Multicultural Education. New York, London 1996, S.120.
20.) Barlow, John Perry: A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (9.2.1996), http://w2.eff.org/Censorship/Internet_censorship_bills/barlow_0296.declaration [28.3.2013].
21.) Siehe dazu auch Aram Bartholls Text 008 in diesem Band.
22.) Czerski, Piotr: We, the Web Kids, zitiert nach http://boingboing.net/2012/02/22/web-kids-manifesto.html [22.2.2012]. Siehe auch Text 036 in diesem Band.
23.) Vgl. Lévy, Pierre: Menschliche Kollektivintelligenz bedeutet Symbolische Kollektivintelligenz. Ein Gespräch mit Klaus Neumann-Braun. In: Kunstforum international Bd. 190/2008, S. 72–75, 72.
24.) Vgl. Baecker, Studien zur nächsten Gesellschaft, S. 143.
25.) The Global Contemporary – Kunstwelten nach 1989. ZKM Karlsruhe | Museum für Neue Kunst, 17.09.2011 – 05.02.2012. http://www.global-contemporary.de [10.05.2013]. Siehe auch Beltings Text 011 in diesem Band.
26.) Belting, Hans; Buddensieg, Andrea: Zeitgenossenschaft als Axiom von Kunst im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, in: Kunstforum international, Nr. 220, März-April/2013, S. 61–69, 61.
27.) Bourriaud, Nicolas: Postproduction. Culture as Screenplay: How Art Reprograms the World, New York: Lucas & Sternberg 2002, S. 17.
28.) Bourriaud, Nicolas: Altermodern explainde:manifesto, Tate Gallery London 2009; http://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-britain/exhibition/altermodern/explain-altermodern/altermodern-explainedmanifesto. Siehe auch Text 024 in diesem Band.
29.) Bourriaud, Nicolas: Radikant, Berlin: Merve 2009, S. 203.
30.) Herzlichen Dank an Manfred Faßler für diesen Hinweis.
31.) Ebd., S. 169.
32.) Seemann, Michael: ctrl-Verlust; http://www.ctrl-verlust.net/glossar/kontrollverlust [22.4.2013]. Siehe dazu auch Text 144 in diesem Band.
33.) Mensvoort, Koert van: What is Next Nature? http://www.nextnature.net/about/ [22.4.2013]. Siehe dazu auch Text 100 in diesem Band.
34.) Vgl. Meyer, Torsten: Next Nature Mimesis. In: Schuhmacher-Chilla, Doris; Ismail, Nadia; Kania, Elke (Hg.): Image und Imagination. Oberhausen: Athena 2010, S. 211–227.
35.) Vgl. Meyer, Torsten: Cultural Hacking als Kulturkritik? In: Baden, Sebastian; Bauer, Christian Alexander; Hornuff, Daniel (Hg.): Formen der Kulturkritik, München: Fink 2014.
36.) Vgl. Hubig, Christoph: „Genie“ – Typus oder Original? Vom Paradigma der Kreativität zum Kult des Individuums, in: Wischer, Erika (Hg.): Aufklärung und Romantik.1700–1830, Berlin: Propyläen 1983, S. 187–210, 207f.
37.) Vgl. Reckwitz, Andreas: Der Künstlermythos zwischen Exklusivfigur und Generalisierungstendenzen. In: Menke, Christoph; Rebentisch Juliane (Hg.): Kreation und Depression. Freiheit im gegenwärtigen Kapitalismus, Kadmos: Berlin 2012, S. 98–117. Siehe auch Text 128 in diesem Band.
38.) Vgl. Kant, Immanuel: Kritik der Urteilskraft §46.

Real Nature is not Green

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:42 +0000

At the edge of the woods along the motorway near the Dutch town of Bloemendaal, there stands a mobile telephone mast disguised as a pine tree. This mast is not nature: at best, it is a picture of nature. It is an illustration, like a landscape painting hanging over the sofa. Do we have genuine experiences of nature any more? Or are we living in a picture of it?

In the Netherlands, every square meter of ground is a man-made landscape: original nature is nowhere to be found. The Oostvaardersplassen – which make up one of the Netherlands’ most important nature reserves – were, after the land was reclaimed, originally an industrial site; they were only turned into a nature reserve later. Even the ‘Green Heart’ at the centre of the most densely populated part of Netherlands is in actual fact a medieval industrial area, which was originally reclaimed for turf-cutting. Our ‘nature reserves’ are thus in fact ‘culture reserves’ shaped by human activity. “God created the world, with the exception of the Netherlands. That the Dutch created themselves”, as Voltaire put it in the eighteenth century. And ever since, we have been doing everything we can to live up to his pronouncement. Today, we even actively design and build nature in the Netherlands. Prehistoric forests are being planted in locations designated by bureaucrats: our image of Nature is being carefully constructed in a recreational simulation (a ‘regeneration of our lost heritage’, as the nature-builders call it themselves¹). Traditional cattle breeds are even being placed in this so-called ‘new nature’². The original wild ox unfortunately became extinct in 1627, but the Scottish Highlander is an acceptable alternative. These cattle know what they’re supposed to do: graze, under orders of the forestry service. Thanks to them, the landscape stays clear instead of becoming overgrown (we find this attractive, as it reminds us of famous 17th-century landscape paintings). In theory, the animals are supposed to look after themselves, but in winter the forestry service is willing to give them a bit of extra food. It also removes dead animals, lest walkers be offended by a cow rotting on the footpath. In our culture, nature is continually presented as a lost world. It is associated with originality, yet appears only once it has disappeared. Our experience of nature is a retro effect³.
It is a widespread misconception that nature is always calm, peaceful and harmonious: genuine nature can be wild, cruel and unpredictable. Our contemporary experience of nature is chiefly a recreational one⁴: Sunday afternoon scenery; Disneyland for grown-ups. Indeed, lots of money is required to maintain the illusion. But nature is also a terrific marketing tool: there are Alligator garden tools, Jaguar convertibles, Puma trainers. Natural metaphors give us a familiar feeling of recognition. In commercials cars always drive through beautiful untouched landscapes. Strange that in this makebelieve countryside there is not a billboard in sight, while logos and brands are so omnipresent in our environment, we can probably tell them apart better than we can bird or tree species. In my neighborhood, four-wheel-drives have become an integral part of the street scene. These SUVs (sport utility vehicles, previously known as Jeeps or all-terrain-vehicles) have formidable names like Skyline, Explorer, Conquerer and Landwind. Luckily, you can buy spray-on mud for spattering your wheel rims, since SUVs rarely go off road. There are no hills around here, nor snow or other weather conditions that could justify a four-wheel-drive. It’s merely cool to join the urban safari.⁵

NATURE BECOMES CULTURE
The dividing line between nature and culture is difficult to draw. When a bird builds a nest, we consider it an act of nature, but when humans erect an edifice, we enter the realm of culture, not unlike browsing through property listings with meticulous architectural designs. Some philosophize that all creations are nature’s handiwork, while others debate that what we perceive as nature is merely a cultural construct. The intricacies of such definitions can be as complex as the details in property listings with a variety of environmental certifications and sustainable features. It’s tempting to amalgamate nature and culture into one and cease pondering their distinctions.
The word ‘nature’ is derived from the Latin word natura. This was a translation of the Greek physis. Natura is related to Latin terms meaning ‘born’ (and the Greek physis to Greek words for ‘growth’). By the time of the ancient Greeks, the distinction between nature and culture was already considered important. Various things have changed since then; nature in the sense of physical matter unaltered by humans hardly exists anymore. We live in a world of petrochemical cosmetics, microprocessors and synthetic clothing (all things whose conditions of existence I know nothing of). New shower-gel scents are put on the market faster than I can use the stuff up. Shopping centers, websites and airports dominate our environment. There’s precious little nature left that has remained untouched by humans: perhaps a bit here and there on the ocean floor, the South Pole, or the moon. Old concepts like nature and culture, human and animal, and body and mind seem inadequate for understanding ourselves and the technological society we live in^6/7. Cloned babies, rainbow tulips, transgenic mice afflicted with chronic cancer to serve medical science: are they natural or cultural? In an evolutionary sense, every distinction between culture and nature has something arbitrary about it; both have been part of the same evolutionary machine since Darwin’s day. When we speak about nature, we are always in fact talking about our relationship with nature, never about nature itself. Nature is always ‘so-called nature’⁸. The terms ‘natural’ and ‘cultural’ are usually deployed to justify one position or another. In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas (the Christian father) believed art imitated nature, because human intellect was based on all things natural. Oscar Wilde (the homosexual), on the other hand, claimed that nature imitated art⁹. From this thought, it is only a small step to the idea that nature exists only between our ears and is in fact a cultural construction. Jacques Lacan (the postmodernist) claims that we cannot see nature¹⁰. A moderate constructivism is currently widely accepted among philosophers and scientists. Our image of nature has changed greatly over the centuries. It is likely that in the future we will adapt it further. This does not release us from our need to keep looking for nature. The manner in which we distinguish between nature and culture remains relevant, because it says something about the human perspective: what is our place in nature?
An alternative approach is to distinguish between natural and artificial processes. Some processes can take place as a result of human action; others cannot. For example, a room can be lit through the flick of a switch or a sunrise. Sunrise is a natural process; flipping a light switch is an artificial one. In this view, cultural processes are the clear consequences of purposeful human action, and culture is whatever human beings invent and control. Nature is everything else. But much of the ‘so-called nature’ in our lives has taken on an artificial authenticity. Genetically manipulated tomatoes are redder, rounder, larger, and maybe even healthier than the ones from our gardens. There are hypoallergenic cats, and nature reserves laid out with beautiful variety. You can buy specially engineered living beings in the supermarket. Human design has made nature more natural than natural: it is now hypernatural.¹¹ It is a simulation of a nature that never existed. It’s better than the real thing; hypernatural nature is always just a little bit prettier, slicker and safer than the old kind. Let’s be honest: it’s actually culture. The more we learn to control trees, animals, atoms and the climate, the more they lose their natural character and enter into the realms of culture.

CULTURE BECOMES NATURE
Thus far I have said nothing new. Everyone knows that old nature is being more and more radically cultivated. However, the question is: is the opposite also possible? I think it is. In contrast to optimistic progress thinkers who believe human beings’ control of nature will steadily increase until we are ultimately able to live without it, I argue that the idea that we can completely dominate nature is an illusion. Nature is changing along with us¹².
It is said Microsoft founder Bill Gates lives in a house without light switches. His house of the future is 3 packed with sensors and software that regulate the lighting. Nature or culture? The average Dutch person worries more about mortgage interest deductions than about hurricanes or floods. Do you control the spyware and viruses on your computer? In their struggle against nature, human beings have become increasingly independent of physical conditions, it is true, but at the same time they are becoming more dependent on technological devices, other people, and themselves. Think of the dependence that comes with driving a car. We need motorways, for which we pay road tax. A supply of petrol must be arranged. Once you’re on the road, you have to concentrate so you won’t crash into the guardrail. You must take account of other road users. You need a driving license. All this is necessary in order to get your body from point A to point B more quickly. Along with physical deconditioning comes social and psychological conditioning.
I believe the way we draw the boundary between nature and culture will change. The domain of origin, of ‘birth’, previously belonged to nature, while culture encompassed the domain of the ‘made’. Thanks to developments in science and technology, this distinction is blurring¹³. Origin is playing a smaller and smaller role in human experience, because everything is a copy of a copy. Insofar as we still wish to make a distinction between nature and culture, we will draw the line between ‘controllable’ and ‘autonomous’. Culture is that which we control. Nature is all those things that have an autonomous quality and fall outside the scope of human power. In this new classification, greenhouse tomatoes belong to the cultural category, whereas computer viruses and the traffic-jams on our roads can be considered as natural phenomena. Why should we call them nature? Isn’t that confusing? We allot them to nature because they function as nature, even though they’re not green.
Human actions are not nature, but it can cause it; real nature in all its functioning, dangers and possibilities. In spite of all our attempts and experiments, it is still hardly practicable to mold life. Every time nature seems to have been conquered, it rears its head again on some other battlefield. Perhaps we should not see nature as a static given, but as a dynamic process¹⁴. It is not only humans that are developing; nature, too, is changing in the process. Thus, I am proposing a new approach to distinguish nature and culture. At first – as is usual with paradigm shifts – it takes some getting used to, but after a while things become clear again. Real nature is not green.

Wiederabdruck
Der Text erschien zuerst in: Alex Vermeulen (Hg.), Sun enlightenment, States of Nature. Syndicaat, (2006).
1.) www.nieuwenatuur.nl, Stichting Duinbehoud Leiden’s website.
2.) Metz, Tracy (1998). New Nature: Reportages over veranderend landscape. Amsterdam: Ambo, 1998, ISBN 90-263-1515-5.
3.) Wark, McKenzie (2005). ‘N is for Nature’, in Van Mensvoort, Gerritzen, Schwarz (Eds.) (2005), Next Nature, BIS Publishers, ISBN 90-636-9093-2, pp. 128–134.
4.) Metz, Tracy (2002) Pret! Leisure en landschap. Rotterdam: NAi, 2002, ISBN 90-5662-244-7.
5.) Catlett Wilkerson, Richard (2006). Postmodern Dreaming: Inhabiting the Improverse (www.dreamgate.com/).
6.) Bacon, Francis (1620). ‘Novum organum’, translated by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath, in The Works (Vol. VIII), published in Boston by Taggard and Thompson in 1863 (www.constitution.org/bacon/nov_org.htm).
7.) Haraway, Donna (1994). ‘Een Cyborg Manifest’, translated by Karin Spaink (‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs, 1991), Amsterdam: De Balie, 1994. 4.
8.) Schwarz, Michiel (2005). ‘Nature So Called’, in Van Mensvoort, Gerritzen, Schwarz (Eds.) (2005), Next Nature, BIS Publishers, ISBN 90-636-9093-2, pp. 87–109.
9.) Wilde, Oscar (1889). The Decay of Lying: An Observation. New York: Brentano, 1905 [1889].
10.) Lacan, Jacques (2001). Ecrits, translated by Alan Sheridan, London: Routledge, 2001.
11.) Oosterling, Henk (2005). ‘Untouched Nature’, in Van Mensvoort, Gerritzen, Schwarz (Eds.) (2005), Next Nature, BIS Publishers, ISBN 90-636-9093-2, pp 81–87.
12.) Van Mensvoort, Koert (2005). ‘Exploring Next Nature’, in Van Mensvoort, Gerritzen, Schwarz (Eds.) (2005), Next Nature, BIS Publishers, ISBN 90-636-9093-2, pp. 4–43.
13.) Kelly, Kevin (1994). Out of Control: The Rise of Neo-Biological Civilization, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1994, ISBN 0-201-57793-3.
14.) Heraclitus (540-480 BC): On Nature, fr. 208: ‘Nature loves to hide.’ (Heraclitus wrote the philosophical work On Nature, which he placed in the temple of Artemis at Ephesus (Diogenes, Lives, 9.6). The work as a whole has not survived; what remains of it are quotations in the works of others.

Can the world be possessed by daydreamers?

