Arendt_Hannah – what's next?

The new always happens against the overwhelming odds of statistical laws and their probability, which for all practical, everyday purposes amounts to certainty; the new therefore always appears in the guise of a miracle.

admin — Thu, 08 Jan 2015 18:48:42 +0000

Ohne Titel (Bedeutungsproduktion)

admin — Mon, 05 Jan 2015 13:17:15 +0000

Der folgende Text verknüpft eine künstlerische Arbeit der Gegenwartskunst und ein Unterrichtsprojekt mit einem Gedanken der Philosophin Hannah Arendt. Im Fokus steht das Nachdenken über Möglichkeiten neue Bedeutungsräume mit anderen (Kunstbetrachter_innen und Schüler_innen) zu generieren. Lesehinweis: Bitte öffnen Sie das durch den QR-Code verlinkte Bildmaterial, während Sie den Text lesen.

Uneindeutig
Bonbons, 161 kg, ein Haufen, am Boden auf freier Fläche, kleine weiße Objekte, mit blauer Maserung, verpackt in silbernem Zellophan-Papier. Das klingt zunächst verlockend, nach Zuckerparadies oder phänomenaler Beute vom vergangenen Karneval. Eigentlich sind Bonbons zum Naschen[1] da. Im Kontext Museum erscheint das vielleicht plötzlich fraglich. What we see is what we see[2]. (Wie lange liegen die wohl schon da?) Erfahrungswerte von Bonbongenuss kollidieren mit dem Wissen um die traditionellen Aufgaben der Institution Museum: Sammeln, Bewahren, Zeigen. Oder hat Rainer Ruthenbeck das Material gewechselt?[3] Ein suchender Blick in Richtung Werkangaben: Félix González-Torres[4]: Untitled (Lover Boys), 1991. Hier wird ein geschlossener Sinn scheinbar verweigert.[5] Die Arbeiten von González-Torres eröffnen „Spannungssituationen zwischen rivalisierenden und gegensätzlichen potentiellen Bedeutungen“[6].

Szenenwechsel
Projektaufgabe im schulischen Kunstunterricht: „Eine Reise ins …“ (Farbenbücher). Zum Projektstart hatte jede Schülerin[7] von zu Hause ein „altes“ Buch mitgebracht. „Alt“ insofern, als dass es auch von den Eltern zur weiteren Bearbeitung freigegeben war. Es durfte also übermalt, beklebt, zerschnitten, in jederlei Hinsicht verändert werden. Von mir, der unterrichtendenden Lehrerin, gesetzt war der Projekttitel „Eine Reise ins …“ verbunden mit der Aufforderung, die Leerstelle mit einem Begriff zu besetzen und das Buch zu diesem Titel entstehen zu lassen. Eine kurze Theorieeinheit zum Thema Farbe war dem Projekt vorausgegangen.
Eine Schülerin ist in die Bearbeitung eines Buches und in eine Bedeutungsproduktion zum selbst gewählten Farbthema „Grün“ vertieft. Grün kann einen Ort oder ein Ding näher bestimmen, glitzern oder klebrig sein, ein Farbton auf einer Malerpalette bezeichnen, personifiziert auftreten, Geschichten und Erfindungen bedingen. Die Qualität der entstehenden Farbenbücher bemisst sich nach den potentiellen Bedeutungshöfen. Bedeutung geht auf mittelhochdeutsch bediutunge = Auslegung[8] zurück. Bedeutungsproduktion im Kunstunterricht könnte einen Schritt weiter gehen und bekäme dann auch mit Zuschreibungen, Assoziationen und Erfindungen zu tun. Was Grün noch alles kann, ist dadurch bedingt, was die Schülerinnen mit Grün verknüpfen und wie und womit sie ihre Produktionen anschließen können.[9] Wenn ein geschlossener Sinn verweigert wird[10] bzw. Bedeutung erst generiert wird, beginnt sich alles zu bewegen. Das Terrain wird unwägbar, für alle Beteiligten, auch für Lehrerinnen und Lehrer.
„Denken ohne Geländer, das ist es was ich zu tun versuche“, so hat die Philosophin Hannah Arendt den Modus ihrer Arbeit selbst bezeichnet. Sie veranschaulicht ihren Gedanken an einem Beispiel:
„Das Wort Haus ist wie ein gefrorener Gedanke, den das Denken auftauen muss, wenn man es so will zu entfrosten hat, wann immer es dessen ursprüngliche Bedeutung herausfinden möchte.[11] Die in die Bedeutungsproduktion zu Grün vertiefte Schülern vom Anfang dieses Abschnittes wäre mit Hannah Arendt gesprochen, dabei das Farbwort Grün aufzutauen und würde darüber hinaus gehend eine Ladung Bedeutungs-Neuschnee produzieren.

Möglichkeiten der Bedeutungsproduktion im Kunstunterricht
Die Institution Schule hat zunächst eine ganze Menge an Bildungs-Standards zu vermitteln – und wie Museen zu bewahren. Die Produktion von Bedeutung als Unterrichtsthema explizit zu machen, kann die Sicht auf die Akteure und den Unterrichtsgegenstand verschieben.

Erfindungen und Entscheidungen
Schülerinnen und Schüler sind im Rahmen des Projektes im Kunstunterricht herausgefordert, etwas aus den Bedeutungsmöglichkeiten herauszulösen und ihre persönliche Form dafür zu finden. Sie entwickeln ihre Einflugschneise zu einem Thema und bestimmen selbst den Bedeutungshof und damit den Radius ihrer künstlerischen Produktion. Für Lehrende könnte die Herausforderung darin bestehen, einen Teil ihrer Deutungshoheit abzugeben und die Autorenschaft für eine Unterrichtsstunde mit Schüler_innnen zu teilen. Entscheidungen werden von diesen gleichermaßen auf der Ebene der Inhalte als auch auf der Ebene der Form getroffen. Materialfragen und Sinn-Findungen werden zusammen und für jedes Projekt individuell verhandelt.

Umordnen
Kunstunterricht kann die Regeln und Praxen der Institution Schule aufgreifen und im Rahmen künstlerischer Prozesse eine Auseinandersetzung mit schulischen Ordnungen ermöglichen. Das Abweichen vom Regelfall wird zur möglichen Spielregel für Unterrichtsprojekte. Im Unterrichtsprojekt „Eine Reise ins …“ (Farbenbücher) geschieht das für das Format Buch. Was macht man normalerweise mit Büchern? Lesen würden die meisten wohl antworten. Ein Buch als Objekt, in Format und Konzept neu zu bestimmen, sich bereits gesetzte Bedeutungen eines anderen Autors zu eigen zu machen, diese zu löschen oder zu überschreiben, das scheint gerade im institutionellen Setting Schule für die Schülerinnen reizvoll. Dort haben sie meist mit geschlossenen Informationsträgern, den nach Altersstufe, Lernjahr und Schulform aufbereiteten Schulbüchern, zu tun.

Keine Angst vor grünen Bäume
Bedeutungs-Neuproduktion beginnt häufig mit der Wiederaufnahme von Naheliegendem und Bekanntem. Der Modus „Wiederholung“ ist in der aktuellen Kunst ein anerkanntes künstlerisches Prinzip und hat in der Appropriation Art eine eigene Form gefunden.[12] In der Konfrontation mit potentiellen und konkurrierenden Bedeutungen kann ein solcher Rückgriff für Schülerinnen und Schüler entlastend sein. Für Lehrerinnen und Lehrer lohnt sich der Querblick. Ein rotes X über einer Zeichnung in Kombination mit einem Hello-Kitty-Aufkleber auf der gegenüberliegenden Buchseite, mag auf den ersten Blick technisch unausgereift anmuten, markiert vielleicht aber auch die Aktualisierung einer jugendlichen Symbolwelt durch eine Sechstklässlerin und könnte dann möglicherweise der Anfang eines neuen Bildkonzepts sein.

Rückkopplung
Bedeutungs-Neuproduktionen brauchen ein Echo. Was für jede einzelne Schülerin so oder genauso gut anders sein kann, verdichtet und bestätigt sich im Austausch mit den anderen. In Interviewgesprächen außerhalb des Kunstraums, hatten die Schülerinnen die Möglichkeit als Expertinnen ihrer eigenen Produktion aufzutreten und sich ihre Farbenbücher vorzustellen. Die Abwesenheit der Lehrerin ermöglicht und provoziert es, Deutungen zu verhandeln oder in Frage zu stellen. Die Bereitstellung von Diktiergeräten provozierten das Erfinden einer Produktionssituation für neue Diskussionen. Bedeutungsproduktion erhält hier eine eigene Form.

In Co-Produktion gehen
Das „Ent-sichern“[13] von Bedeutungen und Bedeutungskontexten lässt geschlossene Sinnvorstellungen schmelzen und ermöglicht und provoziert neue Kontextualisierungen und Sinnerfindungen auf der Ebene der konkreten Prozesse und auch auf der institutionellen und logistischen Ebene von Kunstunterricht. Aktuelle Kunst geht dabei nicht in der Logik der Institution Schule auf[14], die Logik der Institution Schule wird aber auch nicht negiert. Dadurch werden Möglichkeitsräume für neue Zusammenhänge produziert, auch für die Ebene der Unterrichtsplanung.
Pädagogische Ordnungen und institutionelle Rahmungen wie Begrüßung, Sitzordnungen, Tafelanschrift, Vorder- und Hinterbühne oder Unterrichtszeit können im Kunstunterricht auf der Ebene künstlerischer Prozesse thematisiert, adaptiert und ggf. auch neu erfunden werden. Wenn Lehrerinnen und Lehrer die Produktion von Bedeutung als Unterrichtsthema explizit machen, können sie Schüler_innen ermöglichen, zu Co-Autoren von Kunstunterricht zu werden.
Vielleicht entsteht dann „in den Reibungsflächen von Planung und Emergenz“[15] innerhalb der Institution Schule ein „Stück Zukunft“[16]

[1] Das mittelhochdeutsche Wort naschen bezeichnet ursprünglich und für die Arbeiten von González-Torres gesprochen das Rezeptionsgeräusch. Knabbern, schmatzen www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/naschen [1.8.14] Auch die Synonyme bringen diesen Aspekt mit: schlecken, leckern, schnäken, schlickern, schnöken.
[2] Was wir sehen ist das, was wir sehen. Vgl. Frank Stellas berühmten Ausspruch zu seiner Arbeit, gleichzeitig Absage an die Abbildhaftigkeit der Malerei: What you see is what you see.
[3] Siehe dazu: http://reiner-ruthenbeck.de/kegel%20und%20haufen/index.html [4.8.14]. In engem Bezug zu den „Candy Spills“ von Félix González-Torres steht insbesondere Ruthenbecks Werkgruppe der Aschehaufen.
[4] Siehe dazu auch: www.andrearosengallery.com/artists/felix-gonzalez-torres [4.8.14].
[5] Siehe dazu auch: Sandra Umathum, „Ich sehe was, was du nicht siehst. Zum Prinzip der Deutungsflexibilität in Felix Gonzales-Torres Werk“, in: dies., Kunst als Aufführungserfahrung. Zum Diskurs intersubjektiver Situationen in der zeitgenössischen Ausstellungskunst. Felix Gonzales-Torres, Erwin Wurm und Tino Sehgal. Bielefeld 2010, S. 32‒42. Die Theaterwissenschaftlerin Sandra Umathum spricht für das Werk von Félix González-Torres von Deutungsflexibilität.
[6] Simon Watney zit. nach Rainer Fuchs, „Der autorisierte Betrachter“, in: Dietmar Elger (Hg.), Félix González-Torres, Ostfildern-Ruit 1997, S. 83‒87, hier S. 86; vgl. Simon Watney, „Im Fegefeuer. Das Werk von Felix Gonzales-Torres“, Parkett, 39, 1994.
[7] Da es sich um eine Schulklasse in einem Mädchengymnasium handelt, sind in der Klasse tatsächlich ausschließlich Schülerinnen.
[8] www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/Bedeutung [2.9.14]
[9] Siehe dazu auch: Christine Heil, „Etwas setzt sich fort. Kunst, Partizipation, Bildung“, in: Institut für Wissenschaft und Kunst (Hg.), kunst fragen, Wien 2010, S. 137–161.
Im Zentrum des Textes stehen Potentiale eines auf Erweiterung und Beteiligung angelegten Vermittlungsraumes.
[10] Der Kurator Rainer Fuchs stellt das für die Arbeiten von Félix González-Torres fest. Sie weisen Bezüge zur Minimal Art auf, sind gleichzeitig biografisch aufgeladen, stellen die Konstitutionsbedingungen eines Kunstwerkes in Frage und arbeiten mit der Bedeutung und dem Gebrauchskontext der verwendeten Objekte.(Vgl. Rainer Fuchs, „Der autorisierte Betrachter“, in: Dietmar Elger (Hg.), Felix Gonzales-Torres, 2. Bd., Ostfildern-Ruit 1997, S.83‒87, hier S. 86.
[11] Vgl. Heidi Bohnet, Klaus Stadler (Hg.), Arendt, Hannah: Denken ohne Geländer. Texte und Briefe. München/Zürich 2013, S. 28; Hannah Arendt, „Über den Zusammenhang von Denken und Moral“, in: dies., „Zwischen Vergangenheit und Zukunft“, München 2012 [1971], S. 138‒146.
[12] Die Künstlerin Elaine Sturtevant beschäftigt sich in ihren Arbeiten mit der Originalität der Idee und der Unabhängigkeit der künstlerischen Idee von der Materialisation. Siehe dazu zum Beispiel: Viola Vahrson, Die Radikalität der Wiederholung. Interferenzen und Paradoxien im Werk Sturtevants. Paderborn/München 2006.
[13] Das 11. Kunstpädagogische Forschungskolloquium in Loccum hat „Ent-sicherungsprozesse“ als elementare Bestandteile von Forschung, künstlerischem Arbeiten und kunstpädagogischen Situationen zum Thema gemacht. Vgl. http://forschungskolloquiumloccum.wordpress.com [25.9.14]
[14] Es geht nicht darum, mit Schülerinnen und Schülern das Werk von Félix González-Torres zu besprechen.
[15] Jens Roselt, „Zukunft probieren“, in: Melanie Hinz, Jens Roselt (Hg.), Chaos und Konzept. Proben und Probieren im Theater, Berlin 2011, S. 16–37, hier S. 35.
[16] Ebd.

Literatur
Bettina Fritsche, Till-Sebastian Idel, Kerstin Rabenstein, „Ordnungsbildung in pädagogischen Praktiken. Praxistheoretische Überlegungen zur Konstitution und Beobachtung von Lernkulturen“, ZSE Zeitschrift für Soziologie der Erziehung und Sozialisation, 31 (1), 2011, S. 28–44.
Lisa Rosa, „Von den Visionen des ‚Lernens für später‘ zum Sinnbildungslernen der Gegenwart“, in: Sara Burkhardt, Torsten Meyer, Mario Urlaß (Hg.), Convention, München 2013, S. 113–120.
Félix González-Torres, Wolfgang Laib, Insert: Roni Horn.