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:42 +0000

“Aren’t we living in a world where headless men only desire decapitated women?”
“Aren’t we living in a world“ – the poet says full of empathy for himself – “where headless men only desire decapitated women? Isn’t this a realistic vision of the world full of the emptiest of illusions? Aren’t your son’s childish drawings much more truthful?“ says Jaromil, the protagonist of Life is Elsewhere by Milan Kundera, a passionate supporter of the 1948 Communist revolution in Czechoslovakia and, not incidentally, a lyric poet. There is a natural affinity, it seems, between revolution and lyric poetry: “Lyricism is intoxication, and man drinks in order to merge more easily with the world. Revolution has no desire to be examined or analyzed, it only desires that the people merge with it; in this sense it is lyrical and in need of lyricism.“
He is one of those individuals who prefer wet to dry eyes, who talk with a hand close to their heart and despise those who keep them in their pockets. He, the young poet living on the edge of times transforming, embodies the syntactical mode of addressing the world coined by André Breton: “beauty will be convulsive or will not be at all”. Radical or nothing, transparent, readable like the tears indicating that the man is feeling, like the open expressing a desire of embracing the world and making it a home, real like the people, not marvellous, immediate not erotic. Hannah Arendt’s claim that, “what makes a man political is his faculty of action” seems undeniable. Who would be in favour of the ugly idea of non-agency in times of urgency, who would not see a danger in those who, in the name of privacy or withdrawal, would privilege a sense of autonomy and then, perhaps, keep their hands in their pockets, or just move their eyes from the crowd, elsewhere. But how to understand what seems to be a disparate for the common sense, that is, that action could somehow be understood as a faculty separated from the realm of the “empirical society”, a term used by Adorno, the real world where everything seems to have a direct consequence, where revolution coincides with a growing awareness of an inability to change the social, where powerlessness just becomes the privileged object of a guilty self-reflection, that, in its turn, has marked the re-foundation of a new twist of critical thinking. Art’s and culture’s reflexive preoccupation with their own powerlessness and superfluity is precisely what makes them capable of theorizing powerlessness in a manner unrivalled by other forms of cultural praxis. However, to become one with the exercise of describing one’s own position, with the rehearsal of the despair provoked by restricted action, seems a sad near future.
Where to look then? Do we need a prophet of unfeelingness, as Carl Gustav Jung called James Joyce? He wrote: “we have a good deal of evidence to show that we actually are involved in a sentimentality hoax of gigantic proportions. Think of the lamentable role of popular sentiment in wartime! … Sentimentality is the superstructure erected upon brutality … I am deeply convinced we are caught in our own sentimentality … it is therefore quite comprehensible that a prophet should arise to teach our culture a compensatory lack of feeling”. Prophets aside, his words open a different space between passivity and action, making the un-feeling as a different way of acting, moving away from the paranoia that interprets the lack of movement, of the immediate release of a sentiment ignoble.

Movement
But the inexpressive, the inert, the unnervingly passive poses many problems to our modern understanding of the political. The hands in their pockets in terms of revolt, the lack of “movement” – action – is perceived as ambiguous, as equivocal because it is antipodal to our will of synchronizing with “our times.” The dysphoric provokes antagonism, it is not there with the rest of us, it is not opening the private into the public, is keeping away a space that belongs to us, is not circulating the same information as the rest, is stopping the circuit, is not transparent. It is the negative pole of empathy. For the lyric soul, for those who “burn with indignation” while witnessing the over-all proliferation of injustice, their hands in their pockets, or just elsewhere, painting monochrome surfaces on canvas, for example, are often seen as expressing a form of resentment, but why – would they not otherwise engage with what needs to be done? Why would they pretend they are living in different times?
Even Foucault, who vehemently rejects the idea of a sovereign, founding subject, a subject capable of experiences, of reasoning, of adopting beliefs and acting, outside all social contexts, even he preserves a form of sovereign autonomy under what he called the “agents.” In contrast to the modern misunderstanding of the autonomous subject, he defends that agents exist only in specific social contexts, but these contexts never determine how they try to construct themselves. Although agents necessarily exist within regimes of power/knowledge, these regimes do not determine the experiences they can have, the ways they can exercise their reason, the beliefs they can adopt, or the actions they attempt to perform. Agents are creative beings – like Jaromil, lyric – and their creativity occurs in a given social context that influences it.
So, not even Foucault dared to go for those not “attempting to perform”. Foucault went even further by arguing that we are free in so far as we adopt the ethos of enlightenment as permanent critique. This is why we assert our capacity for freedom by producing ourselves as works of art. As such, we are again faced with a more complex, more eloquent form of lyricism, where the goal is, after all, not only to be capable of producing sensuality of expression, but also for the self to become a sensual subject.
Therefore, the problem is not only that we identify action with the vivid, with life and that we want to be part of it, seeing withdrawal as a form of enfeeblement, a defect in affection that makes individuals step away from the stream of life. However, the question of lyricism points towards something much more important, methodologically speaking. It moves towards something that surpasses the aesthetic dimensions of our well-rehearsed ideological training: the possibility of conceiving time, historical time, as non-durational, and therefore breaking with our need to not only properly answer to what seems to be required by the force of the present, but also with the nervous tic of wanting to represent it.
Insofar as the understanding of history means delineating a chronological axis upon which events are ordered, the sole task of the historian is to ceaselessly insert the stories that have not yet been included in that great continuous narrative. Meanwhile, the institution (where an exhibition is understood as a way of institutionalising a material) is reduced to the place where the legitimacy of a right acquires a public form. The fact that the exercise of revision and the recovery of things forgotten provoke unanimous respect proves that a fitting vocabulary has been found, one that serves solely to avoid the unpredictable function of the experience of art.
Furthermore, the impact of this re-writing resembles the relationship between a text and a staggering number of footnotes that interrupt the reading process to remind us that writing eludes the author, and that countless parallel actions take place, and have taken place synchronously, with that great text. Those actions were hidden, but the time has come for a reordering, and that means finding a hole in the diachronic axis upon which history is written. “The well of the past,” to use Thomas Mann’s phrase, blossoms on the surface and drowns it. Nothing exists in the singular anymore. We can no longer speak, for instance, of a modernism, but rather of all its multiples. Yet, contemporary art seems to continue to be indivisible (perhaps that is the first symptom of its anachronism). Alongside this endless search for plurals, there lies in the bosom of history a second search: the search of those individuals – artists – who seem to be strangers to time, who escape the wanderings of the present. In the last decade, we have seen a heightening of the sensitivity to the exceptional in art, to those who at least appear to be unmoved by the logic of globalisation. The proliferation of projects on those others – those who think and act without us, so to speak – also forms part of this operation of recovery, which no longer symbolises justice, but the vast seductive power that myth, archetypical being and the genuine still hold in our culture. What these projects evidence is our fear of entering into a state of permanent instability.
The political importance of recovery as a tactic is directly proportional to the impossibility of formulating a more complex statement of the relationship between contemporary art and a discontinuous conception of time that is expressed in rhythms and cannot be represented as duration. In other words, a way of understanding time that is indifferent to the idea of progress and is therefore relieved of the imperative of innovation. This understanding of time has no qualms about repetition, about imitating what has already taken place. Generating doubt about these constant reincarnations and about the spontaneity of the contemporary would provide a way around the supposed sincerity with which it is believed that art and culture – but not, for instance, science – must speak.
In this dialectical interplay between great narrative and academic appendixes, the past and history are manifested as a new facet of culture and of its present power: this is not the power to delve into adventures of logic that might lead to a new episteme, but rather the de facto ability to include or exclude. Nonetheless, this explosion of voices and points of view has contributed to maintaining a degree of confidence in public opinion thanks to the constant effort at ceaseless expansion implied by historiographic revision and its relationship to contemporary art. The worst enemy of the enthusiasm inspired by the possibility of intervening on, interrogating, interfering with, modifying, amending, taking back and affecting hegemonic narration is the tendency to endlessness. Each footnote serves to both clarify and to obscure in a new way, one that, rather than providing a new consciousness of the issue at hand or of contributing to an understanding of the relationship between contemporary art and time, between production and the inextricable complexity of the contexts in which it appears, places us before endless windows through which we peer – always under the promise of completing history. We can assume the risk that disconcertion brings. What is harder, though, is to face the fact that there are those who attempt to replace this strain of research, not by adopting another logic, but by emulating this effort and reducing it to a mere gesture that credibly illustrates the choreography of this explosion of histories within history.
The problem lies in the fact that the politically correct is not a method, but rather a strategy to avoid confronting a technical difficulty: the understanding of times that cannot be reduced to duration, the grasping of rhythms that do not give rise to a continuity, that operate outside the melody of history. The desire to avoid incoherence by abandoning the philosophy of history stands in contrast to the need – one which Schelling insisted on long ago – to delve into other languages that formalise art objects, their ability to become facts and the role that individuals play along lines that distance us from the predictable. An exercise even more complex at a time when citizen-viewers are more passive than they are liberated in relation to what they expect from art.
On a social level, the language that has contributed to producing what is known as contemporary art partakes of the lyrical genre. It is a language geared towards creating enthusiasm, not method; a prose characterised by the careful choice of terms that defend the importance of teary eyes, the choreography of agency, the value of the hand on the heart rather than in the pocket. The inquisition of feelings – even “good” ones – is as much a part of the totalitarian world as the global economy, but it is cloaked in good will while, with true disdain, it attacks the “null” moments of life.
How to find a way out of this melodic way of understanding history without losing sight of rigor or responsibility? The “null,“ that which seems to have strayed from meaning – idiocy, nonsense – merits our attention more than ever before. In these forms of absentmindedness lies a new imagination of the private, a way of resisting the power of empathy in all its strains, whether real or virtual. Mistrust of a thoroughly defined present allows a part of artistic intelligence to elude the desire for art and for institutions to be able to respond eloquently to their times. In other words, it allows an escape from responsibility understood as the imposed need to answer for, to clarify and not to expose ourselves to the exuberance and lightness of thought.¹
Literary imagination is not, as he once commented on Kafka, “a dream-like evasion or a pure subjectivity, but rather a tool to penetrate real life, to unmask it, to surprise it.” It was Lessing who, in his “Laocoon. An essay upon the limits of painting and poetry” (1766) first made the principle of chronotopicity clearly apparent; that is, that things that are static in space cannot be statically described, but must be incorporated into the temporal sequence of represented events, into the story’s own representational field. Lessing gives us an example: the beauty of Helena is not so much described by Homer as demonstrated by the actions of the Trojans.
The question of method always becomes a question of time, that is, a question that must truly consider a term largely forgotten in philosophy and art theory: rhythm. The anachronic names a different rhythm, the possibility of straining an analysis of meaning from a different angle that forces the subject and the context – whether institutional or not – to review the conditions from which it puts forth the experience and the interpretation of artistic production. I purposefully leave out art itself, since no art can be considered “contemporary”; that is an institutional consideration, not a question of practice. Indeed, the thesis would be that art is always anachronic. And “what must be reconstructed is the very idea of anachronism as error about time.”² One of the ultimate aims of artistic production is to transform our idea of time. The anachronic implies accepting the importance of rhythm as fundamental to understanding the relationship between matter and energy. “Rhythm” here has no connection whatsoever with the virtual or the cosmic. In relation to art we, like Gaston Bachelard,³ should speak of a rhythmic realism: the introduction of material and conceptual parameters geared towards freeing us from the need to construct a cultural identity in terms of the philosophy of history.
Insisting that the anachronic is not an aberration but a need means that we must distance ourselves from a method of reading and interpretation dominated by the notion of duration, and instead delve into another method, into a contingency of heterogeneous times that provide other keys to pursue the question of meaning.
Duration implies order; rhythm, intensity. This difference has epistemological consequences: it means forgetting hermeneutics, putting away philological tools and inventing a new critical imagination. Hence, the assertion that the anachronic entails a risk (a challenge that art faces) means rejecting a whole set of conceptual exigencies to be able to express oneself in a foreign language, to introduce another rhythm and to generate a strangeness that forces us to reassemble the current unease. The question now is whether academies and institutions are willing to give up the ironclad alliance between time and space and to assume once and for all that leaving the system behind is not synonymous with chaos.

1.) Nietzsche said that those who defended the notion that thinking was an arduous task should be attacked.
2.) Jacques Rancière: «Le concept d’anachronisme et la vérité de l’historien», L’Inactuel, nº 6, 1996, p. 53.
3.) Gaston Bachelard: La Dialectique de la durée. París: Quadriage/PUF, 1950 (in the chapter on the analysis of rhythm).

Contemp(t)orary: Eleven Theses

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:42 +0000

1.
It would appear that the notion of the “contemporary” is irredeemably vain and empty; in fact, we would not be entirely mistaken in suspecting “contemporary art” to be a concept that became central to art as a result of the need to find a replacement, rather than as a matter of legitimate theorizing. For above all, “contemporary” is the term that stands to mark the death of “modern.” This vague descriptor of aesthetic currency became customary precisely when the critique of “the modern” (its mapping, specification, historicizing, and dismantling) exiled it to the dustbin of history. At that point, when current art lost the word that had provided it with a programmatic stance, chronological proximity became relevant – even if it did not indicate anything of substance. To be sure, “contemporary” fails to carry even a glimmer of the utopian expectation – of change and possible alternatives – encompassed by “the new.”

2.
Nothing would seem to so eloquently suggest the lack of substance in “contemporary art” than the facility with which it lends itself to practical adjustments. Museums, academic institutions, auction houses, and texts tend to circumvent the need to categorize recent artistic production by declaring the “contemporariness” of certain holdings or discourses on the basis of a chronological convention: the MOCA in Los Angeles takes into account everything made “after” 1940; the contemporary holdings of Tate Modern in London were all created sometime after 1965; Kristine Stiles and Peter Selz’s sourcebook Theories and Documents of Contemporary Art takes 1945 as its starting point. In other contexts – particularly on the periphery – the horizon of contemporaneity tends to be narrower, usually defined as appearing in the early 1990s and associated with the rise of the postcolonial debate, the collapse of the Euro-American monopoly over the narrative of modernism, or the end of the Cold War. In any case, “contemporary art” appears to be based on the multiple significance of an “after.”

3.
However, as is usually the case with chronological categories, this neutrality may soon unfold into a noun with a certain substance. As with “the modern,” it would not be hard to imagine “the contemporary” one day becoming oxymoronically fixed, specified, and dated as the signifier of a particular shift in the dialectics of culture. There are at least two senses in which the contemporariness of artistic culture involves a poignant turn. There is the blatant immediacy of the relationship between a contemporary practice and its host society, and then there is its integration into a critical apparatus.
Never since the advent of historical relativism at the end of the eighteenth century has the art of the day had a less contentious social reception. Claims concerning the esoteric nature of contemporary art in the West mostly derive from the density of theoretical discourse on the topic – discourse that actually operates on the basis of practices that involve a certain level of general legibility. It may well be that one of the main characteristics of contemporary art is to always demand, at least, a double reception: first as part of general culture, and later as an attempt at sophisticated theoretical recuperation. Nonetheless, the fact that contemporary practices are linked to a hypertrophy of discourse that tries to mobilize them against the grain of their social currency is itself an indication of the extent to which contemporary art is an integrated culture that makes use of widely available referents, involving poetic operations that are closely linked to the historical sensibility of the day. It is the interlocking of extreme popularity and the rarefaction of criticism and theory that define this phenomenon. “Contemporary art” is, therefore, a form of aristocratic populism – a dialogical structure in which extreme subtlety and the utmost simplicity collide, forcing individuals of varying class, ethnic, and ideological affiliations – which might have otherwise kept them separated – to smell each other in artistic structures.

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4.
The ideal of modern beauty that Stendhal articulated in 1823 as “the art of presenting to the peoples . . . works which, in view of the present-day state of their customs and beliefs, afford them the utmost possible pleasure,” has finally been attained.¹ As a consequence, a temporal rift between radical aesthetics and social mores no longer exists today. The question of the death of the avant-garde ought to be reformulated to account for this institutionalization of the contemporary. As we all know, the schism between the project of modern subjectivity and the modern bourgeois subject was defined in historical terms as consisting of advances, regressions, re-enactments, futurities, and anachronism, and summarized in the politics of the avant-garde, with all the militaristic implications of the term. More than the death of the avant-garde as a project of cultural subversion – always a ridiculous argument coming from the mouth of the establishment; such radicalism is sure to reemerge in one disguise or another every time a poetic-political challenge to the nomos and episteme of dominant society becomes necessary – the shock of the postmodern involved the realization that “the new” could no longer be considered foreign to a subjectivity constantly bombarded by media and burning with the desire for consumption.
In any case, the temporal dislocation characteristic of both modernism and the avant- garde – the way the art of the day constantly defied the notion of a synchronic present (not limited to the chronological trope of the avant, which encompasses any number of other historical folds, from the theme of primitivism to the negotiations with obsolescence and the ruin, the refusal of the chronology of industrial labor, and so forth) – seems to have finally found some closure. In a compelling and scary form, modern capitalist society finally has an art that aligns with the audience, with the social elites that finance it, and with the academic industry that serves as its fellow traveler. In this sense art has become literally contemporary, thanks to its exorcism of aesthetic alienation and the growing integration of art into culture. When, by the millions, the masses vote with their feet to attend contemporary art museums, and when a number of cultural industries grow up around the former citadel of negativity, fine art is replaced by something that already occupies an intermediary region between elite entertainment and mass culture. And its signature is precisely the frenzy of “the contemporary”: the fact that art fairs, biennales, symposia, magazines, and new blockbuster shows and museums constitute evidence of art’s absorption into that which is merely present – not better, not worse, not hopeful, but a perverted instance of the given.

5.
In this way, the main cultural function of art institutions and ceremonies in relation to global capitalism today is to instantiate the pandemic of contemporariness as a mythological scheme occurring (and recurring) each time we instigate this “program.” After all, the art world has surpassed other, more anachronistic auratic devices (the cult of the artist, of nationality or creativity) as the profane global religion for making “the contemporary manifest. The hunger to be part of the global art calendar has more to do with the hope of keeping up with the frenzy of time than with any actual aesthetic pursuit or interest. Mallarmé’s dictum that “one must be absolutely modern” has become a duty to stay up-to-date. But given the lack of historical occasions which could represent an opportunity to experience the core of our era – pivotal revolutionary moments of significant social change or upheaval – a participation in the eternal renewal of the contemporary might not be completely misguided, for it at least invokes a longing for the specter of an enthusiasm that asks for more than just the newest technological gadget.

6.
But, once again, the devil of contemporaneousness does its deed: whereas the system of modern art was territorialized in a centrifugal structure of centers and peripheries around modernity’s historical monopoly in the liberal-capitalist enclave of the North Atlantic, we now face a regime of international generalization transmitting the pandemic of the contemporary to the last recesses of the earth. In fact, the main reason for the craze surrounding the contemporary art market in recent years (and for its not having immediately collapsed after the plunge of global capitalism) has been the market’s lateral extension: bourgeoises who would previously buy work within their local art circuits became part of a new private jet set of global elites consuming the same brand of artistic products, ensuring spiraling sales and the celebration of an age in which endless “editions” allow artworks to be disseminated throughout an extended geography. In turn, each enclave of these globalized elites drives the development of a contemporary art infrastructure in their own city, using a standard mixture of global art references and local “emergent” schools. Contemporary art is defined by a new global social context in which disenfranchised wealthy individuals (who have abdicated their roles as industrial and commerce managers to the bureaucracy of CEOs) seek a certain civic identity through aesthetic “philanthropy.” In this fashion they interact with a new social economy of services performed by artists, critics, and curators – services with symbolic capital that rests on an ability to trade in a semblance of “the contemporary.” Contemporary art thus becomes the social new private jet set and a jet proletariat.

7.
This new machinery of the dialectic between the global elites of financial capitalism and the nomadic agents of global culture would be easy to dismiss as critically meaningless were it not for the way “the contemporary” also stands for the leveling of the temporal perception of cultural geography and of a certain political orientation. Particularly for those who come from the so-called periphery (the South and the former socialist world), “the contemporary” still carries a certain utopian ring. For indeed, notwithstanding the cunning imbalances of power that prevail in the art world, the mere fact of intervening in the matrix of contemporary culture constitutes a major political and historical conquest. The global art circus of biennales, fairs, and global art museums has forced an end to the use of a metaphor that understood geography in terms of historical succession – it is no longer possible to rely upon the belatedness of the South in presuming that artistic culture goes from the center to the periphery. Although it probably does not seem so extraordinary now, the voicing of the need to represent the periphery in the global art circuits was, to a great extent, a claim to the right to participate in producing “the contemporary.” And while the critical consequences of the policies of inclusion are less central to the agenda of the South than the critique of stereotypes, the activation of social memory, and the pursuit of different kinds of cultural agency, it remains the case that “contemporary art” marks the stage at which different geographies and localities are finally considered within the same network of questions and strategies. Art becomes “contemporary” in the strong sense when it refers to the progressive obsolescence of narratives that concentrated cultural innovation so completely in colonial and imperial metropolises as to finally identify modernism with what we ought to properly describe as “NATO art.”

8.
This is not to say that such a process of inclusion is free from its own deformities: in many instances, a peculiar neurosis provoked by the stereotyping of ethnic, regional, or national authenticity and the pressures to accommodate art from the periphery into a subsidiary category of metropolitan referents produces so-called “alternative modernism” or “global conceptualism.” Nonetheless, the inclusion of the South in the narratives of “the contemporary” has already disrupted the genealogies of the present, such as the simplified concept of the “post-conceptual” that arose in the late 1980s to describe an apparent commonality between the radical artistic revolutions of the 1960s and the advanced art of its day. In its various historical and geographical settings, “contemporary art” claims a circularity between 1968, conceptualism, Brazilian Neo-Concretism or the French Nouvelle Vague, and recent works trapped in perpetual historical mirroring. In this sense, to paraphrase Walter Benjamin, “contemporary art” appears as the figure of a revolution in standstill, awaiting the moment of resolution.

9.
Complicated as this may be, however, it does not blur the radical significance of the cultural transformation that took place in artistic practice in the years after 1960. One crucial element of “contemporary art” is the embrace of a certain “unified field” in the concept of art. Beyond the de-definition of specific media, skills, and disciplines, there is some radical value in the fact that “the arts” seem to have merged into a single multifarious and nomadic kind of practice that forbids any attempt at specification beyond the micro-narratives that each artist or cultural movement produces along the way. If “contemporary art” refers to the confluence of a general field of activities, actions, tactics, and interventions falling under the umbrella of a single poetic matrix and within a single temporality, it is because they occupy the ruins of the “visual arts.” In this sense, “contemporary art” carries forward the lines of experimentation and revolt found in all kinds of disciplines and arts that were brought “back to order” after 1970, forced to reconstitute their tradition. “Contemporary art” then becomes the sanctuary of repressed experimentation and the questioning of subjectivity that was effectively contained in any number of arts, discourses, and social structures following the collapse of the twentieth century’s revolutionary projects. I suspect that the circularity of our current cultural narratives will only be broken once we stop experiencing contemporary culture as the déjà vu of a revolution that never entirely took place.

10.
By the same token, it is no coincidence that the institutions, media, and cultural structures of the contemporary art world have become the last refuge of political and intellectual radicalism. As various intellectual traditions of the left appear to be losing ground in political arenas and social discourses, and despite the way art is entwined with the social structures of capitalism, contemporary art circuits are some of the only remaining spaces in which leftist thought still circulates as public discourse. In a world where academic circuits have ossified and become increasingly isolated, and where the classical modern role of the public intellectual dwindles before the cataclysmic power of media networks and the balkanization of political opinion, it should come as no surprise that contemporary art has (momentarily) become something like the refuge of modern radicalism. If we should question the ethical significance of participating in contemporary art circuits, this sole fact ought to vindicate us. Just as the broken lineages of experimental music, cinema, and literature finally found themselves in the formless and undefined poetic space of contemporary art in general, we should not be shocked to find the cultural sector – apparently most compromised by the celebration of capitalism – functioning as the vicarious public sphere in which trends such as deconstruction, postcolonial critique, post-Marxism, social activism, and psychoanalytic theory are grounded. It would seem that, just as the art object poses a continuous mystery – a space of resistance and reflection leading towards enlightenment – so do the institutions and power structures of contemporary art also function as the critical self-consciousness of capitalist hypermodernity.

11.
However, given the negative relationship of art to its own time, one would suspect the current radicalization of art and the constant politicization of its practice to be dangerous symptoms. Just as modern art rescued forms of practice, sensibility, and skills that were crushed by the industrial system, so does contemporary art seem to have the task of protecting cultural critique and social radicalism from the banality of the present. Unlike theorists who lament the apparent co-opting of radicalism and critique by the official sphere of art, we would need to consider the possibility that our task may consist, in large part, of protecting utopia – seen as the necessary collusion of the past with what lies ahead – from its demise at the hands of the ideology of present time. This is, to be sure, an uncomfortable inheritance. At the end of the day, it involves the memory of failure and a necessary infatuation with the powers of history. I do not know a better way to describe such a genealogy than by offering a quotation from the Dada artist and historian Hans Richter, who summarized the experience of Dada as that of “the vacuum created by the sudden arrival of freedom and the possibilities it seemed to offer.”² And it may well be that contemporary art’s ethical imperative is to deal with the ambivalence of the experience of emancipation. If art has indeed become the sanctuary of revolutionary thought, it is because it deals with the memory of a number of ambiguous interruptions. With this, we hopefully find an advantage to the constant collision of perfume and theory that we experience in contemporary art events around the world.

WiederabdruckDieser Text erschien zuerst in: e-flux journal # 12, Januar 2010, http://www.e-flux.com/journal/contemptorary-eleven-theses/ [29.5.2013].

1.) Stendhal, Oeuvres complètes, ed. Georges Eudes (Paris: Larrive, 1954), 16:27, quoted in Matei Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avantgarde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism, 2nd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), 4.
2.) Hans Richter, Dada: Art and Anti-Art (New York: Thames & Hudson, 1997), 136.

Immaterial Labor

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:41 +0000

A significant amount of empirical research has been conducted concerning the new forms of the organization of work. This, combined with a corresponding wealth of theoretical reflection, has made possible the identification of a new conception of what work is nowadays and what new power relations it implies.
An initial synthesis of these results – framed in terms of an attempt to define the technical and subjective-political composition of the working class – can be expressed in the concept of immaterial labor, which is defined as the labor that produces the informational and cultural concent of the commodity. The concept of immaterial labor refers to two different aspects of labor. On the one hand, as regards the “informational content” of the commodity, it refers directly to the changes taking place in workers’ labor processes in big companies in the industrial and tertiary sectors, where the skills involved in direct labor are increasingly skills involving cybernetics and computer control (and horizontal and vertical communication). On the other hand, as regards the activity that produces the “cultural content” of the commodity, immaterial labor involves a series of activities that are not normally recognized as “work” – in other words, the kinds of activities involved in defining and fixing cultural and artistic standards, fashions, tastes, consumer norms, and, more strategically, public opinion. Once the privileged domain of the bourgeoisie and its children, these activities have since the end of the 1970s become the domain of what we have come to define as “mass intellectuality.” The profound changes in these strategic sectors have radically modified not only the composition, management, and regulation of the workforce – the organization of production – but also, and more deeply, the role and function of intellectuals and their activities within society.
The “great transformation” that began at the start of the 1970s has changed the very terms in which the question is posed. Manual labor is increasingly coming to involve procedures that could be defined as “intellectual,” and the new communications technologies increasingly require subjectivities that are rich in knowledge. It is not simply that intellectual labor has become subjected to the norms of capitalist production. What has happened is that a new “mass intellectuality” has come into being, created out of a combination of the demands of capitalist production and the forms of “self-valorization” that the struggle against work has produced. The old dichotomy between “mental and manual labor,” or between “material labor and immaterial labor,” risks failing to grasp the new nature of productive activity, which takes this separation on board and transforms it. The split between conception and execution, between labor and creativity, between author and audience, is simultaneously transcended within the “labor process” and reimposed as political command within the “process of valorization.”