Vom Kritizismus über die Kritik zur Kritikalität

admin — Mon, 05 Jan 2015 13:17:03 +0000

Eine TheoretikerIn ist jemand, die durch Theorie auseinander genommen wurde.
Anstatt aus der Anhäufung theoretischer Werkzeuge und Materialien besteht die Arbeit der Theorie darin, den Grund, auf dem sie steht, zu dekonstruieren. Fragen und Ungewissheiten dort einzuführen, wo es vorher einen scheinbaren Konsens darüber gab, was man tat und wie.
Im Kontext der Frage, was eine KünstlerIn sein könnte, möchte ich die Frage danach stellen, was eine TheoretikerIn sein könnte, um darauf hinzuweisen, wie unentwirrbar diese Existenzen und Praxen miteinander verbunden sein können. Die alten Grenzen zwischen der Praxis und der Theorie, dem Historisieren und dem Zurschaustellen, der Kritik und der Affirmation sind schon lang erodiert.
Künstlerische Praxis wird als Wissensproduktion anerkannt, und theoretische und kuratorische Unternehmen haben eine wesentliche experimentellere und erfinderischere Dimension angenommen: beide existieren eher im Bereich der Potenzialität und der Möglichkeit als in jenem einer ausschließlich materiellen Produktion.
Die früheren pragmatischen Beziehungen, durch die der eine Bereich „Dienstleistungen“ für den anderen lieferte, sind einem Verständnis dessen gewichen, dass wir gemeinsam kulturelle Angelegenheiten konfrontieren und auch gemeinsam kulturelle Einsichten produzieren müssen. Statt eines „Kritizismus“, der einen Akt des Urteils darstellt, der sich auf ein klar definiertes Objekt der Kritik bezieht, erkennen wir jetzt nicht nur unsere eigene Verwicklung in das Objekt oder das kulturelle Moment, sondern auch die performative Natur jeglicher Aktion oder Haltung, die wir in Beziehung dazu einnehmen. Wir denken all diese Praxen jetzt als verbunden in einem komplexen Prozess der Wissensproduktion anstelle der früheren Aufteilung in Kreativität und Kritizismus, Produktion und Anwendung. Wenn man diese Perspektiven teilt, kann man nicht die Frage: „Was ist eine KünstlerIn?“ stellen, ohne zu fragen „Was ist eine TheoretikerIn? “
Das Narrativ der theoretischen Dekonstruktion, des Auseinandergenommenwerdens ist eine Reise durch verschiedene Phasen, in der das Denken, in das wir eingebettet sind, seine Gültigkeit verliert; diese Momente der schweigenden Epiphanie, in der wir erkannt haben, dass die Dinge nicht notwendig so sein müssen, dass es eine ganz andere Weise gibt, sie zu denken, Momente, in denen die Paradigmen, die wir bewohnen, aufhören, sich selbst zu legitimieren und in einem Blitz als nichts anderes enthüllt werden, als was sie sind – Paradigmen. In meinem eigenen Fall war dies eine Reise einer Disziplin, die Kunstgeschichte genannt wird, über die großen Straßen der kritischen und theoretischen Studien zu einem anderen, weniger disziplinierten Ort, den wir im Moment sehr provisorisch „Visual Culture“ nennen könnten.
Außerdem komme ich zu den Formationen der Visual Culture aus einer etwas anderen Perspektive der kulturellen Differenz, und es ist eines der Privilegien der kulturell Entorteten, dass ihr Blick immer merkwürdig und fragend ist, nie frontal positioniert und oft in einem ungemütlichen Verhältnis zu den dominanten Paradigmen. Ich kam ursprünglich aus einem langen, konventionellen und sehr anti-intellektuellen Training in der Kunstgeschichte, das mich am Ende in totaler Ratlosigkeit darüber zurück ließ, wie die Zwischenräume zwischen dem, was ich war, was ich tat und der Welt, die ich bewohnte, zu navigieren seien.
In meinem eigenen Fall war die Distanz zwischen -diesen drei Aspekten so, dass einigermaßen akzeptable Übungen darin, eine professionelle Praxis auszudehnen und zu erweitern, um die eigenen Belange darin unterzubringen, im Nachhinein nicht in der Lage waren, -Brücken über die Lücken zu schlagen. Meine Aufmerksamkeit war daher in erster Linie von den Möglichkeiten in Anspruch genommen, ein Projekt nicht aufgrund gegebener Materialien oder existierender Kategorien zu formulieren, sondern aufgrund dessen, was in jedem historischen Moment eine Sammlung dringender Belange war.
Diese tauchten grob gesagt für mich in folgender Weise auf: in den 1980ern eine Beschäftigung mit sexueller und Geschlechterdifferenz, die in eine Untersuchung feministischer Epistemologien mündete; in den 1990ern eine Befassung mit Differenzen in Zusammenhang mit „Rasse“ und Kultur, die darin mündete, die Autorität der „Geographie“ als eines Wissensbereichs mit politischen Implikationen aufzufassen; und momentan die Beschäftigung mit Fragen der Demokratie und den parlamentarischen oder performativen Modi, die uns zur Teilnahme offen stehen, die ich gegenwärtig als eine Erforschung der Partizipation denke und damit, was es bedeutet, an einer visuellen Kultur teilzunehmen jenseits der Rollen, die uns entweder die Rolle ZuschauerInnen oder ZuhörerInnen zuweisen.
Ich spreche natürlich von einer langen Reise, die bis jetzt etwa 18 Jahre gedauert hat, die einerseits Begegnungen mit den Arten umfasste, in denen die globale Politik sich permanent reformuliert und neu formatiert, und andererseits extrem spannende Begegnungen mit der kritischen Theorie, die behauptete, dass Dinge nicht notwendig das sind, was sie scheinen und mir die Werkzeuge gab, um durch sie hindurch zu sehen. Aber keine Angst, ich werde Ihnen nicht den langen Marsch vom Strukturalismus zu Deleuze vorturnen, mit seinen Umwegen über den Feminismus, die Psychoanalyse und den Kolonialismus. Anstatt dessen beschäftige ich mich mit der Dynamik des Verlusts, des Aufgebens und des Weggehens und Entbehrens.
Diese Dynamiken sind für mich ein notwendiger Teil meines Verständnisses von Visual Culture, denn was es auch sein mag, es ist KEIN akkumulatives, addi-tives -Projekt, in dem Teile neuer Perspektiven auf eine existierende Struktur geklebt werden und sie so anscheinend bereichern und erweitern und sie scheinbar annehmbarer machen für den Druck der Gegenwart. In meinem eigenen Denken ist es nicht möglich, den -Begriff der „Kritikalität“, den ich als grundlegend für die Visual Culture ansehe, von jenen Prozessen abzulösen, in denen die Institutionen des Wissens verlassen, theoretische Modelle der Analyse und Praxis aufgegeben werden und in denen man ohne gewisse Loyalitäten auskommt.
So wie ich „Kritikalität“ verstehe, stellt sie eben jene Operation dar, die Grenzen des eigenen Denkens anzuerkennen, da niemand etwas Neues lernt, ohne etwas Altes zu verlernen. Sonst addierte man nur Information, anstatt eine Struktur zu überdenken.
Es scheint mir, dass es uns gelungen ist, uns innerhalb einer relativ kurzen Zeitspanne vom Kritizismus über die Kritik zur Kritikalität zu bewegen – Anklagen zur Untersuchung der zugrunde liegenden Annahmen, die erlauben, etwas als eine überzeugende Logik anzusehen, und ausgehend von einer ungewissen Basis zu operieren, die, obwohl sie auf Kritik gründet, sich doch auf Kultur in anderem Sinne beziehen mag als in dem der kritischen Analyse; auf andere Weise als derjenigen, Fehler aufzudecken, Auslassungen zu verorten, Schuld zuzuweisen.
Im Projekt des „Kritizismus“ sind wir vor allem mit der Anwendung von Werten und Urteilen beschäftigt und operieren aufgrund von fast uneingestandenen -humanistischen Maßeinheiten, die ihrerseits durch -naturalisierte Glaubenssätze und verleugnete Interessen aufrecht erhalten werden. Das Projekt der „Kritik“, das jenes des „Kritizismus“ durch verschiedene Schichten poststrukturalistischer Theorie und der damit verbundenen Bereiche der sexuellen Differenz und des Postkolonialismus negierte, diente einer außerordent-lichen Untersuchung all jener Annahmen und natura-lisierten Werte und Denkstrukturen, die ererbte Wahrheitsansprüche des Wissens aufrecht erhielten.
Die „Kritik“ in ihrer tausendfachen Komplexität -erlaubte uns, die überzeugende Logik und die Opera-tionen solcher Wahrheitsansprüche zu enthüllen, aufzudecken und sie kritisch zu überprüfen. Dennoch erhielt die Kritik, trotz ihres mächtigen Apparats und ihres großen und fortdauernden Wertes, ein gewisses äußerliches Bescheidwissen aufrecht, eine gewisse -Fähigkeit, außen nach innen zu sehen, und das, was -anscheinend innerhalb der Falten des strukturierten Wissens verborgen lag, zu entwirren und zu enthüllen und aufzudecken. Die immer größer werdende Betonung darauf, Schuld zuzuweisen und Auslassungen und Ungerechtigkeiten aufzuzeigen, hat Allianzen zwischen der Kritik und solchen politischen Projekten wie der „Identitätspolitik“ geschaffen und die komplexe Potenzialität vermindert, die darin liegt, die Kultur durch eine Reihe produktiver Dualitäten und Zweideutigkeiten zu besetzen.
Man hat schließlich immer etwas falsch gemacht, das ist eine permanente und fortdauernde Situation, da wir uns jedes Jahr neuer und bisher unrealisierter Perspektiven bewusst werden, die weitere interne kulturelle Ungerechtigkeiten erhellen. Die gegenwärtige Phase der kulturellen Theorie, die ich „Kritikalität“ nenne (vielleicht nicht der beste Begriff, aber der einzige, den ich momentan zur Verfügung habe), nimmt durch eine Betonung der Gegenwart Form an, dadurch, eine Situation auszuleben, Kultur eher als Serie von Wirkungen zu sehen denn als Serie von Ursachen, durch die Möglichkeiten etwas von ihrem Potenzial zu aktualisieren als dadurch ihre Fehler aufzudecken. Selbstverständlich ist „Kritikalität“ durch die Arbeiten von Deleuze, Nancy und Agamben beeinflusst, durch ihre Dekonstruktion der Dichotomien von Innen und Außen, durch eine Vielzahl sich entfaltender Kategorien, wie der Rhizomatik, der Falten, der Singularitäten, usw., die solche Binaritäten zusammenbrechen lassen und sie durch ein komplexes multiples Einander-Innewohnen ersetzen, und daher für mich mit Risiko verbunden sind, mit einer kulturellen Besetzung, die performativ das, was sie riskiert, anerkennt, ohne schon in der Lage zu sein, es voll zu artikulieren.
In der Kritikalität haben wir diese doppelte Besetzung, in der wir sowohl vollständig mit dem Wissen der Kritik ausgerüstet und fähig zur Analyse sind, während wir zur selben Zeit die Bedingungen selbst teilen und leben, die wir durchschauen können. Insofern leben wir eine Dualität aus, die gleichzeitig sowohl einen analytischen Modus erfordert und eine Nachfrage nach der Produktion neuer Subjektivitäten, die anerkennen, dass wir das sind, was Hannah Arendt fellow sufferers nannte, jene, die gemeinsam unter denselben Bedingungen leiden, die sie kritisch untersuchen.

(Übersetzt von Hito Steyerl)

Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text ist der erste Teil von „What is a Theorist?“, im Deutschen zuerst veröffentlicht in: Martin Hellmond, Sabine Kampmann, Ralph Lindner, Katharina Sykora (Hg.), Was ist ein Künstler? Das Subjekt der Moderne, München 2003.

Artistic Activism and Agonistic Spaces

admin — Mon, 05 Jan 2015 13:16:51 +0000

Can artistic practices still play a critical role in a society where the difference between art and advertizing have become blurred and where artists and cultural workers have become a necessary part of capitalist production? Scrutinizing the “new spirit of capitalism” Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello¹ have shown how the demands for autonomy of the new movements of the 1960’s had been harnessed in the development of the post-Fordist networked economy and transformed in new forms of control. The aesthetic strategies of the counter-culture: the search for authenticity, the ideal of self-management, the anti-hierarchical exigency, are now used in order to promote the conditions required by the current mode of capitalist regulation, replacing the disciplinary framework characteristic of the Fordist period. Nowadays artistic and cultural production play a central role in the process of capital valorization and, through “neo-management”, artistic critique has become an important element of capitalist productivity.
This has led some people to claim that art had lost its critical power because any form of critique is automatically recuperated and neutralized by capitalism. Others, however, offer a different view and see the new situation as opening the way for different strategies of opposition. Such a view can be supported by insights from André Gorz for whom “When self-exploitation acquires a central role in the process of valorization, the production of subjectivity becomes a terrain of the central conflict … Social relations that elude the grasp of value, competitive individualism and market exchange make the latter appear by contrast in their political dimension, as extensions of the power of capital. A front of total resistance to this power is made possible. It necessarily overflows the terrain of production of knowledge towards new practices of living, consuming and collective appropriation of common spaces and everyday culture.”²To be sure the modernist idea of the avant-garde has to be abandoned, but that does not mean that any form of critique has become impossible. What is needed is widening the field of artistic intervention, by intervening directly in a multiplicity of social spaces in order to oppose the program of total social mobilization of capitalism. The objective should be to undermine the imaginary environment necessary for its reproduction. As Brian Holmes puts it, “Art can offer a chance for society to collectively reflect on the imaginary figures it depends upon for its very consistency, its self-understanding.”³I agree that artistic practices could contribute to the struggle against capitalist domination but this requires a proper understanding of the dynamics of democratic politics; an understanding which I contend can only be obtained by acknowledging the political in its antagonistic dimension as well as the contingent nature of any type of social order. It is only within such a perspective that one can grasp the hegemonic struggle which characterizes democratic politics, hegemonic struggle in which artistic practices can play a crucial role.

The political as antagonism
The point of departure of the theoretical reflections that I will propose in this piece is the difficulty that we currently have for envisaging the problems facing our societies in a political way. Contrary to what neo-liberal ideologists would like us to believe, political questions are not mere technical issues to be solved by experts. Properly political questions always involve decisions which require us to make a choice between conflicting alternatives. This incapacity to think politically, is to a great extent due to the uncontested hegemony of liberalism. “Liberalism”, in the way I use the term in the present context, refers to a philosophical discourse with many variants, united not by a common essence but by a multiplicity of what Wittgenstein calls “family resemblances”. There are to be sure many liberalisms, some more progressive than others but, save a few exceptions, the dominant tendency in liberal thought is characterized by a rationalist and individualist approach which is unable to grasp adequately the pluralistic nature of the social world, with the conflicts that pluralism entails; conflicts for which no rational solution could ever exist, hence the dimension of antagonism that characterizes human societies. The typical liberal understanding of pluralism is that we live in a world in which there are indeed many perspectives and values and that, due to empirical limitations, we will never be able to adopt them all, but that, when put together, they constitute an harmonious ensemble. This is why this type of liberalism must negate the political in its antagonistic dimension. Indeed, one of the main tenets of this liberalism is the rationalist belief in the availability of a universal consensus based on reason. No wonder that the political constitutes its blind spot. Liberalism has to negate antagonism since, by bringing to the fore the inescapable moment of decision – in the strong sense of having to decide in an undecidable terrain – antagonism reveals the very limit of any rational consensus.

Politics as Hegemony
Next to antagonism, the concept of hegemony is, in my approach, the other key notion for addressing the question of “the political”. To acknowledge the dimension of the political as the ever present possibility of antagonism requires coming to terms with the lack of a final ground and the undecidability which pervades every order. It requires in other words recognizing the hegemonic nature of every kind of social order and the fact that every society is the product of a series of practices attempting at establishing order in a context of contingency. The political is linked to the acts of hegemonic institution. It is in this sense that one has to differentiate the social from the political. The social is the realm of sedimented practices, that is, practices that conceal the originary acts of their contingent political institution and which are taken for granted, as if they were self-grounded. Sedimented social practices are a constitutive part of any possible society; not all social bonds are put into question at the same time. The social and the political have thus the status of what Heidegger called existentials, i. e. necessary dimensions of any societal life. If the political – understood in its hegemonic sense – involves the visibility of the acts of social institution, it is impossible to determine a priori what is social and what is political independently of any contextual reference. Society is not to be seen as the unfolding of a logic exterior to itself, whatever the source of this logic could be: forces of production, development of the Spirit, laws of history, etc. Every order is the temporary and precarious articulation of contingent practices. The frontier between the social and the political is essentially unstable and requires constant displacements and renegotiations between social agents. Things could always be otherwise and therefore every order is predicated on the exclusion of other possibilities. It is in that sense that it can be called “political” since it is the expression of a particular structure of power relations. Power is constitutive of the social because the social could not exist without the power relations through which it is given shape. What is at a given moment considered as the “natural” order – jointly with the “common sense” which accompanies it – is the result of sedimented hegemonic practices; it is never the manifestation of a deeper objectivity exterior to the practices that bring it into being.
Every order is therefore political and based on some form of exclusion. There are always other possibilities that have been repressed and that can be reactivated. The articulatory practices through which a certain order is established and the meaning of social institutions is fixed are “hegemonic practices”. Every hege-monic order is susceptible of being challenged by counter-hegemonic practices, i. e. practices which will attempt to disarticulate the existing order so as to install another form of hegemony.
What is at stake in what I call the “agonistic” struggle,⁴ which I see as the core of a vibrant democracy, is the very configuration of power relations around which a given society is structured. It is a struggle between opposing hegemonic projects which can never be reconciled rationally. An agonistic conception of democracy acknowledges the contingent character of the hege-monic politico-economic articulations which determine the specific configuration of a society at a given moment. They are precarious and pragmatic constructions which can be disarticulated and transformed as a result of the agonistic struggle among the adversaries. Contrary to the various liberal models, the agonistic approach that I am advocating recognizes that society is always politically instituted and never forgets that the terrain in which hegemonic interventions take place is always the outcome of previous hegemonic practices and that it is never an neutral one. This is why it denies the possibility of a non-adversarial democratic politics and criticizes those who, by ignoring the dimension of “the political”, reduce politics to a set of supposedly technical moves and neutral procedures.