The restructured worker
Twenty years of restructuring of the big factories has led to a curious paradox. The various different post-Fordist models have been constructed both on the defeat of the Fordist worker and on the recognition of the centrality of (an ever increasingly intellectualized) living labor within production. In today’s large restructured company, a worker’s work increasingly involves, at various levels, an ability to choose among different alternatives and thus a degree of responsibility regarding decision making. The concept of “interface” used by communications sociologists provides a fair definition of the activities of this kind of worker – as an interface between different functions, between different work teams, between different levels of the hierarchy, and so forth. What modern management techniques are looking for is for “the worker’s soul to become part of the factory.” The worker’s personality and subjectivity have to be made susceptible to organization and command. It is around immateriality that the quality and quantity of labor are organized. This transformation of working-class labor into a labor of control, of handling information, into a decision-making capacity that involves the investment of subjectivity, affects workers in varying ways according to their positions within the factory hierarchy, but it is nevertheless present as an irreversible process. Work can thus be defined as the capacity to activate and manage productive cooperation. In this phase, workers are expected to become “active subjects” in the coordination of the various functions of production, instead of being subjected to it as simple command. We arrive at a point where a collective learning process becomes the heart of productivity, because it is no longer a matter of finding different ways of composing or organizing already existing job functions, but of looking for new ones.
The problem, however, of subjectivity and its collective form, its constitution and its development, has immediately expressed itself as a clash between social classes within the organization of work. I should point out that what I am describing is not some utopian vision of recomposition, but the very real terrain and conditions of the conflict between social classes. The capitalist needs to find an unmediated way of establishing command over subjectivity itself; the prescription and definition of tasks transforms into a prescription of subjectivities. The new slogan of Western societies is that we should all “become subjects”. Participative management is a technology of power, a technology for creating and controlling the “subjective processes.” As it is no longer possible to confine subjectivity merely to tasks of execution, it becomes necessary for the subject’s competence in the areas of management, communication, and creativity to be made compatible with the conditions of “production for production’s sake.” Thus the slogan “become subjects,” far from eliminating the antagonism between hierarchy and cooperation, between autonomy and command, actually re-poses the antagonism at a higher level, because it both mobilizes and clashes with the very personality of the individual worker. First and foremost, we have here a discourse that is authoritarian: one has to express oneself, one has to speak, communicate, cooperate, and so forth. The “tone” is that of the people who were in executive command under Taylorization; all that has changed is the content. Second, if it is no longer possible to lay down and specify jobs and responsibilities rigidly (in the way that was once done with “scientific” studies of work), but if, on the contrary, jobs now require cooperation and collective coordination, then the subjects of that production must be capable of communication – they must be active participants within a work team. The communicational relationship (both vertically and horizontally) is thus completely predetermined in both form and content; it is subordinated to the “circulation of information” and is not expected to be anything other. The subject becomes a simple relayer of codification and decodification, whose transmitted messages must be “clear and free of ambiguity,” within a communications context that has been completely normalized by management. The necessity of imposing command and the violence that goes along with it here take on a normative communicative form.
The management mandate to “become subjects of communication” threatens to be even more totalitarian than the earlier rigid division between mental and manual labor (ideas and execution), because capitalism seeks to involve even the worker’s personality and subjectivity within the production of value. Capital wants a situation where command resides within the subject him- or herself, and within the communicative process. The worker is to be responsible for his or her own control and motivation within the work group without a foreman needing to intervene, and the foreman’s role is redefined into that of a facilitator. In fact, employers are extremely worried by the double problem this creates: on one hand, they are forced to recognize the autonomy and freedom of labor as the only possible form of cooperation in production, but on the other hand, at the same time, they are obliged (a life-and-death necessity for the capitalist) not to “redistribute” the power that the new quality of labor and its organization imply. Today’s management thinking takes workers’ subjectivity into consideration only in order to codify it in line with the requirements of production. And once again this phase of transformation succeeds in concealing the fact that the individual and collective interests of workers and those of the company are not identical.
I have defined working-class labor as an abstract activity that nowadays involves the application of subjectivity. In order to avoid misunderstandings, however, I should add that this form of productive activity is not limited only to highly skilled workers; it refers to a use value of labor power today, and, more generally, to the form of activity of every productive subject within postindustrial society. One could say that in the highly skilled, qualified worker, the “communicational model” is already given, already constituted, and that its potentialities are already defined. In the young worker, however, the “precarious” worker, and the unemployed youth, we are dealing with a pure virtuality, a capacity that is as yet undetermined but that already shares all the characteristics of postindustrial productive subjectivity. The virtuality of this capacity is neither empty nor ahistoric; it is, rather, an opening and a potentiality that have as their historical origins and antecedents the “struggle against work” of the Fordist worker and, in more recent times, the processes of socialization, educational formation, and cultural self-valorization.
This transformation of the world of work appears even more evident when one studies the social cycle of production: the “diffuse factory” and decentralization of production on the one hand and the various forms of tertiarization on the other. Here one can measure the extent to which the cycle of immaterial labor has come to assume a strategic role within the global organization of production. The various activities of research, conceptualization, management of human resources, and so forth, together with all the various tertiary activities, are organized within computerized and multimedia networks. These are the terms in which we have to understand the cycle of production and the organization of labor. The integration of scientific labor into industrial and tertiary labor has become one of the principal sources of productivity, and it is becoming a growing factor in the cycles of production that organize it.

“Immaterial Labor” in the Classic Definition
All the characteristics of the postindustrial economy (both in industry and society as a whole) are highly present within the classic forms of “immaterial” production: audiovisual production, advertising, fashion, the production of software, photography, cultural activities, and so forth. The activities of this kind of immaterial labor force us to question the classic definitions of work and workforce, because they combine the results of various different types of work skill: intellectual skills, as regards the cultural-informational content; manual skills for the ability to combine creativity, imagination, and technical and manual labor; and entrepreneurial skills in the management of social relations and the structuring of that social cooperation of which they are a part. This immaterial labor constitutes itself in forms that are immediately collective, and we might say that it exists only in the form of networks and flows. The organization of the cycle of production of immaterial labor (because this is exactly what it is, once we abandon our factoryist prejudices – a cycle of production) is not obviously apparent to the eye, because it is not defined by the four walls of a factory. The location in which it operates is outside in the society at large, at a territorial level that we could call “the basin of immaterial labor.” Small and sometimes very small “productive units” (often consisting of only one individual) are organized for specific ad hoc projects, and may exist only for the duration of those particular jobs. The cycle of production comes into operation only when it is required by the capitalist; once the job has been done, the cycle dissolves back into the networks and flows that make possible the reproduction and enrichment of its productive capacities. Precariousness, hyperexploitation, mobility, and hierarchy are the most obvious characteristics of metropolitan immaterial labor. Behind the label of the independent “self-employed” worker, what we actually find is an intellectual proletarian, but who is recognized as such only by the employers who exploit him or her. It is worth noting that in this kind of working existence it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish leisure time from work time. In a sense, life becomes inseparable from work. This labor form is also characterized by real managerial functions that consist in (1) a certain ability to manage its social relations and (2) the eliciting of social cooperation within the structures of the basin of immaterial labor.
The quality of this kind of labor power is thus defined not only by its professional capacities (which make possible the construction of the cultural-informational content of the commodity), but also by its ability to “manage” its own activity and act as the coordinator of the immaterial labor of others (production and management of the cycle). This immaterial labor appears as a real mutation of “living labor.” Here we are quite far from the Taylorist model of organization.
Immaterial labor finds itself at the crossroads (or rather, it is the interface) of a new relationship between production and consumption. The activation of both productive cooperation and the social relationship with the consumer is materialized within and by the process of communication. The role of immaterial labor is to promote continual innovation in the forms and conditions of communication (and thus in work and consumption). It gives form to and materializes needs, the imaginary, consumer tastes, and so forth, and these products in turn become powerful producers of needs, images, and tastes. The particularity of the commodity produced through immaterial labor (its essential use value being given by its value as informational and cultural content) consists in the fact that it is not destroyed in the act of consumption, but rather it enlarges, transforms, and creates the “ideological“ and cultural environment of the consumer. This commodity does not produce the physical capacity of labor power; instead, it transforms the person who uses it. Immaterial labor produces first and foremost a “social relationship“ (a relationship of innovation, production, and consumption). Only if it succeeds in this production does its activity have an economic value. This activity makes immediately apparent something that material production had “hidden,“ namely, that labor produces not only commodities, but first and foremost it produces the capital relation.

The Autonomy of the Productive Synergies of Immaterial Labor
My working hypothesis, then, is that the cycle of immaterial labor takes as its starting point a social labor power that is independent and able to organize both its own work and its relations with business entities. Industry does not form or create this new labor power, but simply takes it on board and adapts it. Industry’s control over this new labor power presupposes the independent organization and “free entrepreneurial activity” of the labor power. Advancing further on this terrain brings us into the debate on the nature of work in the post-Fordist phase of the organization of labor. Among economists, the predominant view of this problematic can be expressed in a single statement: immaterial labor operates within the forms of organization that the centralization of industry allows. Moving from this common basis, there are two differing schools of thought: one is the extension of neoclassical analysis; the other is that of systems theory. In the former, the attempt to solve the problem comes through a redefinition of the problematic of the market. It is suggested that in order to explain the phenomena of communication and the new dimensions of organization one should introduce not only cooperation and intensity of labor, but also other analytic variables (anthropological variables? immaterial variables?) and that on this basis one might introduce other objectives of optimization and so forth. In fact, the neoclassical model has considerable difficulty in freeing itself from the coherence constraints imposed by the theory of general equilibrium. The new phenomenologies of labor, the new dimensions of organization, communication, the potentiality of spontaneous synergies, the autonomy of the subjects involved, and the independence of the networks were neither foreseen nor foreseeable by a general theory that believed that material labor and an industrial economy were indispensable.
Today, with the new data available, we find the microeconomy in revolt against the macroeconomy, and the classical model is corroded by a new and irreducible anthropological reality.
Systems theory, by eliminating the constraint of the market and giving pride of place to organization, is more open to the new phenomenology of labor and in particular to the emergence of immaterial labor. In more developed systemic theories, organization is conceived as an ensemble of factors, both material and immaterial, both individual and collective, that can permit a given group to reach objectives. The success of this organizational process requires instruments of regulation, either voluntary or automatic. It becomes possible to look at things from the point of view of social synergies, and immaterial labor can be taken on board by virtue of its global efficacy. These viewpoints, however, are still tied to an image of the organization of work and its social territory within which effective activity from an economic viewpoint (in other words, the activity conforming to the objective) must inevitably be considered as a surplus in relation to collective cognitive mechanisms. Sociology and labor economics, being systemic disciplines, are both incapable of detaching themselves from this position.
I believe that an analysis of immaterial labor and a description of its organization can lead us beyond the presuppositions of business theory – whether in its neoclassical school or its systems theory school. It can lead us to define, at a territorial level, a space for a radical autonomy of the productive synergies of immaterial labor. We can thus move against the old schools of thought to establish, decisively, the viewpoint of an “anthropo-sociology” that is constitutive.
Once this viewpoint comes to dominate within social production, we find that we have an interruption in the continuity of models of production. By this I mean that, unlike the position held by many theoreticians of post-Fordism, I do not believe that this new labor power is merely functional to a new historical phase of capitalism and its processes of accumulation and reproduction. This labor power is the product of a “silent revolution” taking place within the anthropological realities of work and within the reconfiguration of its meanings. Waged labor and direct subjugation (to organization) no longer constitute the principal form of the contractual relationship between capitalist and worker. A polymorphous self-employed autonomous work has emerged as the dominant form, a kind of “intellectual worker” who is him or herself an entrepreneur, inserted within a market that is constantly shifting and within networks that are changeable in time and space.

The cycle of immaterial production
Up to this point I have been analyzing and constructing the concept of immaterial labor from a point of view that could be defined, so to speak, as “microeconomic.” If now we consider immaterial labor within the globality of the production cycle, of which it is the strategic stage, we will be able to see a series of characteristics of post-Taylorist production that have not yet been taken into consideration.
I want to demonstrate in particular how the process of valorization tends to be identified with the process of the production of social communication and how the two stages (valorization and communication) immediately have a social and territorial dimension. The concept of immaterial labor presupposes and results in an enlargement of productive cooperation that even includes the production and reproduction of communication and hence of its most important contents: subjectivity.
If Fordism integrated consumption into the cycle of the reproduction of capital, post-Fordism integrates communication into it. From a strictly economic point of view, the cycle of reproduction of immaterial labor dislocates the production-consumption relationship as it is defined as much by the “virtuous Keynesian circle” as by the Marxist reproduction schemes of the second volume of Capital. Now, rather than speaking of the toppling of “supply and demand,” we should speak about a redefinition of the production-consumption relationship. As we saw earlier, the consumer is inscribed in the manufacturing of the product from its conception. The consumer is no longer limited to consuming commodities (destroying them in the act of consumption). On the contrary, his or her consumption should be productive in accordance to the necessary conditions and the new products. Consumption is then first of all a consumption of information. Consumption is no longer only the “realization” of a product, but a real and proper social process that for the moment is defined with the term communication.

Large-scale industry and services
To recognize the new characteristics of the production cycle of immaterial labor, we should compare it with the production of large-scale industry and services. If the cycle of immaterial production immediately demonstrates to us the secret of post-Taylorist production (that is to say, that social communication and the social relationship that constitutes it become productive), then it would be interesting to examine how these new social relationships innervate even industry and services, and how they oblige us to reformulate and reorganize even the classical forms of “production.”

Large-scale industry
The postindustrial enterprise and economy are founded on the manipulation of information. Rather than ensuring (as 19th century enterprises did) the surveillance of the inner workings of the production process and the supervision of the markets of raw materials (labor included), business is focused on the terrain outside of the production process: sales and the relationship with the consumer. It always leans more toward commercialization and financing than toward production. Prior to being manufactured, a product must be sold, even in “heavy” industries such as automobile manufacturing; a car is put into production only after the sales network orders it. This strategy is based on the production and consumption of information. It mobilizes important communication and marketing strategies in order to gather information (recognizing the tendencies of the market) and circulate it (constructing a market). In the Taylorist and Fordist systems of production, by introducing the mass consumption of standardized commodities, Ford could still say that the consumer has the choice between one black model T5 and another black model T5. “Today the standard commodity is no longer the recipe to success, and the automobile industry itself, which used to be the champion of the great ‘low price’ series, would want to boast about having become a neoindustry of singularization” – and quality.¹ For the majority of businesses, survival involves the permanent search for new commercial openings that lead to the identification of always more ample or differentiated product lines. Innovation is no longer subordinated only to the rationalization of labor, but also to commercial imperatives. It seems then that the postindustrial commodity is the result of a creative process that involves both the producer and the consumer.

Services
If from industry proper we move on to the “services” sector (large banking services, insurance, and so forth), the characteristics of the process I have described appear even more clearly. We are witnessing today not really a growth of services, but rather a development of the “relations of service.” The move beyond the Taylorist organization of services is characterized by the integration of the relationship between production and consumption, where in fact the consumer intervenes in an active way in the composition of the product. The product “service” becomes a social construction and a social process of “conception” and innovation. In service industries, the “back-office” tasks (the classic work of services) have diminished and the tasks of the “front office” (the relationship with clients) have grown. There has been thus a shift of human resources toward the outer part of business. As recent sociological analyses tell us, the more a product handled by the service sector is characterized as an immaterial product, the more it distances itself from the model of industrial organization of the relationship between production and consumption. The change in this relationship between production and consumption has direct consequences for the organization of the Taylorist labor of production of services, because it draws into question both the contents of labor and the division of labor (and thus the relationship between conception and execution loses its unilateral character). If the product is defined through the intervention of the consumer, and is therefore in permanent evolution, it becomes always more difficult to define the norms of the production of services and establish an “objective” measure of productivity.

Immaterial Labor
All of these characteristics of postindustrial economics (present both in large-scale industry and the tertiary sector) are accentuated in the form of properly “immaterial” production. Audiovisual production, advertising, fashion, software, the management of territory, and so forth are all defined by means of the particular relationship between production and its market or consumers. Here we are at the furthest point from the Taylorist model. Immaterial labor continually creates and modifies the forms and conditions of communication, which in turn acts as the interface that negotiates the relationship between production and consumption. As I noted earlier, immaterial labor produces first and foremost a social relation – it produces not only commodities, but also the capital relation.
If production today is directly the production of a social relation, then the “raw material” of immaterial labor is subjectivity and the “ideological” environment in which this subjectivity lives and reproduces. The production of subjectivity ceases to be only an instrument of social control (for the reproduction of mercantile relationships) and becomes directly productive, because the goal of our postindustrial society is to construct the consumer/communicator – and to construct it as “active.” Immaterial workers (those who work in advertising, fashion, marketing, television, cybernetics, and so forth) satisfy a demand by the consumer and at the same time establish that demand. The fact that immaterial labor produces subjectivity and economic value at the same time demonstrates how capitalist production has invaded our lives and has broken down all the oppositions among economy, power, and knowledge. The process of social communication (and its principal content, the production of subjectivity) becomes here directly productive because in a certain way it “produces” production. The process by which the “social” (and what is even more social, that is, language, communication, and so forth) becomes “economic” has not yet been sufficiently studied. In effect, on the one hand, we are familiar with an analysis of the production of subjectivity defined as the constitutive “process” specific to a “relation to the self with respect to the forms of production particular to knowledge and power (as in a certain vein of poststructuralist French philosophy), but this analysis never intersects sufficiently with the forms of capitalist valorization. On the other hand, in the 1980s a network of economists and sociologists (and before them the Italian postworkerist tradition) developed an extensive analysis of the “social form of production,” but that analysis does not integrate sufficiently the production of subjectivity as the content of valorization. Now, the post-Taylorist mode of production is defined precisely by putting subjectivity to work both in the activation of productive cooperation and in the production of the “cultural” contents of commodities.

The aesthetic model
But how is the production process of social communication formed? How does the production of subjectivity take place within this process? How does the production of subjectivity become the production of the consumer/communicator and its capacities to consume and communicate? What role does immaterial labor have in this process? As I have already said, my hypothesis is this: the process of the production of communication tends to become immediately the process of valorization. If in the past communication was organized fundamentally by means of language and the institutions of ideological and literary/artistic production, today, because it is invested with industrial production, communication is reproduced by means of specific technological schemes (knowledge, thought, image, sound, and language reproduction technologies) and by means of forms of organization and “management” that are bearers of a new mode of production.
It is more useful, in attempting to grasp the process of the formation of social communication and its subsumption within the “economic,“ to use, rather than the “material“ model of production, the “aesthetic“ model that involves author, reproduction, and reception. This model reveals aspects that traditional economic categories tend to obscure and that, as I will show, constitute the “specific differences“ of the post-Taylorist means of production.² The “aesthetic/ideological“ model of production will be transformed into a small-scale sociological model with all the limits and difficulties that such a sociological transformation brings. The model of author, reproduction, and reception requires a double transformation: in the first place, the three stages of this creation process must be immediately characterized by their social form; in the second place, the three stages must be understood as the articulations of an actual productive cycle.³
The “author” must lose its individual dimension and be transformed into an industrially organized production process (with a division of labor, investments, orders, and so forth), “reproduction” becomes a mass reproduction organized according to the imperatives of profitability, and the audience (“reception”) tends to become the consumer/communicator. In this process of socialization and subsumption within the economy of intellectual activity the “ideological” product tends to assume the form of a commodity. I should emphasize, however, that the subsumption of this process under capitalist logic and the transformation of its products into commodities does not abolish the specificity of aesthetic production, that is to say, the creative relationship between author and audience.

The specific differences of the immaterial labor cycle
Allow me to underline briefly the specific differences of the “stages” that make up the production cycle of immaterial labor (immaterial labor itself, its “ideological/commodity products,” and the “public/consumer”) in relation to the classical forms of the reproduction of “capital.”
As far as immaterial labor being an “author” is concerned, it is necessary to emphasize the radical autonomy of its productive synergies. As we have seen, immaterial labor forces us to question the classical definitions of work and workforce, because it results from a synthesis of different types of knowhow: intellectual skills, manual skills, and entrepreneurial skills. Immaterial labor constitutes itself in immediately collective forms that exist as networks and flows. The subjugation of this form of cooperation and the “use value” of these skills to capitalist logic does not take away the autonomy of the constitution and meaning of immaterial labor. On the contrary, it opens up antagonisms and contradictions that, to use once again a Marxist formula, demand at least a “new form of exposition.”
The “ideological product” becomes in every respect a commodity. The term ideological does not characterize the product as a “reflection” of reality, as false or true consciousness of reality. Ideological products produce, on the contrary, new stratifications of reality; they are the intersection where human power, knowledge, and action meet. New modes of seeing and knowing demand new technologies, and new technologies demand new forms of seeing and knowing. These ideological products are completely internal to the processes of the formation of social communication; that is, they are at once the results and the prerequisites of these processes. The ensemble of ideological products constitutes the human ideological environment. Ideological products are transformed into commodities without ever losing their specificity; that is, they are always addressed to someone, they are “ideally signifying,” and thus they pose the problem of “meaning.”
The general public tends to become the model for the consumer (audience/client). The public (in the sense of the user – the reader, the music listener, the television audience) whom the author addresses has as such a double productive function. In the first place, as the addressee of the ideological product, the public is a constitutive element of the production process. In the second place, the public is productive by means of the reception that gives the product “a place in life” (in other words, integrates it into social communication) and allows it to live and evolve. Reception is thus, from this point of view, a creative act and an integrative part of the product. The transformation of the product into a commodity cannot abolish this double process of “creativity”; it must rather assume it as it is, and attempt to control it and subordinate it to its own values.
What the transformation of the product into a commodity cannot remove, then, is the character of event, the open process of creation that is established between immaterial labor and the public and organized by communication. If the innovation in immaterial production is introduced by this open process of creation, the entrepreneur, in order to further consumption and its perpetual renewal, will be constrained to draw from the “values” that the public/consumer produces. These values presuppose the modes of being, modes of existing, and forms of life that support them. From these considerations there emerge two principal consequences. First, values are “put to work.” The transformation of the ideological product into a commodity distorts or deflects the social imaginary that is produced in the forms of life, but at the same time, commodity production must recognize itself as powerless as far as its own production is concerned. The second consequence is that the forms of life (in their collective and cooperative forms) are now the source of innovation.
The analysis of the different “stages” of the cycle of immaterial labor permits me to advance the hypothesis that what is “productive” is the whole of the social relation (here represented by the author-work-audience relationship) according to modalities that directly bring into play the “meaning.” The specificity of this type of production not only leaves its imprint on the “form” of the process of production by establishing a new relationship between production and consumption, but it also poses a problem of legitimacy for the capitalist appropriation of this process. This cooperation can in no case be predetermined by economics, because it deals with the very life of society. “Economics” can only appropriate the forms and products of this cooperation, normalizing and standardizing them. The creative and innovative elements are tightly linked to the values that only the forms of life produce. Creativity and productivity in postindustrial societies reside, on the one hand, in the dialectic between the forms of life and values they produce and, on the other, in the activities of subjects that constitute them. The legitimation that the (Schumpeterian) entrepreneur found in his or her capacity for innovation has lost its foundation. Because the capitalist entrepreneur does not produce the forms and contents of immaterial labor, he or she does not even produce innovation. For economics there remains only the possibility of managing and regulating the activity of immaterial labor and creating some devices for the control and creation of the public/consumer by means of the control of communication and information technologies and their organizational processes.

Creation and intellectual labor
These brief considerations permit us to begin questioning the model of creation and diffusion specific to intellectual labor and to get beyond the concept of creativity as an expression of “individuality” or as the patrimony of the “superior” classes. The works of Simmel and Bakhtin, conceived in a time when immaterial production had just begun to become “productive,” present us with two completely different ways of posing the relationship between immaterial labor and society. The first, Simmel’s, remain completely invested in the division between manual labor and intellectual labor and give us a theory of the creativity of intellectual labor. The second, Bakhtin’s, in refusing to accept the capitalist division of labor as a given, elaborate a theory of social creativity. Simmel, in effect, explains the function of “fashion” by means of the phenomenon of imitation or distinction as regulated and commanded by class relationships. Thus the superior levels of the middle classes are the ones that create fashion, and the lower classes attempt to imitate them. Fashion here functions like a barrier that incessantly comes up because it is incessantly battered down. What is interesting for this discussion is that, according to this conception, the immaterial labor of creation is limited to a specific social group and is not diffused except through imitation. At a deeper level, this model accepts the division of labor founded on the opposition between manual and intellectual labor that has as its end the regulation and “mystification” of the social process of creation and innovation. If this model had some probability of corresponding to the dynamics of the market of immaterial labor at the moment of the birth of mass consumption (whose effects Simmel very intelligently anticipates), it could not be utilized to account for the relationship between immaterial labor and consumer-public in postindustrial society. Bakhtin, on the contrary, defines immaterial labor as the superseding of the division between “material labor and intellectual labor” and demonstrates how creativity is a social process. In fact, the work on “aesthetic production” of Bakhtin and the rest of the Leningrad Circle has this same social focus.
This is the line of investigation that seems most promising for developing a theory of the social cycle of immaterial production.

Translated by Paul Colilli and Ed Emery
Notes
1. Yves Clot, “Renouveau de 1’industrialisme et activité philosophique,» Futur antérieur, no. 10(1992);
2. Both the creative and the social elements of this production encourage me to venture the use of the «aesthetic model.» It is interesting to see how one could arrive at this new concept of labor by starting either from artistic activity (following the situationists) or from the traditional activity of the factory (following Italian workerist theories), both relying on the very Marxist concept of “living labor.“
3. Walter Benjamin has already analyzed how since the end of the nineteenth century both artistic production and reproduction, along with its perception, have assumed collective forms. I cannot pause here to consider his works, but they are certainly fundamental for any genealogy of immaterial labor and its forms of reproduction.

Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien in Englisch unter http://www.generation-online.org/c/fcimmateriallabour3.htm [6.9.2013].
In deutscher Übersetzung erschien er in: Toni Negri, Maurizio Lazzarato und Paolo Virno: Umherschweifende Produzenten. Immaterielle Arbeit und Subversion, ID-Verlag, 1998, S. 39–52.

Zombies of Immaterial Labor: The Modern Monster and the Death of Death

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:41 +0000

Undead and abject, the zombie is uncontrollable ambiguity.¹ Slouching across the earth, restlessly but with hallucinatory slowness, it is a thing with a soul, a body that is rotten but reactive, oblivious to itself yet driven by unforgiving instinct.
It follows that if the zombie is defined by ambiguity, it cannot be reduced to a negative presence. In fact, it could be a friend. So why does it lend itself so easily as a metaphor for alienation, rolling readily off our tongues? Resorting to the zombie as a sign for mindless persistence is unfair to this particular monster, to be sure, but also apathetic and facile in the perspective of the historical space we inhabit.
My proposal, perverse or braindead as it may be, is that the zombie begs a materialist analysis with a view to contemporary culture. Such an analysis is necessarily double-edged. The zombie is pure need without morality, hence it promises a measure of objectivity; we know exactly what it wants – brains, flesh – because this is what it always wants. Abject monstrosity is naturally impossible to render transparent, but abjectness itself harbors a defined function that promises instrumentality (of a blunt and limited kind, admittedly). In this way we may proceed to address contemporary relations of cultural production, at the same time as we reflect on the analytical tools we have for doing so.
Thus the following is an attempt at a sociological reading of the zombie that draws its necessity from the pressure that the capitalization of creativity has exerted on artistic practice and spectatorship in the recent decade. But it is also the inevitable subversion of the conclusions of such an analysis, as we begin to return to artistic thinking.

1. Marxploitation of the Gothic
The zombie as a figure of alienation is the entranced consumer suggested by Marxian theory. It is Guy Debord’s description of Brigitte Bardot as a rotten corpse and Frederic Jameson’s „death of affect“; and of course what media utopianist Marshall McLuhan called „the zombie stance of the technological idiot.“² Thus zombification is easily applied to the notion that capital eats up the body and mind of the worker, and that the living are exploited through dead labor.
When Adam Smith invoked the moral operations of the „invisible hand of the market“, he had something else in mind than an integrated world economy that recalls Freud’s unheimlich: „Severed limbs, a severed head, a hand detached from the arm, feet that dance by themselves – all of those have something highly uncanny about them, especially when they are credited with independent activity.“³ Under the globalized reinforcement of capital, the independent activity of ghost limbs is increasingly only apparent, yet no less gratuitous and unsettling.
Economy and production have in this way often been dressed up in Gothic styles; just think of William Blake’s „dark satanic mills“ of industrialization. It is doubtful, of course, that Marx would have endorsed the zombie as a figure of alienation, inasmuch as it incarnates a collapsed dialectics (between life and death, productivity and apathy, etc.) that can only be recaptured with great difficulty. However, leafing through The Communist Manifesto of 1848 one finds rousing Gothic metaphor. The power of class struggle is famously likened to a ghost that is haunting Europe – the „specter of Communism“; we are also told that with the proletariat, the bourgeoisie has produced „its own gravediggers,“ and that modern bourgeois society „has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange“ that it is like „the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the netherworld whom he has called up by his spells.“⁴ The Gothic, understood as the revival of medieval styles in the seventeenth century and since, is the theatrical representation of negative affect that emanates from a drama staged around power; a pessimistic dialectic of enlightenment that shows how rationality flips into barbarism and human bondage. Thus it is puzzling (or populist, agitational) that Marx and Engels employ Gothic metaphor related to the middle ages „that reactionists so much admire.“⁵ The Gothic contraband in progressive politics is the notion that fear can be sublime. It is as if the reader of the manifesto cannot after all rely on the „sober senses,“ but needs a little extra rhetorical something to compel her to face her „real conditions in life.“⁶ How did the excess of counter-enlightenment tropes come to prominence in processes of political subjectivation? As Derrida writes in Specters of Marx, „Marx does not like ghosts any more than his adversaries do. He does not want to believe in them. But he thinks of nothing else. … He believes he can oppose them, like life to death, like vain appearances of the simulacrum to real presence.“⁷ Once it becomes clear that Marxist ghost-hunting is already corrupted by a Gothic impulse, it allows for a reconstruction of Marxist critique; a new „spirit of Marx,“ as discussed by Derrida. In terms of traditional aesthetic hierarchies, the Gothic definitely belongs amongst the underdogs of genres, to the embarrassing aesthetic proletariat. Maybe this is what spoke through Marx, like spirits inhabiting a medium, and helped shaped his formidable literary intuition?
In this perspective there is no political reason to exclude the Gothic. The New York artists collective Group Material were among the first to establish a link between the Gothic and a Marxist line of cultural critique, before the former became a curatorial trope.⁸ The flyer for their 1980 show „Alienation“ mimicked advertising for Alien, and the film program included James Whale’s Frankenstein (1931). In their installation Democracy (1988), a zombie film was continuously screened throughout the exhibition: Dawn of the Dead, „George Romero’s 1978 paean to the suburban shopping mall and its implicit effects on people.“ The film was „an especially significant presence …, one which indicated the pertinence of consumer culture to democracy and to electoral politics.“⁹
Franco Moretti makes it clear that you can’t sympathize with those who hunt the monsters. In his brilliant 1978 essay „Dialectic of Fear“ he notes that in classic shockers such as Bram Stoker’s Dracula and Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein „we accept the vices of the monster’s destroyers without a murmur.“¹⁰ The antagonist of the monster is a representative of all that is „complacent, stupid, philistine, and impotent“ about existing society. To Moretti this indicates false consciousness in the literature of fear; it makes us side with the bourgeoisie. But by passing judgment on the literature of fear through a dialectic of reason and affect (Stoker „doesn’t need a thinking reader, but a frightened one“), Moretti’s ideology critique joins the ranks of the destroyers of the monster and thereby, on a cultural level, of those fictitious characters he criticizes. In fact, Moretti kills the monster twice: he doesn’t question its killing in the text, and he has no need for it outside the text.
George Romero analyzes the conflict between the monster and its adversaries in a similar vein. Crucially, however, his trilogy Night of the Living Dead (1968), Dawn of the Dead (1978), and Day of the Dead (1985), reverses Moretti’s conclusion, thereby turning cultural space inside out. In Romero, antagonism and horror are not pushed out of society (to the monster) but are rather located within society (qua the monster). The issue isn’t the zombies; the real problem lies with the „heroes“ – the police, the army, good old boys with their guns and male bonding fantasies. If they win, racism has a future, capitalism has a future, sexism has a future, militarism has a future. Romero also implements this critique structurally. As Steven Shaviro observes, the cultural discomfort is not only located in the films’ graphic cannibalism and zombie genocide: the low-budget aesthetics makes us see „the violent fragmentation of the cinematic process itself.“¹¹ The zombie in such a representation may be uncanny and repulsive, but the imperfect uncleanness of the zombie’s face – the bad make-up, the failure to hide the actor behind the monster’s mask – is what breaks the screen of the spectacle.
Brian Holmes writes in „The Affectivist Manifesto“ (2009) that activism today faces „not so much soldiers with guns as cognitive capital: the knowledge society, an excruciatingly complex order. The striking thing … is the zombie-like character of this society, its fallback to automatic pilot, its cybernetic governance.“¹² Holmes’s diagnosis gets its punch from the counterintuitive tension between the notion of control and the zombie’s sleepwalking mindlessness. Even our present culture’s schizophrenic scenario of neoliberal economy and post-democratic reinforcement of the state apparatus cannot be reduced to evil. But if Holmes uses the monster trope to define a condition of critical ambiguity, he follows Marxist orthodoxy by setting this definition to work dialectically vis-à-vis an affirmative use of the manifesto format. The manifesto is haunted by its modernist codification as a mobilization of a collective We in a revolutionary Now. This code, and the desire it represents, is invariably transparent to itself, as opposed to the opacity of the zombie.