The Public Space
What are the consequences of the agonistic model of democratic politics that I have just delineated for visualizing the public space? The most important consequence is that it challenges the widespread conception that, albeit in different ways, informs most visions of the public space conceived as the terrain where consensus can emerge. For the agonistic model, on the contrary, the public space is the battleground where different hegemonic projects are confronted, without any possibility of final reconciliation. I have spoken so far of the public space, but I need to specify straight away that, we are not dealing here with one single space. According to the agonistic approach, public spaces are always plural and the agonistic confrontation takes place in a multiplicity of discursive surfaces. I also want to insist on a second important point. While there is no underlying principle of unity, no predetermined centre to this diversity of spaces, there always exist diverse forms of articulation among them and we are not faced with the kind of dispersion envisaged by some postmodernist thinkers. Nor are we dealing with the kind of “smooth” space found in Deleuze and his followers. Public spaces are always striated and hegemonically structured. A given hegemony results from a specific articulation of a diversity of spaces and this means that the hegemonic struggle also consist in the attempt to create a different form of articulation among public spaces.
My approach is therefore clearly very different from the one defended by Jürgen Habermas, who when he envisages the political public space (which he calls the “public sphere”) presents it as the place where deliberation aiming at a rational consensus takes place. To be sure Habermas now accepts that it is improbable, given the limitations of social life, that such a consensus could effectively be reached and he sees his ideal situation of communication as a “regulative idea”. However, according to the perspective that I am advocating, the impediments to the Habermasian ideal speech situation are not empirical but ontological and the rational consensus that he presents as a regulative idea is in fact a conceptual impossibility. Indeed it would require the availability of a consensus without exclusion which is precisely what the agonistic approach reveals to be impossible.
I also want to indicate that, despite the similar terminology, my conception of the agonistic public space also differs from the one of Hannah Arendt which has become so popular recently. In my view the main problem with the Arendtian understanding of “agonism”, is that to put it in a nutshell, it is an “agonism without antagonism”. What I mean is that, while Arendt puts great emphasis on human plurality and insists that politics deals with the community and reciprocity of human beings which are different, she never acknowledges that this plurality is at the origin of antagonistic conflicts. According to Arendt, to think politically is to develop the ability to see things from a multiplicity of perspectives. As her reference to Kant and his idea of “enlarged thought” testifies her pluralism is not fundamentally different from the liberal one because it is inscribed in the horizon of an intersubjective agreement. Indeed what she looks for in Kant’s doctrine of the aesthetic judgment is a procedure for ascertaining intersubjective agreement in the public space. Despite significant differences between their respective approaches, Arendt, like Habermas, ends up envisaging the public space in a consensual way. To be sure, as Linda Zerilli has pointed out,⁵ in her case the consensus results from the exchange of voices and opinions (in the greek sense of doxa) not from a rational “Diskurs” like in Habermas. While for Habermas consensus emerges through what Kant calls “disputieren”, an exchange of arguments constrained by logical rules, for Arendt is a question of “streiten”, where agreement is produced through persuasion, not irrefutable proofs. However neither of them is able to acknowledge the hegemonic nature of every form of consensus and the ineradicability of antagonism, the moment of “Widerstreit”, what Lyotard refers to as “the differend”. It is symptomatic that, despites finding their inspiration in different aspects of Kant’s philosophy, both Arendt and Habermas privilege the aspect of the beautiful in Kant’s aesthetic and ignore his reflection on the sublime. This is no doubt related to their avoidance of “the differend”.

Critical artistic practices and hegemony
What kind of link can we establish between this theoretical discussion and the field of artistic practices? Before addressing this question I want to stress that I do not see the relation between art and politics in terms of two separately constituted fields, art on one side and politics on the other, between which a relation would need to be established. There is an aesthetic dimension in the political and there is a political dimension in art. This is why I consider that it is not useful to make a distinction between political and non-political art. From the point of view of the theory of hegemony, artistic practices play a role in the constitution and maintenance of a given symbolic order or in its challenging and this is why they necessarily have a political dimension. The political, for its part, concerns the symbolic ordering of social relations, what Claude Lefort calls “the mise en scène”, “the mise en forme” of human coexistence and this is where lies its aesthetic dimension.
The real issue concerns the possible forms of critical art, the different ways in which artistic practices can contribute to questioning the dominant hegemony. Once we accept that identities are never pre-given but that they are always the result of processes of identification, that they are discursively constructed, the question that arises is the type of identity that critical artistic practices should aim at fostering. Clearly those who advocate the creation of agonistic public spaces, where the objective is to unveil all that is repressed by the dominant consensus are going to envisage the relation between artistic practices and their public in a very different way than those whose objective is the creation of consensus, even if this consensus is seen as a critical one. According to the agonistic approach, critical art is art that foments dissensus, that makes visible what the dominant consensus tends to obscure and obliterate. It is constituted by a manifold of artistic practices aiming at giving a voice to all those who are silenced within the framework of the existing hegemony.
In my view this agonistic approach is particularly suited to grasp the nature of the new forms of artistic activism that have emerged recently and that, in a great variety of ways, aim at challenging the existing consensus. Those artistico-activist practices are of very different types, from a variety of new urban struggles like “Reclaim the streets” in Britain or the “Tute Bianche” in Italy to the “Stop advertising” campaigns in France and the “Nike Ground-Rethinking Space” in Austria. We can find another example in the strategy of “identity correction” of the Yes Men who appearing under different identities – for instance as representatives of the World Trade Organization develop a very effective satire of neo-liberal ideology.⁶ Their aim is to target institutions fostering neo-liberalism at the expense of people’s well-being and to assume their identities in order to offer correctives. For instance the following text appeared in 1999 in a parody of the WTO website: “The World Trade Organization is a giant international bureaucracy whose goal is to help businesses by enforcing ‘free trade’: the freedom of transnationals to do business however they see fit. The WTO places this freedom above all other freedoms, including the freedom to eat, drink water, not eat certain things, treat the sick, protect the environment, grow your own crops, organize a trade union, maintain social services, govern, have a foreign policy. All those freedoms are under attack by huge corporations working under the veil of free trade, that mysterious right that we are told must trump all others.”⁷ Some people mistook this false website for the real one and the Yes Men even managed to appear as WTO representatives in several international conferences where one of their satirical interventions consisted for instance in proposing a telematic worker-surveillance device in the shape of a yard-long golden phallus.
I submit that to grasp the political character of those varieties of artistic activism we need to see them as counter-hegemonic interventions whose objective is to occupy the public space in order to disrupt the smooth image that corporate capitalism is trying to spread, bringing to the fore its repressive character. Acknowledging the political dimension of such interventions supposes relinquishing the idea that to be political requires making a total break with the existing state of affairs in order to create something absolutely new. Today artists cannot pretend any more to constitute an avant-garde offering a radical critique, but this is not a reason to proclaim that their political role has ended. They still can play an important role in the hegemonic struggle by subverting the dominant hegemony and by contributing to the construction of new subjectivities. In fact this has always been their role and it is only the modernist illusion of the privileged position of the artist that has made us believe otherwise. Once this illusion is abandoned, jointly with the revolutionary conception of politics accompanying it, we can see that critical artistic practices represent an important dimension of democratic politics. This does not mean, though, as some seem to believe, that they could alone realize the transformations needed for the establishment of a new hegemony. As we argued in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy⁸ a radical democratic politics calls for the articulation of different levels of struggles so as to create a chain of equivalence among them. For the “war of position” to be successful, linkage with traditional forms of political intervention like parties and trade-unions cannot be avoided. It would be a serious mistake to believe that artistic activism could, on its own, bring about the end of neo-liberal hegemony.

Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien zuerst in: Art&Research: A Journal of Ideas Contexts and Methods, 1 (2), 2007, www.artandresearch.org.uk/v1n2/mouffe.html [18.10.2014].

1.) Luc Boltanski, Eve Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism. London 2005.
2.) Interview with André Gorz, Multitudes, 15, 2004, p. 209.
3.) Brian Holmes, “Artistic Autonomy”, www.u-tangente.org.
4.) For a development of this “agonistic” approach, see Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox. London 2000, chapter 4.
5.) Linda Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom. Chicago 2005, chapter 4.
6.) See for instance their book “The Yes Men. The True Story of the End of the World Trade Organization” published by The Disinformation Company Ltd, 2004
7.) The Yes Men Group website, www.theyesmen.org [29.9.2014]
8.) Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. London 1985, 2nd edition 2001.

Es ist ein Fluch, in interessanten Zeiten zu leben.

admin — Sat, 12 Oct 2013 14:03:29 +0000

See it Again, Say it Again. The Artist as Researcher

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:49 +0000

Introduction
‘Research’ is a buzz-word on the international art scene. People everywhere are talking about ‘the artist as researcher’ and debating how research in art relates to academic research. These discussions often revolve around the legitimisation of research in art within an academic framework and it is primarily theoreticians, not the artists, who are driving them. This book is an attempt to change this. It approaches the phenomenon of ‘research in and through art’ (to use the most correct and complete term) from the perspective of the visual artist and through the prism of artistic practice. Most of the authors are visual artists themselves and the contributions by theorists also focus on the practice of the artist as researcher.
The exceptional thing about research inand through art is that practical action (the making) and theoretical reflection (the thinking) go hand in hand. The one cannot exist without the other, in the same way action and thought are inextricably linked in artistic practice. This stands in contradistinction to ‘research into art’, such as art history and cultural studies.
Master’s courses in the field of research in art are now on offer in various European cities and artists can gain a doctorate at a growing number of universities. This has long been the case in the United Kingdom, but for most European countries it is new. We can justifiably speak of an ‘educational turn in art’ and an ‘artistic turn in academic education’.¹Political decision-making has thereby given concrete impulses to the institutionalisation of research in art. However, the phenomenon of research in art is nothing new. The idea of art-as-research flows from art itself, in particular from the conceptual art of the 1960s onwards. Conceptual artists oppose the view that art can be viewed in isolation from history and politics, and they assert that art is necessarily cognitive.
In the post-modern era, reflection and research are closely interwoven with artistic practice. In some cases the research has become the work of art itself; subject matter and medium serving as an instrument in the research or ‘thought process’. Artists are increasingly positioning themselves in the societal and artistic field as researchers.

Research and the public domain
The artist-as-researcher distinguishes himself from other artists by taking it upon himself to make statements about the production and thought processes. The artist-researcher allows others to be participants in this process, enters into a discussion about this and opens himself up to critique. This is by no means self-explanatory; it actually represents a radical shift in the conception of ‘artistry’. After all, the romantic view of the artist as a recluse in a studio from which he or she sends messages out into the world was prevalent until far into the 20th century.
The artist-researcher seeks the discussion in the public domain. ‘For research to be research it has to be debated in the public domain,’ as Sarat Maharaj remarked.² This might happen at art academies and at certain art institutes, as well as at universities. When the discussion takes place in an academic context, within the framework of research for a PhD, then certain conditions are attached. For example, the research needs to yield fresh insights, not merely into one’s personal work but for art in a broader sense as well. Crucial here is the academic opponent, whose task it is to critically evaluate the new contribution to the artistic domain. If the research fails to produce novel insights, then there is no justification for the research project to lead to an academic dissertation.
There is a wide range of views about the nature of this dissertation as well as a diversity of opinion about the requirements to which it can be subjected, as is also demonstrated by the contributions to this volume. However, almost everyone concurs that language somehow plays an important part in research in art. Without language it is impossible to enter into a discourse, so the invention of a language in which we can communicate with one another about research in art and through which we can evaluate the research is probably more important than devising a viable research methodology.
When asked about their reasons for embarking upon doctoral research, the response of almost all the artist-researchers is that their aim is to be part of a research community where they can share their thoughts with others and receive constructive, substantive criticism about their work. This research community represents a significant expansion of the possibilities for art and its practitioners, as well as a broadening of art discourse.

Art as (self-) critique
The age-old Western paradigm of art as mimesis, that is as imitation of the world, and as an expression of the close unity of the beautiful and true, came to an end around 1800. Friedrich Hegel thought that art had met its apotheosis, by which he of course did not mean that no more art would be produced or that our visual tradition had suddenly come to an end. For Hegel, the end of art meant that art could no longer be seen as the manifestation of truth and that the depiction of the divine, or of the divine in creation, was no longer self-explanatory.
Hegel’s cogitations coincided with the emergence of an historical awareness, which is by definition also a critical awareness. Henceforth it would be evident that, because of the diversification of modern life and the increasing fragmentation of what was once a single, all-encompassing worldview, it was impossible for any work of art to continue being the rendering of a totality. In art, this new critical awareness assumed a clear-cut form from the second half of the 19th century.
Artists emancipated themselves from the classical tradition and positioned themselves as autonomous creators. One of the ways in which they did this was by responding in an overtly discursive manner to works of art by others. There are many well-known examples of this new, critical attitude: Manet and Titian, Cézanne and Rubens, Picasso and Velázquez, and so on. This critical discursivity represents a shift away from the centuries-old tradition of pupils emulating their masters. By degrees attention shifted from the interpretation of the work of art as a reproduction of reality to the interaction, the active dialogue, between the work of art and the social and historical context in which it was created and the work’s beholder. Modern art, which was no longer representational, became self-critical.
In critical terms, modern art took aim at the societal and political fields, and at itself. The artist places every work of art in the context of other works of art, it is positioned vis-à-vis other works of art. This does not imply that those other works of art are literally identifiable in the new work (though that may be the case). Works of art embody a meta-element, a conceptual moment; the work of art is ‘aware’ of itself, of its own position. One might term this the ‘self-awareness’ of works of art, which question and comment on themselves and the art of others.
From the 1960s, critique and self-reflexivity were a deliberate strategy in art – take, for example, conceptual art, Fluxus, appropriation art, institutional critique and so on. Artists claimed a discursive space for themselves. However, almost immediately this discursive space came under huge pressure from market forces and the for-profit mentality. In the USA and the UK this shift came about in the late 1970s with the governments of Reagan and Thatcher, which were the starting shot for the rise of the art market and, in its wake, a resurgence in traditional, figurative painting. ‘Wir wollen Sonne statt Reagan (‘We want sun instead of Reagan’), sang Joseph Beuys.
Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, neo-liberalism has been the prevailing ideology in Western countries and across whole swathes of the non-Western world, and the laws of the market have apparently gained universal currency. Artists are expected to operate as ‘cultural entrepreneurs’ in the market and within a cultural industry that is to large extent fuelled by biennials, large museums and galleries. Even art journals, which previously played a critical role, participate in this.³
So where is there still a place in the art world for art as critical investigation and self-critique? Where can one find a locus, a platform for reflection and dialogue, which is not subject to pressures from the culture industry? Though universities are also being placed under increased pressure by a profit-driven mentality and cost-cutting operations, and though even here there is the looming danger of a cultural industry of ‘knowledge production’, academia nevertheless seems to represent a good candidate for providing the leeway for this.