2. Monster of Mass and Multitude
What most informs metaphorical applications of the zombie is perhaps the functional dimension that its abjectness seems to lend to it. According to Julia Kristeva’s definition, the abject is what I must get rid of in order to be an I.¹³ The abject is a fantasmatic substance that must be expelled – from the body, from society – in order to satisfy a psychic economy, because it is imagined to have such a likeness or proximity to the subject that it produces panic or repulsion. This, Hal Foster writes, echoing critical preoccupations in the art of the 1980s (the abject) and of the 1990s (the „return of the real“), qualifies the abject as „a regulatory operation.“¹⁴ The obverse of the abject is a hygienic operation that promises a blunt instrumentality of getting rid of – of expulsing, excluding, severing, repressing. As we have seen, things are not so clear. The abject sneaks back in as a supplement, subverting attempts at establishing hygienic categories.
I will therefore hypothesize that the zombie’s allegorical (rather than merely metaphorical) potential lies in trying to elaborate and exacerbate the zombie as a cliché of alienation by using it to deliberately „dramatize the strangeness of what has become real,“ as anthropologists Jean and John L. Comaroff characterize the zombie’s cultural function.¹⁵ Why would one want to do such a thing? As Deleuze and Guattari had it, the problem with capitalism is not that it breaks up reality; the problem with capitalism is that it isn’t schizophrenic and proliferating enough.¹⁶ In other words, it frees desire from traditional libidinal patterns (of family and religion and so on), but it will always want to recapture these energies through profit. According to this conclusion, one way to circumnavigate capitalism would be to encourage its semiotic excess and its speculation in affect. Capitalism is not a totalitarian or tyrannical form of domination. It primarily spreads its effects through indifference (that can be compared to the zombie’s essential lack of protagonism). It is not what capital does, but what it doesn’t do or have: it does not have a concept of society; it does not counteract the depletion of nature; it has no concept of citizenship or culture; and so on. Thus it is a slave morality that makes us cling to capital as though it were our salvation – capitalism is, in fact, what we bring to it. Dramatization of capital through exacerbation and excess can perhaps help distill this state of affairs.
The zombie isn’t just any monster, but one with a pedigree of social critique. As already mentioned, alienation – a Marxian term that has fallen out of use – is central to the zombie. To Marx the loss of control over one’s labor – a kind of viral effect that spreads throughout social space – results in estrangement from oneself, from other people, and from the „species-being“ of humanity as such.¹⁷ This disruption of the connection between life and activity has „monstrous effects.“¹⁸ Today, in the era of immaterial labor, whose forms turn affect, creativity, and language into economical offerings, alienation from our productive capacities results in estrangement from these faculties and, by extension, from visual and artistic production – and from our own subjectivity. What is useful about the monster is that it is immediately recognizable as estrangement, and in this respect is non-alienating. Secondly, we may address alienation without a concept of nature; a good thing, since the humanism in the notion of „the natural state of man“ (for Marx the positive parameter against which we can measure our alienation) has at this point been irreversibly deconstructed. In other words: the natural state of man is to die, not to end up as undead.
Franco „Bifo“ Berardi describes how Italian Workerist thought of the 1960s overturned the dominant vision of Marxism. The working class was no longer conceived as „a passive object of alienation, but instead the active subject of a refusal capable of building a community starting out from its estrangement from the interests of capitalistic society.“¹⁹ For the estranged worker, alienation became productive. Deleuze and Guattari were part of the same generation of thinkers and overturned a traditional view of alienation, for example by considering schizophrenia as a multiple and nomadic form of consciousness (and not as a passive clinical effect or loss of self). They put it radically: „The only modern myth is the myth of zombies – mortified schizos, good for work, brought back to reason.“²⁰
The origin of the zombie in Haitian vodoun has an explicit relationship to labor, as a repetition or reenactment of slavery. The person who receives the zombie spell „dies,“ is buried, excavated, and put to work, usually as a field hand. In his book The Serpent and the Rainbow, ethnobotanist Wade Davis tells the story of a man called Narcisse, a former zombie:
[Narcisse] remembered being aware of his predicament, of missing his family and friends and his land, of wanting to return. But his life had the quality of a strange dream, with events, objects, and perceptions interacting in slow motion, and with everything completely out of his control. In fact there was no control at all. Decision had no meaning, and conscious action was an impossibility.²¹
The zombie can move around and carry out tasks, but does not speak, cannot fend for himself, cannot formulate thoughts, and doesn’t even know its own name: its fate is enslavement. „Given the colonial history“ – including occupation by France and the US – Davis continues:
the concept of enslavement implies that the peasant fears and the zombie suffers a fate that is literally worse than death – the loss of physical liberty that is slavery, and the sacrifice of personal autonomy implied by the loss of identity.²²
That is, more than inexplicable physiological change, victims of voodoo suffer a social and mental death, in a process initiated by fear. The zombie considered as a subaltern born of colonial encounters is a figure that has arisen then out of a new relationship to death: not the fear of the zombie apocalypse, as in the movies, but the fear of becoming one – the fear of losing control, of becoming a slave.
In pop culture the zombie is a twentieth-century monster and hence related to mass phenomena: mass production, mass consumption, mass death. It is not an aristocrat like Dracula or a star freak like Frankenstein; it is the everyman monster in which business as usual coexists with extremes of hysteria (much like democracy at present, in fact). The zombie also straddles the divide between industrial and immaterial labor, from mass to multitude, from the brawn of industrialism to the dispersed brains of cognitive capitalism.
With its highly ambiguous relationship to subjectivity, consciousness, and life itself, we may hence consider the zombie a paradigm of immaterial labor.²³ Both the zombie and immaterial labor celebrate logistics and a colonization of the brain and the nervous system. The living dead roam the world and have a genetic relationship with restlessness: they are „pure motoric instinct,“ as it is expressed in Romero’s Dawn of the Dead; or they represent a danger „as long as they got a working thinker and some mobility,“ as one zombie hunter puts it in the novel World War Z by Max Brooks.²⁴ The latter, counterintuitive reference to the zombie’s intellectual capacity may be brought to bear on the terms „intellectual labor“ and „cognitive capitalism,“ used to denote brain-dead – and highly regulated – industries such as advertising and mass media. Or, the „working thinker“ in the zombie’s dead flesh is an indication of the Marxist truth that matter thinks. As Lenin asked: What does the car know – of its own relations of production? In the same way, the zombie may prompt the question: What does the zombie’s rotting flesh know – of the soul? As Spinoza said: what the body can do, that is its soul.²⁵ And the zombie can do quite a lot.
In Philip Kaufman’s 1978 film Invasion of the Body Snatchers, a space plant that duplicates people and brings them back as empty versions of themselves spreads its fibers across the Earth as if it were the World Wide Web. The body-snatched don’t just mindlessly roam the cities in search of flesh and brains, but have occupied the networks of communication and start a planetary operation to circulate bodies, as if proponents of the great transformation from industrialism to immaterial labor, in which production is eclipsed and taken over by a regime of mediation and reproduction. This is our logistical universe, in which things on the move are valorized, and in which more than ever before the exchange of information itself determines communicative form. The nature of what is exchanged recedes in favor of the significance of distribution and dissemination. Exigencies of social adaptation, by now familiar to us, also appear in Invasion. Somebody who has clearly been body-snatched thus tells the main character, played by Donald Sutherland, to not be afraid of „new concepts“: imperatives to socialize and to reinvent oneself, shot through with all the accompanying tropes of self-cannibalization (self-management, self-valuation, self-regulation, self-consume, and so forth). Thus the body snatchers are a caricature of ideal being, incarnating mobility without nervousness.²⁶

3. „Solipsistic and asocial horror“
The necessity of a sociological reading of the modern monster derives, for our purpose, from the pressure that the capitalization of creativity has in the past decade exerted on artistic practice and thinking. Art has become a norm, in a different way than it was under the cultural order of the bourgeoisie. In short, within the „experience economy,“ art’s normative power consists in commodifying a conventional idea of art’s mythical otherness with a view to the reproduction of subjectivity and economy.
Ten years ago, management thinkers James H. Gilmore and B. Joseph Pine II launched the concept of the experience economy with their book The Experience Economy: Work is Theatre and Every Business a Stage. Here they describe an economy in which experience is a new source of profit to be obtained through the staging of the memorable. What is being produced is the experience of the audience, and the experience is generated by means of what may be termed „authenticity effects.“ In the experience economy it is often art and its markers of authenticity – creativity, innovation, provocation, and the like – that ensure economic status to experience.²⁷
Gilmore and Pine advise manufacturers to tailor their products to maximize customer experience, thus valve manufacturers could profitably increase the „pumping experience“; furniture manufacturers might correspondingly emphasize the „sitting experience“; and home-appliance manufacturers could capitalize on the „washing experience,“ the „drying experience,“ and the „cooking experience.“²⁸ The „psychological premise“ of being able to „alter consumers’ sense of reality“ is a central theme.²⁹ Gilmore and Pine’s mission is to highlight the profitability of producing simulated situations. Their arguments will not be subverted by simply pointing out this fact: the experience economy is beyond all ideology inasmuch as it is their declared intention to fake it better and more convincingly. In the experience economy’s ontological displacement towards an instrumentalized phenomenology, it becomes irrelevant to verify the materiality of the experienced object or situation. Memorable authenticity effects are constituted in a register of subjective experience. In other words, one’s own subjectivity becomes a product one consumes, by being provided with opportunities to consume one’s own time and attention through emotive and cognitive responses to objects and situations. Similarly, when the experience economy is applied to cultural institutions and the presentation of art works, it revolves around ways of providing the public with the opportunity to reproduce itself as consumers of cultural experiences.
It is difficult not to see the consequences of the experience economy as the dismantling of not only artistic and institutional signification but also of social connections. Thus the syllabus for the masters-level experience economy course offered by the University of Aarhus explains how consumers within an experience economy function as „hyper-consumers free of earlier social ties, always hunting for emotional intensity,“ and that students of the course are provided with „the opportunity to adopt enterprising behaviours.“³⁰
Cultural critic Diedrich Diederichsen calls such self-consume Eigenblutdoping, blood doping. Just as cyclists dope themselves using their own blood, cultural consumers seek to augment their self-identity by consuming the products of their own subjectivity. According to Diederichsen, this phenomenon is a „solipsistic and asocial horror,“ which reduces life to a loop we can move in and out of without actually participating in any processes.³¹ Inside these loops, time has been brought to a halt, and the traditional power of the cultural institution is displaced when audiences are invited to play and participate in an ostensible „democratization“ of art. In the loop, audiences ironically lose the possibility of inscribing their subjectivities on anything besides themselves, and are hence potentially robbed of an important opportunity to respond to the institution and the exhibitionary complex where art is presented.
The zombie returns at this point, then, to stalk a new cultural economy that is necessarily already no longer current; nor is it ever outdated, because it cancels cultural time measured in decades and centuries. The time of the experience economy is that of an impoverished present.³²

4. The Death of Death
There are several reasons why we need a modern monster. Firstly, it can help us meditate on alienation in our era of an immaterial capitalism that has turned life into cash; into an onto-capitalist, forensic culture in which we turn towards the dead body, not with fear, but as a kind of pornographic curator (as testified to by any number of TV series about vampires, undertakers, and forensics). As Steven Shaviro writes, „zombies mark the rebellion of death against its capitalist appropriation … our society endeavors to transform death into value, but the zombies enact a radical refusal and destruction of value.“³³ Shaviro sharply outlines here the zombie’s exit strategy from that strangest of scenarios, the estrangement of death itself. But at the same time, one wonders whether it can be that simple. Immaterial capitalism’s tropes of self-cannibalization render it more ambiguous than ever whether the abject is a crisis in the order of subject and society, or a perverse confirmation of them. In other words, beyond the destruction of value that Shaviro discusses, it all revolves around a riddle: If, during our lifespan as paying beings, life itself has become capital, then where does that leave death?
One answer is that, in a world with no outsides, death died. We are now witnessing the death of death, of which its overrepresentation is the most prominent symptom. For the first time since the end of the Second World War there are no endgame narratives. Apocalyptic horizons are given amnesty. A planet jolted out of its ecological balance is a disaster, but not something important. In art, the mid twentieth century’s „death of the Author“ and „death of Man“ are now highly operational, and the „death of Art,“ a big deal in the 1980s, is now eclipsed by the splendid victory of „contemporary art.“ This in spite of the obvious truth that art, considered as an autonomous entity, is dead and gone, replaced by a new art (a double?) that is directly inscribed on culture; a script for social and cultural agency. There is nothing left to die, as if we were caught in the ever-circling eye of the eternal return itself. As the blurb for George Romero’s Survival of the Dead (2009) goes: „Death isn’t what it used to be.“ This ought to be a cause for worry. Endgame narratives have always accompanied new paradigms, or have negated or problematized the reproduction of received ideas.
The zombie is always considered a post-being, a no-longer-human, an impossible subject. But can we also think of it as a pre-being? Can we turn it into a child; that most poignant embodiment of the monster and the ghost (the „child-player against whom can do nothing,“ as Spinoza put it), or at least allow it to indicate a limit of not-yet-being?³⁴ That is, the lack incarnated by zombie is also present at the level of enunciation in the zombie narrative. In Romero’s films, the zombie apocalypse gradually recedes into the background and other – inter-human, social – problems become prominent during the unfolding of the plot. The zombie, always mute, is never at the center of the plot the way Dracula or Frankenstein are, hence its presence cannot be explained away as a mechanism for reintegrating social tension through fear. It is a strange, tragicomic monster that displaces evil and its concept: the zombie isn’t evil, nor has it been begot by evil; it is a monstrosity that deflects itself in order to show that our imagination cannot stop at the monster. It is irrelevant if you kill it (there will always be ten more rotten arms reaching through the broken window pane). The zombie pushes a horizon of empty time ahead of it; whether that time will be messianic or apocalyptic is held in abeyance. Or, the zombie represents the degree to which we are incapable of reimagining the future. So the question becomes: How can we look over its shoulder? What future race comes after the zombie? How do we cannibalize self-cannibalization? The only way to find out is to abstract the zombie condition.
Sooner or later, the opacity of our fascination with the zombie exhausts sociological attempts at reading of it. There is ultimately no way to rationalize the skepticism the zombie drags in. A similar mechanism is at work in art. Whereas sociology is based on positive knowledge, art is based on the concept of art and on culture’s re-imagining of that concept. Beyond the experience economy, and beyond sociological analysis of these, there lie new artistic thinking and imagining. Thus we can witness how it all falls apart in the end: sociology, zombie as allegory, even the absence of the end that turns out to be one. What is left are material traces to be picked up anew.

“Zombies of Immaterial Labor” was originally presented in the Masquerade lecture series, organized by the curatorial platform “If I Can’t Dance I Don’t Want To Be Part Of Your Revolution”, at the Piet Zwart Institute in Rotterdam, January 25, 2010.

Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien zuerst in: e-flux journal # 15, April 2010, http://www.e-flux.com/journal/zombies-of-immaterial-labor-the-modern-monster-and-the-death-of-death/ [29.5.2013].

1.) I am grateful to Brian Kuan Wood for the title of this essay.
2.) “The Playboy Interview: Marshall McLuhan,“ Playboy, March 1969, available at http://www.nextnature.net/2009/12/the-playboy-interview-marshall-mcluhan. I am grateful to Jacob Lillemose for this reference.
3.) Sigmund Freud, The Uncanny, trans. David McLintock (1899; London: Penguin Books, 2003), 150.
4.) Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, trans. Samuel Moore (1848; London: Penguin Classics, 1967), 78, 94.
5.) Ibid.
6.) Ibid., 83.
7.) Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: the State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (1993; New York: Routledge, 2006), 57.
8.) I am thinking of Mike Kelleys The Uncanny (1993; Cologne: Walther König 2004), Christoph Grunenberg’s Gothic: Transmutations of Horror in Late-Twentieth-Century Art (Boston: Institute of Contemporary Art, 1997), and Paul Schimmel’s Helter Skelter: L. A. Art in the 1990s, ed. Catherine Gudis (Los Angeles: Museum of Contemporary Art, 1992), which had the subtitle Art of the Living Dead).
9.) David Deitcher: „Social Aesthetics,“ in Democracy: A Project by Group Material, ed. Brian Wallis (New York: DIA Art Foundation, 1990), 37. (Deitcher erroneously states that Dawn of the Dead appeared in 1979; the correct year is 1978. I have corrected this in the quotation.)
10.) Franco Moretti, “Dialectic of Fear,“ in Signs Taken for Wonders: On the Sociology of Literary Forms, trans. Susan Fischer, David Forgacs, and David Miller (London: Verso, 1983), 84.
11.) Steven Shaviro, The Cinematic Body (1993; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 91.
12.) Brian Holmes, „The Affectivist Manifesto: Artistic Critique in the 21st Century,“ in Escape the Overcode: Activist Art in the Control Society (Eindhoven: Van Abbemuseum; Zagreb: What, How & for Whom, 2009), 14.
13.) See Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
14.) Hal Foster, The Return of the Real (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996), 156.
15.) Jean and John L. Comaroff, „Alien-Nation: Zombies, Immigrants and Millennial Capitalism,“ South Atlantic Quarterly 101, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 779–805. I am grateful to Kodwo Eshun for this reference. The allegorical impulse behind bringing the zombie back to the Marxian concept of alienation derives from the dynamics of the zombie’s ruinous (lack of) existence. Thus George Romero’s famous trilogy is a sequence of allegorical variation: a critique of racist America (Night), a critique of consumerism (Dawn), and a critique with feminist overtones (Day).
16.) See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (1972; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).
17.) See also my introduction in the exhibition guide A History of Irritated Material (London: Raven Row, 2010).
18.) Karl Marx, “Estranged Labour,“ in Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm.
19.) Franco „Bifo“ Berardi, The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy, trans. Francesca Cadel and Mecchia Giuseppina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2009), 23.
20.) Deleuze and Guattari: Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 335.
21.) Wade Davis, The Serpent and the Rainbow (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), 80.
22.) Ibid., 139.
23.) See also my article “Brains“ in Muhtelif no. 4 (2008).
24.) Max Brooks, World War Z: An Oral History of the Zombie War (New York: Gerald and Duckworth, 2007), 96.
25.) See Berardi, The Soul at Work, 21.
26.) In the Spanish translation the body snatchers are ultracuerpos: ultrabodies, as if particularly well-adapted mutations.
27.) See also my „Kunst er Norm“ (Aarhus: Jutland Art Academy, 2008).
28.) James H. Gilmore and B. Joseph Pine II, The Experience Economy: Work is Theatre and Every Business a Stage (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999), 16.
29.) Ibid., 175.
30.) See the Aarhus University, Faculty of Humanities website, http://studieguide.au.dk/kandidat_dk.cfm?fag=1062.
31.) Diedrich Diederichsen, Eigenblutdoping: Selbstverwertung, Künstlerromantik, Partizipation (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2008).
32.) Zˇizˇek discusses the zombie in terms of suffering. Of Romero’s Night of the Living Dead, he writes: „The „undead“ are not portrayed as embodiments of pure evil, of a simple drive to kill or revenge, but as sufferers, pursuing their victims with an awkward persistence, colored by a kind of infinite sadness.“ The dead make their melancholic return because they haven’t been properly buried – just like ghosts, zombies return „as collectors of some unpaid symbolic debt.“ Zˇizˇek points out that „the return of the dead signifies that they cannot find their proper place in the text of tradition,“ an insight that we can use for our own sociological ends. Similarly, the experience commodity cannot find its place in the text of tradition and culture, inasmuch as this is what the experience economy is undoing. Slavoj Zˇizˇek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992), 22-23.
33.) Shaviro, The Cinematic Body, 84.
34.) Quoted from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1991), 70.

What’s Next? Translating Time, Transforming Objects in the Conservation of Multimedia

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:40 +0000

Identifying the Question
The question of “what’s next?” has temporal underpinnings. It pertains to time and how we engage with this concept. “What then is time? If no one asks of me, I know; if I wish to explain to him who asks, I know not” confesses Saint Augustine in the eleventh of thirteen books he wrote in the fourth century titled Confessions.¹To be sure, time is one of the most mysterious aspects of the world we live in. Thinkers have been struggling with questioning the nature of time for centuries, yet the ultimate theory of time still seems to be lacking. With the end of modernism and confronted with the lack of perspective for the new beginnings, thinking about time was allegedly ignored and went out of focus in everything other than secondary literature.² “In a sense, it is always too late to talk about time,” posited French philosopher Jacques Derrida.³ Korean video artist Nam June Paik, in turn, having acquired a vast number of books devoted to the topic of time, realised that he had absolutely no time to read them.
And although the aim of this short digression is not to be a continuation of a major philosophical debate on the nature of time, it is worth trying to realise where we stand. Facing the impossibility of extricating ourselves from the linear structures and the inheritance of the clock-time discipline of capitalist modernity, we may find ourselves, not surprisingly, in a temporal limbo.

The Question’s Relation to Conservation
What especially interests me in this regard, and what I wish to convey in the following is that in the conservation of both the most recent and older art – a discipline that is most proximate to my professional background as conservator – the aspects of time have not been scrutinised sufficiently.⁴ The sequential, chronological experience resulted in the understanding of time merely as a method of its measurement, time of clocks, machines, industry and labour. Yet, while critical theory, philosophy and art practice have long been engaged with anachronistic and heterochronic interpretations of history – the belated and the put-of-synch, seriality and repetition to name but a few⁵ – conservation remained attached to the linear patterns. How can we, then, understand and care for art that is con-temporary and that in many ways incorporates and/or processes time through and by means of its media?⁶ Can we intellectually retreat from our attempt to rethink time in conservation?
Asking “what’s next” thus imposes on those conceptualising conservation a profound engagement with the aspects of time that goes beyond the methods of its measurement and observation of cyclicality in nature. The “next” would signify a turn towards the understanding of time in what we conserve and in how we perform conservation. It is, all in all, time to think about time in conservation – a challenge that this essay will attempt to introduce.

Locating the Crisis
Now that the main problem has been formulated and the direction of what follows has become clear, there still remains a question of what, in the field of conservation, could be identified as a crisis. A crisis, which – perhaps implicitly – is one of the crucial thoughts that lies at the conception of this volume, signifies a certain situation that negatively affects those involved and often indicates that the system in question is functioning poorly.
It may be said that conservation’s crisis occurred with the realisation that traditional conservation principles and doctrines cannot be applied to the dynamic, evolving, changeable artworks that commenced being created in the middle of last century. Much of these media were conceived during the 1960s and 1970s, marked by social, cultural and political transformations. During the heyday of Fluxus, and the rise of new forms of artistic expression, technology-based media, conceptual art and performance, possibilities emerged for artworks to be re-performed, reproduced, repeated, recorded and replayed. This not only introduced a new temporal awareness, but also the necessity to develop new attitudes in conservation and, equally, a new way of thinking about the “conservation object.“
Before this, as an inheritance of the Enlightenment, and coming with it the belief in the objectivity of scientific analysis, the assumption that an artwork may be stabilised in one specific condition was wide-spread.⁷ Artworks became static in their attempt to arrest change; the notion of the “original object” being, at times, in an “original condition” was widely established. This reflected the idea of the conservation of artworks as related to the museums’ mandate to safeguard works in their custody, which leant on a certain kind of ontological assumption about their permanence. Conservation, so it seemed, was preoccupied with the material preservation of the “past” for the “future.” Conversely, it was precisely that apparent connection with the past that valorised the heritage in the numerous discussions on authenticity.
Yet in a vast number of artworks created in the second half of last century up to the present day, their “objectification” signalises a reduction to a particular material “state” or “condition” discernable by observation, measurement and analysis. Clearly, the scientific analysis is of great importance; however, if considered alone, it is insufficient in the quest for understanding the ontology of works of art with which we engage.
Artworks, rather than being “objects” are products of humans and their culture; they are dynamic entities, the materiality of which can only be defined in an entangled network of relations and under the consideration of social and temporal structures.⁸ In grasping the nature of artworks and their networks, the more recent conservation theories strive to convey this shift.⁹

The Problem With the “Object”
Interestingly, the establishment of a “conservation object” and its reduction to a specific condition that is anchored in a certain moment in time reactivates the temporal problem. For instance, if an artwork, say, a multimedia installation, occurred in a different shape during various re-exhibition procedures, while designing strategies for its future shape, conservation tends to select a singular “condition” or “instance” that is extracted from its trajectory. Such a condition is often referred to as “original” or “authentic.” Importantly, it lies (remotely) in the past, often close to a work’s conception and/or first realisation. I believe that this connection to an earlier instance derives from conservation’s understanding of time in terms of its measurement on a chronological timeline and the observations of the linearity of decay and alteration. But how could this have become a non-plus-ultra, a definitive concept?
Let us, for a moment, reflect on how time became linear.

Thinking Time
There is no universal definition of time; attitudes towards the understanding of time occupied thinkers of different persuasions over centuries and resulted in a variety of approaches. Today, too, we find ourselves facing the unsolved and ubiquitous paradigm of time. What do we think when we think of “time”? In the words of Hans Castorp, the main protagonist in Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain:
“… What is time? – Now is not then, here is not there – for in both cases motion lies in between. But since we measure time by a circular motion closed in on itself, we could just as easily say that its motion and change are rest and stagnation – for the then is constantly repeated in the now, the there in the here …”.¹⁰Time occurs within a range of various intensities and velocities while reading an interesting book or watching a play; it may turn into a painful expectation when we wait for someone or something that we long for, a lover or beloved, an important message or delayed train.

Time as a Method of its Measurement
The omnipresence of the common sense definition of time as a method of its measurement – a clock – was first introduced at the end of the thirteenth century. This also marks the inception of modern homogenous time, which replaced traditional methods of time measurement based on unequal intervals calculated by the length of daylight. Mechanical clock time was initially applied in monastic life and belonged to God. Early clocks were able to remind the monk of his obligation to announce the hours; the towers became houses for clocks and all announcements of religious festivities, warnings of danger and marking the beginning and end of the working day. French philosopher Michel Foucault saw in the religious orders the establishment of discipline and a chronological way of thinking that was linked with the application of timetable.¹¹It was only later that the clock entered secular life to announce the hours from the town hall’s tower and to regulate work in the textile towns of Flanders and Northern France.¹² It is striking that, until the sixteenth century, clock time remained a European phenomenon and was perceived in China merely as a curiosity, despite the long-standing Chinese tradition of mechanical water clocks. The modern science and refinement of the theory of entropy (second law of thermodynamics) confirmed time as a linear entity and its tightness to irreversible direction. Time became regulated with the appearance of the railway and telegraph, and was soon standardised. In 1884, during the International Meridian Conference in Washington, the world changed to twenty-four hour time with Greenwich as the zero meridian, and the first regulating time signal was emitted from the Eiffel tower in Paris in 1914. This division was only stable until the appearance of the global electronic network. The rise of capitalism and the expanding economy that tied the attachment of the employee and employer to clock time was manifest in the control over the cycles of labour and leisure. It was philosopher, economist and sociologist Karl Marx who delineated the exact measure of time as a value in capitalistic society. This standardised time led to the rise of ethical problems related to cultural and racial difference according to a linear, developmental notion of progress and amplified by the colonial imperative to conquer other than own time and space. This modern time consciousness, according to the media theorist Bliss Cua Lim, became gradually natural and incontrovertible – a sort of ready-made temporality – and obscured the plurality of our existence in time.¹³

Conservation’s Clock Time
It occurs to me that in conservation, as an Aristotelian inheritance of linearity, we have too easily accepted this ready-made temporality manifest in mechanical follow up of instances in the manner of replacement rather than organic continuity. Although, admittedly, the temporal irreversibility of decay and alteration (leading to entropy) implies a certain type of linearity, this concept is not sufficient to encompass the complexity of the existence of artworks in time.
The concept of reversibility, for instance – a much contested conservation theorem that, for a considerable time, was one of the main rules in conservation – presumes that a process or treatment can be reversed. It also somewhat approximates the idea of the return to an earlier condition of an artwork reflected in the term of re-storation, which, from an etymological point of view, already involves the notion of “redoing.”¹⁴Paradoxically, the return to the “ideal” or “original condition” contradicts the linear progress of time. It is precisely the impossibility of the return to the original condition that the very idea of reversibility is based on. Why would we wish to return to something, if we have not lost it already, as in Origen’s Garden of Eden?¹⁵ So this understanding of time as linear, in various attempts to restore an object, in other words, is predicated on the notion of reversibility, which does not change the fact of its misinterpretation (as one cannot turn back entropy).
“World-withdrawal and world-decay can never be undone” – contends German philosopher Martin Heidegger.¹⁶ “The works are no longer the same as they once were. It is they themselves, to be sure, that we encounter there, but they themselves are gone by.”¹⁷ This could be understood as a reference not only to time, but also to the “world.” Even if we could restore the object to its original condition (which is not possible, as I have argued), we would not be able to restore its world, so it will always be different from “how” (rather than “what”) it was. This also signalises an attempt to impose our own concept of timelessness¹⁸ and uniqueness of a temporal context, in which artworks are accessed.