Art and knowledge
There is no simple answer to the question of whether research in art generates knowledge and the kind of knowledge that this may be. What do artists know?⁴ They of course know something about images; they know what it is to produce a ‘picture’. Artists have a grasp of phenomena, how things appear to us in a visible guise – about this they know a great deal, but this is too general and therefore too non-committal. The assumption that artists know how things appear to us can only be demonstrated on the basis of specific works of art and this still leaves us with no answer to the broader question of what artists know.
In the context of research in art, perhaps it is better to pose a different question, namely how do artists think? Hannah Arendt’s Thinking, the first volume of The Life of the Mind, might provide a way forward here.⁵
In Thinking, Arendt elaborates upon the distinction made by Immanuel Kant between two modes of thinking, Vernunft and Verstand. Arendt defines Vernunft as ‘reason’ and Verstand as ‘intellect’.
According to Arendt, the distinction between reason and intellect coincides with the distinction between meaning and knowledge. ‘Reason’ and ‘intellect’ serve different purposes, she writes. The first manner of thinking, reason, serves to ‘quench our thirst for meaning’, while the second, intellect, serves ‘to meet our need for knowledge and cognition’ (the capacity to learn something). For knowledge we apply criteria of certainty and proof, it is the kind of ‘knowing’ that presupposes truth, in the sense of correctness.
‘Reason’ has its origins in our need to ponder questions to which we know there is no answer and for which no verifiable knowledge is possible, such as questions about God, freedom and immortality. Reason therefore transcends the limitations of knowledge, namely the criteria of certainty and proof. ‘The need of reason is not inspired by the quest for truth but by the quest for meaning,’ writes Arendt. ‘And meaning and truth are not the same.’
In the other manner of thinking, cognisance or knowledge, the thinking is a means to an end and that objective is the determination or attainment of truth and scholarly insight. Verstand wants to understand perceptible reality and operates by applying laws and fixed criteria to phenomena as they are perceived by the senses. Verstand is based on common sense, on faith in reality, in the ‘authenticity’ of the world. The scholar approaches the world with the goal of unmasking sensory illusions and correcting errors in scholarly investigation.
Reason, by contrast, has a self-contained objective; it is the pure activity of thinking and the simultaneous awareness of this activity while we are thinking. Reason is therefore not merely reflexive but also self-reflexive. The awareness of the activity of thinking itself creates, according to Arendt, a sensation of vitality, of being alive. Reason is the unceasing quest for meaning, a quest that never ends because of constant doubt, and because such thinking is ultimately founded on doubt it possesses what Arendt calls a ‘self-destructive tendency with regard to its own results’.
In order to experience the thinking ourselves, in order to know the possibilities of one’s own mind, it is necessary for us to withdraw from the ‘real’ world. Sensory experience distracts us when we try to concentrate and think, which is why we say that someone who is thinking concentratedly is ‘absent’. To be able to understand the spectacle of the world from within we must break free from sensory perception and from the flux of daily life.
The scientist can also temporarily withdraw from the world of phenomena, but he does that to solve a problem and with the aim of returning to that world and applying the answer there, to deploy the solution in that sensory domain.
Reason, writes Arendt, is ‘out of order’ with the world. It is a type of thinking that does not chime with the world and that is for two reasons: because of the withdrawal from the world that it requires and because it does not produce any definitive end result, it offers no solutions.
It should be obvious that it is primarily reason, Vernunft, which is the faculty of thinking that is relevant to art. Reason is the kind of thinking that is stored away in the work of art. Arendt therefore calls a work of art a ‘thought-thing’, and states that art ‘quenches our thirst for meaning’. Art provides no solutions and has no objective beyond itself.
But what about the fact that the activity of thinking (of ‘reasoning’) presupposes invisibility, that it withdraws from the sensory world and turns inward to a place the outsider cannot see, while works of art are objects that are in fact real, palpable and visible, objects which are part and parcel of reality?
The work of art’s ‘reality’ is idiosyncratic and diverges from other objects in the world – even in the case of ready-mades or conceptual actions intended to traverse the boundary between art and life. It is the function of works of art to generate meaning or to give direction to the quest for meaning. The work of art is the materialisation of thinking; thinking is rendered visible in the work of art. In the work of art, that which is actually absent (the invisible ‘reason’, reasoning) is made present. Art questions all the certitudes that are accepted as matter-of-course, even those of and about itself.
The work of art is not the end product of the artist’s thinking, or just for a moment at best; it is an intermediate stage, a temporary halting of a never-ending thought process. As soon as the artist has allowed the work as object out into the world, he takes leave of it. His activity with regard to this specific work now belongs to the past, and at this point the beholder, the public, becomes involved in the work. The beholder picks up the train of thought as it is embodied in the work of art.
The verb ‘to know’ implies knowledge, evidence, and is therefore not applicable to art or to what artists do. ‘Knowing’ harks back to concepts and criteria that belong in the world of exact science and with a mode of thinking that, in essence, is alien to art.
I would not want to aver that there is an unbridgeable gap between scientists and artists. Scientists have important intuitive moments, flashes of insight, when suddenly and seemingly out of nowhere the long-sought solution to a problem presents itself. Conversely, artists carry out research and their research is, at least in part, rationalisable and disseminable. However, the orientation of these activities and the way in which the thinking takes shape differs for scientists and artists.

Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien als Einleitung in: Janneke Wesseling (ed.), See it Again, Say it Again: The Artist as Researcher, Amsterdam: Valiz, 2011.
1.)These developments are a direct consequence of the Bologna Agreements and the Europe-wide reorganisation of education, aimed at establishing a comparable BA and MA framework for all European countries.
2.)At a symposium about research in art, held as part of ‘Manifesta 8’ in Murcia, Spain, in 2010.
3.)See Laurens Dhaenens and Hilde Van Gelder in the introduction to Kunstkritiek. Standpunten rond de beeldende kunsten uit België en Nederland in een internationaal perspectief [Art criticism. Viewpoints on the visual arts from Belgium and the Netherlands in an international perspective] (Leuven: LannooCampus, 2010).
4.)The question ‘What do artists know?’ was the theme of a round-table discussion on art and education, organised by James Elkins in 2010.
5.)Hannah Arendt (1978), Life of the Mind, ed. Mary McCarthy, 2 vols., New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. . Thinking was originally published in 1971.

Art without Work?

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:48 +0000

I recently recalled the precise moment when it first occurred to me that I would like to become an artist. I grew up in Moscow, and my father was a self-taught musician working at the circus. Circus artists work extremely hard physically: the amount of daily practice and physical exercise necessary to perform acrobatic acts or walk a tightrope is really enormous. They practice and exercise all day and perform by night—it’s nearly a twenty-four-hour-a-day job.
There was a birthday party for one of the kids in the building we lived in, which belonged to the union of circus artists. The children at the party, all about five or six years old, were children of clowns, animal trainers, and so forth. We were watching a cartoon on TV and at some point a conversation started about what we wanted to become when we grew up. Following the usual suggestions like a cosmonaut or a fireman, one of the kids said that he wanted to be a fine artist, because they do not work. I was very shy as a kid, so I did not say much, but thought to myself that this boy was really clever and that I too did not want to work and should therefore try to become an artist.
Ironically, this momentary realization ultimately pointed me on a trajectory that led to a perpetual state of work for many years: while my classmates in school tended to just hang out or play sports after class, I went to drawing lessons every evening. When my family moved to America, I enrolled in three schools simultaneously: the School of Visual Arts by day, Art Students League classes by night, and group life drawing lessons on weekends. Somehow the idea of not working went out the window, and all throughout my artistic education the emphasis was on work: the idea being that I had to fill all my available time with learning and practice, and that the sheer effort of this was bound to make me an artist. Perhaps this occupation of time was also practice for my future career: being a professional artist in a society where labor and time are still the ultimate producers of value. So the logic was that if all my time was filled with the labor of learning the skills of an artist, perhaps something of value would be produced, leading to a lifetime occupation by artistic labor. Thinking was of relatively little importance within this scenario.
I have to add that the system of non-university art education at the time (the 1980s) aided such an approach, because it made it possible to avoid academic studies almost entirely – literature, history, philosophy, and so forth—in favor of studio practice geared toward contriving some sort of artistic style that would be marketable.
Sometime in graduate school I started to get the sense that all this was not getting me very far artistically, that some other approach or modality of practice was possible. I don’t mean getting far only in terms of a career – although I remember this being a fairly serious concern for most people in my program—but on a basic level of just not not being convinced that the paintings and objects I was making were particularly compelling as art objects despite all the labor I put into making them. Thus there was a real urgency to find some other way to go about this, but what this other way could be was confusing and very mystifying: it was not so much about becoming a slacker artist, but rather a realization that an entirely different type of engagement was necessary in order for an artistic practice to make sense beyond appearances—beyond merely looking like art.
Since the early twentieth century, much of the advanced analysis of art production refers to the position of the artist and the intellectual as cultural workers. I think that it probably seemed highly desirable to see yourself as a member of the most dynamic class, a class that was expected to dominate the making of history: the working class. While rereading The Communist Manifesto some time ago, it was interesting to note how sure Marx was that the middle class (from which a vast majority of “cultural producers” actually come) is merely a small and historically insignificant group that is destined to vanish during the final confrontation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat: a battle from which the proletariat was expected to emerge victorious, bringing about the end of History. What progressive agent of culture would want to belong to the middle class, this vanishing species?
To this day, many in the field of art insist on using the term “cultural producer,” a term that supposedly blurs differences between different participants in the art industry—artists, curators, critics, historians, administrators, and patrons of art—on the assumption that we are all working together to produce meaning and thus culture.
Much of this language and thinking is predicated on the privileged position of work: that in order for art to come into being, work needs to be done—hard work, important work, expert work, work of art, art work. While there is a lot of disagreement about what type of work is actually required, who should or can do it, or if and how they should be trained for it, it is rarely questioned whether work is actually necessary or essential to the production of art. Duchamp mused whether there could be a work “not of art,” but can there also be an art without work? The readymade is something that immediately comes to mind, yet I feel that using existing objects produced by the labor of others does not solve this particular problem, because it is not about simply delegating, outsourcing, or appropriating. In other words, if the labor of art production is outsourced to others, while the artist and the market benefit by the surplus value it produces, it is merely a perpetuation of the exploitation that creates conditions of alienation in our society. What I mean by art without work is perhaps closer to a situation where you play a musical instrument for the sheer enjoyment of making music, where the activity is a pleasurable one not defined by labor or work per se.
Naturally, making art objects requires labor and work, but art does not exclusively belong to the realm of objects. For example, some years ago I was looking at Matisse paintings at the Metropolitan Museum of Art. As I was leaving the museum, I became aware of a residual sensation that looking at these paintings produced: for some time I was actually seeing things on the street according to the visual logic of the paintings. This made me think that this is exactly where the “art” of Matisse resides—in this ephemeral yet incredibly powerful effect that occurs when you are not looking at the paintings themselves. However, because these works are such expensive, sought-after objects, the museum frames the experience of encountering them as the veneration of fetish objects, where the emphasis is placed on the object itself rather than what it can trigger within the subject. This is very unfortunate. It seems to me that art resides within and in between subjects, and subjects don’t always require work to produce themselves. For example, falling in love, or having a religious or aesthetic experience does not require work, so why should art require work to come into being?
Conceptual art becomes an important modality of practice in this respect: while conceptual artists managed to shift much of the work involved in art production to the viewer via self-reflexive framing, and explicitly stated that objects of art need not be made at all,¹ I feel that the ethos of their approach is something quite different than the condition I am trying to describe. Not surprisingly, much of conceptual art suffered the same fate as Matisse, ending up as prized objects in private and public collections.
Another aspect of all this is a certain shift that art underwent with the industrialization of society. In traditional societies, that which we now call art was something more practical or utilitarian in nature: it had a clear decorative, religious, or other use value, and it did not require a special social space/framework, like an exhibition or a museum, within which to become understandable as art. In this sense art was much more integrated in everyday life and did not involve the kind of suspension of reality that many artists of our time find so frustrating: a context in which you have freedom to utter virtually anything, but on the condition that it’s not real because it’s art.
The question of work has also become a very polemical issue these days, and particularly so in the field of art and culture. What is work for an artist within our post-Fordist blur between life and work, freedom and alienation? It’s useful to refer to distinctions that Hannah Arendt draws between labor, work, and action. For Arendt, labor corresponds to a basic need for human life to sustain itself, such as farming, preparation of food, etc. Work goes beyond the satisfaction of immediate needs and corresponds to the human ability to build and maintain a world fit for human use, while action is “the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter, [and] corresponds to the human condition of plurality.”²
I suppose Arendt’s understanding of this was inspired by the ancient Greeks, who frowned on the idea of work: labor was for slaves; free citizens were expected to engage in politics, poetry, philosophy, but not work. The only type of occupation not looked down upon was apparently that of a shepherd, presumably because when one herds animals, one is not fully occupied and thus free to think.
While I am not completely sure that action, in Arendt’s beautiful definition, is always applicable in describing conditions that enable the production of art, I suspect that certain types of art practices can turn labor and work into action, and in doing so, free art from a dependence on labor and work.
Historically there have been different approaches to realizing this, yet all seem to converge on a concern with conditions of production. If art is produced as an outcome of certain conditions (rather then simply an act of genius, which is not interesting or possible to discuss), then creating such conditions would actually produce art. If the ultimate conditions of production are the world and life (rather than a studio or art museum), it would then follow that a certain way of living, of being in the world, would in itself result in the production of art: no work is necessary.
Such interdependence between art and life, and the state of the subject therein, was a central concern for many artists of the early-twentieth-century avant-gardes. It seems that the thinking at the time was that the production of a new way of life would not only result in the production of a groundbreaking, revolutionary art, but also the other way around: that the production of a new type of art would result in a new way of life and, in turn, a new subject. One of the instances of this is Lef magazine, co-published by Rodchenko, Mayakovsky, and others, the explicit goal of which was to produce such a new subject through exposing its readers to new content and form, to new art.
Last winter I spent a lot of time looking at Warhol’s films from around the mid-’60s. I found the complex structure he put in place for the production of these films really interesting: while Warhol’s silkscreen paintings from this period garner most attention from art historians (in part because they are expensive objects in museums and private collections), it is as if he had them made in order to fund his films, which were expensive to create but produced no income. It’s tempting to understand this simply as a situation where someone works explicitly for money to fund the production of his “real work”—his art. However this simple dichotomy does not play out here: Warhol is very blunt about his apparent indifference to the production of his paintings and objects in interviews from that period, where he is clear that not only are the paintings and objects physically made by studio assistants, but even their subject matter is determined by others, and his involvement in the films is not very different—the screenplays are written by someone else, he does not direct the actors, or shoot the films, or edit them. The set for the most part is just his studio: the Factory.
One of my personal favorites is a film called The Couch (1964), in which, according to Gerard Malanga (who found the featured red couch on the street and brought it to the Factory), documents the fact that every time other activities at the Factory were finished or exhausted, someone would just start filming the couch and whatever was taking place on it at the moment: conversations, eating, sex, and so forth. The films do not seem to be made to be watched in their entirety, which is something that would be hard for most filmmakers to accept: you want the audience to see the totality of your work, no matter how experimental, and it’s frustrating when people stop paying attention or leave midway through the piece. Yet the majority of Warhol’s films seem to have a built-in indifference to this.
In one of the interviews I saw, from 1966 or so, Warhol says point blank that he has not worked in three years and is not working at the time of the interview. It’s easy to assume that this is only another evasive maneuver or provocation, which he was so good at during interviews, yet it seems to me that he was actually being very direct: having created certain conditions for production, he was present, yet did not need to work in order for significant art to come into being. Perhaps he was simply being physically present within the structure he set in motion.
It also seems to me that the most important mechanism of the Factory, its central activity, was not so much the production of art objects or films, but the production of very particular social relations: a new way of life that in turn resulted in films and other things. Warhol, the proponent of Business Art, may seem to be artistically far from the idealist or utopian avant-garde, but the structures he was using were not so dissimilar: a certain kind of de-personalization of an artwork using a collective approach rooted in a creative community – strangely reminiscent of De Stijl, Bauhaus, and so forth – all of which placed just as strong an emphasis on the reorganization of life and social relations as on the production of art. I find that, far from being dated or obsolete, this type of model is of particular significance today, facilitated and amplified by the emergence of powerful and free tools for communication, production, and dissemination found mostly on the internet, which together create a possibility for a degree of autonomy from capital.
A different yet sympathetic approach to not working can be found in the artistic practice of Rirkrit Tiravanija. Although his work has been fully absorbed and valorized by art institutions and the market, he is rather adamant that much of his activity is not art at all. In fact, once you start questioning him, it turns out that almost nothing he does, with the exception of the occasional painting, sculpture, or drawing, is, in his opinion, art. And this is not mere posing or a provocation: it seems to me that this comes from a deep reverence for a certain capacity of the everyday and a desire to explore this capacity to its fullest, most radical extent.
A couple of years ago we did something in New York which involved turning e-flux’s storefront into a kind of a free meal/discussion space where three days of conversations on contemporary art took place during lunch and dinner sessions. Rirkrit did most of the cooking, with some help from his assistants and friends. I never noticed how much Rirkrit actually works when he cooks for a large number of people. Each of the three days started early, around seven or eight in the morning, with food shopping. Food preparation started around eleven, to be ready in time for lunch sessions, followed by a couple of hours of cleaning. Then shopping again for dinner (no refrigerator during the hot New York summer), cooking, and cleaning again until past midnight. Not having a real, equipped kitchen makes food preparation, cooking, and cleaning very labor intensive. On the other hand, spending most of his time in the improvised backyard kitchen allowed Rirkrit to not engage in the conversation and to not speak or answer questions about his art, which is something I think he does not like to do. When asked if what he was doing is art, Rirkrit said no, he was just cooking.
I think what happens here is that rather than speak or work in the capacity as an artist, Rirkrit prefers to make himself very busy doing something else in the space of art. Furthermore, not unlike the Factory, yet dispersed amidst many different art venues and dates, Rirkrit’s activity manages to temporarily construct a rather peculiar set of social relations between those in attendance. While he displaces the art object and the figure of the artist from its traditional place at center stage (to the kitchen), perhaps reflecting Duchamp, his presence usually forms a quiet yet influential and shape-giving center for those present. Rirkrit does manage to produce art while not working in the capacity of an artist, yet to do so he really makes himself very busy: he works very hard doing something else.
I feel that the ethos behind much of this has to do with the communist dream of non-alienated work. When Marx writes about the end of division of labor and narrow professionalization, he describes a society where identity and social roles are extremely fluid: one day you can be a street cleaner, the next day an engineer, a cook, an artist, or a mayor.³ In this scenario, alienation disappears and art becomes indistinguishable from everyday life: it dissolves in life. Historically there is a clear trajectory of this desire for the dissolution of art, which is visible in artistic practices from early modernism to the present day. This desire may be actually older than communism and, in a certain way, it outlasts the collapse of communist ideology, which makes me think that this may be something deeper than ideology. It could be that this desire has to do with a need to reclaim a reality that art may have had prior to the industrialization of society.

Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien zuerst in: e-flux journal # 29, November 2011, http://www.e-f lux.com/journal/art-withoutwork/ [3.4.2013].
1.)Lawrence Weiner, Declaration of Intent (1968):
1. The artist may construct the piece.
2. The piece may be fabricated.
3. The piece need not be built.Each being equal and consistent with the intent of the artist the decision as to condition rests with the receiver upon the occasion of receivership.
2.)Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 7.
3.)Karl Marx, The German Ideology (1845) (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998), 53: For as soon as the division of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; whereas in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic. This fixation of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into material power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now.

Das gewisse Savoir/Pouvoir. Möglichkeitsfeld Kunstvermittlung

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:47 +0000

Seit den 1990er Jahren sind die Debatten im Bereich der Kunstvermittlung reflexiv geworden. Führungen müssen nicht mehr bloß überzeugen und fesseln, in Vermittlungsprojekten sollen künstlerische Arbeiten, Tendenzen und Themen nicht nur möglichst interaktiv zugänglich gemacht werden. Vielmehr sind das Sprechen und Handeln selbst in den Blick der Kunstvermittlungstheorie geraten. In zahlreichen Seminaren und Tagungen, in Vermittlungsteams und in den zunehmend aus dem Boden sprießenden Lehrgängen im Ausstellungsbereich wurde über die eigene Positioniertheit innerhalb von Machtverhältnissen und innerhalb von Institutionen diskutiert.¹ So wurde Kunstvermittlung unter Rekurs auf die New Museology² und Ansätze der Institutionskritik im Kunstfeld³ mitten im Wissen/Macht Nexus verortet.⁴ Kunstvermittler haben ihren Alltag kritisch beleuchtet und fanden dabei viele Selbstverständnisse in ihren Grundfesten erschüttert. Das ist aber kein Grund zur Resignation: Denn gerade zwischen Wissen und Macht liegt vielleicht auch der Handlungsraum der Kunstvermittlung.
Nachdem also in den letzten Jahren die Institutionen, die Methoden und das Sprechen der Kunstvermittlung kritisch reflektiert und in Frage gestellt wurden, soll mit diesem Text das Möglichkeitsfeld der Kunstvermittlung von verschiedenen Seiten beleuchtet werden.
In ihrem Buch „Outside in the Teaching Machine“ fragt die postkoloniale Theoretikerin Gayatri Spivak nach Agency (Handlungsmacht) und arbeitet an einer kritischen Theorie der Handlung. Unter dem Titel „More on Power/Knowledge“⁵ liest sie Foucault mit den Theorieinstrumentarien Derridas und gewinnt dabei eine ebenso neue wie ermächtigende Perspektive auf den Wissen/Macht Nexus (Savoir/Pouvoir). Denn Pouvoir bedeutet auf französisch nicht nur Macht, sondern auch Können. Die Verbkombination savoir/pouvoir liest Spivak nun wie savoir-vivre als „sich aufs Können verstehen.“⁶Mit dieser Relektüre verändert sich der Blick wesentlich: Wissen und Macht sind nicht bloß die beiden Verhältnisse zwischen zwei Formen des Handelns, sondern stellen auch einen Raum her, in dem diese miteinander in Beziehung gesetzt werden können. In diesem Spivakschen Sinne soll mit diesem Text die Handlungsmacht mitten in einer kritischen Kunstvermittlungspraxis verortet werden.
Mit Gayatri Spivaks Lektüre von Michel Foucault eröffnet sich eine theoretische Verortung des Handelns, das niemals unschuldig ist und immer mittendrin zu operieren hat. Was ist dieses Mittendrin im Ausstellungsraum: Wie kann dieser als öffentlicher Verhandlungs- und Handlungsraum entworfen werden? Wer agiert hier mit welchen Mitteln? Und wenn es – der Argumentationslinie von Spivak folgend – keinen Außenstandpunkt und keine Vogelsperspektive des Wissens mehr gibt, dann kann Kunstvermittlung die mächtige Unterscheidung zwischen der Produktion und der Reproduktion von Wissen hinter sich lassen und zu handeln beginnen.

1. Mittendrin Handeln
Auf den ersten Blick mag es so scheinen, dass die Reflexivität, die Diskussionen über die Macht der Diskurse und die Institutionskritik das Handeln in den Hintergrund treten ließen. Vieles, was in der Vermittlung als selbstverständlich, wichtig und progressiv galt – wie zum Beispiel die Öffnung der Institutionen, die freie Assoziation von Besuchern oder der Einsatz von interaktiven Strategien der Vermittlung – wurde kritisch beleuchtet und auf seine ideologischen, hegemonialen, bürgerlich-institutionellen oder paternalistischen Strategien hin untersucht.⁷In der Folge ist der institutionelle Konstruktionscharakter von Werten, Tendenzen, Wahrheiten und Geschichten zutage getreten, so dass auch die Besucher nicht mehr als autonome Subjekte gesehen werden konnten, die es aufzuklären und zur Mündigkeit zu führen galt. Nun könnte man denken, dass wir als autonome Subjekte und unsere Vermittlungsstrategien so stark in Frage gestellt wurden, dass überhaupt niemand mehr weiß, wie angemessen zu handeln sei.
„Was können wir denn dann noch tun?“ hätte vielleicht gefragt werden können. Aber diese Frage stellte sich nicht oder vielmehr nicht auf resignierende Weise: Denn weit entfernt davon einfach zu paralysieren, hat die Reflexivität selbst zahlreiche Formen des Ausdrucks in einer Kunstvermittlung gefunden, die sich als kritische Praxis versteht.⁸Und so lässt sich feststellen, dass sich die Kritik verändert hat. Sie kann sich selbst nicht mehr auf die Position eines Außenstandpunkts zurückziehen, sondern ist genau so mitten in Diskursen und Machtverhältnissen, wie das, worauf sie sich bezieht. Kritik erfüllt dabei eine doppelte Funktion. Einerseits ist sie Kritik an etwas, andererseits umfasst die Kritik auch die eigenen Geltungsansprüche. Das heißt, der Ort, von dem aus kritisiert wird, gerät selbst in die Kritik – wird selbst verdächtig. Die Konsequenz ist eine Kritik in doppelter Hinsicht: Selbstkritik und Sozialkritik.⁹ Diese „doppelte Besetzung“ einer Kritik, die sich selbst nicht ausnimmt, bezeichnet die Theoretikerin Irit Rogoff als Kritikalität:
„In der Kritikalität haben wir diese doppelte Besetzung, in der wir sowohl vollständig mit dem Wissen der Kritik ausgerüstet und fähig zur Analyse sind, während wir zur selben Zeit die Bedingungen selbst teilen und leben, die wir durchschauen können. Insofern leben wir eine Dualität aus, die gleichzeitig sowohl einen analytischen Modus erfordert und eine Nachfrage nach der Produktion neuer Subjektivitäten, die anerkennen, dass wir das sind, was Hannah Arendt fellow sufferers nannte, jene, die gemeinsam unter denselben Bedingungen leiden, die sie kritisch untersuchen.“¹⁰Rogoff macht auch deutlich, dass Lernen damit zu tun hat, durch Lernen auseinander genommen zu werden, „da niemand etwas Neues lernt, ohne etwas Altes zu verlernen.“¹¹ Die Kunstvermittlerin Carmen Mörsch bezeichnet Kunstvermittlung in genau diesem Sinne als kritische Praxis¹²: Kunstvermittlung wird zu einem Zusammenhang der Auseinandersetzung mit Gesellschaft, mit Institutionen und mit sich selbst.
Wenn also in den letzten Jahren Kunstinstitutionen als mächtige Orte der Produktion und Festschreibung von Kanon und Werten analysiert wurden, so lässt sich doch sagen, dass gerade dort, wo der Kanon (re)produziert wird, auch etwas geschehen kann. In diesem Sinne sind Ausstellungen und Kunstinstitutionen an der Schnittstelle von Herrschaft und Befreiung angesiedelt. Sie sind strukturierte Räume der Verwaltung, aber sie bergen auch Möglichkeiten des Handelns im sozialen Raum. Und genau dort können Gegenerzählungen und Kritik stattfinden – ohne dabei jedoch völlig unschuldig zu bleiben. „You take positions in terms not of the discovery of historical or philosophical grounds, but in terms of reversing, displacing and seizing the apparatus of value-coding“¹³, schreibt Gayatri Spivak über die Rolle postkolonialer Lehrender und macht klar, dass es einen Außenstandpunkt der Kritik ebenso wenig gibt, wie die Möglichkeit, sich deshalb einer Position zu entziehen. Hier soll Kunstvermittlung als Rahmen verstanden werden, in dem das gewisse Savoir/Pouvoir wirksam werden kann, in dem mitten in den Institutionen, mitten im Wissen/Macht Nexus ein Raum entsteht, um sich aufs Können zu verstehen.

2. Sich mit dem Apparat der Wertekodierung anlegen
Institutionen und ihre Strategien – vom Sammeln, Bewahren, Forschen, Erzählen und Ausstellen bis zum Vermitteln¹⁴ – kritisch zu beleuchten, heißt demnach, auch diese als gemachte, historisch gewachsene und veränderliche wahrzunehmen, mächtige Wissensproduktion (etwa auch darüber, was als gute Kunst gilt) aktiv zu verlernen und sich also mitten im Apparat der Wertekodierung mit diesem anzulegen. Das bedeutet, andere Wissensformen nicht bloß zu hören, sondern auch zuzulassen, dass diese die bestehende Wissensordnung grundlegend befragen, angreifen und verändern können.
Dafür soll eine Dekonstruktion der Vorstellung des Dreiecks Objekt-Vermittler-Besucher stattfinden und versucht werden, einige Selbstverständnisse im Kunstfeld und Ausstellungsfeld zu verlernen: Was wäre, wenn Vermittler nicht länger diejenigen wären, die Wissen haben, und Besucher jene, die Wissen brauchen? Was wäre, wenn Vermittlungsprozesse als Räume kollektiven Handelns als Auseinandersetzung mit unterschiedlichen Wissensformen konzipiert werden würden?
Diese Perspektivierung auf Handlungsmacht öffnet den Blick für ein Veränderungspotential, das über die bloße Einladung zum Mitmachen hinausgeht, indem es die Definitionsmachtverhältnisse über das, was die Institution ist, selbst adressiert. Verstehen wir Kunstinstitutionen als öffentliche Räume, die nicht bloß für alle offen, sondern Orte von allen sein wollen, dann geht es um die Frage nach der Möglichkeit einer Veränderung. Dieser wesentliche Unterschied zwischen Partizipation in einem bloß scheinbaren oder in einem politischen Sinne wirkt sich auf das Verständnis von Vermittlung aus. Die Vermittlungstheoretikerin Carmen Mörsch unterscheidet vier verschiedene Formen der Vermittlung und spricht von affirmativen, reproduktiven, dekonstruktiven und transformativen Ansätzen der Vermittlung: Mörsch zufolge würden affirmative Ansätze das Wissen und die Werte von Institutionen frontal weitergeben, während reproduktive Methoden für den Erwerb von institutionellem Wissen und Werten eher dialogische und interaktive Mittel wählen würden. In beiden Fällen würde der institutionelle Kanon allerdings nicht hinterfragt. Dies finde vielmehr erst in der dritten Kategorie, bei den dekonstruktiven Zugängen statt. Denn diese würden Institutionen und ihre Logiken reflektieren, während erst die vierten, die transformativen Strategien noch einen Schritt weiter gehen würden: Sie hätten nämlich das Ziel, die Institutionen nicht nur zu analysieren, sondern sie auch zu verändern.¹⁵An genau dieser Stelle, an der die Vermittlung zulässt, dass etwas passieren kann, das nicht schon vorher feststeht und das gesellschaftliche und institutionelle Logiken nicht bloß hinterfragt, sondern in diese eingreift, überschreitet Kunstvermittlung den Pfad der Reflexivität und Dekonstruktion und beginnt transformativ zu werden. Unter diesen Bedingungen scheint es sinnvoll, sich Vermittlung nicht mehr als Transferleistung von Wissen, sondern vielmehr als Auseinandersetzung zwischen unterschiedlichen Wissensformen vorzustellen.