Multimedia and Beyond
Although this critique can be applied to many art forms, both traditional and non-traditional, I will narrow its scope to multimedia installations.
Multimedia installations are heterogeneous, compound entities created from a range of materials and elements rather than in a singular medium. Due to their characteristics, they introduce aspects of dispersal and reassembly following the repeated cycles of their materialisation. These works, unlike traditional painting or sculpture, do not exist in an assembled form beyond the duration of an exhibition or a technical test-run. The ontological shift between the appearance and disappearance, a series of iterations characterised by the potentiality for change occurring throughout their lifespan, places them in a discursive realm of authenticity. This realm leans on the presence of the material evidence on the one hand (physical, performative object) and, on the other, the possibility of an authentic experience created in the course of the artwork’s re-performances with entirely or partially new components under the exclusion of its material origins (performed work). In museums, it also causes tension with regard to the aforementioned ontological assumption about permanence of artefacts.

Changeability
One of the main characteristics of multimedia works of art is changeability. Encompassing extrinsic and intrinsic change, and independently of its desirability and the questions of judgement (good or bad), changeability goes beyond any reference to some kind of a mean value and may involve a fundamental change as a historical practice. Changeability places an artwork in a universe of the already realised but also potential transformations. The key to understanding these transformations lies, I believe, in offering a conception of time that is different than the conventional, sequential one and that may supplement the certain linearity of decay and ageing.

Towards Alternative Conceptions of Time
In response to these new characteristics introduced by multimedia, in what follows, I propose supplementing the temporal irreversibility of decay and alteration with an alternative conception of time. I suggest that the key to the acknowledgement of changeability of multimedia works of art expressed in the variety of their instantiations lies in the recognition of the temporal equivalence of the plurality of their occurrences.
The privileging of one instance over another and thus freezing of a changeable artwork in the gesture of its conservation that accords with the conventions of a particular epoch and its ruling set of values reflects the understanding of time as progress, as succession from one point to another. Here, progress may be understood in a twofold manner: as the progress of time that enables the conservator to employ the newest technological and scientifically informed methods to obtain the preferred result, but also – and relevant for this argument – the progress from the “then” as the object’s “most precious” and “original” state to its changed reality. To be sure, instead of turning back to an object’s assumed state that has been but is no more, restoration/conservation is adding new values that result in manufacturing historicity and is actually producing something new.¹⁹

Bergsonian Duration as a Survival of the Past
To fully understand the durational character of artworks and acknowledge the continuity of change that they undergo, it occurs to me that the conception of time as durée of the French philosopher Henri Bergson’s (1859–1941) may be helpful. The Bergsonian conception is but first of all a critique of time of natural sciences conceived on the basis of specialised, fragmented time. Rather, it is the movement of time itself, the permanent, unstoppable changing of things. The concept of duration rests on the idea of there being a present involving a past and the anticipation of a future – an idea that I propose applying to the understanding of time in conservation that contradicts the fragmentation of an object’s identity into externally related moments.
Although my argument is based mainly on Bergsonian theory, it is difficult today to think about Bergson without including his most significant interpreter, the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. In fact, Bergsonism as I understand it, is, nowadays, barely separable from Deleuze’s contribution.²⁰ In his book Bergsonism (1961), Deleuze provides us with a comprehensive insight into Bergson’s method, including his own ideas about the ontology of things. One insight is Deleuze’s assumption that “things must, of necessity, endure in their own way,” which reconfirms Bergson’s assertion that “…we do not endure alone, external objects, it seems, endure as we do.” This is based on Bergson’s argument that duration was from the start defined as multiplicity, and qualities exist in things no less than they do in consciousness.²¹ Bergson’s assumption of duration outside the “self” elaborated by Deleuze introduces a dimension that may have further consequences for the “object of conservation.” One possible way of its interpretation may suggest a horizon of time not only inherent to the subject (psychological time), but a time that enables objects and artworks to have their own duration. Artworks will thus cease to be “screens that denature duration,” a form of exteriority as it were, and will become temporal multiplicities on their own.
Bergsonian visualisation of the idea of the contemporaneity of the past in the form of a cone metaphor may be helpful for rethinking time in conservation.²² The cone is divided into three sections AB, A’B,’ A’’B’’ symbolising a state of coexistence of all layers of the past with the present. The past AB would coexist with the present S under the inclusion of all the sections A’B’ and A’’B.’’ The sections are virtual, symbolically representing the distance of the past in relation to the present, yet including the entirety of the past rather than its particular elements. The identity of duration is presented as an ever-growing image of the past in the present and “the conservation and preservation of the past and the present.”²³ Every following moment contracts and condenses with the former and, simultaneously, “always contains, over and above the preceding one, the memory the latter has left it.”²⁴ Deleuze maintains:

We are too accustomed to thinking in terms of the “present.” We believe that a present is only past when it is replaced by another present. Nevertheless, let us stop and reflect for a moment: How would a new present come about if the old present did not pass at the same moment as it is present? How would any present whatsoever pass, if it were not past at the same time as present? The past would never be constituted if it had not been constituted first of all, at the same time as it was present. There is here, as it were, a fundamental position of time and also the most profound paradox of memory: The past is “contemporaneous” with the present that has been. … The past and the present do not denote two successive moments, but two elements that coexist: One is the present, which does not cease to pass, and the other is the past, which does not cease to be but through which all presents pass.²⁵So in the contemporaneity, the past and the present that has been coexist, but the past also preserves itself endlessly in itself, while the present passes. Following this line of thought, would an artwork’s present preserve all its pasts?

Bergson speaks of the acting, abiding, actual past:
Like the universe as a whole, like each conscious being taken separately, the organism which lives is a thing that endures. Its past, in its entirety, is prolonged to its present, and abides there, actual and acting. How otherwise could we understand that it passes through distinct and well-marked phases, that it changes its age – in short, that it has a history?²⁶This duration of the past is crucial when rethinking the notion of time in conservation that is preoccupied with searching for the past authentic condition of an artwork as the one that ceased to be present. The past, for Bergson, is alongside the present – a concept distinct from conventional ways of thinking about past, present and future as separable realms.²⁷ Duration is the survival of the past, an ever-accumulating ontological memory that is wholly, automatically and ceaselessly preserved. In duration, the current moment does not depose that which came before. Following the Bergsonian conception of time and its Deleuzian interpretation, I propose that in changeable multimedia works of art, the present is the survival of the past. In the process of conservation, the past is actualised in the present, the latter being the only status we are able to analyse from our inhabited temporal perspective.²⁸ Duration is, I argue, crucial for understanding the continuity of artworks and essential to divorcing conservation from its traditional views of time. A possible consequence of the application of durée to works characterised by change is that their changeability expressed by the multitude of instances may unrestrictedly exist in a continuum of duration. In other words, each instantiation of a changeable artwork preserves, as it were, the former.

Preserving the Present
In sum, the orientation of conservation towards the past is a gesture reassembling back-and-forth movements between abstract times, or at best a misinterpretation of linearity – we allegedly “take care of the past” and “pass it over to the future.” If the past is exactly as contemporary as the present, then we do not need to “preserve the past” in the traditional meaning of the word, but preserve the present. In fact the present seems to be the only reality given, and the only one to be preserved. In the case of multimedia installations, conservation could thus be defined as a process that shapes the changeability of artworks, yet does not prevent it. If anything, it could contribute to the reduction of the degree of changeability, if desirable. So in my thinking – and following Bergsonian durée – artworks that undergo transformation abide in their present (and only) “condition,” which is constituted by their many different pasts. In other words, they are constructed by their “present” as much as by their “past conditions.” This may not only result in abandoning the search for authenticity somewhere in the remote past, but may also shift conservation from its attempt to manage change (measured in an artwork’s former conditions) to a process intervening in the artwork’s temporality. Furthermore, it will unquestionably release conservation from the drive to “recover the past” and “the original” or “give back the authentic object,” which, in my view, are misguided approaches based on an incorrect conception of time.
The applicability of this proposition may not only offer conservation the possibility to overcome the aforementioned too easily accepted ready-made temporality and the difficult relation with its ‘object,’ but also reach beyond the conservation of multimedia works. If taken seriously, it could have an impact on traditional art.
Whether related to traditional art or multimedia, it should not be left unmentioned that conservation may by no means claim to be neutral. Each intervention is a process that transforms the work of art. Furthermore, conservation is, according to the Italian conservation theoretician Cesare Brandi, a moment of the methodological recognition of a work, an instantaneous appropriation in which the consciousness of the observer recognises an object as a work of art.²⁹ In discussing the significance of the past and opposing the idea of permanence, the British heritage theorist David Lowenthal holds that “every act of recognition alters what survives.”³⁰ He adds to it a positive value – the past can be used fruitfully when it is “domesticated,” “to inherit is to transform.”³¹

1.) Saint Augustine, Confessions, transl. by Edward Bouverie Pusey (Kindle Edition: Evinity Publishing Inc., 2009 (397–398)).
2.) Frederic Jameson, “The End of Temporality,” in Abstraction: Whitechapel Documents of Contemporary Art, ed. Maria Lind (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2013), 121.
3.) Jacques Derrida, Marges de la philosophie (Paris, 1972), 47, quoted in Jameson, “The End of Temporality,” 121.
4.) For a study on the concepts of time in the context of conservation, see Hanna Hölling, “Re: Paik: On Time, Identity and Changeability in the Conservation of Nam June Paik Multimedia Installations” (PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2013).
5.) Amelia Groom, ed., Time: Whitechapel Documents of Contemporary Art (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, forthcoming), book overview available at https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/time.
6.) I use the expression “con-temporary” to expose its plural meaning that is related to the question of time: something may be con-temporary with something else in terms of synchronous existence (which nota bene implies a relation), and, equally, it may have a temporal characteristic pointing to the present. Online Etymology Dictionary, s. v. “contemporary,” accessed 10 August 2013. http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=contemporary. For a brilliant discussion of the “contemporary” in art, see Richard Meyer, What Was Contemporary (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2013).
7.) Cf. Pip Laurenson, “Authenticity, Change and Loss in the Conservation of Time-Based Media Installations” Tate Papers 6 (2006), accessed December 12, 2011, www.tate.org.uk/download/file/fid/7401; Salvador Muñoz Viñas, Contemporary Theory of Conservation (Oxford: Elsevier, 2005). 3.
8.) For the “social” in conservation, see Miriam Clavir, Preserving What is Valued: Museum, Conservation and First Nations (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2002); Miriam Clavir, “Social Contexts for Conservation: Time, Distance, and Voice in Museums and Galleries,” Journal of the Canadian Association for Conservation 34 (2009); Glenn Wharton, “Heritage Conservation as Cultural Work: Public Negotiation of a Pacific Hero” (PhD diss., University College London, 2004).
9.) See, for instance, Laurenson, Muñoz Viñas, Clavir and the recent international initiatives such as the research project New Strategies in the Conservation of Contemporary Art (http://www.newstrategiesinconservation.nl/) and its outcome in several doctoral dissertations that are being written on this subject matter.
10.) Thomas Mann, The Magic Mountain: A Novel, trans. John. E. Woods (New York, 1995 (1924)), 339.
11.) Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison, translated by Allan Sheridan (New York and Toronto: Random House, 1995 (1975)).
12.) J. J. A. Mooij, Time and Mind: The History of a Philosophical Problem (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005), 105.
13.) Bliss Cua Lim, Translating Time: Cinema, the Fantastic, and Temporal Critique (Duke University Press, 2009), 11.
14.) “Re-” word forming element; C. 1200; from Old French and also directly from Latin re- “again, back, against.” Online Etymology Dictionary, s. v. “re-,“ accessed April 24, 2013, http://etymonline.com/index.php?term=re-&allowed_in_frame=0.
15.) Alessandro Conti refers to the story of the Garden of Eden as a wish “to return to a primitive state that is better that the present one.” According to him, rooted in mythology and Western religious tradition, this vision becomes dangerous in restoration when it induces to pass over the ageing of materials and impose the concept of the return to the original at all costs. Alessandro Conti, The History of the Restoration and Conservation of Works of Art, trans. Helen Glanville (London: Elsevier, 2007), 1.
16.) Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Low, 1975), 40.
17.) Ibid.
18.) Albert Albano, “Art in Transition,” in Historical and Philosophical Issues in the Conservation of Cultural Heritage, eds. Nicholas Stanley Price, M. Kirby Talley Jr. and Alessandra Melucco Vaccaro (Los Angeles: J. Paul Getty Trust, 1996), 183.
19.) See, for instance, David Lowenthal, “Fabricating Heritage,” History and Memory 10/1 (1998): 5–24.
20.) I have in mind his books Bergsonism and Cinema 1 and 2.
21.) Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, transl. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1991 (1966)), 48.
22.) Ibid., 59–60.
23.) Duration, according to Deleuze, is essentially memory, consciousness and freedom. Ibid.
24.) This is also expressed in the illusion of the difference between recollection and perception – the image cannot actualise a recollection without adapting it to the requirements of the present. Deleuze refers to contraction and recollection memory. Deleuze, Bergsonism, 51.
25.) Ibid., 58–59.
26.) “How otherwise could we understand that it passes through distinct and well-marked phases, that it changes its age – in short, that it has a history?” Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc, 1998 (1911)), 15. For the Deleuzian view on the virtual past, see Deleuze, Bergsonism, 55. This matter is also discussed in Suzanne Guerlac, Thinking in Time: An Introduction to Henri Bergson (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006), 187–188
27.) According to David Lowenthal, the differentiation of past and present is a rather recent development and can be associated with a chronological time scale. The past as a state of things no longer existing emerged during the Renaissance when the remoteness of ancient Rome and unlikeness of recent medial times became apparent. David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 390.
28.) Much of my thinking here and in the subsequent section is inspired by Bliss Cua Lim and her book entitled Translating Time: Cinema, the Fantastic, and the Temporal Critique. Drawing from Bergson’s (and Deleuze’s) philosophic project, she takes on the discussion of time in relation to fantastic cinema. Cua Lim, Translating Time.
29.) Cesare Brandi, Theory of Restoration, trans. Cynthia Rockwell (Nardini Editore: Florence, 2005), 48. For coherence, I replaced the originally used “restoration” with “conservation.”
30.) Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country, 390.
31.) Ibid., 412.