3. Objekte, die handeln
Welche Wissensformen treffen nun in Ausstellungen aufeinander? Vor dem Hintergrund der vielen kritischen Diskussionen zum „Wie“ der Vermittlung sind neben methodischen Fragen Überlegungen zum „Was“ in den letzten Jahren ein wenig in den Hintergrund geraten. Um also nicht nur die Rolle und die Arbeit von Vermittlern im Blick zu haben, soll nun auch gefragt werden, welche Rolle dabei die Objekte und die Kunst spielen können. Was wäre, wenn wir uns nicht mehr vorstellen würden, dass wir es mit wichtigen und wertvollen Objekten zu tun haben, bei deren Betrachtung die Vermittlung von Wissen stattfinden soll? Wir sind es (davon zeugen zahlreiche Katalog- und Ausstellungstexte im zeitgenössischen Kunstfeld) nur zu gewohnt, Kunstwerken einen enigmatischen Charakter zuzusprechen und uns vorzustellen, dass ihnen Bedeutung stumm innewohnt, die zwar durch Worte nicht aufgelöst, aber mit viel affirmativem Wissen über Ikonografien, Kontexte, Tendenzen, Theorien und Diskussionen doch zumindest in ihrer Mehrdeutigkeit „ausgelotet“¹⁶ werden kann. Hier soll nun vorgeschlagen werden, in der Auseinandersetzung die künstlerischen Arbeiten in Ausstellungen weniger auratisch aufgeladen oder als Rätsel zu behandeln, sondern diese selbst als Akteure zu verstehen, die innerhalb von Machtverhältnissen und Deutungshoheiten in ihrer Materialität, Geschichte und Positioniertheit handeln.
Mit der These, dass Dinge handeln, hat in den letzten Jahren der französische Soziologe Bruno Latour von sich Reden gemacht. Er geht davon aus, dass die Dinge Akteure sind und fragt: „Wie könnte eine objektorientierte Demokratie aussehen?“¹⁷ Er macht deutlich, dass die Vorstellung eines bloß konstruierenden Zugriffs auf die Dinge eine moderne Konstruktion des Zeitalters der Ordnung und Klassifizierung ist. Er schlägt vor, die Dinge selbst als Handelnde innerhalb von Netzwerken zu verstehen und schreibt: „Verfahren der Autorisierung und Legitimation sind wichtig. Doch sie sind nur die Hälfte dessen, was nötig ist, um sich zu versammeln. Die andere Hälfte liegt in den Streitfragen selbst, in den Sachen, die zählen, in der res, die ein Publikum um sich schafft. Sie müssen innerhalb der relevanten Versammlung repräsentiert, autorisiert, legitimiert und geltend gemacht werden.“¹⁸ Für Latour sind Objekte also nicht nur Gegenstand von Konstruktionen, sie selbst sind es, die handeln, etwas aufzwingen, in etwas hineinziehen, sich nicht um Regeln scheren, wiederum auch selbst geregelt werden und nach Positionierung verlangen.
Angelehnt an Latours Theoretisierung von Objekten als Akteure soll hier vorgeschlagen werden, künstlerischen Arbeiten in Ausstellungen Handlungsmacht zuzuschreiben. Nun ist das Dreieck vollends aufgelöst, der Blick ein Stück auf die Seite gerückt, und Vermittlung erscheint als Situation, in der Handlungen geschehen und Dinge außer Rand und Band geraten können.
Vermittlung könnte auf diese Weise als Versammlung in einem öffentlichen Raum verstanden werden, bei der unterschiedliche Akteure und Wissensformen aufeinandertreffen: das Wissen der Objekte und der Kunstwerke, das Wissen der Institution sowie das Wissen der Besucher und Vermittler. Selbstverständlich sind nicht alle Wissensformen gleich legitimiert. Aber so wie die Lage der Legitimation gerade jetzt steht, war es nicht immer und muss es auch nicht notwendigerweise bleiben. Und das macht doch Lust auf das gewisse Savoir/Pouvoir…

Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien zuerst in: ADKV (Hg.): Collaboration. Vermittlung.Kunst.Verein. Ein Modellprojekt zur zeitgemäßen Kunstvermittlung an Kunstvereinen in Nordrhein-Westfalen 2008–2009. Köln: Salon-Verlag 2012, S. 28–33.

1.)Vgl. etwa Mörsch, Carmen u. a. (Hg.): Kunstvermittlung 2. Zwischen kritischer Praxis und Dienstleistung auf der documenta 12. Berlin 2009. Oder: Schnittpunkt (Hg.): Wer spricht? Autorität und Autorschaft in Ausstellungen. Wien 2005.
2.)Vgl. Vergo, Peter: The New Museology. London 1989.
3.)Vgl. etwa Welchmann, John C. (Hg.): Institutional Critique and After. Zürich 2006. Oder: Fraser, Andrea: Was ist Institutionskritik? In: Texte zur Kunst 59/15 (2005). S. 86–89.
4.)Mit Wissen/Macht Nexus ist hier die Schnittstelle von Wissen und Macht im Diskurs bezeichnet, wie sie Michel Foucault in seinem Gesamtwerk jeweils aus unterschiedlicher Perspektive beleuchtet hat. Damit unterscheidet sich Kunstvermittlung nicht eigentlich von allen anderen gesellschaftlichen Diskursen – denn Wissen und Macht sind ja die beiden miteinander verwobenen Aspekte, die das Denken Michel Foucaults ausmachen und durch die alles, was sagbar und denkbar ist, bestimmt ist (von der Kategorisierung über Disziplin und Normierung bis zum Widerstand).
5.)Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty: Outside in the Teaching Machine. New York/London 1993. S. 25–51.
6.)Ebd.: Being able to do something. S. 34.
7.)Vgl. Sternfeld, Nora: Der Taxispielertrick. Vermittlung zwischen Selbstregulierung und Selbstermächtigung. In: Schnittpunkt (Hg.): Wer spricht? Autorität und Autorschaft in Ausstellungen. Wien 2005. S. 15–33. Sowie: Marchart, Oliver: Die Institution spricht; ebd. S. 34–58.
8.)Viele schöne Beispiele dafür liefern die beiden Forschungsbände zur Kunstvermittlung auf der documenta 12: Güleç, Ayse u. a. (Hg.): Kunstvermittlung 1, Arbeit mit dem Publikum, Öffnung der Institution. Sowie: Mörsch, Carmen u. a. (Hg.): Kunstvermittlung 2. Zwischen kritischer Praxis und Dienstleistung auf der documenta 12. Berlin 2009.
9.)Ebd., S. 53.
10.)Rogoff, Irit: Vom Kritizismus über die Kritik zur Kritikalität. In: translate webjournal 8 (2006), http://eipcp.net/transversal/0806/rogoff1/de [15.02.2008].
11.)Ebd.
12.)„Spannend wird’s, wo es schwierig wird“ – Interview mit Carmen Mörsch, http://www.documenta12.de/index.php?id=1112 [7. 11. 2009].
13.)Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty: Outside in the Teaching Machine. New York/London 1993. S. 63.
14.)Ich beziehe mich hier bewusst auf die musealen Aufgaben, wie sie in den Statuten von ICOM 2001 festgehalten wurden, in etwas abgewandelter Form. Dort steht: „A museum is a non-profit, permanent institution in the service of society and its development, open to the public, which acquires, conserves, researches, communicates and exhibits the tangible and intangible heritage of humanity and its environment for the purposes of education, study and enjoyment“, http://icom.museum/statutes.html# [7.11.2009]. Wenn Kunstvereine sich als öffentliche Räume verstehen möchten, dann stellt sich die Frage, welche der musealen Aspekte für sie wichtig und gültig sind und welche nicht. Zur Öffentlichkeit gehört jedoch Jürgen Habermas zufolge die Perspektivierung auf Alle. Für Habermas stellt die Verbindung von Öffentlichkeit mit Allgemeinheit eine notwendige Voraussetzung für diese dar: „Die bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit steht und fällt mit dem Prinzip des allgemeinen Zugangs. Eine Öffentlichkeit, von der angebbare Gruppen eo ipso ausgeschlossen wären, ist nicht etwa nur unvollständig, sie ist vielmehr gar keine Öffentlichkeit.“ (Habermas, Jürgen: Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Frankfurt am Main 1990. S. 156).
15.)Vgl. Mörsch, Carmen: Am Kreuzungspunkt von vier Diskursen: Die documenta 12 Vermittlung zwischen Affirmation, Reproduktion, Dekonstruktion und Transformation. In: Mörsch, Carmen u. a. (Hg.): Kunstvermittlung 2. Zwischen kritischer Praxis und Dienstleistung auf der documenta 12. Berlin 2009. S. 9–33.
16.)Ein sehr beliebtes Wort in Ausstellungstexten.
17.)Latour, Bruno: Von der Realpolitik zur Dingpolitik. Berlin 2005. S. 10.
18.)Vgl. Lash, Scott: Objekte, die urteilen: Latours Parlament der Dinge. In: http://translate.eipcp.net/transversal/0107/lash/de [7. 11. 2009].

FREE

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:45 +0000

– Who wants to know? – I want to know.
– What do you want to know? – I don’t know!

At some point last year I proposed within my institution, Goldsmiths, University of London, that we develop a free academy adjacent to our institution and call it “Goldsmiths Free.” The reactions to this proposal, when not amused smirks at the apparently adolescent nature of the proposal, were largely either puzzled – “What would we get out of it? Why would we want to do it?” – or horrified – “How would it finance itself?” No one asked what might be taught or discussed within it and how that might differ from the intellectual work that is done within our conventional fee-charging, degree-giving, research-driven institution. And that of course was the point, that it would be different, not just in terms of redefining the point of entry into the structure (free of fees and previous qualifications) or the modus operandi of the work (not degree-based, unexamined, not subject to the state’s mechanisms of monitoring and assessment), but also that the actual knowledge would be differently situated within it. And that is what I want to think about here, about the difference in the knowledge itself, its nature, its status, and its affect.
The kind of knowledge that interested me in this proposal to the university was one that was not framed by disciplinary and thematic orders, a knowledge that would instead be presented in relation to an urgent issue, and not an issue as defined by knowledge conventions, but by the pressures and struggles of contemporaneity. When knowledge is unframed, it is less grounded genealogically and can navigate forwards rather than backwards. This kind of “unframed” knowledge obviously had a great deal to do with what I had acquired during my experiences in the art world, largely a set of permissions with regard to knowledge and a recognition of its performative faculties – that knowledge does rather than is. But the permissions I encountered in the art world came with their own set of limitations, a tendency to reduce the complex operations of speculation to either illustration or to a genre that would visually exemplify “study” or “research.” Could there be, I wondered, another mode in which knowledge might be set free without having to perform such generic mannerisms, without becoming an aesthetic trope in the hands of curators hungry for the latest “turn”?
Heads will surely be shaken! The notion of “free” is currently so degraded in terms of the free market, the dubious proposals of the new “free” economy of the internet, and the historically false promises of individual freedom, that it may be difficult to see what it might have to offer beyond all these hollow slogans. Nevertheless, the possibility of producing some interrogative proximity between “knowledge” and “free” seems both unavoidable and irresistible, particularly in view of the present struggles over the structures of education in Europe.
The actual drive towards knowledge and therefore towards some form of expansion and transformation seems far more important than simply a discussion of the categories it operates within. In order to attempt such a transition I need to think about several relevant questions:
1. First and foremost, what is knowledge when it is “free“?
2. Whether there are sites, such as the spaces of art, in which knowledge might be more “free” than in others?
3. What are the institutional implications of housing knowledge that is “free”?
4. What are the economies of “free” that might prove an alternative to the market- and outcome-based and comparison-driven economies of institutionally structured knowledge at present?
Evidently, en route I need to think about the struggles over education, its alternative sitings, the types of emergent economies that might have some purchase on its rethinking, and, finally, how “education” might be perceived as an alternative organizational mode, not of information, of formal knowledges and their concomitant marketing, but as other forms of coming together not predetermined by outcomes but by directions. Here I have in mind some process of “knowledge singularization,” which I will discuss further below.
Obviously it is not the romance of liberation that I have in mind here in relation to “free.” Knowledge cannot be “liberated,” it is endlessly embedded in long lines of transformations that link in inexplicable ways to produce new conjunctions. Nor do I have in mind the romance of “avant-garde” knowledge, with its oppositional modes of “innovation” as departure and breach. Nor am I particularly interested in what has been termed “interdisciplinarity,” which, with its intimations of movement and “sharing” between disciplines, de facto leaves intact those membranes of division and logics of separation and containment. Nor, finally, and I say this with some qualification, is my main aim here to undo the disciplinary and professional categories that have divided and isolated bodies of knowledge from one another in order to promote a heterogeneous field populated by “bodies” of knowledge akin to the marketing strategies that ensure choice and multiplicity and dignify the practices of epistemological segregation by producing endless new subcategories for inherited bodies of named and contained knowledge.
There is a vexed relation between freedom, individuality, and sovereignty that has a particular relevance for the arena being discussed here, as knowledge and education have a foothold both in processes of individuation and in processes of socialization. Hannah Arendt expressed this succinctly when she warned that
Politically, this identification of freedom with sovereignty is perhaps the most pernicious and dangerous consequence of the philosophical equation of freedom and free will. For it leads either to a denial of human freedom – namely, if it is realized that whatever men may be, they are never sovereign – or to the insight that the freedom of one man, or a group, or a body politic, can only be purchased at the price of the freedom, i. e. the sovereignty, of all others. Within the conceptual framework of traditional philosophy, it is indeed very difficult to understand how freedom and non-sovereignty can exist together or, to put it another way, how freedom could have been given to men under the conditions of non-sovereignty.¹
And in the final analysis it is my interest to get around both concepts, freedom and sovereignty, through the operations of “singularization.” Perhaps it is knowledge de-individuated, de-radicalized in the conventional sense of the radical as breach, and yet operating within the circuits of singularity – of “the new relational mode of the subject” – that is preoccupying me in this instance.
And so, the task at hand seems to me to be not one of liberation from confinement, but rather one of undoing the very possibilities of containment.
While an unbounded circulation of capital, goods, information, hegemonic alliances, populist fears, newly globalized uniform standards of excellence, and so forth, are some of the hallmarks of the late neoliberal phase of capitalism, we nevertheless can not simply equate every form of the unbounded and judge them all as equally insidious. “Free“ in relation to knowledge, it seems to me, has its power less in its expansion than in an ultimately centripetal movement, less in a process of penetrating and colonizing everywhere and everything in the relentless mode of capital, than in reaching unexpected entities and then drawing them back, mapping them onto the field of perception.

STRUGGLES
In spring and autumn of 2009 a series of prolonged strikes erupted across Austria and Germany, the two European countries whose indigenous education systems have been hardest hit by the reorganization of the Bologna Accord; smaller strikes also took place in France, Italy, and Belgium.² At the center of the students’ protests were the massive cuts in education budgets across the board and the revision of state budgets within the current economic climate, which made youth and the working class bear the burden of support for failing financial institutions.
The strikes were unified by common stands on three issues:
1. against fees for higher education
2. against the increasing limitation of access to selection in higher education
3. for re-democratization of the universities and re-inclusion of students in decision-making processes
Not only were these the largest and most organized strikes to have been held by school and university students since the 1980s, but they also included teachers, whose pay had been reduced and whose working hours had been extended, which, after considerable pressure from below, eventually moved the trade unions to take a position.
The concerns here were largely structural and procedural, and considering all that is at stake in these reorganizations of the education system, it is difficult to know what to privilege in our concern: the reformulation of institutions into regimented factories for packaged knowledge that can easily be placed within the marketplace; the processes of knowledge acquisition that are reduced to the management of formulaic outcomes that are comparable across cultures and contexts; “training“ replacing “speculating“; the dictation of such shifts from above and without any substantive consultation or debate. All of these are significant steps away from criticality in spaces of education and towards the goal that all knowledge have immediate, transparent, predictable, and pragmatic application.
The long, substantive lines that connect these struggles to their predecessors over the past forty years or so, and which constitute “education” as both an ongoing political platform and the heart of many radical artistic practices, are extremely well articulated in a conversation between Marion von Osten and Eva Egermann, in which von Osten says of her projects such as “reformpause”:
Firstly, I tried to create a space to pause, to hold on for a moment, to take a breath and to think – to think about what kinds of change might be possible; about how and what we might wish to learn; and why that which we wished to learn might be needed. I guess, in this way, both Manoa Free University and “reformpause” shared similar goals – not simply to critique the ongoing educational reforms and thereby legitimize established structures, but rather to actively engage in thinking about alternate concepts and possible change.
Secondly, there is a long history of student struggles and the question arises as to whether or not these are still relevant today and, if they are, how and why? The recent student struggles did not simply originate with the Bologna Declaration. The genealogy of various school and university protests and struggles over the past forty years demonstrates that we live in an era of educational reforms which, since the 1960s, have led to the construction of a new political subjectivity, the “knowledge worker.” This is not just a phenomenon of the new millennium; furthermore, many artistic practices from the 1960s and 1970s relate to this re-ordering of knowledge within Western societies. This is one of the many reasons why we so readily relate to these practices, as exemplified by conceptualism and the various ways in which conceptual artists engaged with contemporary changes in the concepts of information and communication.³
All of this identifies hugely problematic and very urgent issues, but we cannot lose sight of the status of actual knowledge formations within these. When knowledge is not geared towards “production,” it has the possibility of posing questions that combine the known and the imagined, the analytical and the experiential, and which keep stretching the terrain of knowledge so that it is always just beyond the border of what can be conceptualized.
These are questions in which the conditions of knowledge are always internal to the concepts it is entertaining, not as a context but as a limit to be tested. The entire critical epistemology developed by Foucault and by Derrida rested on questions that always contain a perception of their own impossibility, a consciousness of thinking as a process of unthinking something that is fully aware of its own status. The structural, the techniques, and the apparatuses, could never be separated from the critical interrogation of concepts. As Giorgio Agamben says of Foucault’s concept of the apparatus:
The proximity of this term to the theological dispositio, as well as to Foucault’s apparatuses, is evident. What is common to all these terms is that they refer back to this oikonomia, that is, to a set of practices, bodies of knowledge, measures, and institutions that aim to manage, govern, control, and orient – in a way that purports to be useful – the behaviors, gestures, and thoughts of human beings.⁴
So the struggle facing education is precisely that of separating thought from its structures, a struggle constantly informed by tensions between thought management and subjectification – the frictions by which we turn ourselves into subjects. As Foucault argued, this is the difference between the production of subjects in “power/knowledge” and those processes of self-formation in which the person is active. It would seem then that the struggle in education arises from tensions between conscious inscription into processes of self-formation and what Foucault, speaking of his concerns with scientific classification, articulated as the subsequent and necessary “insurrection of subjugated knowledges,” in which constant new voices appear claiming themselves not as “identities,” but as events within knowledge.⁵ The argument that Isabelle Stengers makes about her own political formation has convinced me that this is a productive direction to follow in trying to map out knowledge as struggle:
My own intellectual and political life has been marked by what I learned from the appearance of drugs users’ groups claiming that they were “citizens like everyone else,“ and fighting against laws that were officially meant to “protect“ them. The efficacy of this new collective voice, relegating to the past what had been the authorized, consensual expertise legitimating the “war on drugs,“ convinced me that such events were “political events“ par excellence, producing – as, I discovered afterwards, Dewey had already emphasized – both new political struggle and new important knowledge. I even proposed that what we call democracy could be evaluated by its relation to those disrupting collective productions. A “true“ democracy would demand the acceptance of the ongoing challenge of such disruptions – would not only accept them but also acknowledge those events as something it depended upon.⁶
Knowledge as disruption, knowledge as counter-subjugation, knowledge as constant exhortation to its own, often uncomfortable implications, are at the heart of “struggle.” The battle over education as we are experiencing it now does not find its origin in the desire to suppress these but rather in efforts to regulate them so that they work in tandem with the economies of cognitive capitalism.

ECONOMIES
The economies of the world of knowledge have shifted quite dramatically over the past ten to fifteen years. What had been a fairly simple subsidy model, with states covering the basic expenses of teaching, subsidizing home schooling on a per capita basis (along with private entities incorporated in “not -for-profit” structures); research councils and foundations covering the support of research in the humanities and pure sciences; and industry supporting applied research, has changed quite dramatically, as have the traditional outlets for such knowledge: scholarly journals and books, exhibitions, science-based industry, the military, and public services such as agriculture and food production. Knowledge, at present, is not only enjoined to be “transferable” (to move easily between paradigms so that its potential impact will be transparent from the outset) and to invent new and ever expanding outlets for itself, it must also contend with the prevalent belief that it should be obliged not only to seek out alternative sources of funding but actually to produce these. By producing the need for a particular type of knowledge one is also setting up the means of its excavation or invention – this is therefore a “need-based” culture of knowledge that produces the support and the market through itself.
So, when I speak of a “free” academy, the question has to be posed: if it is to meet all the above requirements, namely, that it not be fee-charging, not produce applied research, not function within given fields of expertise, and not consider itself in terms of applied “outcomes,” how would it be funded?
In terms of the internet, the economic model of “free“ that has emerged over the past decade initially seemed to be an intensification or a contemporary perpetuation of what had been called by economists, the “cross-subsidy“ model: you’d get one thing free if you bought another, or you’d get a product free only if you paid for a service. This primary model was then expanded by the possibilities of ever increasing access to the internet, married to constantly lowered costs in the realm of digital technologies.
A second trend is simply that anything that touches digital networks quickly feels the effect of falling costs. And so it goes, too, for everything from banking to gambling, check it out! The moment a company’s primary expenses become things based in silicon, free becomes not just an option but also the inevitable destination.⁷ The cost of actually circulating something within these economies becomes lower and lower, until cost is no longer the primary index of its value.
A third aspect of this emergent economic model is perhaps the one most relevant to this discussion of education. Here the emphasis is on a shift from an exclusive focus on buyers and sellers, producers and consumers, to a tripartite model, in which the third element that enters does so based on its interest in the exchange taking place between the first two elements – an interest to which it contributes financially. In the traditional media model, a publisher provides a product free (or nearly free) to consumers, and advertisers pay to ride along. Radio is “free to air,” and so is much of television. Likewise, newspaper and magazine publishers don’t charge readers anything close to the actual cost of creating, printing, and distributing their products. They’re not selling papers and magazines to readers, they’re selling readers to advertisers. It’s a three-way market.
In a sense, what the Web represents is the extension of the media business model to industries of all sorts. This is not simply the notion that advertising will pay for everything. There are dozens of ways that media companies make money around free content, from selling information about consumers to brand licensing, “value-added“ subscriptions, and direct e-commerce. Now an entire ecosystem of Web companies is growing up around the same set of models.⁸
The question is whether this model of a “free” economy is relevant to my proposal for a free “academy,” given that in an economic model the actual thing in circulation is not subject to much attention except as it appeals to a large public and their ostensible needs. Does this model have any potential for criticality or for an exchange that goes beyond consumption? Novelist, activist, and technology commentator Cory Doctorow claims that there’s a pretty strong case to be made that “free” has some inherent antipathy to capitalism. That is, information that can be freely reproduced at no marginal cost may not want, need or benefit from markets as a way of organizing them. . . . Indeed, there’s something eerily Marxist in this phenomenon, in that it mirrors Marx’s prediction of capitalism’s ability to create a surplus of capacity that can subsequently be freely shared without market forces’ brutality.⁹
The appealing part of the economy of “free” for debates about education is its unpredictability in throwing up new spheres of interest and new congregations around them. It has some small potential for shifting the present fixation on the direct relation between fees, training, applied research, organization-as-management, predictable outputs and outcomes, and the immediate consumption of knowledge. This however seems a very narrow notion of criticality as it is limited to the production of a surplus within knowledge and fails to take on the problems of subjectification. And it is the agency of subjectification and its contradictory multiplicity that is at the heart of a preoccupation with knowledge in education, giving it its traction as it were, what Foucault called “the lived multiplicity of positionings.” The internet-based model of “free” does break the direct relation between buyers and sellers, which in the current climate of debates about education, in the context of what Nick Dyer-Witheford has called “Academia Inc.,” is certainly welcome. But it does not expand the trajectory of participation substantively, merely reducing the act of taking part in this economy of use and exchange. The need to think of a “market” for the disruption of paradigms emerges as an exercise in futility and as politically debilitating. To think again with Agamben:
Contemporary societies therefore present themselves as inert bodies going through massive processes of desubjectification without acknowledging any real subjectification. Hence the eclipse of politics, which used to presuppose the existence of subjects and real identities (the workers’ movement, the bourgeoisie, etc.), and the triumph of the oikonomia, that is to say, of a pure activity of government that aims at nothing other than its own replication.¹⁰
What then would be the sites of conscious subjectification within this amalgam of education and creative practices?

SITES
Over the past two decades we have seen a proliferation of self-organized structures that take the form, with regard to both their investigations and effects, of sites of learning.¹¹ These have, more than any other initiative, collapsed the divisions between sites of formal academic education and those of creative practice, display, performance, and activism. In these spaces the previously clear boundaries between universities, academies, museums, galleries, performance spaces, NGOs, and political organizations, lost much of their visibility and efficaciousness. Of course, virtually every European city still has at least one if not several vast “entertainment machine” institutions, traditional museums that see their task as one of inviting the populace to partake of “art” in the most conventional sense and perceive “research” to be largely about themselves (to consist, that is, in the seemingly endless conferences that are held each year on “the changing role of the museum”). These institutions however no longer define the parameters of the field and serve more as indices of consumption, market proximities, and scholastic inertia.
What does knowledge do when it circulates in other sites such as the art world?
As Eva Egermann says:
Of course, the art field was seen as a place in which things could happen, a field of potential, a space of exchange between different models and concepts and, in the sense of learning and unlearning, a field of agency and transfer between different social and political fields and between different positions and subjectivities. In a way, the exhibition functioned as a pretext, a defined place for communication and action that would perhaps establish impulses for further transformations. So, the project functioned as an expanded field of practice from which to organize and network between many different groups, but also to question and experiment with methods of representation and distribution for collective artistic research. We wanted to disseminate our research for collective usage through various means, such as the study circle itself, a wiki, publications and readers and through the model of a free university.¹²
More than any other sphere, the spaces of contemporary art that open themselves to this kind of alternative activity of learning and knowledge production, and see in it not an occasional indulgence but their actual daily business, have become the sites of some of the most important redefinitions of knowledge that circulate today.
As sites, they have marked the shift from “Ivory Towers” of knowledge to spaces of interlocution, with in between a short phase as “laboratories.” As a dialogical practice based on questioning, on agitating the edges of paradigms and on raising external points of view, interlocution takes knowledge back to a Socratic method but invests its operations with acknowledged stakes and interests, rather than being a set of formal proceedings. It gives a performative dimension to the belief argued earlier through the work of Foucault and Derrida, that knowledge always has at its edges the active process of its own limits and its own invalidation.
In setting up knowledge production within the spaces and sites of art, one also takes up a set of permissions that are on offer. Recognizing who is posing questions, where they are speaking from, and from where they know what they know, becomes central rather than, as is typical, marginal qualifications often relegated to footnotes. Permission is equally granted to start in the middle without having to rehearse the telos of an argument; to start from “right here and right now” and embed issues in a variety of contexts, expanding their urgency; to bring to these arguments a host of validations, interventions, asides, and exemplifications that are not recognized as directly related or as sustaining provable knowledge. And, perhaps most importantly, “the curatorial,” not as a profession but as an organizing and assembling impulse, opens up a set of possibilities, mediations perhaps, to formulate subjects that may not be part of an agreed-upon canon of “subjects” worthy of investigation. So knowledge in the art world, through a set of permissions that do not recognize the academic conventions for how one arrives at a subject, can serve both the purposes of reframing and producing subjects in the world.
Finally, I would argue that knowledge in the art world has allowed us to come to terms with partiality – with the fact that our field of knowing is always partially comprehensible, the problems that populate it are partially visible, and our arguments are only partially inhabiting a recognizable logic. Under no illusions as to its comprehensiveness, knowledge as it is built up within the spaces of art makes relatively modest claims for plotting out the entirety of a problematic, accepting instead that it is entering in the middle and illuminating some limited aspects, all the while making clear its drives in doing so.¹³
And it is here, in these spaces, that one can ground the earlier argument that the task at hand in thinking through “free“ is not one of liberation from confinement, but rather one of undoing the very possibilities of containment. It is necessary to understand that containment is not censure but rather half acknowledges acts of framing and territorializing.

VECTORS
In conjunction with the sites described above it is also direction and circulation that help in opening up “knowledge” to new perceptions of its mobility.
How can we think of “education” as circulations of knowledge and not as the top-down or down-up dynamics in which there is always a given, dominant direction for the movement of knowledge? The direction of the knowledge determines its mode of dissemination: if it is highly elevated and canonized then it is structured in a particular, hierarchical way, involving original texts and commentaries on them; if it is experiential then it takes the form of narrative and description in a more lateral form; and if it is empirical then the production of data categories, vertical and horizontal, would dominate its argument structures even when it is speculating on the very experience of excavating and structuring that knowledge.¹⁴
While thinking about this essay I happened to hear a segment of a radio program called The Bottom Line, a weekly BBC program about business entrepreneurs I had never encountered before. In it a businessman was talking about his training; Geoff Quinn the chief executive of clothing manufacturer T. M. Lewin said he had not had much education and went into clothing retailing at the age of sixteen, “but then I discovered the stock room – putting things in boxes, making lists, ordering the totality of the operation.”¹⁵ He spoke of the stockroom, with a certain sense of wonder, as the site in which everything came together, where the bits connected and made sense, less a repository than a launch pad for a sartorial world of possibilities. The idea that the “stockroom” could be an epiphany, could be someone’s education, was intriguing and I tried to think it out a bit … part Foucauldian notion of scientific classification and part Simondon’s pragmatic transductive thought about operations rather than meanings – the “stockroom” is clearly a perspective, an early recognition of the systemic and the interconnected, and a place from which to see the “big picture.” While the “stockroom” may be a rich and pleasing metaphor, it is also a vector, along which a huge range of manufacturing technologies, marketing strategies, and advertising campaigns meet up with labor histories and those of raw materials, with print technologies and internet disseminations, with the fantasmatic investments in clothes and their potential to renew us.
Therefore what if “education” – the complex means by which knowledges are disseminated and shared – could be thought of as a vector, as a quantity (force or velocity, for example), made up of both direction and magnitude? A powerful horizontality that looks at the sites of education as convergences of drives to knowledge that are in themselves knowledge? Not in the sense of formally inherited, archived, and transmitted knowledges but in the sense that ambition “knows” and curiosity “knows” and poverty “knows” – they are modes of knowing the world and their inclusion or their recognition as events of knowledge within the sites of education make up not the context of what goes on in the classroom or in the space of cultural gathering, but the content.
Keller Easterling in her exceptionally interesting book Enduring Innocence builds on Arjun Appadurai’s notion of “imagined worlds” as “the multiple worlds that are constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups spread around the globe … these mixtures create variegated scapes described as “mediascapes and “ethnoscapes.” Which, says Easterling, by “naturalizing the migration and negotiation of traveling cultural forms allows these thinkers [such as Appadurai] to avoid impossible constructs about an authentic locality.”¹⁶ From Easterling’s work I have learned to understand such sites as located forms of “intelligence” – both information and stealth formation. To recognize the operations of “the network” in relation to structures of knowledge in which no linearity could exist and the direct relation between who is in the spaces of learning, the places to which they are connected, the technologies that close the gaps in those distances, the unexpected and unpredictable points of entry that they might have, the fantasy projections that might have brought them there – all agglomerate as sites of knowledge.
We might be able to look at these sites and spaces of education as ones in which long lines of mobility, curiosity, epistemic hegemony, colonial heritages, urban fantasies, projections of phantom professionalization, new technologies of both formal access and less formal communication, a mutual sharing of information, and modes of knowledge organization, all come together in a heady mix – that is the field of knowledge and from it we would need to go outwards to combine all of these as actual sites of knowledge and produce a vector.
Having tried to deconstruct as many discursive aspects of what “free” might mean in relation to knowledge, in relation to my hoped-for-academy, I think that what has come about is the understanding of “free” in a non-liberationist vein, away from the binaries of confinement and liberty, rather as the force and velocity by which knowledge and our imbrication in it, move along. That its comings-together are our comings-together and not points in a curriculum, rather along the lines of the operations of “singularity” that enact the relation of “the human to a specifiable horizon” through which meaning is derived, as Jean-Luc Nancy says.¹⁷ Singularity provides us with another model of thinking relationality, not as external but as loyal to a logic of its own self-organization. Self-organization links outwardly not as identity, interest, or affiliation, but as a mode of coexistence in space. To think “knowledge” as the working of singularity is actually to decouple it from the operational demands put on it, to open it up to processes of multiplication and of links to alternate and unexpected entities, to animate it through something other than critique or defiance – perhaps as “free.”

Wiederabdruck
Dieser Text erschien zuerst in: e-flux Journal, Education Actualized, #14, 03/2010 unter: http://www.e-flux.com/journal/free/ [07.06.2013].

1.) Hannah Arendt, “What is Freedom?” Chapter VI “Revolution and Preservation” in The Portable Hannah Arendt, (ed. Peter R. Baehr) (Penguin, London:, Penguin, 2000), 455.
2.) See Dietrich Lemke’s “Mourning Bologna” in this issue, http://e-flux.com/journal/view/123.
3.) Marion von Osten and Eva Egermann, “Twist and Shout,” in Curating and the Educational Turn: 2, eds. Paul O’Neill and Mick Wilson (London: Open Editions; Amsterdam: de Appel, forthcoming).
4.) Giorgio Agamben, “What is an Apparatus?” in What is an Apparatus? and Other Essays, eds. and trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 12.
5.) Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper (London: Harvester, 1980), 81.
6.) Isabelle Stengers, “Experimenting with Refrains: Subjectivity and the Challenge of Escaping Modern Dualism,” in Subjectivity 22 (2008): 38–59.
7.) This is Chris Anderson’s argument in Free: The Future of a Radical Price (New York: Random House, 2009).
8.) See http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/16-03/ff_free.
9.) See Cory Doctorow, “Chris Anderson‘s Free adds much to The Long Tail, but falls short, “ Guardian (July 28, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/blog/2009/jul/28/cory-doctorow-free-chris-anderson.
10.) Agamben, “What is an Apparatus?” 22.
11.) See for example: Copenhagen Free University, http://www.copenhagenfreeuniversity.dk/freeutv.html Universidad Nómada, http://www.sindominio.net/unomada/ Facoltà di Fuga, http://www.rekombinant.org/fuga/index.php
The Independent Art School, http://www.independent-art-school.org.uk/ Informal Universityin Foundation, http://www.jackie-inhalt.net/
Mobilized Investigation, http://manifestor.org/mi
Minciu Sodas, http://www.ms.lt/ , including http://www.cyfranogi.com/, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/backtotheroot/, http://www.onevillage.biz/
Pirate University, http://www.pirate-university.org/
Autonomous University of Lancaster, http://www.knowledgelab.org
Das Solidarische Netzwerk für offene Bildung (s.n.o.b.), Marburg (Germany), http://deu.anarchopedia.org/snob
The Free/Slow University of Warsaw, http://www.wuw2009.pl/
The University of Openness, http://p2pfoundation.net/University_of_Openness
Manoa Free University, http://www.manoafreeuniversity.org/
L’université Tangente, http://utangente.free.fr/
12.) Von Osten and Egermann, “Twist and Shout.”
13.) See Irit Rogoff, “Smuggling – An Embodied Criticality, “ available on the website of the European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies,
http://eipcp.net/dlfiles/rogoff-smuggling.
14.) See Lisa Adkins and Celia Lury, “What is the Empirical?” European Journal of Social Theory 12, no. 1 (February 2009): 5–20.
15.) Geoff Quinn, interview by Evan Davis, The Bottom Line, BBC, February 18, 2010, available online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00qps85#synopsis
16.) Keller Easterling, Enduring Innocence: Global Architecture and its Masquerades (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005), 3.
17.) Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), xi.

Regenerative Kunst und die Ausbildung sozialer Werte

admin — Thu, 12 Sep 2013 12:42:45 +0000

Wie lässt sich die Idee einer Gesellschaft aus einer künstlerischen Perspektive entwickeln, die den Anspruch erhebt, diskursiv, übergreifend, eingreifend und verbindend in die soziale Lebenswelt zu wirken? In einer Welt, die sich zunehmend ihrer existenziellen Risiken bewusst wird, müssen Wachstum und Wohlstand neu interpretiert und neue Wachstumsindikatoren definiert werden. Die größten gegenwärtigen gesellschaftlichen Herausforderungen, also Klimawandel, Energiewende und schonender Umgang mit globalen Ressourcen werden zum künstlerischen Themenfeld. Dabei haben künstlerische Projekte die Möglichkeit, Genregrenzen zu überschreiten, Fachdiskurse zu verbinden und neue Blickwinkel zu ermöglichen.

Die (Re)Sozialisierung der Kunst
Was kann Kunst zu gesellschaftlichen Transformationen beitragen? Resozialisierung von zeitgenössischer Kunst bedeutet vor allem die Auseinandersetzung und das Agieren innerhalb der Gesellschaft als Teil des künstlerischen Handelns. Resozialisierung kann deshalb auch als Repolitisierung verstanden werden. Sie fordert von der Kunst die Rückgewinnung eines Verhältnisses zur gesellschaftlichen Realität als die Voraussetzung für politische Handlungsfähigkeit und soziale Befreiung. Sie erfordert verantwortungsvolles Handeln und ein kritisches Bewusstsein der Akteure. REINIGUNGSGESELLSCHAFT betrachtet die Herstellung sozialer Praxis aus dem Blickwinkel ihrer Anwendbarkeit. Praxis bedeutet hier bewusstes Handeln. Bei der Betrachtung dieses Handlungskonzeptes sind nicht nur die Auswirkungen auf die Gesellschaft von Bedeutung, sondern auch die Rückwirkungen.
REINIGUNGSGESELLSCHAFT agiert als Forum, das gesellschaftliche Denk- und Handlungsräume interdisziplinär vereint. Mit den Projekten der RG werden emanzipatorische Prozesse für alle Beteiligten bewusst gemacht und damit Voraussetzungen für gesellschaftliche Erneuerungen geschaffen. Die RG drückt diese Zielsetzung in ihrem Namen aus und versteht unter Reinigung den Prozess der Erneuerung. Künstlerinnen und Künstler werden zu Akteuren im gesellschaftlichen Prozess, ihre Aktivitäten tangieren verschiedene Lebensbereiche. Diese Definition besagt, dass Kunst die Aufgabe hat, Teil einer öffentlichen Wertedebatte zu sein und zu gesellschaftlichen Transformationsprozessen beizutragen. Künstlerische Praxis wird zum sozialen Prozess und fügt politischen, wirtschaftlichen und wissenschaftlichen Diskursen eine zusätzliche Dimension hinzu. Es werden Handlungskonzepte entwickelt, die sich auf strukturelle Weise mit ökonomischen und sozialen Verhältnissen beschäftigen.
REINIGUNGSGESELLSCHAFT löst das Konzept Autorenschaft durch einen integrierenden Arbeitsansatz auf. Partner in den verschiedenen Projekten werden zu emanzipierten Protagonisten. Alle teilnehmenden Personen haben die Möglichkeit, ihre Erfahrungen und Vorstellungen mit einzubringen. Die Möglichkeit der direkten Partizipation integriert Personen und befähigt sie, als unabhängige politische Individuen zu handeln.
Hannah Arendts Konzept des politischen Handelns¹ spielt im Kultur- und Kunstbereich eine tragende Rolle, indem dieses Handeln in andere gesellschaftliche Bereiche hineinwirkt und zu ihrer Entwicklung beiträgt. Versteht man den Begriff einer integrierten Kunstpraxis als Möglichkeitsform des interdisziplinären Zusammenwirkens unterschiedlicher Kulturen, kann daraus auch ein neues Politikverständnis entstehen. Dabei geht es darum, Wechselwirkungen und Abhängigkeiten in der Gesellschaft, die zu einer zunehmenden Abgrenzung führen, als Integrationschance zu sehen. Dafür ist eine Lösung von existierenden Begriffsdefinitionen notwendig, um sie in einem vernetzten und integrierten Sinn neu zu konstruieren.
Artur .Zmijewskis Essay „Angewandte Gesellschaftskunst“ unternahm den Versuch, im Zuge der 7. Berlin Biennale, eine kritische Auseinandersetzung über die gesellschaftliche Rolle von Kunstprojekten führen. Obwohl richtigerweise Normierungen des politisch Korrekten im institutionellen Kunstbetrieb diskutiert wurden, greift die Debatte zu kurz, weil sie bedauerlicherweise dem Bezugssystem „Kunst“ zu viel Raum gibt, auf Kosten einer übergreifenden gesellschaftlichen Perspektive. Weil es in diesem Sinne ein Missverständnis wäre, von “angewandter Gesellschaftskunst“ zu sprechen, prägte RG den Begriff (Re)Sozialisierung der Kunst.² Dieses Konzept schließt die gegenseitigen Wechselwirkungen zwischen Kunst und Gesellschaft ein. Re-Sozialisierung steht auch für die Forderung nach Freiräumen jenseits politischer Instrumentalisierung und etablierten Strukturen und Institutionen.
Mit dem Übergang von einem materiellen Kunstbegriff hin zu einem prozessorientierten Ansatz eröffnet sich die Möglichkeit für direkte Wirkungen der Kunst ins alltägliche Leben, verbunden mit der Chance, soziale Defizite zu vermindern. Integrierende Formen der Kooperation und Partizipation können die Formulierung von kulturellen und sozialen Werten unterstützen und bewusst machen, oder wie der in Großbritannien ansässige Forscher und Autor François Matarasso sagt: …raise questions, imagine alternatives, communicate experiences and share ideas.³

Politiken des öffentlichen Raumes
Jacques Rancière spricht davon, das Territorium des Gemeinsamen neu zu gestalten.⁴ Aus diesem Grund ist es wichtig, die politischen Möglichkeiten des Raumes zu analysieren und zu determinieren. Wenn die etablierten Zweckbestimmungen z. B. des urbanen Raumes in Frage gestellt werden, kann sich ein kritisches Potential entfalten.
Das Ziel künstlerischer Aktivitäten im öffentlichen Raum ist die Schaffung einer neuen Aufmerksamkeit für lokale Identitäten, die Anregung eines öffentlichen Dialogs, die Ausbildung eines Bewusstseins für Funktionen des öffentlichen Raumes, die Erforschung der Beziehungen zwischen persönlichen und gesellschaftlichen Interessen und die Entwicklung einer künstlerischen Praxis, welche gleichzeitig Forschung und Interaktion ist.
Die Aufgabe als Künstler ist es, Prozesse zu initiieren, zu moderieren und abzubilden. Frederic Jameson spricht von der Entwicklung einer Ästhetik, Theorie und Politik der kognitiven Kartographie.⁵ Sie impliziert, dass Künstler und Theoretiker Orientierungen im globalen gesellschaftlichen Raum vermitteln.
Diese Methode oszilliert zwischen sozialwissenschaftlicher Analyse und ästhetischer Umsetzung mit dem Ziel, kritisches Nachdenken über strukturelle Veränderungen anzuregen. Kernthemen sind Migration und Stadtentwicklung, Umweltbewusstsein, Sicherheit und die Rolle von Kunst in der Gesellschaft. Es geht um die Stärkung der öffentlichen Aufmerksamkeit für sozialpolitische Themen, die Vernetzung der Teilnehmer und Institutionen und die Rolle der Stadt als einen Ort für sozialen Dialog.
Gesellschaftliche Teilhabe, vor allem in den westlichen Post-Industriegesellschaften, findet vordergründig durch Konsum statt. Die Erosion gesellschaftlicher und politischer Institutionen führt in der Verbrauchergesellschaft zu einem Vertrauensverlust in demokratische Prozesse und zur Entstehung von Parallelwelten. Die vorkodierten Wertsysteme bestimmen weiterhin, den sozialen-, politischen-, medialen-, ökonomischen Raum. In einer entsolidarisierten Gesellschaft bieten sich für Künstler und Kulturschaffende Handlungsfelder, in denen sie sich mit Ausgeschlossenen solidarisieren und ein kritisches Bewusstsein vermitteln können.
Eine diskursive kulturelle Praxis kann dazu beitragen, gesellschaftliche Wertvorstellungen neu zu denken und weiterzuentwickeln. Dabei ist es wichtig, ästhetische Grundsätze mit ethischen, sozialen und ökologischen zu synchronisieren. Eine emanzipatorische Aufgabe liegt darin, bestehende Macht- und Institutionsstrukturen zu hinterfragen. Durch Partizipation und Vernetzung unterschiedlicher Akteure entsteht Identifikation mit übergreifenden Inhalten und neue Interessengruppen haben die Möglichkeit, sich zu formieren.

Ein kognitiver Kunstbegriff
Kunst ist weder ein Feigenblatt der Gesellschaft, noch eine Beilage. Vielmehr betrachten wir Kunst als ein Feld mit einer genauen Funktion, welche beinhaltet, dass sie kognitiv ist, der Erkenntnis dient und ein Element des Lernens enthält. In diesem Sinne spielt Kunst eine tragende Rolle, wenn es darum geht, den Herausforderungen der zeitgenössischen Gesellschaft zu begegnen. Wir sehen Verbindungslinien in die Bereiche Bildung, Sport, Umwelt und sozialer Dialog. Eine integrierte Kunstpraxis kann auch dazu beitragen, den Bereich Bildung zu transformieren und neue Wege des Lernens im Dialog mit anderen Disziplinen zu beschreiten. Der Schwerpunkt liegt auf prozessorientierten, dialogischen Formen, die Teilhabe und die Ausbildung sozialer Werte ermöglichen.
Im Bereich Kunst kann man deshalb von einem kognitiven Kunstbegriff sprechen, der empirische Methoden anwendet und Untersuchungsfelder mit dem Ziel der Erkenntnisgewinnung vereint. Soziologen sprechen beispielsweise von einer Kunst, welche die künstlerische Sozial- und Bewusstseinsforschung antreibt. Der Soziologe Karl-Siegbert Rehberg betont den katalysatorischen Wert ihres kritischen Potentials: „Was soziologische Künstler liefern, ist eine kühle, sozusagen entideologisierte Ideologiekritik, ein Durchschauen der Verdeckungsformeln und Machtinteressen durch das bloße Zeigen, eine Dekodierung von Selbstverständlichkeiten, deren Hintergründe wir zumeist nicht mehr bemerken. Das ist die Aufgabe jeder kritischen Analyse. Und Kunstprojekte wie diese, tragen dazu bei, sie in einen neuen Diskursraum zu übersetzen und als „Wissensressource“ fruchtbar zu machen.“⁶
Kunst und Kultur können die strukturellen gesellschaftlichen Aufgaben, die stets im globalen Kontext zu betrachten sind, nicht lösen. Sie können aber zu einem öffentlichen Problembewusstsein und durch individuelle und lokale Umsetzungen zu Lösungen beitragen. Es geht auch darum, durch eine interdisziplinäre Zusammenarbeit zu neuen Formen eines vernetzten Lernens und Wissensproduktion jenseits der definierten Bereiche zu gelangen. Daraus leiten sich Handlungsstrategien ab, die zur Entwicklung neuer Formen gesellschaftlicher Organisation anwendbar sind.

WiederabdruckDieser Text wurde zuerst veröffentlicht in: Milev, Yana (ed.): Design Anthropology, Peter Lang Publishing Group 2013.

1.) Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
2.) REINIGUNGSGESELLSCHAFT, The (Re)Socialisation of Art, available at www.reinigungsgesellschaft.de/projekte/_2009/resoc/theses%20and%20questions_en.pdf, accessed 20 August 2011.
3.) Matarasso, François, Re-thinking Cultural Policy, background paper to the conference Culture and the Policies of Change, Brussels, 6-7 September 2010.
4.) Rancière, Jacques, Das Unbehagen in der Ästhetik, Wien: Passagen Verlag, 2008, S. 32.
5.) Jameson, Fredric, Postmodernism & Cultural Theories, Shaanxi: Shaanxi Normal University Press, 1987.
6.) Rehberg, Karl-Siegbert, Arbeit und Konsum: Virtualität als Schicksal, 2008, verfügbar auf http://www.reinigungsgesellschaft.de/texte/RG-Konsum.pdf